58 P. 95 | Or. | 1899
after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
There was a contention by counsel for plaintiff at the argument that the legal title to this land did not pass out
And Chancellor Wendell, in Varick v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 167, 202 (19 Am. Dec. 571): “By a careful examination of the authorities., it will be found that there could be no
In Swift v. Mulkey, 14 Or. 64 (12 Pac. 76), Thayer, J., says : “ ‘The legal title draws after it the possession, and a right of entry is not barred unless there has been a disseisin, followed by an actual, open, notorious, and continuous adverse possession for the period of ten years next prior to the commencement of the action. To be adverse possession, it must be occupancy under a claim of ownership, though it need not be under color of title.’ The law presumes every person to be in the legal seisin and possession of the land to which he has a perfect and complete title; and this seisin and possession is coextensive with his right, and continues till he is ousted
The nest case relied upon to substantiate the doctrine is Hayes v. Martin, 45 Cal. 559. This was concerning a Spanish or Mexican grant, prior to the issuance of a patent by the United States government. The holder of such a grant, under the decisions of California, was entitled to the possession pending proceedings for a confirmation of title in the United States court, and could maintain ejectment prior to final confirmation. The statute of limitations, as it respects titles derived from Spain and Mexico, had been amended by the act of April, 1863, and the interpretation of the amendment was that, if such a title had been fully confirmed prior to its passage, an adverse possession of five years after confirmation would bar a recovery ; but, if title had not been so confirmed, then that five years from the date of its passage was allowed within which to commence the action, without reference to the subsequent confirmation : Mayor of San Jose, etc. v. Trimble, 41 Cal. 536. Now, in Hayes v. Martin, 45 Cal. 559, Rhodes, J., ih referring to this statute, said: “In Mayor, etc., v. Trimble, 41 Cal. 536, the proceedings for a confirmation of the title of the city were still pending, or, in other words, the title of the city had been confirmed, but there had been no final confirmation of the survey, nor had a patent issued, and it was held that the statute would run in favor of the party in the adverse possession.” Then he proceeds : “It is not requisite that a party who relies upon the statute should show that he claims title in hostility to the United States. He may admit title in the United. States, either with or without a claim on his part of the right to acquire the title from the United States ; and it is sufficient if he has such possession as .is required by the
Then followed the case of McManus v. O'Sullivan, 48 Cal. 7, concerning a title of the same nature. The United States, by act of congress, had relinquished to the City of San Francisco certain lands, in trust that the same should be disposed of or conveyed by the city to parties in bona fide actual possession at the time the act was passed. Neither party was claiming title derived from the city, but the purpose of the action was to establish a possessory title, and thereby determine the right to a conveyance from the city. That such was the nature of the title in litigation is disclosed by the opinion of the court. Wallace, C. J., says: “If we are to consider the case of the plaintiff as resting solely upon the prior possession of her intestate, and wholly disconnected with the decree of the circuit court, the order of the board, the act of the legislature, and the act of congress already referred to, it is plain that the possession of the defendants, if adverse in its character, was- sufficient, in point of mere duration of time, to bar the plaintiff of a recovery in this action; for their possession, such as it was, began in January, 1862, and this
The doctrine, however, is not applicable to these titles alone. It was applied in Manly v. Howlett, 55 Cal. 94,
The Missouri cases are more to the defendant’s purpose. Clemens v. Runckel, 34 Mo. 41 (84 Am. Dec. 69), appears to be exactly in point. The court there, speaking through Bates, J., says : “The defendant, and those under whom he claims, did not enter or hold under the plaintiff. They did not recognize his title. They had no privity with him. They do not appear even to have known of the existence of his title. They recognize the title in another person (the United States), who was supposed to be the proprietor; and as to the United States their possession was not hostile. But they did expect to acquire the title of the United States, believing themselves to have a right of pre-emption to the exclusion of all other persons, and a present right to the use and possession of the land.” In Gibson v. Chouteau’s Heirs, 39 Mo. 536, 589 — a subsequent case — the court said : “This possession [speaking of the possession under an equitable right] was not adverse to the United States, but would be considered as held under the government
The more recent cases of the Court of Civil Appeals in Texas seem also to support the defendant’s contention : Converse v. Ringer, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 54 (24 S. W. 705); Longley v. Warren, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 269 (33 S. W. 304). But it is doubtful if they are directly to the purpose. The first case cited asserts that “naked possession, in hostility to the claim of the true owner, is sufficient as a basis for the recovery under this statute,” and refers to Craig v. Cartwright, 65 Tex. 413, as authority. It will be found that case was based upon an act of February 5, 1841, which provides, in effect, that ten years of such peaceable possession and cultivation, use, or enjoyment thereof, without any evidence of title, shall give to such naked possessor full property preclusive of all other claims : Oldham & W. Dig. Tex. p. 300, article 1330. So that under this act it was not necessary that the person entering be more than a naked possessor in order to set the statute of limitations running ; in other words, if he remain in such possession for a period of more than ten years, he loses the character of naked possessor, and becomes the owner of the thing possessed. Another feature in that state is that a later statute provides that an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another, sets the statute of limitations running, so that the language employed is restrictive, and not as broad as the general rule. Hence it cannot lie said that the Texas authorities absolutely sustain the defendant’s contention.
It is inconceivable that a person who claims to have the fee simple title — the absolute and only existing title— and to have acquired it through adverse possession, could have obtained it without holding adversely to all others. The defendant does not now acknowledge title in the government, but says he has the title which it formerly held — the ultimate title, the one that plaintiff claims— and has deraigned from the government. Yet he pretends to have acquired it, while not only conceding and admitting, but asserting, that the government held it during the whole time that the statute was running. Such assertion is matter of record, for he contested the grant to the road company through the land department
Reversed .