ALTMAN v MERIDIAN TOWNSHIP
Docket No. 90316
Supreme Court of Michigan
June 8, 1992
Rehearing denied 440 Mich 1204
439 Mich 623
REFERENCES
Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planing §§ 163-168.
See the Index to Annotations under Maps and Plats; Subdivisions; Zoning.
The township board acted within its authority under the Subdivision Control Act and Arrowhead.
- The authority of local governing bodies to approve and disapprove proposed development plats is created and governed by the Subdivision Control Act. Section 182(4)(a) of the act provides that a plat that is isolated from or that isolates other lands from existing public streets is to be rejected unless suitable access is provided. In its common and ordinary usage, “isolated” may refer to a relatively remote or inaccessible place or area, even though there may be some access. In this case, it is fair usage to say that the proposed subdivision would be relatively isolated from existing public streets.
- The remedy for isolation is the provision of suitable access, i.e., appropriate to the given purpose, not any access or some access. The township board‘s ability to determine suitability flows naturally from § 182(4)(a) and clearly serves the stated legislative concerns relating to public safety, the orderly use of land, and proper ingress to and egress from lots. Thus, while Creekwood Lane is a public street and would provide some access to the outside world for the proposed subdivision, the township board was entitled to conclude that it would not provide suitable access under the circumstances. Therefore, § 182(4)(a) supports the board‘s disapproval of the plat.
- The township board‘s request that the developer construct a direct access route from the proposed subdivision across his own land, which was slated for later development, to the county road, does not conflict with Arrowhead. The required improvement is not outside the developer‘s property, nor would the required access road confer any special benefit on other persons or property without compensation or allocation of costs. Rather, it primarily would benefit the developer‘s property and would further his overall development plans. Nothing more has been asked of the developer than that he develop his property in a manner consistent with governing statutes, local regulations, and legitimate safety concerns.
Reversed.
Justice RILEY, joined by Justices BRICKLEY and MALLETT, dissenting, stated that the township lacked authority to reject
Section 182(4)(a) of the Subdivision Control Act provides for rejection by a governing body of a plat that is isolated from or that isolates other lands from existing public streets, unless suitable access is provided. In this case, the proposed plat not only has access to an existing public street currently used for vehicular travel, but was planned to conform with the township‘s policy of allowing single access routes for developments of fifty homes or less.
Authorities such as the township board have no inherent power to approve or reject a proposed development plat. Any power they do have is granted by the Legislature through the Subdivision Control Act. While proper zoning is a prerequisite to plat approval, a zoning plan is not a plat for purposes of the act. Because the governing body must act only within the limits of authority granted under the act, it must rely only on a plat submitted pursuant to the act, rather than on a plan submitted for rezoning purposes. In this case, the rejection of the plat was improper because it was not supported by the provisions of the Subdivision Control Act. Arrowhead does not control because the issue in that case did not involve whether an alteration could be required outside a plat, but, as in this case, on land owned by the developer and intended to be part of the same subdivision.
ZONING — SUBDIVISIONS — PLAT APPROVAL — TOWNSHIP BOARDS — SUBDIVISION CONTROL ACT.
In determining whether the plat of a proposed subdivision should be approved, a local governing body may reject the plat as being isolated from or isolating other lands from existing public streets, even though there is some access, where the access is not suitable, i.e., appropriate to the given purpose (
Fraser, Trebilcock, Davis & Foster, P.C. (by Donald A. Hines and Mark A. Bush), for the plaintiffs.
Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by William K. Fahey and Stephen J. Rhodes) and
Amici Curiae:
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe & Thomsen, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham and Eileen W. Wicklund), for Michigan Townships Association and Michigan Municipal League.
CAVANAGH, C.J. We address in this case the authority of a local governing body to disapprove a proposed subdivision plat pursuant to the Subdivision Control Act (SCA),
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 15, 1987, Meridian Township granted the developer plaintiffs’ request to rezone a fifty-three-acre parcel of property north of Haslett Road in Meridian Township for single-family, medium density residential development. The proposed subdivision plan submitted in connection with the rezoning provided for two access routes to Haslett Road. The first was an indirect access at the western end of the development, connecting
In any event, the developer submitted a preliminary plat for the first phase of the development, entitled Meadowbrook Estates, on March 2, 1988. This plat proposed construction of twenty-five new homes on an 8.8-acre parcel at the eastern end of the overall development area. For this initial phase of the development, access to Haslett Road was to be provided only through Creekwood Lane, and not through the direct boulevard access. As required by the SCA, the developer submitted the plat to the Ingham County Health Department, the Ingham County Drain Commission, and the Ingham County Road Commission, and obtained the necessary approvals. The road commission, however, imposed the condition, not challenged by the developer, that a direct access route to Haslett Road be built for hauling and construction purposes. The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission and the Haslett Public Schools also approved the plat.
The Meridian Township Board of Trustees, the final local authority with regard to plat approval, considered the proposed plat at its regular meeting of September 20, 1988, and disapproved it by a vote of five to one. At meetings on October 3 and November 22, 1988, the board amended the minutes of its September 20 meeting to specify the reasons for its disapproval of the plat and the key condition of approval, which were adopted by a vote of five to two, as follows:
(1) The subdivision is designed in such a way as to encourage use of Creekwood [Lane] by through traffic. Such a design is not consistent with Section 101-4.12(a) of the subdivision regulations, which states that streets shall be so arranged so as to discourage their use by through traffic.
(2) The alignment of Wood Knoll Drive provides sole access onto Creekwood [Lane], which requires egress onto Haslett Road at a point where there is less than 750 feet of sight distance — in violation of Section VII.B.1 of the County Road Commission Plat Procedures. It would be practical for the proprietor to provide access to Haslett Road farther to the east, where there is 750 feet of sight distance.
The developer filed suit to overturn the disapproval of his plat on November 3, 1988, contending that (1) the township board failed properly to approve or disapprove the plat within ninety days of filing, with reasons for disapproval and conditions for approval stated in writing, in accordance with
On June 25, 1991, the circuit court clarified its opinion as follows:
In the opinion granting summary disposition to Defendant (issued from the bench on January 25, 1989), this Court did, indeed, view Haslett Road as the existing public street and Creekwood [Lane] as not being “suitable access” to that public street.
The Court recognizes that Creekwood is literally, a public street itself, and that it provides some access to the outside world.
The issue is whether the legislature authorized a township to decide whether such a residential street provides “suitable” access. In this Court‘s
view the legislature did grant that authority, and the township may withhold permission to develop the plat until suitable access is provided.
We then granted leave to appeal, 439 Mich 868 (1991), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, finding ourselves in agreement with the reasoning of the circuit court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE TOWNSHIP BOARD‘S STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The authority of local governing bodies to approve and disapprove proposed subdivision plats is created and governed by the SCA.
No approving authority or agency having the power to approve or reject plats shall condition approval upon compliance with, or base a rejection upon, any requirement other than those included in [SCA §] 105.
Approval of preliminary and final plats shall be conditioned upon compliance with:
(a) The provisions of this act.
(b) Any ordinance or published rules of a municipality or county adopted to carry out the provisions of this act.
(c) Any published rules of a county drain commissioner, county road commission, or county plat
board adopted to carry out the provisions of this act.
In this case, the township board asserts three grounds for its rejection of the developer‘s proposed plat, one deriving from each quoted subsection. The board argues that its action is supported by (1) a “provision[] of this act,” namely,
We do not address the validity of the township board‘s reliance upon § 101-4.12(a) of the subdivision regulations, in view of the fact that neither the circuit court nor the Court of Appeals has passed on that issue, and we find that we need not address that issue in order to resolve this case. The three issues before this Court are the validity of
B. SCA § 182(4)(a)
Section 182(4)(a) of the SCA states:
The governing body shall . . . [r]eject a plat which is isolated from or which isolates other lands from existing public streets, unless suitable access is provided. [Emphasis added.]
The Court of Appeals held that § 182(4)(a)
does not apply to the instant situation since access to the subdivision is gained by Creekwood [Lane], an existing public street. Nor does the plat isolate any other lands from any public streets. [Slip op, p 4.]
This interpretation would preclude rejecting any plat on the basis of § 182(4)(a) unless it were totally isolated, without regard for the suitability of whatever minimal access to some public street is provided. The interpretation thus effectively rewrites § 182(4)(a) so as to eliminate the requirement of “suitable access.”5
While “isolated” generally connotes detachment
In any event, reading § 182(4)(a) as an integrated whole, it clearly provides that the remedy for “isolation” is to provide “suitable access.” Not just any access, or some access, but suitable access. It would contradict ordinary usage to deem any access, no matter how minimal or inconvenient, to automatically constitute suitable access. One standard dictionary defines “suitable” as “[a]ppropriate to a given purpose or occasion,” and offers such synonyms as “fit, . . . meet, proper, appropriate, apt, fitting, happy, [and] felicitous.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: New College Edition (1982), pp 1217, 508. “Suitable . . . implies ability to meet requirements related to a particular need or to an occasion. . . .” Id. at 508.
Under the Court of Appeals interpretation, if a plat starts out totally isolated from any public street, a township is free to reject the plat until
The Court of Appeals interpretation, in effect, rewrites § 182(4)(a) to read as follows:
The governing body shall . . . [r]eject a plat which is totally isolated from or which totally isolates other lands from any existing public street, unless some access is provided to any existing public street. [Emphasized words added.]
The effective excision of the term “suitable” from § 182(4)(a) violates, of course, the familiar principle of statutory construction that “[e]very word of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible.” Baker v General Motors Corp, 409 Mich 639, 665; 297 NW2d 387 (1980).
At the very least, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the meaning of § 182(4)(a) is open to serious question and cannot be resolved on the
The provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties, townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers granted to counties and townships by this constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this constitution. [Emphasis added.]
We just recently reaffirmed the importance of this principle of liberal construction. See Adams Outdoor Advertising v East Lansing, 439 Mich 209, 218, n 14; 483 NW2d 38 (1992). Furthermore, as we have held:
The primary and fundamental rule of constitutional or statutory construction is that the Court‘s duty is to ascertain the purpose and intent as expressed in the constitutional or legislative provision in question. Also, while intent must be inferred from the language used, it is not the meaning of the particular words only in the abstract or their strictly grammatical construction alone that governs. The words are to be applied to the subject matter and to the general scope of the provision, and they are to be considered in light of the general purpose sought to be accomplished or the evil sought to be remedied by the constitution or statute. [White v Ann Arbor, 406 Mich 554, 562; 281 NW2d 283 (1979).]
Thus, the township board‘s authority under § 182(4)(a) must be broadly and liberally construed in light of the stated legislative purposes of the
[T]o promote the public health, safety and general welfare; to further the orderly layout and use of land; . . . [and] to provide for proper ingress and egress to lots . . . .
The township board‘s authority to determine whether the access provided to a proposed subdivision is “suitable,” above and beyond the minimal existence of any access to any existing public street, flows naturally from § 182(4)(a) when that provision is interpreted in light of the principles set forth above. The township board‘s ability to ensure “suitability” of access clearly serves the stated legislative concerns relating to public safety, the orderly use of land, and proper ingress to and egress from lots.
In sum, we conclude that while Creekwood Lane is, technically, a public street and would provide some access to the outside world for the proposed subdivision, the township board was entitled to conclude that Creekwood Lane would not provide suitable access to the subdivision in light of all the circumstances, in particular the safety concerns regarding the Creekwood-Haslett intersection discussed more fully in part II(C). Therefore, § 182(4)(a) supports the township board‘s disapproval of the proposed plat.
C. ARROWHEAD
Finally, the condition for plat approval imposed by the township board in this case — that the devel-
In Arrowhead, the developer submitted for approval a subdivision plat adjoining Chilson Road, a public county road. A steep hill on Chilson Road threatened to create a hazardous sight obstruction for traffic entering and leaving the proposed subdivision by Navajo Trail, one of three planned entrances to the subdivision.7 The Livingston County Road Commission approved the plat subject to the condition that the developer remove the hill on Chilson Road and perform related regrading and resurfacing work to eliminate the sight obstruction. See id., 413 Mich 507-509. We stated the dispositive issue as follows:
Whether a county road commission has authority to require a subdivision developer to make improvements on a county road located entirely outside the platted subdivision as a condition precedent to plat approval . . . . [Id. at 510.]
We expressly emphasized two other crucially important factors in Arrowhead. First, we noted that conditioning plat approval on the developer‘s improvement of land totally outside his own property would exceed the authority of local governments under the SCA because “only the parcel or tract of land in which the proprietor has an ownership interest can be partitioned or divided by him . . . .” 413 Mich 517 (emphasis added). “[W]e think the Legislature cannot be said to have intended implicitly to extend the requirements of § 183(1)(b) to roads outside the subdivision which are not ‘required to be shown on a plat.‘” Id. at 518.
[N]owhere does there exist any statutory provision defining suitable standards governing cost allocation of off-site improvements. Apart from the constitutionality of the proposed exaction in this case, a question we neither reach nor decide, it is clear that it would be impermissible to impose the entire cost of an off-site improvement on a single subdivision developer where other persons or property would be specially benefited. [Id. at 519. Emphasis added.]
Significantly, this Court noted in Arrowhead that “under § 183(1)(b) the commission could have required that Arrowhead lay out Navajo Trail in a way which would locate its intersection with Chilson Road at a safe distance from the hazardous sight obstruction . . . .” 413 Mich 518 (emphasis added). This hypothetical condition bears a remarkable similarity to the condition that the township board has imposed in this case, which is essentially that the developer locate the main access road to his subdivision at a safe distance from the sight obstruction (the s-curve) on Haslett Road. The developer in this case has not been asked to remedy the sight obstruction on the county road itself, as was the developer in Arrowhead.
While the required access road would extend beyond the boundaries of the initial plat submitted by the developer, it does not constitute, as did the county road in Arrowhead, a road “outside the subdivision which [is] not ‘required to be shown on a plat.‘” 413 Mich 518. To the contrary, the required access road would traverse the developer‘s own property across the overall planned subdivision, which the developer himself has already slated for eventual platting and development.
In sum, nothing more has been asked of the developer in this case than that he develop his own property in a manner consistent with governing statutes, local regulations, and legitimate safety concerns. The duty to provide suitable access in accordance with such statutes and regulations rests with the developer. The township board‘s request in furtherance of that goal does
III. CONCLUSION
The courts cannot sit in judgment on the precise merits of the myriad discretionary and factbound decisions reached every day by democratically elected local governing bodies in the area of zoning and development. We can only review whether local governing bodies have discharged their powers in a manner consistent with applicable law. We find no basis for concluding that the township board has done otherwise in this case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
LEVIN, BOYLE, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, C.J.
RILEY, J. (dissenting). This case arises out of the rejection by defendants township and township
I dissent from my colleagues because
As conceded by the circuit judge, “Creekwood is literally, a public street itself, and . . . provides some access to the outside world.” The Court of Appeals also found that “§ 182(4) does not apply to the instant situation since access to the subdivision is gained by Creekwood Drive, an existing public street.” Id. at 4.
Twenty-five homes currently utilize Creekwood. Creekwood in fact is already equipped to accommodate an extension to a new subdivision by way of the stub street that was constructed as part of the
Furthermore, the finding that the defendants’ rejection of plaintiffs’ plat was unwarranted is consistent with a fair reading of the SCA and applicable Michigan case law. Approving authorities, such as defendant township board, have no inherent power to approve or reject a proposed development plat. Any power they do have is given by the Legislature, through the SCA.2 Section
Approval of preliminary and final plats shall be conditioned upon compliance with:
(a) The provisions of this act.
(b) Any ordinance or published rules of a municipality or county adopted to carry out the provisions of this act.
(c) Any published rules of a county drain commissioner, county road commission, or county plat board adopted to carry out the provisions of this act.
In the instant case, defendants argue that they assumed a secondary access to Haslett Road would be built because it was included in plaintiffs’ larger plan submitted with their rezoning request. Proper zoning is a prerequisite to plat approval. Oakland Court v York Twp, 128 Mich App 199, 201; 339 NW2d 873 (1983). A zoning plan is not, however, a plat for purposes of the SCA. Because the governing body must act only within the limits of authority given to it by the sca, it must rely only upon a plat submitted pursuant to the SCA,
Our decision in Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston Co Road Comm, 413 Mich 505; 322 NW2d 702 (1982), does not control the issue in the instant case. Whether or not an alteration could be required outside the plat, but on land owned by the developer and intended to be part of the same subdivision, was not at issue in Arrowhead. The road commission in Arrowhead required that the developer make several alterations to his plat before approval would be granted. Of all the requirements, only the one which involved land outside the submitted plat was stricken by this Court as unwarranted. The commission could have required the developer to relocate Navajo Trail, a road entirely within the boundaries of the proposed plat. 413 Mich 518. Improvements upon the county road which abutted the developer‘s property could not be required, for they were entirely outside the land to be partitioned and divided by the developer. Id.
Other cases cited by the parties do not support a contrary result. The pre-Arrowhead decision of Carlson v City of Troy5 reflects simply that a governing body has no authority to reject a plat
Similarly, in Eversdyk v Wyoming City Council6 and Eyde Construction Co v Meridian Charter Twp,7 the grounds upon which the approving authorities based their rejection of the developers’ proposed plats were not supported by the sca. In Eversdyk,8 the city council rejected the plat because the city planned to rezone the area to a designation which would be incompatible with the developer‘s proposed development. While the SCA allows the governing authority to reject a plat on the basis of existing and published rules, rejection on the basis of proposed rules which are not yet operative was improper.
In Eyde,9 the township attempted to require that the developer dedicate recreation land to the township in order to have the plat approved. Such authority is not expressed in the sca, nor could it be fairly implied. The writ of mandamus ordering the township to remove the condition was therefore affirmed.
Thus with all respect to my colleagues, I would hold that defendants’ rejection of plaintiffs’ proposed plat was not authorized by the powers conferred upon it by the sca. I would therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
BRICKLEY and MALLETT, JJ., concurred with RILEY, J.
Notes
The dissent relies upon the township‘s purported “policy of allowing single accesses to developments of fifty homes or less . . . .” Post, p 644. Such a general policy could not, however, reasonably operate to preclude the township board from assessing the particular safe-access and other issues posed by each development. Equally untenable is the suggestion that the township‘s prior consent to the construction of the existing Wood Knoll Drive stub street adjoining Creekwood Lane constituted some sort of irrevocable advance consent to the development of any new subdivisions seeking to use that stub street for access. See post, pp 643-644. The township was not under any legal requirement, “at the time the Creekwood subdivision was developed,” post, p 644, to give advance notice of what hypothetical future subdivisions adjoining Creekwood Lane it might approve or disapprove, and on what grounds. 90 Mich App 543; 282 NW2d 387 (1979).
All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. 167 Mich App 64; 421 NW2d 574 (1988).
Because the governing body must act only within the limits of authority given to it by the sca, it must rely only upon a plat submitted pursuant to the sca, rather than a plan submitted for rezoning purposes. [Post, pp 645-646.]
Obviously, it is the plat that is submitted that either must be approved or disapproved, with appropriate conditions, by the local governing body under the SCA. But we are aware of no authority, and the dissent cites none, that would preclude the local governing body from considering the full context of the submitted plat and any available, competent evidence bearing upon the plat, including related rezoning plans, in reaching an informed decision to approve or disapprove the plat, as long as the governing body acts in full accordance with the sca and any other applicable laws. See n 6 supra.