17 Barb. 276 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1853
The verdict of a jury will not be set aside for misdirection of the judge if, from the evidence in the cause, this court see the result would have been the same, whether the objectionable directions had been given or not; or where the evidence in the cause warrants the verdict. (Depeyster v. Columbian Insurance Co., 2 Caines’ R. 85. Dean v. Hewit, 5 Wend. 257. Dole v. Lyon, 10 John. R. 447. Jackson v. Timmerman, 12 Wend. 299.)
The facts in this case as established by the evidence are the following. In 1836, Mr. John Mason, upon the death of one of his sons, cancelled á will, which he had previously made, and which had been drawn by and deposited with "Vice Chancellor McCoun. At the time he cancelled that will, Mr. Mason told Vice Chancellor McCoun he would at -some future day call and get him to draw another will for him. Subsequently to this, upon various occasions, and before the spring of 1839, in casual conversations with Vice Chancellor McCoun, Mr. Mason alluded to the subject of having Vice Chancellor McCoun draw a will for him; to which Mr'. McCoun always in substance replied, Whenever you desire it to be done call at my office, where you will find me of evenings and I will attend to it for you.” During this same period Mr. Mason had several conversations with a friend and relative of his, Mr. John Gr. Jones; in which the litigation upon the Lorillard will, its result, and the difficulty of making a will that would stand legal tests, were the topics of conversation. In some of these Conversations Mr. Jones stated that “ the revised statutes made a good enough will for any man; that he (Jones) had made his will according to the provisions" of the revised statutes as near as it could be made.” Mr. Mason observed, “ He thought a person might in a preamble to his will
Here was Mr. Mason, in the full possession of his intellect, conscious that he might die at any moment, and that he must die in a few hours at the farthest, and that no human means could prolong his life, conversing with the man of all others to whom he would confide the drawing of his will, and yet he did not allude to the subject of a will. Would he have thus acted unless at that time, from mature deliberation, he had determined to die without a will % I think he would not. At this time, as late as the 22d, Mr. Mason could lie upon his back with his head raised only yvith his pillows, and there had been no wandering of his mind: he had not talked incoherently; he had not spoken of things and objects as being present which were not there; he had in all respects, under every circumstance, down to and includ
This will, only appointing executors, must have gone into the hands of the family on the 23d, and must also have then gone
During the night of the 25th, the evidence establishes that Mr. Mason had a continuous paroxysm of pain; that a part of the time he was speechless, and did not know what was occurring ;. that “ they had to rub him with, brandy to bring him to ;” that Dr. Berger alongside of the bed, in tones sufficiently loud to have been heard by Mr. Mason had he been sensible, stated to Mr. Isaac Jones, “ it was useless to give Mr. Mason any thing; that all that could be done, was to let him be as quiet as he could.” On the morning of the 26th of September, the Messrs. Jones, according to appointment, called at Mr. Strong’s
The condition of Mr. Mason physically and mentally on that morning as described by the witnesses, and in the order of time spoken of, was as follows: “ Mary Grillan was in the room early in the next morning (2-6th) at 6 or half past 6, or it might have been earlier; he was half sitting up in bed against a chair be
“ I read the will through without pausing; and having done so, I asked Mr. Mason in reference to the whole, and not to any particular part of it; whether he understood' it, to which he answered that he did. I then asked him if it was correct; he said it was ; and in answer to one of these questions, I am not sure which, but think it was the first, he said, perfectly.” “I cannot charge my mind with the precise words, [he used in answer to the question, ‘ was it correct,’] but it was either yes, or some other expression tantamount to that, conveying an unqualified assent to it.” “Immediately, [after the will was read,] Mr. Mason directed a large book, to which he pointed, to be brought and laid before him, and directed, as I well recollect, the particular
Mary Murphey testified, 11 When she was going down stairs for a drink for Mr. Mason, she saw two gentlemen coming up stairs.” “ One of them had a paper in his hands.” “ She went to the kitchen to the cook, [to prepare the drink ;] she was about twenty minutes going down, waiting for the drink; and as she was returning, she met the gentleman coming down, who went up with a paper in his hand, returning down stairs; he went out of the front door; as she got to Mr. Mason’s door, Mrs. Jones came out, took the drink and went back into the room, and shut the door, leaving the witness in the entry. • Mrs. Jones said nothing.” “ A few minutes after this, she heard of Mr. Mason’s death. Mrs. Jones told her he was dead.” This witness laid him out. Ellen Graham testified, “ She was in the parlor of young John Mason, over the street door, and heard the lawyer (Mr. Strong) go out. The carriage was then at the gate; I placed young John in the carriage; when she came back met Mr. George and Mrs. Rebecca Jones on the stairs, who told her Mr. Mason was dead; this was but a few moments after the lawyer left; I should think not more than 15, not much more anyhow.” Catherine Riley testified, “ On the day Mr. Mason died she furnished a drink in the kitchen ; handed it to Mary Murphy, who came down in a hurry for it; heard of his death in less than an hour after this, from the nurse; about an hour between her going up with the drink and her hearing of Mr. Mason’s death.”
The evidence in the case establishes the following facts : Mr. Mason was in the perfect possession of his intellect, down to and including the 22d of September, 1839. As early as the 10th or 12th of September, he was conscious that he must die soon thereafter, and that he might die at any moment; the subject of making a will was thought of by him, and down to and including the 22d, he had determined not to make a will. From the 22d down to the afternoon of the 25th, his body and mind rapidly decayed.
The only remaining question of fact is, whether Mr. Mason, notwithstanding all the foregoing established facts, was, during the twenty minutes Mr. Strong was reading the will, and the time Mr. Mason was signing and acknowledging it, restored to the possession of a disposing mind, memory and understanding; for if he was, the will is good. The testimony of Mr. Strong, while it shows the presence of approaching death, making rapidity of action on the part of Mr. Strong necessary, states facts, which to an intelligent mind, not cognizant of the occurences of the previous twenty-four hours, were consistent with the possession by Mr. Mason of disposing mind and memory. Yet, those facts aire not inconsistent with the mechanical performance by Mr. Mason of habitual business acts, in the absence of mental direction. The jury, by their verdict, found the existence of the latter fact. In my judgment, the evidence fully justifies such conclusion. Ho direction of a court could as strongly indicate the result the jury arrived at, as the simple statement of the evidence in the chronological order of the events.
The motion for, a new trial should be denied with costs.
This controversy, in one form or another, has been pending more than thirteen years. The will, which is the source and subject of it, was, though not without hesitation, as his opinion shows, finally admitted to probate by the late surrogate in 1840; a decision six years afterwards declai’ed to be erroneous, and reversed by the supreme court. The reversal being founded on a question of fact, a trial by jury became necessary, and was ordered accordingly. Having resulted unfavorably to the alleged will, a motion is now made for a new trial. It is made on the part of the Messrs. Jones and others claiming under the instrument, and alleging it to be the will of John Mason. The jury, under the charge of the judge, upon the evidence, gave their verdict against the instrument, declaring, in substance, that it was executed “ without knowledge,” and was not the will of the alleged testator. And the question now is, could they, or could any other twelve impartial men, on the case presented, or on any case likely to be presented, have arrived, or be likely to arrive, at any different or more favorable result? If not, a new trial would not only be an idle, but, considering the long litigation already encountered, an unjustifiable, vexatious and expensive ceremony. One general term of the supreme court, as we have seen, has already decided, and the decision has been neither reversed nor appealed from, that upon the evidence presented before the surrogate, and returned to the judges at that term, the instrument in their opinion was not sufficiently proved to be the will of John Mason. On the jury trial which followed, nearly all the matters previously proved, certainly all the matters of any importance, were again given in evidence. Upon them, and the additional proofs, which are not pretended to have strengthened the case of the will, the jury found not only negatively that the instrument in question was not sufficiently proved; but affirmatively that it was not the will of John Mason. What ground is there then, or according to the usual practice of the court can there be, for what, if granted, must virtually be a third or rather a fourth trial of the same issue ? The counsel for the supporters of the alleged will rests his motion mainly on the assumption, which he has endeavored to main
Assuming that Mr. Mason, laboring himself under a mortal paroxysm, on the instant after listening for the first time to one continuous rapid reading of a long special testamentary instrument, by a lawyer out of breath, said ever so distinctly that he “ perfectly understood” its contents, he obviously uttered an impossibility, and demonstrated, as it seems to me, by the most conclusive evidence, his incapacity.to understand it at all. ¡No man, I may say no lawyer, after such a reading of such an instrument, (never having perused a previous draft,) could say he understood it perfectly, unless from a blind impulse of disordered sanity. The jury to whom it was read, and read deliberately, and who were the proper judges of this question, and had a right to act on their own knowledge of the ordinary powers of, the human intellect have in effect said that such an observation by Mr. Mason, if made, was in their view conclusive evidence that the dying man in making it, although still retaining to some extent the power of speech, in fact, as Dr .Van ¡Rensselaer testifies, knew not what he said. Swinborne, (vol. 1, p. 189,) speaking of wills made “ at the very- point of death,” and where the party “ doth not of his own accord make or declare his testament, but at interrogation of some other, demanding of him whether, &c., answereth yea, or I do so,” says they are attended with difficulty. In some cases it is “ to be presumed that the testator did answer yéa, rather to deliver himself of the importunity of the demandant, than upon devotion or intent to make his will; because it is for the most part painful and grievous to those that be in that extremity, to speak, or be demanded any question; and, therefore; are ready to answer yea to any question almost, that they may be quiet: which advantage crafty and covetous persons knowing very well are then most busy, and do labor with tooth and nail to procure the sick person to yield to their demands,” &c. Such an instrument, where the sick person merely yields to importunity, “being then passing to
My conclusion is, that this motion for a, new trial should be denied, and that a judgment pursuant to the revised statutes should be entered, declaring that the paper propounded as a -.will is not the will of John Mason, and ordering that the record
Mitchell, Roosevelt and Morris, Justices.]
Mitchell, P. J., dissented.
New trial denied.