*564 OPINION
In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiffs appeal the dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of their complaints alleging that the defendants’ advertising is responsible for the underage, and therefore illegal, purchase of alcoholic beverages by the plaintiffs’ minor children.
See Alston v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co.,
No. Civ. 05-72629, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 31324,
The plaintiffs in these two eases are parents of minor children. The defendants are domestic manufacturers and importers of alcoholic beverages and the Beer Institute, a trade association. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ advertising is responsible for the illegal (underage) purchase of alcoholic beverages by minor children, and that plaintiffs’ own minor children have been subject to the defendants’ advertising campaigns. Plaintiffs do not, hоwever, allege, admit, or plead any facts tending to demonstrate that their own minor children, or any particular minor children, have actually purchased any such alcohol. These plaintiff parents seek to recover money allegedly spent on рurchases of alcoholic beverages by minor children and to enjoin further advertising.
See Alston
at *1;
Eisenberg
at *2. In considering these claims, both of the district сourts determined that their respective plaintiffs could not demonstrate injury or causation for any of their claims, and concludеd that the plaintiffs had failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted. Neither of the district courts discussed standing, even thоugh other courts presented with virtually identical claims have done so.
See, e.g., Hakki v. Zima Co.,
No. 03-9183,
“Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even [if] the parties are prepared to concede it.... When the lower federal court lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on аppeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
The plaintiffs allege two kinds of injury, economic injury and injury to their parental rights, but this second claim of injury is specious. As the district court explained in Eisenberg-.
*565 This Court is aware of no legal authority that would support restriction of a private party’s freedom of speech and expression under the theory that the expressed ideas interfere with a parent’s right to make deсisions regarding their children’s upbringing. Parents have a right to make fundamental decisions about a child’s upbringing, but they have no legal right to prevent other private parties from attempting to influence their children.'
See Eisenberg
at *16 (noting that “[a]ll of the cited cases dealing with an interference with parental rights involve state actors”);
see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform,
Nor do these сomplaints adequately plead any economic injury, principally because these plaintiffs have not alleged that their children have purchased any alcohol—that is, these plaintiffs have not alleged that they have suffered any economic injury. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ complaints do not allege a legal “injury in fact” based on this theory.
It may be, as plaintiffs contend, that they could overcome this deficiency if they were permitted to amend their complaints. But even if that were the case, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they have standing because they cannot show causation or redressability.
See Alston
at *3, 9;
Eisenberg
at *13-14, 16. As the plaintiffs’ complаints acknowledge, laws in both forum states protect against the underage consumption of alcohol—both the sale of alcohol to and the purchase of alcohol by a minor are unquestionably illegal. Therefore, the causal connection between the defendants’ advertising and the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is broken by the intervening criminal acts of the third-party sellers and the third-party, underage purchasers.
See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
The plaintiffs not only cannot demonstrate causation, they cannot articulate a viable remedy. The plaintiffs’ most obvious remedy would be to recover from then-children the money those children converted from the plaintiffs (i.e., parents) in order to violate the law prohibiting underage purchase of alcohol. A second obvious remedy would be to recover money from the retailers who sold alcohol to minors in violation of the law. The corresponding injunсtive remedy would be the rigorous enforcement of the existing laws against the purchase of alcohol by minors. The plaintiffs, of course, cannot obtain these remedies through this litigation against these named defendants.
In any event, if outlawing the actual sale and purchase is insufficient to remedy the alleged injuries (which is the premise underlying the plaintiffs’ theories), then outlawing mere advertising must be insuffi *566 cient as well. Consequently, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate redressability. If these plaintiffs are convinced that alcohol advertising (i.e., First Amеndment commercial speech) should be outlawed, then the means must be by legislation or constitutional amendment, not by judicial fiat.
Fоr the foregoing reasons, we hold that the plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their claims in federal court. Accordingly, we VACATE the orders of the district courts and REMAND these cases to the district courts with instructions to DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction.