184 Ind. 565 | Ind. | 1914
Lead Opinion
Action by appellee against appellant, and others, to quiet title. There was a trial by the court, with special finding of facts, and conclusion of law. It is contended that the court erred in its legal conclusion. Luke Walters died testate on March 24, 1865. His will, was executed on March 7, 1865. The second item makes certain provisions for the widow. The third item reads as follows:
“I give and bequeath to my son, Francis M. Walters, during his natural life and after his death to his children surviving him in fee simple the following tract of land in the county and state aforesaid to wit: The west half of the northeast quarter of section thirty in township 7 north of range eight, west, containing eighty acres.”
The fourth item devises 80 acres to decedent’s daughter Mary Baker by the same language used in item three. The fifth item devises the residue of the land to four sons and a daughter, without any intervening life estate. The rights of the parties here depend upon the construction of item three of the will. When the will was executed and probated, Francis M. Walters, named in item three, was married and had two children, appellee William R. Walters, and Nancy Walters, who married one Luther Alsman, and was the mother of appellant. She died intestate in 1895, leaving appellant as her sole descendant. After the death .of testator said Francis had four other children born to him, viz., Permelia, Eliza, Luther and Luke. The latter died in infancy. Luther died intestate, unmarried and without issue, in 1898. Eliza died intestate, unmarried and without issue
The cases cited discuss the rules of construction to which we have referred. These rules are not mere arbitrary formalities. They have been formulated to aid in the ascertainment of the testator’s true intent and prevent its subversion by ascribing a meaning to a word, perhaps carelessly used, which conflicts with the general intent of the testator. Aspey v. Lewis, supra. They are the product of the wisdom and experience of the ages in seeking amid ambiguous phrases, the intent of those engaged in the serious and solemn business of making a final disposition of property by will. When the will herei was made the testator knew that his son Francis might live as long as he actually did — 44 years. He knew that of the children then born, and that might' thereafter be born, no one might survive Francis, in which ease nothing would pass by item three to testator’s grandchildren or their descendants, if appellee’s theory be eorrreet. It is scarcely conceivable that the testator entertained such intent. It must be presumed that a rational, normal person in making such a will as this would have tender and just regard for dependent grandchildren who were manifestly objects of his bounty. Aspey v. Lewis,
On appellant’s theory titles vested conditionally and divested on the death of each of the five children of the first taker who died before Francis, until finally only appellee was left. The practical effect of such theory is to constitute the deceased children of Francis mere conduits for the transmission of a fee simple title that could vest absolutely only on the condition that some child should survive the life tenant. For practical purposes the title might , as well be in abeyance — a thing abhorred by the common law. Nothing in this will warrants the imputation to testator of an intent to make the fee simple title of this land a grand prize to the victor in his grandchildren’s race with death. The mere definition of a single word or the position of a pronoun ought not alone to pursuade a court that a testator’s purpose was devoid of reason, prudence and affection- when making a final disposition of his property among his grandchildren. Appellee relies especially on Corey v. Springer (1894), 138 Ind. 506, 37 N. E. 322. Whether the doctrines declared in that ease can be reconciled with those declared in the cases to which we have referred, we
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
Counsel suggest the adoption here of the rule recognized in recent English decisions, notwithstand- ■ ing its conflict with that recognized by this court for decades. See Aldred v. Sylvester, supra. Had this court never before considered the question, we should feel constrained to examine the decisions
Where, therefore, a will is presented that is ambiguous, and the intention of the testator is clouded by apparently conflicting expressions, courts have resorted to rules of construction which had their origin in deductions from the observed uniformity of testator’s intentions, and the expression thereof in writing their wills. From experience it was observed that testators,' in the use of words of postponement usually had in mind only the actual time of enjoyment of the gift, and not its vesting; that deferred vesting often resulted in public inconvenience, and in injury to the beneficiary; that resort to postponed vesting was unusual except for special cause, and consequently, unless the intent to defer the vesting is. clearly manifested, the testator must be deemed, in the use of words of postponement, to have referred only to the time of enjoyment. McArthur v. Scott (1885), 113 U. S. 340, 378, 5 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 1015. The rule, in its origin, was in our opinion supported by sound reason, but if
Counsel for appellee cite Coveny v. McLaughlin (1889), 148 Mass. 576, 20 N. E. 165, and a great many Massachusetts cases which are claimed to support their contention here. It would unduly lengthen this opinion to set out the substance, even, of the eases cited. Should it be concluded that Massachusetts courts are not in full accord with the rules so long recognized here, we would doubt the propriety, at this late date, of modifying them materially. However, we call attention to two recent decisions of that tribunal which is justly held in the highest esteem by all courts. In Whitman v. Huefner (1915), 221 Mass. 265, 108 N. E. 1054, the testator devised his estate to trustees in trust, to pay the income thereof, and, if necessary, portions of the principal, to his widow, during life. This provision followed: “and upon her decease to pay over * * * to my children and the issue of any deceased, child to take by right of representation the share the parent would have taken, if living, to have and to hold the saíne to them and their heirs.” The widow and three children survived testator. One child died intestate without issue in the widow’s lifetime, leaving his wife surviving. Another child, Alice, married and had a child, but died in the testator’s widow’s lifetime, leaving a husband and the child, surviving. This child died, at the age of four years, in 1905. Testator’s widow died in 1914. The remaining one of testator’s children survived his widow. In holding
This will shows, as we view it, that the testator did not contemplate partial intestacy;, that the words “I give * * * to his children” the land in controversy, indicated the testator’s intention to vest the estate in the children when the will took effect, and not at the life tenant’s death; that the use of the words “fee simple”, following the same language concededly used in devising a fee simple absolute, denotes the devise of an absolute, rather than a contingent fee. Against this is the phrase “surviving him” on which appellee bases his claim. Aside from any question of words of survivorship involving a double meaning — postponement of en
Note. — Reported in 106 N. E. 879; 111 N. E. 921. As to the rules of construction of testamentary writings, see 89 Am. St. 488. As to the time to which words of survivorship refer in a devise or bequest of a remainder after a life estate, see 14 Ann. Cas. 706. See, also, under (2) 40 Cyc 1475, 1477; (3) 40 Cyc 1449; (4) 16 Cyc 601; (5) 40 Cyc 1413; (6) 40 Cyc 1666, 1667; (7) 40 Cyc 1409; (8) 40 Cyc 1667, 1674; (9) 4 C. J. 642; 3 Cyc 219; (10) 40 Cyc 1411.