324 Mass. 472 | Mass. | 1949
The plaintiff brings this bill to compel specific performance of an alleged contract for the sale of certain real estate in Revere. From a final decree ordering specific performance the defendant appeals.
The evidence is reported and the judge made a report of the material facts. Concerning the facts there is virtually no dispute. We summarize them as follows: The defendant owned lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 on Revere Street in the city of Revere. At some time during the summer of 1947 the plaintiff made to the defendant through its mayor an offer in writing to purchase these lots for the sum of $900. On December 23,1947, the mayor submitted to the city council
On March 1, 1948, the city council voted to rescind their order of December 30, 1947, and this action was approved by the mayor on March 9. On March 10 an attested copy of the vote of rescission was sent by the city clerk to the plaintiff.
In the case at bar the vote of the council on December 30, 1947, did not in itself constitute an acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer. As in the Dunham case, discussed above, it was intended merely as authority to the city solicitor to execute a deed, and it contemplated the deed as the only contract which the defendant was to execute with the plaintiff. We have not overlooked the fact that the plaintiff was notified of the vote by the city clerk in his letter of January 5, 1948, but that, we think, did not amount to an acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer by the defendant. It was merely to inform the plaintiff of the action taken by the council to the end that he might communicate with the city solicitor and consummate the transaction. See Benton v. Springfield Young Men’s Christian Association, 170 Mass. 534, 537. The effect of the vote was not enlarged because the letter stated that the bid had been “ordered granted” by the council. The clerk in his letter was referring to the action taken by the council, and what they did as disclosed by their vote, rather than the clerk’s characterization of what they did, must control. The vote and the letter were initiatory steps and did not bind the defendant to a contract to sell the land in question.
Decree reversed with costs.
Pursuant to a request by the plaintiff’s president the city clerk on February 11, 1948, delivered to him an attested copy of the city council's order of December 30, 1947.
The mayor was not the same person who had recommended the sale, a new mayor and city council having taken office on January 5, 1948.