OPINION
After over twelve hours of heavy drinking, appellant Oscar Alpiak was positioned with a shotgun on the strand between Old Karluk and New Karluk in the early morning hours of August 21, 1977. Alpiak’s cousin, Theodore Ambrosia, and Ambrosia’s fiancee, Eunice Naumoff, were walking along the trail toward New Karluk at about 2:30 a. m. Suddenly, Alpiak came toward the couple and shot Ambrosia in the upper right quadrant of his chest. Alpiak told Ambrosia, “I should just finish you off.” Naumoff struggled with Alpiak over the *665 gun but he prevailed and forced her at gun point to accompany him to his house and' to have sexual intercourse with him. In the meantime, Ambrosia, who had been abandoned, drowned in a nearby tidal area.
After pleading guilty to manslaughter in violation of AS 11.15.040, 1 Alpiak was sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment with a recommendation that he receive alcoholism treatment. Alpiak complains that the superior court’s sentence is excessive because of the court’s failure to give proper weight to the goal of rehabilitation.
At the time of sentencing, Alpiak was 23 years old and had no previous convictions. The superior court had before it both a presentence report and a psychiatric evaluation. Both documents noted that Alpiak has had a severe drinking problem for the past several years, and both suggested that the court recommend treatment for Alp-iak’s alcoholism. In sentencing Alpiak to a term of ten years imprisonment, the superi- or court specifically recommended that Alp-iak be given alcoholism treatment.
In
Capwell v. State,
This does not end our inquiry, however, since we must decide not only whether weight was given to the goal of rehabilitation but whether the weight given was sufficient. In making this determination, we apply the standard of review for sentence appeals which is whether the trial court’s imposition of sentence was “clearly mistaken.”
Clearly v. State,
Although the sentencing court recognized the need to provide treatment for Alpiak’s alcohol problem, it also gave weight to the gravity of the offense. In
Creed v. State,
Although Creed had no prior criminal convictions, we have frequently held that violent crimes involving physical injury to innocent people are to be regarded as our most serious offenses and are not to be treated lightly. 4 (footnote omitted)
Like Creed, Alpiak had no prior convictions. Creed had a history of drug dependence and had ingested alcohol and drugs on the eve *666 ning of his crimes; 5 similarly, Alpiak had a history of chronic alcoholism and had been drinking heavily prior to shooting Ambrosia. Furthermore, because of Alpiak’s actions an innocent person died — a result even more serious than the consequences of the injuries inflicted by Creed. Given these factors, we think the superior court properly concluded that the nature of Alpiak’s crime called for significant sanctions. 6
The crime of manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of 20 years. 7 Upon review of the record, we do not believe the superior court was clearly mistaken in imposing 10 years incarceration with a recommendation of alcoholism treatment. We are not persuaded that the sentence is excessive or that the superior court failed to give proper weight to rehabilitation in shaping the sentence.
Affirmed.
Notes
. AS 11.15.040 provides:
Manslaughter. Except as provided in [AS 11.15.010-030], a person who unlawfully kills another is guilty of manslaughter, and is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years.
. The superior court, after recognizing that rehabilitation was one of the criteria articulated in
State v. Chaney,
The trial court need not recite the goals of sentencing as long as it is clear that it has considered those goals.
.
State v. Chaney, 477
P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
See Parks v. State,
.
Ames v. State,
.
Creed v. State,
. In
Abraham
v.
State,
We are of the further belief that a sentence of 1-year confinement for the taking of a human life in a most brutal manner does not serve to effectuate the goals of deterrence and respect for the laws of Alaska.
The superior court, in sentencing Alpiak, referred to Abraham and determined that the need for significant sanctions was an important consideration in this case because a homicide had been committed.
See also Sumabat v. State,
.See note 1, supra.
