Appellant brought this action to enjoin the District Director from “collecting or attempting to collect or enforce” a tax lien, covering federal excise (wag
Noting that the courts below had misinterpreted its decision in the Nut Margarine case, the Supreme Court again considered the applicability of § 7421 (a) in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., supra. It is now too plain for doubt that the statute operates as a jurisdictional bar to a suit for injunctive relief unless it is clearly shown that (1) “under the most liberal view of the law and facts, the United States cannot establish its claim * * * ”; and, (2) the taxpayer has no available remedy at law. Supra, 370 U.S. p. 7, 82 S.Ct. p. 1129.
The allegations of the instant complaint are to the effect that appellant was not engaged in any business made subject to the wagering tax assessed; that he did not hold a special occupational stamp to engage in such business and could not, therefore, be liable for the occupational tax assessed; and, that the assessments are based upon assumed facts and estimated amounts, and aré therefore arbitrary, capricious and wholly void. The assessment of the tax is, of course, presumptively correct and in order to establish federal court jurisdiction for injunctive relief, more is required than bare allegations of illegality, even though such allegations may ultimately be sustained. See: Licavoli v. Nixon, 6 Cir.,
In this posture of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the adequacy of appellant’s legal remedy under the so-called pay-and-sue statute. See: 28 U.S. C. § 1346(a) (1). But it is not inappropriate to observe, however, that the “excise tax assessments may be divisible into a tax on each transaction or event, so that the full-payment rule would probably require no more than payment of a small amount.” Flora v. United States,
Affirmed.
