274 Conn. 449 | Conn. | 2005
Opinion
This case involves an appeal by the plaintiff, Maria Almada, from the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of the named defendant, Wausau Business Insurance Company (Wausau),
The record discloses the following undisputed facts. The plaintiffs husband, Jose Almada, died in 1972 as a result of injuries he had sustained in the course of his employment at Glass Container Corporation (Glass). Beginning that year through December, 1999, Wausau, the third party administrator for Glass’ workers’ compensation claims, paid the plaintiff dependent’s benefits in the amount of $95 per week.
In support of its claim that the exclusivity provision of the act barred the action in DeOliveira, the defendant insurer claimed that “the commission’s jurisdiction is not limited to claims for injuries that ultimately are compensable, but extends to alleged acts of misconduct in the course of workers’ compensation proceedings. Specifically, it contend [ed] that the act provides a remedy for misconduct related to the handling of claims and thereby reflects a legislative intent that the remedy for delayed payment, even if vexatious, remain within the purview of the workers’ compensation scheme. The defendant further contended] that employees are not entitled to redress in tort for every injury either that is not compensable or for which compensation is inadequate under the act.” Id., 495. We agreed with the defendant, concluding that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim. Id., 501.
In light of our decision in DeOliveira, we thereafter asked the parties in the present appeal to submit supplemental briefs on the question of whether the plaintiffs appeal is governed by our decision in DeOliveira. The plaintiff claims that the exclusivity of the act is not jurisdictional and, therefore, that Wausau has waived appellate review of that issue by its failure to raise the exclusivity provision as a special defense.
Wausau responds that the decision in this case is controlled by DeOliveira because: (1) that case establishes that, in light of the exclusivity provision of the act, Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for tortious processing of a workers’ compensation claim; (2) “just as [the] claimed psychological injuries [in DeOliveira] arose out of and in the course of the workers’ compensation claims process, so too did [the plaintiffs] claimed emotional distress”; (3) “[j]ust as the misconduct at issue in DeOliveira was within the purview of the ‘fault or neglect’ provision of [the act], so too was the delay in adding COLAs to [the plaintiffs] benefits”; and (4) indeed, the plaintiff in fact had been awarded interest, attorney’s fees and penalties pursuant to the act.
Wausau concedes that it did not raise the exclusivity of the act as a special defense, but contends nonetheless that we should consider the application of DeOliveira to this case for two reasons. First, Wausau contends that the plaintiff had pleaded the facts that support her claim that Wausau mishandled her benefits, and, therefore, it is incumbent upon her to prove what she has pleaded in order to recover. Second, because those same facts, which essentially establish that the exclusivity of the act applies, are not in dispute, Wausau claims that it was not required to plead exclusivity as a special defense. We agree with Wausau that, under the circumstances of this case, appellate review of the issue of
Generally speaking, facts must be pleaded as a special defense when they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Practice Book § 10-50; see Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 502, 853 A.2d 460 (2004). “The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway. Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 1, 6, 327 A.2d 583 (1973); DuBose v. Carabetta, 161 Conn. 254, 261, 287 A.2d 357 (1971). Whether facts must be specially pleaded [however] depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues. See Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 6-7; DuBose v. Carabetta, supra, 259-61.” Bennett v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 230 Conn. 795, 802, 646 A.2d 806 (1994). In Bennett, we held that the defendant’s failure to have pleaded the $100,000 policy limit as a special defense did not deprive it of the benefit of that provision because the complaint originally filed by the plaintiffs expressly had alleged uninsured motorist coverage “ ‘up to a policy limit of $100,000 per accident,’ ” an allegation that the plaintiffs agreed to delete because the parties had agreed, inter alia, that the policy limit was indeed $100,000. Id., 802. “Because the plaintiffs [in Bennett] had already acknowledged the $100,000 policy limit in their complaint, the defendant’s failure to plead that policy provision as a special defense did not preclude the trial court from reducing the jury award in accordance with [General Statutes] § 38a-336 (b).” Id., 802-803; compare Grant v. Bassman, 221 Conn. 465,472-73, 604 A.2d 814 (1992) (concluding that exclusivity had to be pleaded as special defense because defendant sought
We agree with Wausau that, in the present case, the plaintiffs allegations of negligent handling of her workers’ compensation benefits with respect to her COLAs are the same essential facts that, in light of our decision in DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 487, would have been necessary for Wausau’s special defense. We also agree with Wausau, pursuant to our reasoning in DeOliveira, that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which arose out of and in the course of the workers’ compensation claim process, is barred by the act, and, therefore, that the plaintiffs remedies are limited to those afforded under the act.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The plaintiff initiated this action against Wausau and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. The action subsequently was withdrawn as against Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. Wausau is the only defendant involved in this appeal.
Because Glass was self-insured, it reimbursed Wausau for all benefits paid on its behalf.
See Public Acts 1977, No. 77-554, § 1, which amended General Statutes § 31-306, the statutory provision governing dependent benefits.
The plaintiff appears to be one of only two beneficiaries, out of 6000 to 8000 claimants to whom Wausau had paid benefits, who did not have their COLA benefits properly recomputed annually.
Pursuant to her claim submitted to the commission seeking payment of the overdue benefits, in December, 2000, the workers’ compensation commissioner for the second district initially awarded the plaintiff $156,515.60 in overdue benefits plus interest at 12 percent per annum and penalties. That award subsequently was adjusted.
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides: “An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal ipjury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal ipjuiy so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.”
Wausau had asserted before the trial court, in its motion for summary judgment, that the exclusivity provision of the act barred the plaintiffs claims. The trial court refused to consider the argument, however, because Wausau had not raised the exclusivity provision as a special defense, and thus could not raise it in its motion for summary judgment.
Wausau also contends, and the plaintiff does not contest, that our decision in DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 273 Conn. 487, if it applies at all, encompasses not only employers and their insurers, but also parties, such as Wausau, that administer the workers’ compensation obligations of self-insured employers.
Accordingly, we reject as irrelevant the plaintiffs assertion that, regardless of whether DeOliveira ultimately will govern her claim, we nevertheless should conclude that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of whether she suffered emotional distress.