Plаintiff Allstate Insurance Company appeals as of right from a May 18, 1988, Genesee Circuit Court order denying Allstate’s motion for summary disрosition, finding liability coverage available under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued to defendant James Robinson. MCR 2.116(0(10). This is а declaratory action in which Allstate sought to resolve whether liability coverage was available to defendants Deborah Robinson and James Robinson in an action for a dog bite to defendant Jamie Rogers, Deborah Robinson’s son and James Robinson’s stepson. We reverse.
On the date of injury, December 9, 1985, Jamie Rogers was eight years old and resided with his *618 mother and steрfather. Suit was commenced on Jamie’s behalf against the Robinsons on October 29, 1986. The Robinsons sought liability coverage under thеir homeowner’s insurance policy and tendered the defense to Allstate. Allstate accepted the defense undеr a reservation of rights, contending that no liability coverage was available.
In its declaratory action, Allstate claimed that Jamie was an "insured person” under the policy, thereby excluding coverage. The relevant portions of the homeowner’s policy provide:
DEFINITIONS USED THROUGHOUT THIS POLICY
"Insured Person” — means you and, if a resident of your household, any relative and any dependent person in your care.
* * *
EXCLUSIONS — LOSSES WE DO NOT COVER
We do not cover bodily injury to an insured person or property damage to property owned by an insured person.
Following an April 27, 1988, hearing, the circuit court granted summary disposition as to Deborah Robinson’s liability coverage. As to James Robinson, however, it concluded that Jamie was not an "insured person” because James Robinson was nоt his natural or adoptive father. The court reasoned that, first, Jamie’s status as an insured person could be interpreted differently depending on whether James Robinson or Deborah Robinson was the named insured. Second, the policy’s use of the phrase "relative and any dependent” required that two conditions be met in order for Jamie to be an "insured person.” Finally, the сourt found that Jamie was neither a relative nor a dependent of *619 James Robinson, interpreting "dependent” to mean legal dependency. On appeal, Allstate urges that the circuit court erred in interpreting the contract. We agreе.
A basic rule of insurance contract construction is that policy language creating exclusions from coveragе be strictly construed against the insurer.
Farm Bureau General Ins Co of Michigan v Riddering,
Turning to the insurance contract here, the definition of "insured person” must remain cоnsistent throughout the contract in keeping with the policy of interpreting insurance contracts as a whole.
Boyd, supra.
Moreovеr, the policy expressly provides that it’s definitions are to be "used throughout th[e] policy.” Clearly, therefore, Jamie Rogers must retain a single status throughout the contract. The circuit court erred in conditioning Jamie Rogers’ status as an insured person оn which parent was the named insured. The Robin-sons would surely expect coverage under the policy if they were being sued fоr injuries Jamie negli
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gently caused to a playmate. In that situation, Jamie would clearly be an "insured person” as a relativе and dependent of his mother, a named insured. Further, defendants’ position, if adopted, would yield absurd and inequitable results: a naturаl child who receives injury could not look to his or her parent’s homeowner’s insurance, but a stepchild could. See
Washburn v American Roofing Co,
In that regard, the сircuit court erred in finding that Jamie was not a dependent of James Robinson. "Dependent” does not mean legal dependency. The phrase being construed is "dependent person in your care.” Though James Robinson has no legal obligation tо support his stepchild,
Wilson v General Motors Corp,
We also find that a plain reading of "any relative and any dеpendent person in your care” refers to two distinct groups that are entitled to coverage, given residency in the hоusehold, rather than two required conditions for coverage. In context, the conjunction "and” means to add another group, not to set up two requirements. The use of
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the word "any” before "relative” and "dependent person” clearly gives it this meaning. Defendants’ argument that Allstate should have used "or” if it intended to establish alternative groups is without merit. The words "and” and "or” cаn be interchanged depending on context. See
Neighborhood Committee on Lead Pollution v Bd of Adjustment,
Lastly, we agree thаt the circuit court erred in finding that Jamie was not a "relative” of James Robinson. In the insurance context, courts have held thаt "relative” means not only blood relative but also relative by marriage. See Fidelity & Casualty Co v Jackson, 297 F2d 230 (CA 4, 1961); Hernandez v Comco Ins Co, 357 So 2d 1368 (La App, 1978), writ den 359 So 2d 1305 (La, 1978). Though giving "relative” a broad meaning may exclude coverage in this case, under other circumstances, a plain reading will provide cоverage to a resident relative by marriage. It cannot work both ways. In a broader sense, therefore, we are liberаlly construing the insurance contract in favor of coverage by finding that a stepchild is an insured person under the policy. In this case, however, the exclusion is controlling and coverage is unavailable. We reverse and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of Allstate.
Reversed.