The present action stems from an automobile accident in which defendant William Keillor’s wife was killed. The accident allegedly was caused by Scott Koppelberger, a minor, who had bеen furnished alcoholic beverages by Daniel Hayes, plaintiff’s insured. Plaintiff brought a declaratоry action against defendant and Hayes, among others, to determine whether plaintiff owed а duty to defend or provide coverage to Hayes. All of the original defendants in the declaratory action, including Hayes but not defendant Keillor, either entered into a consent judgment or defaulted. Following a hearing on February 14, 1989, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. Defendant appeals as of right, alleging: (1) the trial court erred in holding that he did not have standing tо litigate Hayes’ coverage, (2) the default judgment against Hayes does *501 not bind him, (3) plaintiff is estopped from asserting the automobile exclusion, and (4) the criminal-acts exclusion and the motor-vehicle exclusion should not be interpreted to deny coverage. We hold that defendant dоes not have standing to litigate the extent of Hayes’ insurance coverage, and we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.
On appeal, defendant claims that he has standing as a third-party beneficiary to litigate the extent of Hayes’ coverage because he has аn interest in the action since he seeks the insurance proceeds in a tort action. We hold that, under Michigan law, defendant does not have standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract of insurance. Michigan’s third-party beneficiary statute, MCL 600.1405; MSA 27A.1405, states:
Any person for whose bеnefit a promise is made by way of contract, as hereinafter defined, has the same right to еnforce said promise that he would have had if the said promise had been made directly tо him as the promisee.
(1) A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit of a person whenever the promisor of said promise has undertaken to give or to do оr refrain from doing something directly to or for said person.
In order for defendant to assert rights under Hayes’ insurance policy, defendant must be an intended third-party beneficiary of the contraсt. To create an intended-beneficiary relationship, the promisor must have undertaken to do something to or for the benefit of the party asserting status as an intended beneficiary.
Rieth-Riley Construction Co, Inc v Dep’t of Transportation,
In
Itrich v Huron Cement Division of National Gypsum Co,
In the present case, we hold that plaintiffs policy did not establish a promise or duty to benefit the defendаnt as an injured third-party. Plaintiff’s policy created a contractual promise to indemnify the insured, not directly benefit the injured party. This intent is manifested by the policy language, which provided:
We will pay all sums arising from the same loss which an insured person become [sic] legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by this part of the policy.
Thus, defendant was not a third-party beneficiary. Once the insured conceded that there was no coverage and had a default entered against him, defendant could not continue to pursue the action to enforce the insurance contract.
We are unрersuaded by defendant’s allegation that plaintiff, by bringing a declaratory action against defеndant, as well as against its insured, Hayes, has waived its right to object to defendant’s
*503
standing to raise the issuе of coverage. It is essential in an action for declaratory judgment that all parties having an apparent or possible interest in the subject matter be joined so that they may be guidеd and bound by the judgment.
Drainage Bd v Village of Homer,
Having concluded that defendant does not have standing in the present action, the remaining issues are moot and we need not address them.
Affirmed.