*1 PERSONAL HAGUE, INSURANCE CO. v. ALLSTATE ESTATE OF HAGUE'S REPRESENTATIVE January 13, 1981 Argued 6, 1980 Decided October No. 79-938. *2 BRENNAN,J., judgment announced the of the Court and delivered an opinion, JJ., joined. which Marshall, White, Blackmun, J., opinion concurring post, p. filed an Stevens, judgment, in the 320. J., dissenting opinion, filed a Powell, J., which C. Burger, J., joined, p. Rehnquist, post, J., part took in the Stewart, no consideration or decision of the case. M. argued
Mark Nolan the cause filed a brief for petitioner. F. argued
Andreas respondent. the cause for Lowenfeld *3 him With on the Hertogs brief were Samuel H. and Bruce Douglas. J. judgment announced of Court
Justice Brennan delivered and an opinion, which Justice White, Justice and joined. Marshall, Justice Blackmun This Court granted certiorari to determine whether Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment1 or the Full Faith and Credit Clause of IV, 1,2§ of the United Art. States Constitution Supreme bars the Court’s choice of substantive govern Minnesota law to the effect of a provision in an policy insurance to respondent’s issued dece dent. 444 U. 1070 (1980). S. 1 The Due Process Clause of the provides Fourteenth Amendment
no State deprive any “shall . person life, . . liberty, property, of or with process out due of law . . .” . 2The Full Faith Clause, IV, 1, provides: Credit Art. § “Full Faith and given Credit shall be in each State public Acts, Records, judicial Proceedings every other State. And Congress may by general prescribe Laws the Manner Acts, in which such Records, Proceedings be proved, shall and the Effect thereof.”
I Ralph injuries died of Respondent’s husband, late Hague, motorcycle on passenger suffered when a which he was a by oc- struck from behind an automobile. The accident immediately which County, Wis., curred in Pierce across operators the Minnesota border from Red Wing, Minn. decedent, of both residents, vehicles were Wisconsin as was the who, respondent at the time resided with accident, Hager Red City, which is one and one-half miles from Wis., Wing. Hague employed Wing Mr. had been in Red for years immediately commuted his death and had preceding daily from place employment. Wisconsin his operator nor operator motorcycle
Neither the automobile carried valid insurance. However, by Insurance petitioner decedent held a Allstate issued contain- Co. three owned him and covering automobiles against him loss ing insuring an motorist clause uninsured The un- incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists. for each coverage $15,000 insured motorist was limited to automobile.3 of this law- prior
After the but the initiation accident, she suit, respondent Wing. Subsequently, to Red moved married a Minnesota and established residence resident approximately Minn. At Savage, her new husband appointed re- Registrar same a Minnesota Probate time, of her deceased husband’s spondent personal representative *4 brought this action Following appointment, estate. her she under in Minnesota District Court a declaration seeking coverage that uninsured motorist $15,000 Minnesota law of late husband’s three could be on each her automobiles coverage total of Petitioner de- provide $45,000. “stacked” to the three motorist fended on the that whether uninsured ground 3 separate premium including Ralph Hague paid a for each automobile separate premium coverage. for each uninsured additional motorist an 306 by Wiscon- determined should be stacked
coverages could Wisconsin, delivered policy was insurance law, sin since involved persons and all in Wisconsin, occurred accident of the accident. the time residents at were Wisconsin Interpreting disagreed. District Court Minnesota The that court concluded stacking, to disallow law Wisconsin of application required choice-of-law rules Minnesota’s apply The court refused stacking. permitting Minnesota of Minnesota” public policy “inimical to the law as Wisconsin summary judgment respondent.4 for granted sitting banc, en affirmed Supreme Minnesota Court, The Wisconsin interpreting also court, the District Court.5 analyz- Minnesota law after prohibit stacking,6 applied Minnesota contacts and interests within ing the relevant Leflar.7 See analytical developed by framework Professor Law, in Conflicts Choice-Influencing Considerations Leflar, (1966). therefore, 41 Y. Rev. 267 The state court, N. U. L. predict- of (1) the conflict-of-laws issue terms examined ability (2) maintenance of interstate sim- result, order, (3) judicial of the task, (4) advancement plification (5) application governmental interests, forum’s Although stating better rule law. the Minnesota “in might be, themselves, contacts sufficient mandate 2d law,” 289 N. W. [Minnesota] 4 App. C to Pet. for Cert. A-29. (1978). 2d 289 N. W.
6Respondent suggested presents has this case a “false conflict.” rejected The court below applied this contention and Minnesota law. though Supreme the Minnesota Even Court’s choice of Minnesota law fol presents conflict, a discussion whether lowed this case a false the fact is apply only question Thus, the court chose to Minnesota law. before this Court is whether that choice was constitutional. previously adopted had conceptual developed model Saari, Leflar in Milkovich Professor 2d 408 Minn. 203 N. W. apparently referring sufliciency The court as a matter of choice *5 (1978), under the four first the court factors, concluded that fifth application of the better rule of law —fa- factor — selection of vored Minnesota law. The court emphasized majority that a of States allow legal deci- stacking allowing stacking fairly sions “are recent and well considered in light of current of automobiles.” Ibid. uses addi- the court tion, found the superior Minnesota rule to Wiscon- sin’s “because it requires the cost of accidents with uninsured spread motorists to be broadly through more pre- insurance Ibid. miums than does the Wisconsin rule.” after Finally, en rehearing the court banc,9 opinion by buttressed its initial “that contracts insurance on motor indicating are vehicles in a class themselves” company since an insurance “knows the automobile is a movable item which will be from driven to state.” 2d, state W. at 50 (1979). N. From this premise court application concluded that of Minnesota law was “not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to due violate Ibid. process.”
II It is not for this say Court whether the choice-of-law analysis suggested by Professor preferred Leflar is or whether would we make the same decision if choice-of-law sitting as Supreme the Minnesota Court. Our sole function tois determine whether the Supreme Court’s choice of its own substantive law in this case exceeded federal consti- tutional limitations. Implicit inquiry recogni- this is the accepted by tion, long Court, this that a set of giving facts or lawsuit, particular rise issue within may a lawsuit, in constitutional justify, terms, law more g., e. Watson jurisdiction. Employers Liability than one See, Corp., Assurance S. 72-73 (1954); 11, infra. generally Clay v. Sun Ltd., Insurance Office, U. S. of law and not as a matter of constitutional limitation on its choice-of-law decision. 2d,
9 289 N.W. *6 As a Clay II). cited as (hereinafter (1964) 181-182 179, from one to select may have State the forum result, contact some having jurisdictions of several the among laws controversy. the with whether questions, choice-of-law deciding
In
constitutional
Credit
and
Full Faith
or the
Process Clause
the
under
Due
contacts
traditionally
examined
has
Clause,10 this Court
and
parties
with the
applied,
was
State,
of
whose
litiga-
rise
giving
or transaction
occurrence
with
ensure that
In order to
II,
at
Clay
supra,
tion.
fundamentally un-
nor
arbitrary
is neither
of law
the choice
Comm’n,
Accident
Assn. v. Industrial
Packers
Alaska
fair, see
has invalidated
Court
532,
294 U. S.
contact
significant
had no
has
a State which
of law of
choice
interests,
state
creating
aggregation
contacts,
significant
or
or transaction.11
the occurrence
and
parties
deciding choice-of-law
approach in
a similar
This Court has taken
and Credit
and the Full Faith
the Due Process Clause
eases under both
the relevant contacts
instance,
has examined
In each
the Court
Clause.
applied. See,
g.,
e.
was
whose law
the State
resulting
and
interests
(1979). Although at one time
Hall,
410, 424
v.
U. S.
Nevada
Credit
Full
and
required
exacting
under the
Faith
a more
standard
Court
evaluating the constitu
Process Clause for
than under the Due
Clause
Industrial
decisions,
Packers
v.
tionality
Alaska
Assn.
see
choice-of-law
(interest
(1935)
of State whose
Comm’n,
Accident
294 U. S.
549-550
rejected),
of State whose law
applied was no less than interest
law was
requirement.
weighing-of-interests
the Court has since abandoned the
supra;
Hall,
Lanza,
(1955);
v.
Wein
see Nevada
Carroll v.
349 U. S.
on a State’s
traub, Due
and Full Faith
Credit Limitations
Process
are
Different considerations
Law,
(1959).
Choice of
L. Rev.
44 Iowa
acts,
rec
is to be accorded
when
faith and credit
of course
issue
full
area,
as in the case
such
ords,
proceedings
outside the choice-of-law
judgments.
of sister state-court
analysis
as the
in the
courts
state
Prior to the advent of
Silberman,
theory,”
analysis
choice of law
modem
“dominant mode
33, 80, n. 259
Era,
Y. U. L.
an
53 N.
Rev.
v. Heitner: The End of
Shaffer
11-13,
States,
nn. 26-27
(1978);
369 U. S.
v. United
cf. Richards
courts),
analysis
pre
in state
(1962) (discussing trend toward interest
jurisdiction
par-
where a
methodology
on
vailing
focused
choice-of-law
Two instructive examples of such invalidation are Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick,
Home Ins. Co. Dick
involved interpretation of an insur-
ance
which had been
in Mexico,
issued
by a Mexican
insurer, to a Mexican citizen, covering a Mexican risk. The
policy was subsequent^
assigned to
Dick,
Mr.
who was
domiciled in Mexico and “physically present and
acting
Mexico,”
The Mutual Hancock in John similarly attenuated was transaction a Massachu insurer, There, v. Yates. Ins. Co. Li fe life on the insurance contract of corporation, issued setts is for, applied contract was The resident. of a New York his insured where the New York and delivered sued, his York, died New After the insured spouse resided. policy suit on Georgia brought moved to spouse permitted jury Georgia law, Georgia. Under whether when deciding oral into account modifications take misrepre material application contained an insurance misrepre such law, however, New York Under sentations. solely on basis to be evaluated were sentations Georgia law. applied court application. Georgia written Georgia to be finding application of reversed, This Court unconstitutional. if a State proposition
Dick and
stand for
Yates
parties
with the
insignificant
only an
contact
has
*8
12
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by garnishing the re
sought
obtain
Dick
had never
reinsurer.
The reinsurer
obligation of the New York
insurance
by
Texas,
publication,
in accord
but
it “was cited
transacted business
statute;
attorneys
appointed for it
the trial
were
ance
a
Texas
liability.”
they
which
court;
filed on its behalf an answer
denied
jurisdiction in the Texas courts to
S.,
There would be
281 U.
at 402.
no
Savchuk, 444
Rush
today.
U. S.
a
v.
entertain
such
lawsuit
See
supra,
Heitner,
Silberman,
at
(1977);
(1980);
433 U.
v.
S.
Shaffer
62-65.
there had
might
been
if
the result
have
different
The Court noted
lay
properly
upon “which the State could
to Texas
been some connection
408,
imposed.”
S., at
n.
regulations
there
the basis
hold as
Employers Liability
Corp.,
Assurance
66, 71
U. S.
Watson
5;
see
occurrence or transaction,
its law unconsti-
tutional.14 Dick concluded that nominal
standing
residence —
inadequate;
alone —was
Yates held that a postoccurrence
change of residence to the forum
standing alone —was
State —
to justify
insufficient
application of forum law. Although
instructive as extreme
examples
selection of forum law,
neither Dick nor
governs
Yates
this case. For in contrast
those
here
decisions,
the Minnesota contacts with the parties
and the occurrence are obviously significant. Thus,
this
case is like
Packers,
Alaska
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual
Co.,
tion of its Workmen’s Compensation Act, where the most significant contact of the worker with California his exe of an cution employment contract in California. The worker, a nonresident alien from Mexico, was hired in California for seasonal work in salmon canning factory in Alaska. As part of the employment contract, the employer, who was doing business in California, agreed to transport the worker and to Alaska return him to when California the work was completed. Even though the employee contracted to be bound by the Alaska Compensation Workmen’s and was Law injured in Alaska, sought he an award under the California Compensation Workmen’s Act. The Court held that choice of California law was not “so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to a denial of due process,” U. S., “[wjithout because a remedy in California, would be [he] remediless,” ibid., and because of California’s interest the worker public become charge, ibid.15 supra generally, Weintraub, at 455-457. 15The Court found no violation of the Full Faith Clause, and Credit *9 since California’s was considered to be no less than Alaska’s, 294 Liberty Co., supra, a District Mutual Ins.
In Cardillo v. em- of Columbia by a District resident, employed Columbia years prior the three employer the for ployer assigned in an automobile was killed to in Virginia, his death work home daily commute course of his Virginia crash in the the the District’s contacts with from The Court found work. satisfy constitutional the occurrence sufficient parties and Dis- residence in the employee’s on the requirements, based Virginia workplace, the home and his commute between trict, “engaged in company of a employee as an and his status in the District of Columbia electrical construction work Id., 471.16 surrounding at areas.” constitutionality ap- the II the Clay upheld
Similarly, had policy insurance There, of forum law. plication Subsequently resident. in Illinois an Illinois issued loss in property to Florida and suffered a insured moved coverage on the nationwide explicitly Florida. Relying company presence and the insurance implicitly plaintiff’s on the Florida residence and Florida and property occurrence loss Court Florida, the Florida court’s choice of Florida law. sustained Yates, from Dick and which found insufficient The lesson Packers, apply forum and from Alaska law, forum contacts II, Cardillo, Clay adequate which found contacts to sus- of forum is that for a law,17 the choice State’s substan- tain 549-550, though injury S., 547-548, at even occurred in Alaska U. employee performing obligations his contract there. while While Packers balanced the interests of California and Alaska Alaska to deter issue, balancing required. longer faith and credit such is no mine full S., 424; supra. Hall, U. See Nevada v. question raised precise Virginia Compensation The was whether the jurisdiction S., over the claim.” “had sole Commission at 472-473. finding application of the District’s law did not violate either due requirements, and credit or full faith Court effect treated process question choice-of-law as constitutional issue. challenged upheld choice-of-law decisions Court has on constitu Hall, supra other grounds in numerous decisions. See Nevada v. tional *10 tive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible man- ner, that State must have a significant significant contact or aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Application of this principle to the facts of this case persuades us that Supreme Minnesota Court’s choice of own did not offend the Federal Constitution.
Ill Minnesota has three contacts with the parties and the oc- giving currence rise to the litigation. In the these aggregate, contacts permit selection by the Supreme Court of Minnesota allowing the stacking Hague’s of Mr. unin- sured motorist coverages.
First, and for purposes very our important contact, Mr. Hague was a member of work having Minnesota’s force, been by employed a Red Wing, Minn., enterprise for the 15 (upholding California’s of California law to automobile acci- dent in California between two California residents and a Nevada official driving by car owned State of Nevada while engaged in official business California); Lanza, Carroll (1955) 349 U. S. (upholding Arkansas’ choice of Arkansas law where employee Missouri employment executed contract employer with Missouri injured job was on in Arkansas but was immediately removed to a Employers hospital); Missouri Watson v. Liability Assurance Corp., 348 (1954) U. 66S. (allowing application of Louisiana direct action statute against Louisiana resident insurer even though policy was written and State, delivered in plaintiff another where injured Louisiana); Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Pacific Comm’n, Accident (1939) U. S. 493 (holding Full Faith and Credit Clause not violated where applied California own Compensa- Workmen’s tion injury Act in case of suffered by employee temporarily Massachusetts in California in employment). course of Thus, Hall, Nevada v. supra, and Employers Liability Watson v. Corp., Assurance supra, upheld application of forum law where the relevant contacts plaintiff’s consisted of residence injury. the place Employers of the Ins. Co. v. Industrial Pacific Comm’n, supra, Accident Lanza, and Carroll v. supra, place relied on the injury arising respective from the employee’s temporary presence in the forum State connection employment. with Iris may im- employment status years death. While preceding his does resident less substantial than a state interest plicate important. The State status, is nevertheless the non- responsibilities towards police power employment has pro- less if somewhat employee analogous, that are resident employees use Thus, residents. such than towards found, *11 upon state facilities may call services and amenities state circumstances. appropriate Minnesota, Hague commuted to work Mr. addition, Mutual Liberty important in Cardillo a contact which was v. Co., 475-476 commute between S., (daily workplace Virginia), in District of Columbia and residence by his uninsured motorist cov- presumably covered and was com- the commute.18 The State’s interest in its erage during for the employees a state concern nonresident reflects muting safety concomitant well-being of its work force and the employers. effect on Minnesota or Hague commuting was not killed while to work
That Mr.
result. To
in Minnesota does
dictate a different
while
Supreme
of Minnesota
hold that the Minnesota
Court’s choice
require
the Constitution for that reason would
law violated
relationship
the parties
narrow a view Minnesota’s
too
giving
litigation.
An
the occurrence
rise
automo-
jurisdiction
not occur
particular
need
within a
bile accident
jurisdiction
be connected
the occurrence.19
for that
18
Hague provided
pay to
to Mr.
that Allstate would
The
issued
damages
by
insured,
insured,
legal representative,
“sustained
his
or
by
arising
ownership,
accident and
out of the
maintenance or use
caused
suggestion
.” No
has been made that
uninsured automobile.
. .
of [an]
protection
Hague’s uninsured motorist
is unavailable because he was
Mr.
driving one of his insured
not killed while
automobiles.
19
applied
jurisdiction
cases have
law of a
other than the
Numerous
juris
injury
existed some
of the
where there
other link between that
situs
Liberty
Co.,
g.,
See, e.
Cardillo v.
Mutual Ins.
and the occurrence.
diction
Comm’n,
(1947);
Assn.
Alaska Packers
v. Industrial Accident
Mr.
residence in Wisconsin does not —as Allstate
seems to argue
constitutionally
mandate
of Wis-
—
consin
the exclusion of forum
If,
law.21
in the in-
(1966);
Lopez,
Tooker
,
N. Y. 2d 569 249
(1969);
N. E. 2d 394
Jackson,
Babcock v.
12 N. Y.
2d
2d
N. E.
injury
or death of a resident of State A in State B is a contact of
*12
A
State
the
occurrence in State B.
19, supra.
See cases cited in n.
21Petitioner’s statement
dispute
that the instant
interpreta
the
involves
tion of insurance contracts which were “underwritten, applied
paid
for, and
by
for Wisconsin residents
covering
and issued
garaged Wisconsin,”
cars
in
6,
Brief for Petitioner
simply
is
way
another
stating
of
Hague
that’Mr.
was a Wisconsin
Respondent
resident.
replied
have
could
that the insur
ance contract was underwritten, applied
paid
by
and
for
for
a Minnesota
worker, and issued covering cars that were driven to
in
work Minnesota
garaged
and
there for a
portion
substantial
day.
of the
The former state
hardly
ment is
significant
more
than the
any
latter since the accident in
event did
any
not involve
of the
which
automobiles
covered
were
under
Hague’s policy.
Mr.
Recovery
sought
pursuant
to the uninsured mo
coverage.
torist
addition, petitioner’s
statement
that
contracts were “under-
by
written ...
Wisconsin residents” is
supported
not
by
stipulated
petitioner
facts if
means to include
Indeed,
itself within
phrase.
that
policy,
part
which is
record,
signed
recites that Allstate
policy Northbrook,
in
Ill. Under
hoary
some versions of the
rule of lex
contractus,
loci
and depending
precise sequence
on the
events,
a se-
quence which is unclear from
us,
the record before
the law of Illinois
arguably might apply
govern
to
contract construction,
though
even
Illinois
between
in Minnesota
occurred
had
case, the accident
stant
if the in-
motorist,
Minnesota
uninsured
an
and
Hague
Mr.
a
covering
in Minnesota
executed
been
had
contract
surance
Hague
Mr.
which
company automobile
registered
sought to
court
if a Wisconsin
drive,
permitted
in Wis-
Hague’s residence
certainly Mr.
law,
Wisconsin
apply
Minnesota, and
Wisconsin
commute between
consin, his
adequate
should be
Wisconsin
presence in
insurer’s
Liberty
Cardillo v.
law.22 See generally
Wisconsin’s
apply
than either
parties
the occurrence
with the
less contact
have
would
sought application of Illinois law on
party
No
or Minnesota.
Wisconsin
in the
below.
that basis
court
would
certain that
Allstate could not be
Wisconsin
Of course
Wisconsin, whether
any
in
necessarily govern
occurred
accident which
expectation would
an
courts
Such
brought
in the Wisconsin
or elsewhere.
lex loci delicti doctrine. While
controlling significance to the wooden
give
in choice-of-law
is a factor
to be considered
place
the accident
abandoned,
blindly
largely
traditional, but now
analysis,
apply
11, supra,
supra
11,
259;
would
Silberman,
n.
see n.
doctrine,
n.
legal
importance
various
distinguish
between
relative
fail
juris
relationship
other
in
lawsuit as well as
involved
issues
If, for ex
or transaction.
parties and
occurrence
dictions
employee who was
Hague
resident and
ample,
had been a Wisconsin
Mr.
hospital
by
to a
then
ambulance
injured
and was
taken
in Wisconsin
dying,
languished
before
Minn.,
he
for
weeks
where
several
Wing,
Red
paid would
ensuring
medical creditors were
Minnesota’s
might
circumstances,
Moreover,
the accident itself
under such
be obvious.
beginning in Wiscon
reasonably
occurrence
characterized as
bistate
be
that Wisconsin
ending
Thus, reliance
the insurer
in Minnesota.
sin and
Wisconsin,
any
necessarily' govern
accident
occurred
would
any
necessarily govern
jurisdiction
the law
another
would
or
Wisconsin,
that did
occur
would
unwarranted.
accident
supra (Massachusetts hospital
Warren,
could
supra;
Rosenthal v.
cf.
*13
expectation
purchased
with
that Massachusetts
not have
insurance
in
recovery
patient
York
who died
govern damages
New
as to
would
York).
brought
in New
hospital and whose
suit
widow
govern,
did
there was
jurisdiction
Wisconsin
If the law of a
other than
coverage, that
likelihood,
respect
uninsured
to
motorist
substantial
at the
Stacking
the rule in
States
stacking
be
most
would
allowed.
was
Court,
in
Supreme
Indeed,
issued.
Wisconsin
was
time
Co.,
Mutual
supra; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial
Comm’n,
Accident
U. S.
532 (1935); Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, S., U.
at
408,
Employment
status is not a
sufficiently less important status
residence,
than
generally
see
Lanza,
Carroll v.
Second, Allstate at all times present doing and business in By Minnesota.23 virtue of its presence, hardly Allstate can claim unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state courts might apply forum law to liti- Employers Nelson v. Casualty Mutual Co., 63 558, 563-566, Wis. 2d and 2, 3, nn. 217 N. 2d 670, 672, W. 2, nn. and identified 29 States, including Minnesota, whose interpreted law it stacking, to allow only 9 States whose interpreted prohibit law it stacking. Clearly then, Allstate could expected not have antistaeMng that an rule would govern any particular accident in which might the insured be involved surprise thus cannot claim unfair from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s choice of forum law. 23The recognized Court has may examination of a State’s contacts divergent result in jurisdiction conclusions for purposes. and choice-of-law Superior See Kulko v. Court, (1978) (no juris 436 U. S. California diction in California but California “arguably might” apply); Shaffer Heitner, v. S., (no jurisdiction 433 U. at 215 in Delaware, although Dela “may ware support of Delaware law”); cf. Hanson Denckla, 235, 254, 357 U. (1958) (no jurisdiction S. 27n. Florida; personal is jurisdiction, “issue law,” choice an issue which decide). Court need found no Nevertheless, inquiries “both ‘are often closely related and to a degree depend substantial upon similar considera ” Shaffer, tions.’ S., J., 224-225 concurring part (Brennan, and dissenting part). Here, course, jurisdiction in the Minnesota courts unquestioned, a factor not significance without assessing constitutionality of choice Minnesota’s own id., substantive law. Cf. (“the at 225 decision that it is fair to bind defendant a State’s laws prove highly and rules should relevant to the permitting fairness of accept jurisdiction that same State to for adjudicating controversy”). *14 318 “Particularly since involved. company is in which
gation it forum], in [the do business licensed was company there, [the and be sued might known have must v. Clay law.” bound feel [forum] would courts forum] (Black, (1960) 207, 221 Ltd., 363 S.U. Insurance Sun Office in Minne presence Allstate’s Moreover, dissenting).25 J., company’s regulating an Minnesota gave sota a Minne both they affected as insofar obligations insurance representative respond court-appointed and resident sota — force work of Minnesota’s member longstanding ent —and S. Cullen, 318 U. Co. v. Canning Hoopeston See Hague. Mr. 313, 316 prior resident Minnesota became respondent
Third, facts reveal stipulated litigation. of this institution the town which Minn., Wing, in Red first settled that she legitimate of surprise or frustration of unfair is no element There Allstate Because of its law. Minnesota’s choice of as a result expectations undoubtedly aware Minnesota was doing business was Min anticipated that have had employee, it Hague was a Mr. was involved. Hague Mr. in which might apply to an accident nesota law Liability As Employers (1964); v. Watson Clay II, 377 U. S. See Assn. v. Industrial 72-73; Alaska Packers Corp., S., at 348 U. surance Dick, 281 538-543; S., Home Co. Comm’n, cf. at Accident State). In present in forum (neither nor reinsurer S., insurer at U. might an Hague suffer Mr. anticipated that deed, specifically Allstate States, United outside in Minnesota or elsewhere accident either id., coverage. Cf. continental policy it offered Wisconsin, issued since in certain Mexican waters occurring (coverage to losses limited at 403 applied). At the same jurisdiction whose law outside were which the contract since control construction did not seek to time, Allstate dictating application choice-of-law clause no policy contained coverage (nationwide Clay supra, II, law. Wisconsin clause). choice-of-law lack of Clay decision, a decision which in the first Black’s dissent Justice to obtain an authori determination a lower-court remanded vacated ques might moot the constitutional of state law construction tative Clay majority support second in the subsequently commanded tion, supra, Clay II, at 180-183. decision. subsequently moved She
her late husband had worked.26 op- resident who marrying a Minnesota Savage, Minn., after *15 Minn. Bloomington, in an automobile service station erated concurrently,” Savage occurred “almost move to Her of case.27 initiation 2d, at with the N. W. the.instant to Minnesota Hague Mrs. moved suggestion no There is finding of purpose of or for the anticipation litigation in this stipu- to her claim.28 The hospitable legal especially climate negate any such inference. facts, they are, sparse lated as Yates, Co. v. Mutual John Hancock While Life change of resi postoccurrence held that a U. S. in of itself the forum State was insufficient dence to State to choose its case power law, confer on the forum irrelevant. of residence was change not hold that such a did in Minne bona fide residence course, respondent’s Here, liti with this sole contact Minnesota had was not the sota Minne with her residence gation. And in connection representative appointed personal sota, respondent was County of Probate for the Hague’s Registrar estate Mr. subsequent residence and Respondent’s Minn. Goodhue, of her personal representative as Minnesota appointment which contact constitute a Minnesota late husband’s estate an in respondent’s recovery, an interest gives Minnesota compensation full identified as the court below terest which them “off welfare keep accident victims” for “resident 289 N. W. obligations.” “to meet financial rolls” and able 2d, at 49. Hague on which Mrs. the date stipulated facts do not reveal The Wing.
first moved to Red Hague re May 28, Mrs. began on 1976. proceedings These on married June respondent’s postoecurrence considering suggests dissent encourage forum will of the Minnesota contacts one change as residence Post, at 337. change the fact that her This overlooks shopping. by litigation considerations. fide and not motivated bona residence was 29 of con- aggregation significant had a sum, Minnesota in- creating state occurrence, parties tacts arbitrary neither law was of its such that terests, of Minne- the choice Accordingly, fundamentally unfair. nor not violate did Court Supreme by the sota law Clause. and Credit Faith the Pull or Clause Process Due
Affirmed. or consideration no part took Justice Stewart of this case. decision judgment. Stevens, concurring in the
Justice precedent neither which unusual case—in I this As view *16 sep- guidance sure provides language constitutional nor —two Full Faith First, does the must be answered. questions arate State, forum require Minnesota, Credit Clause1 2 Clause Process the Due apply Second, law? does Wisconsin ap- Minnesota from prevent Amendment of the Fourteenth federal implicates inquiry The first plying own law? sovereignty respect Minnesota ensuring interest in litigants’ implicates Wisconsin; of the State of the second rights.3 of their adjudication in a fair 29 or contacts, together two either express no whether the first We view separately, the choice of Minnesota would have sufficed to sustain by Supreme made Court. 1 IV, 1, provides: Article § Acts, public given each State to the “Full Faith and Credit shall be in every the Con- Records, Proceedings other State. And and Judicial Acts, gress may by general prescribe the Manner which such Laws Proceedings proved, the Effect thereof.” Records and shall be 2 provides, part: Section 1 of Fourteenth Amendment life, liberty, deprive any property, or with- person “No State shall . . . process out due law . . . questions only presented by after The two the choice-of-law issue arise it the forum is assumed or contacts with established that the defendant’s jurisdiction. support personal Although State are sufficient the choice- sovereign liti- respect and fairness to the of-law for another concerns — I realize that both this analysis Court’s of choice-of-law questions4 and scholarly criticism of those decisions5 have treated these two inquiries as though they indistinguish- were gants similar to the —are two performed by functions jurisdictional inquiry, they are not identical. Volkswagen World-Wide Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. 286, S. 291-292 we stated: “The concept of minimum contacts, turn, can be seen perform two related, but distinguishable, protects functions. It against defendant the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through courts, their do not beyond reach out limits imposed on them their coequal as status sovereigns in a federal system.” Reese, also Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Colum. 1587, L. Rev. 1589- While it has suggested been this same minimum-con analysis tacts be used to define the constitutional limitations on choice of law, see, e. g., Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Law, Choice of 78 Mich. L. 872 (1980), Rev. the Court has made years clear over the that the personal jurisdiction and inquiries choice-of-law are not the same. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U. 84, (1978); California S. Shaffer Heitner, 433 U. S. (1977); id., at 224-226 (Brennan, J., dissent ing part); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. (1958); id., 253-254 (Black, J., dissenting). 4Although the Court has struck down state court’s choice forum law on both due process, g., see, e. Home Dick, Ins. v.Co. S. (1930), and full faith and grounds, see, credit g., e. John Hancock Mutual Yates, Co. v. 299 U. S. 178 (1936), life analytical no clear distinction between the two provisions constitutional emerged. has The Full Faith Clause, Credit course, was inapplicable in Home Ins. Co. because *17 foreign law a nation, rather than of a State, sister issue; atwas similarly explanation clear for the upon Court’s reliance Full Faith and Credit Clause in John Hancock Mutual be cannot found. Life Indeed, John Hancock probably Mutual Ins. is best understood as a Life process due case. Reese, See supra, 1589, 17; at and n. Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State’s Law, Choice of 44 L. 449, Iowa (1959). Rev. 457-458 5 Leflar, See R. American 5, Law p. 7, Conflicts 55, pp. 106-107 § § (3d 1977). ed. The frequent Court’s failure distinguish between the two Clauses in the may choice-of-law context suggestions underlie the various commentators that either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or Due Process Clause recognized single as appropriate source for 322 the two constitu- I Nevertheless, persuaded am
able.6 proper interests and that protect different provisions tional of each. analysis separate consideration requires I provi one of several The Full Faith and Credit Clause is designed to transform sions the Federal Constitution single, into a independent sovereignties from several States Co., Light Washington See Thomas Gas v. unified Nation. Milwaukee (1980) (plurality opinion); 261, 448 S. 271-272 U. County Co., M. White E. (1935).7 S. 268, 296 276-277 U. implements design Full The Faith and Credit Clause this by directing litiga for State, acting that a when forum as having respect tion or aspects implications, multistate legitimate infringement interests of other States and avoid upon sovereignty. however, their does not, rigidly The Clause Martin, Compare constitutional limitations on choice of law. Constitu- Law, (1976) (full tional Limitations on Choice 61 Cornell Rev. 185 L. credit), supra (due Reese, process); faith Kirgis, also see Law, Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of 62 Cornell L. Rev. 94 explicitly provisions Even when the Court has both considered single requirements case, the and Full Due Process Faith by essentially Credit Clauses have been measured the same standard. example, Employers Liability Corp., For in Watson v. Assurance S.U. (1954), separately process the Court considered the due and full faith questions. id., However, and credit concluding 70-73. at that the Full Faith and Credit apply Clause did not bar the Louisiana courts from ing case, substantially Louisiana law in that upon pre the Court relied analysis requirements ceding process. Id., By way of due at 73. contrast, Comrn’n, in Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident 532, analysis U. S. 544-550 the Court’s full faith and credit dif significantly process analysis. However, fered from its due as noted in the plurality opinion, 10, ante, at the Court has since abandoned the represented by full faith and credit standard Alaska Packers. Sumner, History See also The Full-Faith-and-Credit-Clause —Its Purpose, (1955); L. Weintraub, supra, Or. Rev. 477; R. 73, p. Leflar, supra, §
323 require the forum apply foreign State to an- law whenever other State has a valid litigation. interest in the See Nevada Hall, v. 440 S. 410, U. 424 v. (1979); Alaska Assn. Packers Comm’n, Industrial Accident (1935); 294 S. 532, U. 546-548 Comm’n, Employers Co. v. Industrial Accident Pacific 493, 306 U. S. (1939).8 501-502 On the of contrary, view the fact that the forum sovereign State is also a in its own right, in appropriate may paramount impor- cases attach tance to legitimate its own interests.9 the fact Accordingly, that a choice-of-law may decision be unsound as a matter of conflicts law does necessarily implicate con- federal cerns embodied in the Faith and Full Credit Clause. Rather, my opinion, the Clause should not invalidate a state court’s of choice forum law unless that choice threatens the federal unity unjustifiably national infringing upon legitimate interests of another State.10 Packers, supra, As the Court overly rigid observed in Alaska appli an cation of the Full produce Faith and Credit Clause would anomalous results: rigid clause, and literal
“A enforcement of the full faith and credit with- regard out to the forum, statute of the would lead result to the absurd that, arises, wherever conflict the statute of each en- state must be other, S., forced the courts of the but be in cannot its own.” 294 U. at example, For it is well established that “the Full Faith and Credit require apply Clause does not a State another State’s law in violation legitimate policy.” public Hall, 410, of its own Nevada v. U. S. omitted). (1979) (footnote 10The kind Full de of state action the Faith and Credit Clause was signed prevent variety ways by has been described in a Court. this Lanza, 408, Carroll v. (1955), 349 U. S. the Court indicated that “any policy hostility the Clause would be invoked to restrain Hall, supra, 424, public Acts” another State. In Nevada we v. approved “pose[d] which no substantial action threat to our constitutional Washington system cooperative federalism.” And in Gas Thomas Co., Light plurality opinion 448 U. S. described the prevention “paro the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the purpose of the interests of other entrenchment on States.” chial *19 to courts’ decision Minnesota the I think case, this In nor- of a matter unsound as plainly law was apply con- of the insurance the execution Both law. mal conflicts took litigation to the rise giving the accident tract of those events both when Moreover, in Wisconsin. place of both operators the decedent, the occurred, plaintiff, the I do Nevertheless, Wisconsin. all residents of vehicles were unity or Wisconsin’s any to national threat not believe that question substantive from the sovereignty ensues allowing the law of another by this case be determined presented State. of the mean- interpreting on the is one question merits itself, the of the insurance contract. Neither contract
ing anything any express reflects under- record, nor else in the be of would standing parties respect the what law . uninsured applied respect separate or with to whether could motorist for of the decedent’s three coverage each cars for provided coverage Since the acci- “stacked.” occur might States, dents that in other it was obvious parties contracting might give at the time of that rise application of the law of States other than Wisconsin. may ensuring while have an interest in Therefore, Wisconsin upon that formed Wiscon- contracts Wisconsin reliance interpreted law are that law, sin accordance with not implicated interest is case.11 this justifiable expectations major litigants are a While concern purposes scrutiny process decisions, II, for of due of choice-of-law see Part infra, Yates, in John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co. decision Life may suggests implicate U. S. 178 this concern also state cognizable In John interests under the Full Faith Credit Clause. Ins., Hancock Mutual struck down on full Court faith and credit Life grounds Georgia Georgia conflicting court’s choice of law over a New York statute in a brought suit on a New York life insurance contract after the insured’s death in New York. Central to the decision in that case was apparent the Court’s Georgia concern that law would result surprise contracting parties. in unfair to one of the The Court found that refusal to establish that Minnesota’s has failed Petitioner or indirect threat poses any direct12 apply Wisconsin any such absence sovereignty.13 to Wisconsin’s became a term law which statute was “a rule substantive the New York paid premium to be or contract, of the as much so as amount omitted). Id., (footnote This statute payment.” at 182 time for its fully parties provision as if a rights as the substantive “determine[d] Id., writing policy.” at 182-183. in the had been embodied in to that effect statute would expect the New York reason to had no The insurer *20 parties to a policy. The arising under the life insurance all control claims death to normally expect place the of not would life insurance contract by way of policy; any bearing upon proper construction have might bewell liability place the tort contrast, policy, a of in the case of relationship, it is reason, in a insurance contract For that life relevant. any than other likely party expect the law of State that neither would subsequent litigation. any possible in contracting place to have relevance of Contracts Life Insurance Carnahan, of Laws and generally C. Conflict See (2d ed. pp. 26A-265, 267-268, 60, 325-327 51-52, 47, pp. 15, pp. § § § 1958). Lije as John Hancock Mutual aptly Freund has characterized Paul and faith the full application of “most ambitious perhaps this Court’s Laws, 59 of Freund, and the Conflict Chief Justice Stone clause.” credit Light v. Electric Co. (1946). Like 1210, 1233 Harv. L. Rev. Bradford atS., relied, 299 U. see the Court Clapper, on S. 145 which 286 U. of constitutional Lije a series Ins. was one of Mutual Hancock John subsequent See by cases. limited that have been in 1930’s decisions Light Co., Washington Gas 412; Thomas v. Lanza, S., at v. Carroll This Traynor, Is See also (plurality opinion). 272-273, supra, at 657, 675 Necessary?, Rev. Really L. Texas Conflict a Cali permitted Court Hall, supra, which the Compare Nevada damages avail statutory on limitation disregard Nevada’s to court fornia upon this direct intrusion found Court The against the State. able was “obnoxious” statute the Nevada justified because sovereignty Nevada’s Id., policy. public to California’s of its application challenging the forum’s litigant a It is clear the burden brought in its courts bears properly a law to lawsuit own protected infringes upon interests of law this choice establishing that Assn. v. Industrial Alaska Packers Credit Clause. and Full Faith S., at 547-548. Comm’n, 294 U. Accident own apply to its law decision that a state court’s equally clear It is Clause where Full Faith Credit violate cannot State’s the forum evaluate unnecessary to find it I threat, conclusion to reach the order litigation in the interest Minne- require does Clause and Credit Full Faith contract question apply Wisconsin courts sota case. in this presented interpretation II would decision a choice-of-law may be assumed It arbitrary or totally if it were Clause the Due Process violate question I litigant. either fundamentally unfair to were if it State his own law of apply the decision judge’s a whether are judges For wholly irrational. as ever be described could may find law and own state their familiar presumably correctly apply consuming to discover time difficult State’s The forum State.14 law of another is therefore justice administration and efficient the fair of valid- presumption to attach my judgment, sufficient, to a dis- its apply own decision to forum State’s ity jurisdiction. has which it pute over operation in the efficient State’s interest forum justify sufficient, however, clearly not system
judicial *21 fundamentally unfair that a rule law is of of application the could demon- litigants. Arguably, litigant one of the to variety ways. of about in a Concern such unfairness strate might of arise choice its own rule of the forum’s fairness upon the interests Cf. impinge at all of other States. law does forum supra Reese, 3, at 1601. n. 14 judge particularly for a trial does not task can difficult who This be library ready containing the statutes and decisions access to a law have apply he is judge If that able to which of is all 50 States. easily discover, savings can can substantial accrue thoroughly familiar or system. Moreover, interpretation judicial an erroneous to the State’s likely judge applying when the is a familiar rule. governing rule is less S., (Brennan, dissenting Heitner, J., 433 U. at 225-226 v. Cf. Shaffer ability apply own (such indicate that State’s its in concerns part) purposes evaluating power be relevant for transaction should to a transaction). parties jurisdiction to that over exercise repre if it nonresidents, residents over if that rule favored in that obtains departure from the rule sented a dramatic unfair if rule itself was jurisdictions, or most American applied.15 on its face or as may of law acceptable otherwise rule an ac- in the litigants if, engaging
result unfairness could not they tivity subject litigation, which of the be their actions would later reasonably anticipated have A choice-of-law decision judged this rule law. can be justifiable expectations parties frustrates surprise fundamentally prevent This desire to unfair unfair. litigant has been central concern Court’s to a this the Due Process of choice-of-law under review decisions Clause.16 appli- “stacking” itself, rule nor Minnesota’s
Neither any litigants, ques- cation of that rule to these raises serious tacking plurality observes, tion fairness. As the “[s] constitutionally suspect against Discrimination nonresidents would upon a choice-of- even if the Due Process Clause were not a check State’s Schreter, law decisions. See Currie & Unconstitutional Discrimination (1960) ; Equal Protection, L. the Conflict of Laws: 28 U. Chi. Rev. Conflict of Schreter, Currie & Discrimination in the Unconstitutional (1960); Note, Privileges Immunities, Uncon Laws: 69 Yale L. J. 1323 Law, stitutional Discrimination in Choice of Colum. L. Rev. may
Moreover, substantively discriminatory unfair rules of law both analysis; any special choice-of-law be detected and remedied without to deal with both varieties principles familiar constitutional are available supra See, g., Martin, at 199. of unfairness. e. analysis, that struck Upon of the decisions of this Court careful most can be ex process grounds court’s choice of forum law down on due a state prevent with the plained attempts a State with a minimal contact as materially enlarging obligations of one of litigation the contractual from possibility anticipate party had no reason parties where Dick, See, g., e. Home Ins. enlargement. Co. S. of such Indemnity Co., Co. & Pine Land (1930); Accident & v. Delta Hartford *22 Yates, Co. (1934); John Hancock Mutual Ins. v. 143 cf. 292 U. S. Life (similar Clause, (1936) concern under Full Faith and Credit S. 178 299 U. supra Weintraub, 11, supra). generally 4, at 457-460. n. see n. 328 issued.” policy rule most States at the time the was
Ante, 22.17 the rule is 316, Moreover, consistent at relationship of a contractual which economics cov policyholder separate premiums three for insurance paid erage for automobiles, including separate premium three a for each I coverage.18 persuaded uninsured motorist Nor am apply that the decision of courts to the Minnesota the “stack ing” rule in this process case can be said violate due be cause expectations that decision frustrates the reasonable parties. the contracting
Contracting parties course, can, expectations make their explicit providing in their contract either that the law of particular jurisdiction a govern questions shall of contract or interpretation,19 particular that a substantive in- rule, for stance “stacking,” shall or apply.20 shall not In the absence 17 Employers See also Nelson Casualty Co., 558, Mutual 2dWis. 563-566, 2, 3, 670, 672-674, nn. N. 2d 2, (1974), W. nn. ante, discussed 316-317, at n. 22. “stacking” provides The rule that all of the uninsured motorist cov erage purchased by party an may insured aggregated, “stacked,” or create a fund provide recovery available to a single for a accident. example, For in Home Dick, Ins. supra, 403, 1, Co. v. at and n. policy subject, by insurance express terms, to Mexican law. Co., Home supra, again provides example. a useful In that case, the policy expressly insurance provided 1-year period limitations for arising claims Id., thereunder. at Similarly, policy the insurance at issue in Indemnity Accident & Co., Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Hartford supra, at prescribed also specific period. limitations express provisions While such obviously relevant, they always are are not dispositive. Clay In v. Sun Ltd., Office, Insurance 377 U. S. the Court allowed the lower court’s choice of forum law to override an express period. contractual limitations emphasized- The Court the fact the insurer had issued the policy insurance knowledge with the it would property cover the insured Id., wherever it was taken. at 181-182. Court also noted that attempted the insurer had not provide in Id., law of another State would control. at 182. Employers Liability Watson v. Corp., S., Assurance policy expressly
insurance provided injured that an party could not main- *23 may im- nonetheless contract the express provisions, of such example, For parties. expectations the plicitly reveal par- of a by a resident policy issued liability insurance if a respect accidents only with provides coverage State ticular con- that the infer it is reasonable to State, that within the obligations under that their parties expected tracting by law.21 that State’s governed would be policy expecta- parties’ indication the express no case, In this for coverage policy provided is insurance available. The tions at the time of States; thus, the United throughout accidents that certainly anticipated have could contracting, parties particular govern other than Wisconsin would the law of States By busi- policy.22 doing virtue arising under claims liability after the insured’s against the insurer until a direct action tain neither the Due Process The Court found been determined. had prevented Louisiana Faith and Credit Clause nor the Full Clause against the permit a direct action applying from forum courts liability. Clay, the As in the insured’s prior to determination insurer anywhere injuries in coverage provided for noted that Court although additional, unarticu- S., 71-72. An at States. the United urging forum law litigant the fact that lated, factor in Watson was contracting While party to the insurance contract. applied was not a rule of law particular advance that may provide in parties be able to clearly entitled them, expectations are their disputes govern between will issue. litigants are at rights third-party weight when less in Mexico policy was issued Co., supra, insurance Home Ins. In only in certain vessel and covered insured corporation Mexican Id., at waters. Mexican 182, Watson Ltd., supra, at Office, Clay v. Sun Insurance con 71-72, Corp., supra, the Court Liability at Assurance Employers of forum courts’ choice upholding the lower significant, in it sidered throughout the United coverage policies provided insurance law, that Clay loss Watson the supra. course, Of in both States. State, the forum actually applied occurred the insurance which Wisconsin, Minnesota. not this case occurred the accident whereas question 336-337, because the post, recognizes, However, as the dissent liability, the tort interpretation rather than is one of contract the merits on process respect to the due dispositive is of the accident site actual con- at the time parties, the fact that inquiry. relevant More ness in Minnesota, Allstate was aware that could be sued in the Minnesota courts; presumably Allstate also was aware law, as well as the of most States, per- mitted “stacking.” Nothing the record requires that a *24 different inference be drawn. the Therefore, decision the Minnesota courts apply the law of forum the case this does not frustrate the expectations reasonable of the contract- ing I parties, can find no fundamental in that unfairness decision requiring the attention this Court.23 traeting, anticipated by that an accident covered the could occur “stacking” in a particular State. The fact this accident did not occur does not expectations undercut by the formed parties the at contracting. the time of In Indemnity Accident & Co. Co., v. Delta & Pine Land Hartford supra, the Court struck down a state despite court’s choice of forum law the fact that the insurance coverage contract’s by was not limited state boundaries. While may Accident indeed have “scant relevance Hartford today,” for ante, is nonetheless consistent with a due process analysis upon based fundamental parties. fairness to the One applied statutes Mississippi courts in Accident was Hartford offensively broad, providing that 11contracts of property, “[a] insurance on lives or interests in this state shall be deemed be made therein.” S.,U. at 148. No similar statute is involved in this In addition, case. Mississippi applied courts law of express forum to override an provision, contractual expectations thus frustrated the of the contract- ing parties. present case, the insurance contract contains no simi- lar parties. declaration the intent of the 23Comparison of this case with Dick, Home Ins. Co. v. 281 U. S. my confirms conclusion that the application of Minnesota law in this case does not offend the Due Process Co., In Home Clause. expressly provided contract particular that a period limitations govern would arising claims under the insurance contract and that Mexican applied law was to be in interpreting contract; addition, the con tract was limited in effect to certain Mexican parties waters. The could hardly have expectations made their respect applicable law plain. case, by way more In this contrast, nothing in the sug contract gests that applied Wisconsin should be or that “stacking” Minnesota’s rule should applied. not be case, In this Co., unlike Home Ins. the court’s choice of forum results no surprise unfair to the insurer. In terms of fundamental fairness, it seems to me that two factors relied upon by the plurality plaintiff’s post- —the accident move to Minnesota and the decedent’s Minnesota employment either —are irrelevant or possibly even tend to undermine the plurality’s conclusion. When expecta- tions of the parties at the time of are the contracting central due process concern, as they are in this case, an unanticipated postaccident occurrence is clearly irrelevant for due process purposes. The fact that the plaintiff became a resident of the forum State after the accident surely cannot justify a ruling in her favor that would not be made if plaintiff were a nonresident. Similarly, while the fact that the de- cedent regularly drove into Minnesota might be relevant the expectations of the contracting parties,24 the fact that he did so because he was employed in Minnesota adds nothing to process due analysis. The choice-of-law decision of the *25 Minnesota courts is consistent with process due because it does not result in unfairness to either litigant, not because Minnesota now has an interest plaintiff the as resident or formerly had an interest in the decedent as employee.
Ill Although I regard the Minnesota courts’ decision to apply forum law as unsound as a matter of conflicts law, and there 24Even this may factor not be of substantial significance. At the time of contracting, parties the were aware that the insurance effective throughout the United States and that the any State, in cluding Minnesota, might be applicable particular claims. The fact that the decedent regularly drove to Minnesota, for whatever purpose, is only relevant to the extent that it affected parties’ the evaluation, at the time of contracting, of the likelihood that Minnesota law would actually be applied at point some in the future. However, because the applicabil ity of Minnesota law was perceived possible as at the time of contracting, it does not seem especially significant process for due purposes that the parties may also have likely considered it that Minnesota law would be applied. This merely factor reinforces the expectation revealed policy’s coverage. national in favor presumption than other record little in this is I concur in decision, support own law forum’s of the function to es- Court’s not this It judgment. is plurality’s choice-of-law a federal courts upon state impose tablish courts cor- that state to ensure it function nor our rule, them- they have rules choice-of-law whatever rectly apply may be exercised authority Our adopted.25 selves Full a violation only prevent area choice-of-law For the reasons the Due Process Clause. Credit or Faith and case. I this find no such violation above, stated and Jus- The Chief Justice with whom Powell, Justice Rehnquist dissenting. join, tice I accept is narrow.
My disagreement plurality opinion, which plurality II of the reservations Part with few reviewing us in state guide principles forth basic sets The Court under the Constitution. choice-of-law decisions its own apply a forum State’s decision should invalidate significant between only there are no contacts when power check on litigation. and the This modest state State Fourteenth by the Due Process Clause of the is mandated IV, Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause Art. I believe, however, plurality adequately § do policies consequence, such review must serve. analyzes con- significant appear found what to me to be trivial has litigation. forum State and tacts between the *26 25 Kryger v. Wilson, 171, rejecting (1916), 176 after a due S. process challenge law, to a state court’s choice of the Court stated: say plaintiff made “The most in error can is that state court deciding a mistaken of doctrines of the conflict laws in governed by the cancellation of a land contfact is the law of the situs in- place making performance. that, being purely stead of the But a question law, of local common is a matter with which this court is not concerned.”
333
I
At least since Carroll v. Lanza,
First, the contacts between the forum State and the litigation should not so “slight and casual” that it would be funda mentally unfair to litigant for the forum to apply its own State’s Clay law. v. Sun Office, Ltd., S.U. (1964). The touchstone here is the expectation reasonable parties. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State’s Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 445-457 (1959) (Weintraub). Thus, in Clay, the “ insurer sold a to Clay ‘with knowledge that he could property take his anywhere in the world he saw fit without ” losing the protection of his insurance.’ U. S., quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Ltd., 363 S. 207, U. 221 (1960) Office (Black, J., dissenting). When the insured moved to Florida knowledge of the insurer, and a loss occurred in that State, this Court found no unfairness in Florida’s applying own rule of decision permit recovery on policy. insurer “must have known it might be sued there.” Ibid. also Employers Watson v. Liability Corp., Assurance (1954). U. S. 66 Dick, Home Ins. Co. v. U. S. 397 a case where the rea expectations
sonable litigant of a were frustrated. The insurance contract confined Mexico, the risk to where loss occurred and where both the insurer and the insured resided until the claim accrued. This Court found a violation Due Process Texas, Clause when State, the forum applied a rule local to allow the gain recovery insured to unavailable under Mexican law. Because the geographic limitation risk, on the *27 interest legitimate a have State must forum Second, In- v. Ins. Co. it. litigation before the outcome Pacific Full (1939). Comm’n, U. S. Accident dustrial the accommodation addresses Clause and Credit Faith limited States. Under the various among sovereign power to the stat- effect give one State circumstances, requires Hall, S.U. v. Nevada State. another law of utory effect give need not State a forum sure, To be own of its in “violation if that State’s to another for a Nonetheless, Id., at 422. public policy.” legitimate by applying legitimate public its further State to forum connection be some there must controversy, a law to its own scope litigation and to the rise giving the facts between jurisdiction. lawmaking of the State’s and Credit Clauses Full Faith Due Process
Both the beyond the limits out do not “reach the States ensure ain coequal sovereigns by their status as them on imposed Woodson, Volkswagen Corp. system.” World-Wide federal Fourteenth Amendment (1980) (addressing S. As the Court stated jurisdiction). on limitation state-court clause full faith and credit Co., supra: “[T]he Pacific statute, for its own to substitute one state require does conflicting it, within and events persons applicable added). Id., (emphasis at 502 state.” another statute rule of de- applying legitimate The State has rule only if to which the the facts litigation cision toward State, created within have effects applied will be To policy is directed. assess public State’s which contacts between the forum and the of asserted sufficiency if form a the court must determine the contacts litigation, policy. and a litigation link between state reasonable of contacts “the state addresses whether short, examination ac- no contacts with the forum State until the claim there were because expectation have had no crued, the insurer could reasonable Texas interpret obligations applied under the contract. See law would Weintraub *28 an
has
interest
in the application of its policy in this in
stance.” Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function,
in B. Cur
rie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of
Laws
189 (1963)
(Currie).
If it does, the Constitution is satisfied.
John Hancock Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Yates,
Life
In summary, the significance of the contacts between a forum State and the litigation must be assessed in light of
2 “It is manifest that Georgia had no interest in the application to this case any policy to be found in its laws. When the contract was entered into, and at all times until the insured died, the parties and the transac tion beyond were legitimate reach of policy whatever Georgia may have Any had. by asserted Georgia must relate to the circumstance that the action is tried there, and must arise not any from policy directed to the business of life insurance but from some policy having to do with the business of the courts. This was apparently recognized even Georgia court; hence the disingenuous characterization of the matter as one ‘procedure’ rather than of ‘substance.’” Currie 236. See also id., at 232-233. or a contact, A policies.3 constitutional important two these protects when the Constitution contacts, satisfies pattern State forum if the surprised unfairly being from litigants forum’s of the when law, own applies legitimate to further understood reasonably can State. forum public
II inquiry constitutional complexity Recognition restraint. principles these apply Court that this requires I do case, of this facts *29 principles these Applying contacts sufficient had Minnesota that however, believe, rule its apply to litigation in this events” “persons the expec- no reasonable that agree I would stacking. permitting insured risk The frustrated. were parties the of tations Sun Clay v. See limited. geographically not petitioner of proximity close The 182. at Ltd., S.,U. Office, Hague that fact the Minnesota, and toWis., City, Hager years should many for Minn., Wing, to Red daily commuted reasonable was a there that to realize insurer led the have Minnesota. in materialize would risk the that probability have could Minnesota plain is precedents, our Under bor- within occurring accident an law its own applied accident The fact 24. n. ante, at ders. be- controlling occur fact, not, did of cause litigants of the expectations before cause significance recognizes that today apparently plurality The It serves. review policies our light of must be evaluated contacte differ will sometimes contacts sufficiency the same acknowledges that plu The Ante, 23. at questions. and choice-of-law jurisdiction con requirement of sufficient for however, the rationale pursues rality, the forum’s than observe further no cases in choice-of-law tacts fundamentally arbitrary nor “neither must its own distinguish does not prohibition general this Ante, But unfair.” or from much jurisdiction, from those choice of questions of Amendment. Fourteenth jurisprudence action provide accrues pertinent perspective. See Wein traub 455; n. 1, supra.
The more doubtful question in this case is whether applica- tion of Minnesota’s substantive law reasonably furthers a legitimate state interest. The plurality attempts give sub- stance to the tenuous contacts between Minnesota and this litigation. Upon examination, however, these contacts are either trivial or irrelevant to the furthering of any public policy of Minnesota.
First, the postaccident residence of the plaintiff-beneficiary is constitutionally irrelevant to the choice-of-law question. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co. Yates, Life supra. plu rality today insists that Yates only held that a postoccurrence move to the forum State could not “in and of itself” confer power on the forum to apply its own law, but did not estab lish that such a change of residence was irrelevant. Ante, at 319. What the Yates Court held, however, was that “there was no occurrence, nothing done, which the law of Georgia could apply.” S.,U. at 182 (emphasis added). Any possible ambiguity in the Court’s view of the significance of postoccurrence change of residence is dispelled by Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, cited by the Yates Court, where it was held squarely that Dick’s postaccident move to the forum *30 State was “without significance.” 281 U. S., at
This rule is sound. If a plaintiff could choose the sub- stantive rules to be applied to an action by moving to a hospitable forum, the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible. Moreover, it would permit the defendant’s rea- sonable expectations at the time the cause of action accrues to be frustrated, it because permit would the choice-of-law question to turn on a postaccrual circumstance. Finally, postaccrual residence has nothing to do with facts to which the forum State proposes to apply its rule; is unrelated to the substantive legal issues presented by the litigation.
Second, the plurality finds it significant that the insurer does business in the forum State. Ante, at 317-318. The State 338 practices the regulating in interest legitimate a have
does The much. too proves argument this But insurer. such an State The forum States. in all business here does insurer unre of the insurer conduct that regulating in interest no has the within contracts executed or persons, property, to lated Cullen, 318 Canning Co. v. Hoopeston State.4 forum flaw recognizes this plurality The (1943). 313, 319 S.U. presence local of the significance the to bolster attempts deemed the other it with factors combining by insurer the that the fact plaintiff of the presence significant: merely restates This State. forum in the worked deceased the case. in question basic in- that particularly emphasizes plurality Third, The Ante, 313-317. State.5 forum in the worked sured the forum in employee a nonresident was the insured that fact Yates, U. S. Co. v. Ins. Mut. Hancock in John petitioner The Life that time of State, at the Georgia, the forum in (1936), did business extensively Also, Georgia Almanac The Insurance case. See Code Ga. time. See at that within State practices regulated insurance this in Yates not hint did (1933). This Court seq. et §56-101 question, the choice-of-law significance slightest fact personam inof the exercise crucial for been have although it would jurisdiction. separate finding a fact, this service from exacts double plurality Ante, at 314-315. job. daily his commuted that the insured contact in Wisconsin lived the insured of the facts merely repetition is This safety have does an The State in Minnesota. and worked employees, not' limited This interest roads. its who use of motorists safety highways. This on motorists all nonresident but extends any practical logic or in encompass, either however, cannot interest, benefit stack can estate a nonresident's whether sense, determination regarding an accident another State written coverage in roads. State’s another on occurred hardly estab- Co., U. S. 469 Liberty Mutual Cardillo merely approved contact; the case independent as an commutation lishes occurring accident an industrial law to State's a forum resided employee both employer and the neighboring State when in a *31 State. forum in the provides
State a significant contact for the furtherance of some policies. local e. See, g., Ins. Co. v. Industrial Pacific Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. (1939) (forum State’s inter- est in compensating workers for employment-related injuries occurring within the State); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Indus- trial Accident Comm’n, 294 U. S. (1935) (forum State’s interest employment-related compensating in- juries of a worker hired in State). The insured’s place employment is not, however, significant in this case. Neither the nature of the insurance policy, events related to the accident, nor the question immediate of stacking coverage is in any way affected implicated or by the insured’s employ- ment status. The plurality’s opinion is vague understandably in explaining how trebling the benefits paid to be estate of a nonresident employee any furthers substantial state relating to employment. Minnesota does not wish its workers to die automobile accidents, but permit- ting stacking will not further this interest. The substantive issue solely here is one of compensation, and whether compensation provided by this increased or not will have no relation to the employment State’s policies police or power. See 5,n. supra.
Neither taken separately nor in aggregate do the con- by tacts asserted the plurality today indicate that Minne- application sota’s of its substantive rule in this case fur- will any ther legitimate state interest.6 The plurality focuses opinion of Justice SteveNs concurring in judgment supports my view that the forum State’s of its own law to this case justified by cannot be the existence of relevant minimum contacts. As Justice SteveNs observes, principal by factors relied plurality on “either are possibly irrelevant to or even tend to [plural undermine the ity’s] Ante, conclusion.” at 331. The interesting analysis proposes he uphold judgment the State’s is, however, difficult to reconcile with our prior may decisions and create more problems than solves. For ex questionable ample, it seems to measure the interest of a State in a con troversy by degree of conscious reliance on private State’s law *32 scant non, pays so doing vel contacts only physical on prece- why our reasons fundamental more attention in choice-of- contacts policy-related reasonable require dents I dissent. Therefore, law cases. strength scrutinizing the Moreover, Ante, a contract.
parties into the Court back this may draw State of a nonforum interests in a States of various interests relative weighing practice discredited opinion). (plurality 308, n. 10 ante, at controversy. See particular