On January 10, 1975, defendant Lacy Anderson, owner and operator of a truck insured by plaintiff Allstate Insurance Co., and Anderson’s passengers, defendants Johnson and Gierak, were severely injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Anderson also owned a car *541 insured by Allstate in a separate policy. Each policy contained uninsured motorist coverage in the limits of $20,000/$40,000. This appeal, from an order of summary judgment granted in defendant’s favor on September 2, 1977, concerns the question of whether Anderson and his passengers may "stack” benefits under Anderson’s two policies.
For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in
Kozak
v
Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange,
Allstate argues that two provisions in the uninsured motorist section of the policy preclude stacking. The first is a part of the definition of "insured”:
"The insurance applies separately with respect to each insured, but the application of the insurance to more than one insured shall not operate to increase the limits of Allstate’s liability.”
The second is a 102-word sentence under the caption "Limits of Liability”:
"The limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each person’ is the limit of Allstate’s liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and, subject to the above provision respecting each person, the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each accident’ is the total limit of Allstate’s liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one accident.”
*542
Insurance contracts are to be strictly construed against the insurer.
Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Insurance Co,
Even if the language were clear, the result might well be unconscionable. The insurer is collecting two uninsured motorist premiums, yet attempting to deliver only one recovery. See
Blakeslee v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co of Michigan,
Allstate argues that even if we allow stacking as to the named insured, we should deny it as to the passengers, because they paid no premiums and are not resident relatives of the named insured. We do not find this argument persuasive. The terms of the policy make no such distinction; the definition of "insured” in the uninsured motorist section includes "any other person while occupying an insured automobile”. Thus
Auto-Owners Insurance Co v Traviss,
*543 Allstate also directs our attention to Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v Curl, supra. In that case Russell Curl was killed in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Curl had resided in a household with his parents and a relative named Cummins. Curl’s estate sought to stack three policies — two issued to Curl’s parents, and one issued to Cummins. This Court allowed stacking of the parents’ policies, but denied it as to the Cummins policy.
In the case at bar Allstate contends that Anderson and Gierak are on the same footing as the Cummins policy. We disagree. The logical extension of stacking of the Cummins policy would have been unlimited liability which the insurer could not possibly foresee when writing a policy — e.g., a resident of a commune attempting to stack policies held by 20 or 30 residents of the same commune. In the case at bar, however, the insurer could forsee the liability stemming from a finite number of passengers, all defined as "insureds”, riding in a vehicle of finite size. As stated in the dissenting opinion of Kozak, supra at 786, should this result seem unfair to the insurer, the insurer may always petition the insurance commissioner for a rate adjustment. The insured has no such remedy.
Affirmed.