738 A.2d 231 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1998
This matter arises on the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), in its declaratory judgment action against the named defendant Paul Simansky (Simansky), and the intervening defendant, Brendan Smith (Smith). Allstate seeks a ruling that pursuant to a policy coverage exclusion, it owes no duty to indemnify Simansky, its insured, with respect to a claim made against Simansky for personal injuries incurred by Smith. The injuries were incurred during an altercation when Smith was stabbed in the throat with a knife by Simansky. That claim is the subject of a lawsuit brought by Smith against Simansky *624 pending in this court.1 The altercation occurred at the University of Hartford, where both defendant were students.
The relevant underlying facts are not in dispute. Simansky is a person insured under a homeowner's policy of insurance in effect at the time of the subject altercation issued by Allstate in New Jersey to Simansky's parents, who resided in New Jersey. Among other things, the policy provides coverage for accidental loss which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages resulting from a covered bodily injury or property loss. In the criminal proceeding brought against him for the stabbing, Simansky was convicted of a violation of General Statutes §
The issues before this court concern the applicability of a specific policy exclusion. That exclusion, set forth in section II of the policy dealing with "Family Liability Protection," reads: "Losses We Do Not Cover:
"1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured per son or which are in fact intended by an insured person. "
"It is the function of the court to construe the provisions of the contract of insurance." Gottesman v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
The parties have cited no Connecticut rulings directly on point on the issues incident to this policy exclusion. The court may look for guidance to other jurisdictions, however, where there are a number of relevant cases. These cases, all enforcing this policy exclusion, include the following: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown,
The terms of the exclusion are clear and unambiguous. The exclusionary conditions are stated in the disjunctive. A distinction is made between (1) bodily injury and property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from an insured's intentional or criminal acts, and (2) such injuries or damage which are in fact intended by the insured. While the condition "or . . . which are in fact intended" requires the subjective or conscious desire of the insured to inflict harm, the condition "which may reasonably be expected" does not. To so require a subjective intent for this condition would render this clause "wholly redundant." AllstateIns. Co. v. Schmitt, supra,
Brown applied the exclusion to a conviction for recklessly inflicting serious bodily harm while armed with a handgun. Id., 226. Barnett applied the exclusion to a conviction for criminal recklessness with a deadly *626
weapon. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barnett, supra,
The basic rule on the effect of a conviction is set forth in Schmitt,
as follows: "A judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of the insured's guilt. No independent examination of the underlying fact should be undertaken in order to ascertain his guilt of the crime. Although a conviction may or may not be conclusive evidence of the underlying facts, it is to be accorded preclusive effect with respect to the insured's commission of the crime." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schmitt, supra,
In his memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Smith contends that this exclusion is void as against public policy on the ground that it denies coverage for criminal acts without regard to mental state. The gist of this proposition is that only crimes which are intentionally committed should qualify for a valid exclusion, for otherwise "victims of unintentional crimes might oppose prosecution for fear of *627 a loss of compensation." Neither defendant has cited any authority in support of this proposition, whether it be case law, statute or regulation, as it may relate to this or any similar policy exclusion. There apparently is none.
Connecticut law has long upheld policy exclusions that have the effect of depriving an innocent victim of the benefit of the tortfeasor's liability insurance. See, e.g., Flint v. Universal Machine Co., supra,
Simansky was convicted of violating §
General Statutes §
The conviction followed a plea of nolo contendere. The defendants contend that the conviction is thereby inadmissible as an admission.Krowka v. Colt Patent Fire Arm Mfg. Co.,
Such is not the situation here. The present case involves the enforcement of a contractual provision in an insurance policy. "`[A] conviction pursuant to a nolo contendere plea gives rise to a variety of collateral consequences in subsequent proceedings.'" Munnelly v. UnitedStates Postal Service,
The rule was succinctly stated in Sokoloff v. Saxbe,
The same rule applies in the present case. The fact of the conviction has a collateral legal consequence on the enforcement of the policy exclusion. For purposes of the exclusion, the conviction cannot be disregarded as if it did not happen. It did happen, and in so happening triggered the exclusion.
The court notes the strict requirements regarding nolo contendere pleas imposed by the Practice Book (as well as case law). The plea must be in writing, the defendant must be properly canvassed, the plea must be found to be voluntary, and the judicial authority must be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. Practice Book §§
The final issue, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, involves the policy exclusion requirement that bodily injury would reasonably be expected to result from Simansky's criminal act. Simansky stabbed Smith in the neck with a knife. There can be no question but that bodily injury to Smith would reasonably be expected to result from this criminal act. Moreover, Simansky was convicted of a crime involving conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and in fact causes serious physical injury to such person. To paraphrase the court's statement inAllstate Ins. Co. v. Barnett, supra,
"[S]ummary judgment `shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted *630
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Suarez v.Dickmont Plastics Corp. ,
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. DickmontPlastics Corp. , supra,
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Allstate is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The policy exclusion applies. The motion is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of Allstate.