50 Mo. 274 | Mo. | 1872
delivered the opinion of the court.
From the record in this case it is shown that the defendant Sutherlin was indebted to the banking house of Wm. H. Trigg & Co., by various, distinct and separate promissory notes, on three of which, amounting in the aggregate to about $1,800, the plaintiff Allison was surety. These three notes, together with the other notes, amounted to about the sum of $9,500. The banking house, for purposes of collection, transferred all these debts to William H. Trigg. The other defendants herein, together with Trigg, constituted the banking house. On each of the debts so held by Trigg separate judgments had been obtained in the Cooper Circuit Court'. Some of the debts were for other parties, although standing in the name of the banking house. Executions were issued on all the judgments, returnable to the March term, 1864, of the Circuit Court, and these executions were levied on all of the real estate of the defendant Sutherlin, consisting of several thousand acres of land. One H. C. Levens also held a demand against Sutherlin, amounting to about $1,200, which was secured by deed of trust on some of Sutherlin’s real estate; but the liens of the judgments in favor of Trigg had priority over the deed :of trust.
Under the judgments the real estate of Sutherlin was advertised' to be sold, and on the day of sale the defendant Sutherlin and his surety, Allison, the plaintiff here, and the creditors met at the sale ; and as it was war times and there was great excitement in
Trigg, under this trust, in connection with Sutherlin, who warranted the title, sold seven or eight thousand dollars’ worth of these lands, leaving about 400 acres still unsold, and the amounts of these sales were paid over to the beneficiaries of the debts held by Trigg. Trigg then transferred to the defendants in this suit the balance of the lands, to be held and disposed of by them on the same terms and trusts. These parties accounted for and paid over to Levens his pro rata share of the money realized.
The plaintiff then brought this suit to be subrogated to the rights of the creditors under the said trust, and to compel them to account for and pay over to him a pro rata share of the moneys arising from the sales of the lands, and to have the remainder of the lands sold and appropriated under the trust, and his part of the proceeds paid over to him.
The case was submitted to the court on the facts as substantially set out above, and the court decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
The doctrine is well settled that as soon as a surety has paid the debt, an equity arises in his favor to have all the securities, original and collateral, which the creditor held against the person or property of the principal debtor, transferred to him, and to avail himself of them as fully as the creditor could have done for the purpose of obtaining indemnity from the principal. By paying the debt of the principal the surety becomes entitled to be subrogated to all the rights of the creditor, so as to have the benefit of all the securities which the creditor had for the payment of the debt, without any exception — as well those which become extinct at law, at least by the act of the surety paying the debt, as all collateral securities which the creditors held for the payment of it — which have not been considered as directly extinguished by the sureties paying the debt. (Furnold v. Bank of Missouri, 44 Mo. 336, and cases cited.)
We do not controvert the rule laid down in Wade v. Cooper, 2 Sim. Ch. 155, and in Matthews v. Switzler, 46 Mo. 301, the cases mainly relied on for the defendants in error, but we think that the facts in this case render it inapplicable. By the express terms of the trust the plaintiff was to be one of the beneficiaries;
The fact that the two years mentioned in the writing have .expired cannot defeat or affect the plaintiff’s rights in the premises. The trust continues until the whole matter is wound up and settled.
There are several hundred acres of land yet remaining unsold, and the plaintiff has a direct interest in seeing that they are disposed of to the best advantage, and he is entitled to his proportionate share of the proceeds.
We think the court erred in its decision, and the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.