Allison v. PattersonAllison v. Patterson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Horowitz
This case involves the constitutionality of
Respondent Roycroft Patterson was charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree after having twice broken into other people‘s homes. Each time, he claimed he
Civil commitment is governed by
Under
(3) Such person is in custody because he has committed acts constituting a felony, and as a result of a mental disorder, presente a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts. In any proceeding pursuant to this subsection it shall not be necessary to show intent, wilfulness, or state of mind as an element of the felony . . .
At the end of respondent Patterson‘s second 90-day period of detention for evaluation and treatment under
At a November 1976 hearing the criminal charges against respondent were dismissed pursuant to
This court was informed at oral argument that respondent Patterson was at that time committed in a California state mental hospital. He had been committed after being found incompetent to stand trial on arson charges stemming from an incident in California in January 1977. The issue here is therefore moot with regard to respondent Patterson. Nonetheless, this court will review an otherwise moot case if matters of continuing and substantial interest are involved.
Northwest Trollers Ass‘n v. Moos,
89 Wn.2d 1, 568 P.2d 793 (1977);
Hartman v. State Game Comm‘n, 85
Wn.2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1975);
Sorenson v. Bellingham,
80 Wn.2d 547, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). Under the criteria set out in
Hartman v. State Game Comm‘n, supra,
this case is appropriate for review
Counsel for respondent first contends
We believe the rational relationship test is the proper test to apply to this statute to determine the equal protection issues raised. Courts have uniformly applied the rational relationship test to the statutes creating differing classes of persons for purposes of involuntary commitment statutes.
See Dorsey v. Solomon,
435 F. Supp. 725 (D. Md. 1977);
French v. Blackburn,
428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977);
Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth,
377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The United States Supreme Court irnpliedly. used the rational relationship test in
Jackson v. Indiana,
406
Applying that standard, we find no equal protection violation here. Persons subject to the special procedures for the 90-day commitment under
whether the defendant is a substantial danger to other persons, or presents a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions.
Furthermore, although respondent contends the State is under no duty to seek less restrictive alternatives for incompetent persons,
The court may, if requested, also appoint a professional person ... to seek less restrictive alternative courses of treatment ... on behalf of the detained person.
At the hearing on the petition for a 90-day civil commitment the same procedures, burden of proof, and other protections are provided for incompetent persons as for others subject to a 90-day civil commitment.
See
Respondent points to
Jackson v. Indiana, supra,
for the proposition that the mere filing of criminal charges without more is insufficient reason for treating persons incompetent to stand trial differently from others in civil commitment proceedings. The issue in
Jackson,
however, was the constitutional protections to be afforded to persons subject to indefinite commitment because they have been found incompetent to stand trial. The Supreme Court held a state could not commit a person who is incompetent to stand trial for an indefinite period upon a mere showing of incompetency, where others subject to indefinite commitment were afforded substantial procedural protections. The effect of the statute challenged there, the court found, was to condemn incompetent persons to permanent institutionalization; the distinctions the state had made, it was held, had deprived them of substantial rights. By contrast, persons in respondent‘s class here are not subject to indefinite commitment, and must be found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence to have committed felonious acts and to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts in the future in order to be committed for only 90 days. Furthermore, such persons are given exactly the same treatment at the 90-day commitment stage as are all other
Respondent contends, however, there is one other significant difference in treatment afforded persons in his class, that is, the grounds upon which they may be committed. The grounds of commitment of persons subject to the special procedure of
Respondent first argues this ground for commitment was not even intended to apply to persons found incompetent to stand trial. The argument is based on the definition of “custody” in
It is next contended that the statute deprives persons in respondent‘s class of equal protection and due process because it does not allow them to litigate the question whether they are dangerous. All felonies are not dangerous, it is argued, so commission of acts constituting a felony may not be presumed to prove dangerousness. By contrast, other persons entering civil commitment process through the 72-hour and 14-day detention periods must be found
Persons in respondent‘s class, of course, can litigate the question whether they committed the alleged felonious acts at the hearing on the petition for the 90-day commitment. The grounds set forth in .280(3) include the fact that the person committed acts constituting a felony. Under the rules for the hearing on the petition set out in
The basic question underlying respondent‘s contention is whether persons who have committed acts constituting a felony, and who are found by mental health professionals and a court or jury to be likely to do so again, are dangerous. Under Washington law the only basis for involuntary commitment is dangerousness. We held in
In re Levias, supra
at 257, that there is no basis for involuntary commitment of persons
“who are not unsafe.”
We did not limit the meaning of dangerousness, though, to physical dangerousness. Acts which are so seriously antisocial as to be classed felonies are dangerous to the security, if not the lives, of our citizens. The State has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens against such acts. We said in
Alter v. Morris,
85 Wn.2d 414, 420, 536 P.2d 630 (1975) that the State‘s interest in commitment is in “the safety
and security
of its citizens.” (Italics ours.) Nor does involuntary commitment of persons likely to commit such acts exceed the constitutional limits of the State‘s power. In his concurring opinion in
O‘Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 582, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), Chief Justice Burger said, “There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the danger of significant antisocial acts“. We hold that civil commitment of persons who have
It is argued that persons in respondent‘s class are nonetheless deprived of their constitutional rights because they may not show they did not have the requisite state of mind to commit a felony. Thus, it is argued, their acts are presumed to be felonious even though they could not have had the intent to commit a felony because of their mental illness. The statute does not, of course, presume that persons in respondent‘s class have committed felonies. It only provides for commitment of mentally ill persons who have committed acts which, apart from state of mind, constitute felonies, that is, are seriously antisocial acts. The issue of state of mind, or blameworthiness, is irrelevant. It is the nature of the acts themselves as presenting a danger to society, and not the state of mind of the actor, which is relevant.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
Wright, C.J., and Rosellini, Hamilton, Stafford, Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, and Hicks, JJ., concur.