187 S.W.2d 728 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1945
Affirming.
The case tests the constitutionality of Chapter 65 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1942. The Act which appears in the Kentucky Revised Statutes as sections
"The jurisdiction of the County Court shall be uniform throughout the State, and shall be regulated by *808 general law, and, until changed, shall be the same as now vested in the County Courts of this State by law."
The circuit court upheld the Act and declared the rights and duties of the county judge, the directors, and the property owners.
Appellants insist that the Act violates section 59 of the Constitution which prohibits special legislation. We have held that general laws which are, by their terms, restricted in their operation to cities of the first class or counties containing a city of the first class were not in violation of the provisions against local legislation. If the classification rests upon a distinctive and natural reason rather than an arbitrary one, it is legal and the law is a general one in the constitutional sense. Connors v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 277, Ky. 23,
"The power of classification for legislative purposes *809 rests with the Legislature, subject to the constitutional limitation or restriction that it must rest on some natural and reasonable difference which appears reasonable and just in relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed. The Constitution permits the Legislature to indulge in making classifications of subjects of legislation for the purpose of making different classes, for the meeting of different contingencies, naturally requiring different legislation in order that the Legislature may adopt general legislation to meet the needs of the people to promote some public object, or the welfare or interest of the general public. (Citations). Such classification will not be disturbed by the court unless so manifestly unfounded, arbitrary, or unjust as to impose a burden upon, or exclude, one or more of a class, without reasonable basis in fact."
We are unable to say that the Legislature, in enacting Chapter 65 of the Acts of 1942, violated any of the limitations or restrictions prescribed by section 59 of the Constitution.
Appellants' principal contention is that the Act violates section 141 of the Constitution which provides that the jurisdiction of the county court shall be uniform throughout the state. The act is a comprehensive one and provides, in substance, that upon written petition of 51 per cent of the owners of property within the proposed public road district, the county judge shall, after first submitting the matter to the county engineer and after setting a time for those objecting to the establishing of the road district to be heard, establish the public road district if satisfied that 51 per cent of the property owners signed the petition and that the signatures are genuine. The county judge is authorized to appoint three persons as members of the road district board of directors whose duty it shall be to control and manage the affairs of the district. By order entered in the county court, the county judge shall fix the amount of the bond of each director and shall approve the same. The Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the board in taking bids for the construction or resurfacing of roads, having the work done, levying and collecting assessment taxes to pay for same, and to pay the expenses of the district. The assessments are made a first lien on the abutting property, and are made on the front foot basis. Appellants rely upon Beauchamp v. Henning, *810
Appellants complain because other sections of our Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, are violated, but these complaints are not stressed. The procedure set up by the Act for constructing roads, assessing the cost against the abutting property, issuing bonds, etc., is similar to the procedure in cities of the first class for improving streets at the cost of the owners of abutting property. The validity of such procedure has been upheld in numerous cases. In view of the rule that all doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in its favor, we are constrained to hold that the Act before us does not contravene any constitutional provision.
The judgment is affirmed.