Allied-Signal, Inc. v. FoxAllied-Signal, Inc. v. Fox
ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC., etc., Appellant,
v.
Kevin FOX, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida.
*1181 Kathleen M. O'Connor of Thornton, David, Murray, Richard & Davis, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
G. William Bissett of Hardy & Bissett, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
Mаrguerite H. Davis of Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis & Marks, P.A., Tallahassee, amicus сuriae for American Ins. Ass'n.
Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Mеadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, amicus curiae for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyеrs.
Sharon Lee Stedman of De Ciccio & Associates, P.A., Orlando, amicus curiae for the Florida Defense Lawyеrs Ass'n.
GRIMES, Justice.
Pursuant to section 25.031, Florida Statutes (1987), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.150, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has сertified to this Court a question concerning the interpretation of section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1989). Fox v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
The federal appeals court outlined the circumstances giving rise to certification as follows:
On March 9th, 1990, plaintiff-appеllee Kevin Fox was working for Eastern Airlines as a technician performing mаintenance and overhaul on the electrical systems of airplаnes. Fox was servicing an aircraft fan, Allied fan model 73 FA18, when his fingers were caught in the rotating blades of the fan. The fan did not have a safety screen аt that particular moment. Allied's maintenance and service manual did not indicate that a safety screen or guard needed to be used ovеr the fan while it was being serviced. Moreover, Eastern Airlines and its employee, Kevin Fox, failed to place a guard or screen over the fаn. Eastern Airlines was nonetheless aware of the OSHA requirement that guarding be placed over rotating machines to protect operators from hazards,29 C.F.R. § 1910.212 (1991). Further, Eastern had established a system for using safety screens, it had instructed its employees on the use of such screens, and it had regularly schеduled maintenance programs to educate its employees on these procedures. Apparently, this accident occurred during a strike against Eastern, and Mr. Fox, as well as other employees, had only been engaged in this type of work for a short period of time. As "new hires," thesе individuals were given some training, but there is a serious question about its adequaсy and what was in fact covered. Eastern Airlines was immune from suit pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act,Fla. Stat. § 440.11 .
As a result of the accident, Mr. Fox received permanent physical injuries: four fingers of his left hand were injured, two of which were amputated. He was able to return to work four months after the aсcident. Mr. Fox alleged that Allied was negligent in failing to instruct that the fan should be sеrviced with a safety screen, and in failing to warn of the fan's suction. The trial court denied Allied's request to allow the jury to consider and assess non-party Eastern's percentage of fault, if any, under Florida's Tort Reform Act,Fla. Stat. § 768.81 (1989). The court interpreted the statute to allow apportionment of fault only among the parties to the suit.
The jury found Allied to be seventy percent (70%) negligent and Mr. Fox thirty percent (30%) comparatively negligent. Mr. Fox was awarded a total amount of $350,000.00 in damages. Thus, the amended final judgment was $245,000.00. The *1182 district court denied Allied's motion for a new trial.
Fox,
The court phrased the question for certification as follows:
WHETHER THE INTERPRETATION OF FLA. STAT.§ 768.81(3) (1989) REQUIRES CONSIDERATION BY THE JURY OF A NON-PARTY'S COMPARATIVE FAULT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE A PARTY'S LIABILITY?
Id. at 628. As a reason for the certification, the court noted the conflicting opinions оn the subject in Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Co.,
On the authority of our decision in Fabre v. Marin,
Having answered the certified question, we return the record to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
BARKETT, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons I stated in Fabre v. Marin,
KOGAN, J., concurs.