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Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v. United States Agency for International Development
651 F.3d 218
2d Cir.
2011
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 study for a new than commission rather view this decision was IN 24. In our ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY

Hangar unreasonable, especially given the TERNATIONAL, INC., Pathfinder In on the FAA’s based prediction, agency’s ternational, Council, Global Health airport projects, other with experience Interaction, Plaintiffs-Appellees, project unlikely was Hangar at all on noise levels. We any impact have Society Open Institute, Plaintiff, hold, therefore, im- that the FAA’s noise impervious pe- calculations pact v. challenge. titioners’ IN UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR course, Massport if and when Of DEVELOPMENT, TERNATIONAL develop with additional proceed chooses to Shah,* Rajiv capacity in his official as Hanscom, may require that work ment Agency Administrator of the for U.S. But NEPA approvals. FAA additional Development, International and his analysis only requires a cumulative “to successors, United States Centers project is assessed as a ensure that Prevention, Disease Control component not sliced into ‘small whole and ” Frieden, R. Thomas in his official ca FAA, v. parts.’ Town of Marshfield Cir.2008) (1st pacity (quoting 40 as Director of the U.S. Centers F.3d C.F.R. 1508.27(b)(7)). purposes, For NEPA Prevention, for Disease Control and speculate possi about the agency need successors, and his De United States future actions that ble effects of partment of Health and Human Ser Coal, See, e.g., on Sensible may not ensue. vices, Sebelius, Kathleen in her offi Dole, 826 F.2d Transp., Inc. capacity Secretary cial (D.C.Cir.1987). Department of Health and Human Services, successors, and her Defend III. CONCLUSION ants-Appellants.** go need no further. A careful read- We ing of the administrative record shows Docket No. 08-4917-CV. FAA conspicuous clarity with was of, with, complied respon- cognizant Appeals, United States Court of applicable under the sibilities statutes Second Circuit. regulations. The conclusions that Argued: Dec. 2010.

reached, inevitable, though not are ade- quately grounded and in accordance with July Decided: Accordingly, deny petition law. we judicial review.

So Ordered. ** showing special dence a need for noise level The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the protection any place vicinity. in the caption official to read as shown above. * Named officials have been substituted for their predecessors pursuant R.App. to Fed. P. 43(c)(2). *5 Diller, for

Rebekah Brennan Center Law, York, School of New Justice NYU (Laura Abel, Bannon, junctions K. Alicia L. entered NY the United States Udell, Jus- S. Brennan Center for District for David the Southern District of York, Law, /.). (Marrero, tice NYU School New New York The district Ahn, Bowker, NY; David W. Sue-Yun enjoined Agencies court from enforc- Wilmer Pickering Hale Dorr 7631(f), § Cutler provision U.S.C. LLP, D.C.; Hirseh, Washington, Jason D. United Leadership Against States HIV/ Wilmer Pickering Hale Dorr Cutler AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of LLP, York, NY, brief), for New on the Act”), (“Leadership 22 U.S.C. Plaintiffs-Appellees. seq., against Plaintiffs-Appellees et Alli- Open International, ance Society Inc. Torrance, Benjamin H. Assistant United (“Path- (“AOSI”), Pathfinder International Attorney States for the Southern District finder”), (“GHC”), Global Health Council (David Jones, York of New S. Assistant and InterAetion. are non-govern- These Attorney, counsel; United States Preet (“NGOs”) mental organizations engaged in Bharara, Attorney, United on the States the international fight against HIV/AIDS brief), Defendants-Appellants. receive under the Act. Lapidus, Rights Lenora M. Women’s 7631(f) Section of the Leadership Act Union, Project, American Liberties Civil provides that “[n]o funds made available to York, (Mie Lewis, New NY Women’s carry out this Act be used to Project, Rights American Civil Liberties provide any group assistance to or organi- Union, NY; York, New Arthur N. Eisen- zation does not have a explicitly Karterton, Alexis New Civil berg, York opposing prostitution.” provision, This Union, York, NY; Liberties New James *6 implemented by and Agen- construed the Esseks, Saxe, Rose LGBT and Pro- AIDS cies, NGOs, requires as a condition of re- ject, Union, American Civil Liberties New ceiving funds, Leadership Act to adopt a York, NY, brief), on the for Amici Curiae policy explicitly opposing prostitution, and American Humanist Association and prohibits recipients engaging from any in Public Health and Human Rights Other activities are “inconsistent” with an Organizations and Experts. anti-prostitution stance. Certain other re- (Eileen Lustberg Lawrence S. M. Con- funds, cipients Leadership Act such as nor, brief), P.C., Newark, on the Gibbons Organization, the Health World are not NJ, Independent for Amicus Curiae Sec- by bound this restriction. tor. below, As explained we conclude that STRAUB, POOLER, Before: and B.D. 7631(f), § as implemented by Agencies, the PARKER, Judges. Circuit beyond falls well what the upheld permissible and this Court have Judge in a separate STRAUB dissents on receipt conditions opinion. 7631(f) funds. merely Section does not PARKER, JR., Judge: B.D. Circuit recipients require Leadership Act funds Defendants-Appellants conduct, from Agency to refrain certain but goes (“USAID”), Development substantially compels for International recipi- further and Department espouse the U.S. of Health Hu- ents government’s and to view- (“HHS”), See point. § man Services and the Consequent- U.S. Cen- C.F.R. 89.1. ly, ters for agree Disease Control and Prevention we with the court district (“CDC”) (collectively, “Agencies” or Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood “Defendants”) in- appeal preliminary Finding success merits. no 7631(e). Second, court, imposed § by the district of discretion

abuse specifies that: Requirement, which affirm. we carry out No funds made available BACKGROUND provide Act be used to this any group organization assistance Leadership Act explicitly a policy that does not have traffick- prostitution and sex opposing the Leader- 2003, Congress passed subsection shall not ing, except enhance Unit- that this strengthen and “to ship Act AIDS, Fight apply the effectiveness to the Global Fund leadership and ed States Malaria, the World response to and States Tuberculosis of the United HIV/ tuberculosis, pandem- malaria International AIDS, Organization, and Health 2009).1 Ill Unit- (Supp. § 7603 Initiative or AIDS Vaccine ics.” U.S.C. several avenues designates agency. ed Nations The Act campaign international through which this 7631(f). only the litigation § This involves run, “5-year, global including to be do not Poliсy Requirement. Plaintiffs development of vaccines strategies”; Requirement’s “sex traffick- challenge the treatments; part- “public-private” and component. ing” agencies and federal nerships between recognized “have NGOs, Congress which Implementation Initial Defendants’ combating effective proven HIV/ 7601(18), §§ pandemic.” AIDS implement the Agencies The defendant concern Congress’s The Act reflects by, part, U.S.- cultural, social, behavioral with the NGOs involved the international based 7601(15). See causes HIV/AIDS. Path- AOSI and fight against HIV/AIDS. 7601(23), forty-one congres- one of Section organizations. two such AOSI finder are §in ad- “findings” set forth sional Asia that aims program runs a Central “Prostitution prostitution: dresses prevent spread HIV/AIDS *7 degrading are to other sexual victimization use, injection drug while Pathfin- reducing it the and children and should be women spread to stem the der works HIV/ to eradicate States policy of United by providing family planning and AIDS industry, the traf- practices. such The sex in more than reproductive health services industry, into such ficking of individuals Both twenty countries. receive causes violence are additional and sexual Agencies than the and from sources other spread of the factors in the of and HIV/ But their supports prostitution. neither epidemic.” AIDS engaging, educating, involve work does assisting groups, prostitutes, such as prostitution-re- two and Congress imposed HIV/AIDS, as well Act fund- that are vulnerable Leadership lated conditions discussing and First, advocating approaches made as specified it no funds ing. among fighting for strategies Act be used carry available to out the HIV/AIDS at, among places, other legalization prostitutes or promote or advocate and forums. trafficking. sex conferences practice prostitution 2008, Pub.L. No. 110— Leadership and Reauthorization Act of 1. Act was reauthorized 2918; Henry and J. 22 U.S.C. 7671. amended in 2008. Tom Lantos Stat. see 122 Leadership Hyde Global United States the Act. version of We cite to the current HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Against and Malaria

225 enacted, activity Leadership expression Act was tution-related and After were, fact, restricted. Legal Office of Department Justice’s (“OLC”) applying warned that Counsel granted The district court AOSI organi- Policy Requirement to U.S.-based preliminary injunctive Pathfinder relief. would be unconstitutional. Heed- Int’l, zations Open Soc’y Alliance Inc. v. U.S. for initially Dev., re- warning, Defendants ing Agency 222 F.Supp.2d Int’l (“Alliance I”). (S.D.N.Y.2006) against from it enforcing frained U.S.- The court thorough engaged analysis changed NGOs. subsequently based OLC Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional condi- and withdrew what it characterized course jurisprudence focusing, tions” in particu- advice,” asserting “tentative prior as its — lar, on Regan v. Taxation Repre- With arguments that “there reasonable sentation, S.Ct. constitutionality” applying support the[ ] (1983), FCC v. League of Policy Requirement U.S.-based or- California, Women Voters and, mid-2005, ganizations, starting L.Ed.2d began Requirement Agencies applying the (1984), Sullivan, and Rust v. grantees. Specifically, to U.S.-based L.Ed.2d 233 requiring issued a USAID directive (1991). that, The cоurt first concluded organizations, as condition of U.S.-based because the substan- Act, receiving funding under “must tially impaired protect- First Amendment policy explicitly prostitu- opposing have a activity by private ed conducted entities tion.” Defendants also construed the Poli- private with funds as a condition of re- grantees cy Requirement prohibiting as benefit, ceiving heightened engaging were in- activities I, scrutiny was warranted. Alliance prostitu- with a policy opposing consistent F.Supp.2d at The court then con- eligible tion. In an effort to remain Policy Requirement, cluded that funding, AOSI both Pathfinder, applied to AOSI and violated adopted policy Pathfinder statements. the First Amendment because it was Pathfinder’s, for stated example, tailored, narrowly imposed a viewpoint- prostitution “opposes trafficking and sex based restriction on their use of private cause primarily because the harm allowing funds without for adequate alter- to women.” communication, native channels of “compelled] affirmatively re- The District Court’s First Decision adopt a quiring policy espous- [them] government’s preferred message.” AOSI and Pathfinder sued the *8 Accordingly, Id. 268-76. the court Agencies, contending conditioning held that Pathfinder AOSI and had dem- Leadership Act the on affirmative onstrated likelihood success on the adoption prostitution of a opposing merits, and their had met burden by compel- violated First Amendment showing irreparable harm. Id. at ling grantees adopt gov- voice the and preliminarily 278. The district thus court viewpoint prostitution, ernment’s and enjoined from enforcing Defendants by restricting grantees in engaging from Requirement against AOSI privately expression Agen- funded Pathfinder, appealed. and Defendants insufficiently opposed cies deem might Appeal The First prostitution. They also asserted unconstitutionally was During appeal, the first course vague respect prosti- Agencies with to what sorts of informed us that and HHS i.e., developing guidelines adequate separation were USAID dence”-— —from (1) grantees legally to establish or work an affiliate if the two entities are

would allow (2) affiliates that would not be separate separate; Leadership no Act funds are with Policy Requirement. The subject to the transferred to the affiliate or used to sub- guide- activities; of the view that the Agencies were sidize its restricted and satisfactorily address the rele- lines would physically financially sepa- entities are and concerns in accordance 41,076. vant constitutional Fed.Reg. rate. 72 The 2007 Brooklyn Legal Ser- with our decision Guidelines elaborated that “whether suffi- Legal Corp. Corp., vices Services physical separation cient and financial ex- (2d Cir.2006) (“[I]n ap- F.3d 223-24 “case-by-case,” ists” would be determined circumstances, Congress may propriate five, and set forth non-exclusive factors rights burden the First Amendment (i) to that relevant determination: the ex- recipients benefits if the separate personnel, manage- istence of recipients adequate are left with alterna- (ii) ment, governance; and the existence of protected expression.”). tive channels for (iii) records; separate accounts and effective, guidelines After the became we degree separation recipi- between the remanded the case to the district court to and ent’s facilities facilities used in the determine first instance whether activities; affiliate to conduct restricted interlocutory appro- relief continued to be (iv) the signs extent which and other Int’l, Soc’y Alliance Inc. priate. Open distinguish forms of identification the two Dev., Agency v. U.S. Int’l 254 Fed. (v) entities; and the extent to which the (2d Cir.2007) (“Alliance Appx. Leadership pro- and the Act II”). gram “protected from associa- with organization tion the affiliated and its The Guidelines 41,077. restricted activities.” permit recipients The Guidelines The District Court’s Second Decision Leadership partner Act funds to with affil- organizations iate that do not with comply remand, On AOSI Pathfinder moved Policy Requirement, provided complaint to amend the to add Global and affiliate maintain recipient “adequate (together, Health Council and InterAction in- separation” so as not to “threaten the “Associations”) plaintiffs, as and to tegrity programs of the Government’s preliminary injunction extend the cover message opposing prostitution.” HHS the Associations. GHC is an alliance of Guidance, 41,076 72 Fed.Reg. (July organizations dedicated to international 2007); Acquisition USAID & Assistance public health. InterAction is an alliance of (“AAPD”) Policy Directive 05-04 Amend- development international and humanitari- 2007). (July ment 1 The Guidelines Many NGOs. of the Associations’ U.S.- (which, infra, slightly discussed were based Pathfin- members —which include 2010), require recipients revised to have der, a member of both GHC and InterAc- “objective integrity independence” participate fight the international tion— “engages affiliate that activi- HIV/AIDS, against receive *9 ties opposition inconsistent with to the [an] funding, subject Policy are therefore (‘restricted practice[ prostitution ] Requirement, and desire relief from it. activities’).” (2010). § 45 C.F.R. 89.3 organizations’ These member HIV/AIDS- Guidelines, initially

The promulgated, prevention administering work includes provided that a recipient programs would be deemed health services and other “objective to have integrity indepen- expressly target groups prosti- and at-risk like

227 2010). They engage advocacy (Apr. tutes. and Amendment 3 The also new concerning global guidance discussion controversial that in specifies comply order to example, practices best Policy health issues—for Requirement, with the Leadership reducing among prosti- for must grantee affirmatively HIV/AIDS state policy tutes —at forums and conferences. “opposed document that it is practices prostitution and sex traf- August per- In the district court ficking psychological because and join mitted InterAction to GHC and physical women, men, they pose risks for injunc- litigation, prеliminary extended children,” 89.1; § AAPD C.F.R. them, tion to and went on to consider 05-04 3 at Amend. and reaffirms that a interlocutory whether relief continued to recipient engage “cannot in activities that light be warranted in of the Guidelines. opposition with inconsistent [its] Soc’y Alliance Inc. v. U.S. Open Int% 18,760. prostitution,” 75 Fed.Reg. at Nei- Dev., Agency F.Supp.2d Int’l ther the 2010 nor the guidance offers (S.D.N.Y.2008) (‘Alliance III”). recipients insight as to what activities was, concluding court held that it be deemed “inconsistent” an “opposi- with de- previous Guidelines did not affect its prostitution.” tion to the Policy Requirement termination that compelled impermissibly speech. The guidance The new also modified the “[wjhile court reasoned that Guidelines for partnering Guidelines an with affiliate may may alter- provide adequate Policy that does not with comply Re- express nate channel for Plaintiffs to their quirement. § See 45 C.F.R. For ex- 89.3. views regarding prostitution,” the clause Guidelines, ample, the revised under which requiring espouse govern- them to profess flexibility “allow more for fund- viewpoint ment’s “remains intact.” Id. It 18,762, ing recipients,” Fed.Reg. at le- heightened scrutiny also concluded that gal required is no separation longer but applicable remained because the considered, factor to be sepa- one Requirement view- discriminates based on management longer expressly rate is no point, and that the Guidelines were too factor, identified as a relevant in determin- Requirement’s burdensome to cure the “objective a recipient whether has in- constitutional Id. at Ac- defects. 546-49. tegrity independence” from an affili- cordingly, the court declined disturb ate, 89.3. C.F.R. preliminary injunction. ap- Defendants pealed pre- from both 2006 and 2008 DISCUSSION liminary injunction orders. Standing I. Promulgated

Additional Guidance Defendants Agencies argue initially April while appeal standing. this was lack Plaintiffs Plaintiffs bear pending, promulgated establishing standing. HHS and USAID the burden Lu guidance Policy jan further pertaining Wildlife, Defenders of Requirement regula- a formal —HHS tion, (1992). HHS, USAID in a standing challenged directive. “Because Integrity Organizational That pleadings, Entities on the basis of the we [here] Implementing Programs Are and Activi- all accept allegations as true material Act, ties Under the Fed. complaint, and must the com construe 2010) (codified 18,760 Reg. (Apr. plaint favor W.R. [Plaintiffs].” Huff 89); Co., pt. C.F.R. USAID AAPD 05-04 Mgmt. Asset LLC v. Deloitte & *10 (2d Pathfinder, LLP, AOSI, compelled Cir. has and 549 F.3d Touche omitted). 2008) (internal quotation many marks of the Associations’ members to standing they de novo. questions adopt policy statements that other- review We York, 621 F.3d that City adopted, New would not have and v. wise Carver Cir.2010). (2d engaging privately them from restricts that is essen- funded activities and “irre comprise the Three elements Agencies them work that tial to but minimum” of stand constitutional ducible an might opposition deem inconsistent with (1) must have suffered an plaintiff ing: Pathfinder, example, prostitution.2 to legally pro invasion of injury-in-fact—an to remain neutral” on the issue “wishe[s] (a) concrete and interest that tected prostitution, adopted anti-рrosti- but an (b) imminent, and actual or particularized, policy tution statement in order avoid (2) hypothetical; there conjectural alleges losing Leadership funding, between a causal connection must be would, injunc- that it the absence of the (3) conduct; and challenged injury and tions, prostitution-related self-censor its merely likely, opposed it must be conferences, publications, and injury will be re speculative, on its website. Lujan, by a favorable decision. dressed 560-61,112 S.Ct. 504 U.S. alleged Defendants that the in- contend juries merely conjectural are because no and InterAction are Because GHC plaintiff “attempted has to form affili- members, of their each suing on behalf ate” and “avail alternative [itself] th[at] standing by associational must establish Appellants’ for communication.” avenue[ ] (a) one of demonstrating at least standing jurisprudence Br. 22-23. But would otherwise members association’s go clear that need not makes Plaintiffs standing right i.e., in its own have sue — potentially pro- burdensome (b) through the inter standing; constitutional has up setting organization cess of an affiliate protect the association seeks ests (c) they can a First Amendment bring before neither purpose; to its germane Am. challenge. Virginia See v. Booksel- requested relief the claim asserted nor the Ass’n, 383, 392-93, 108 lers S.Ct. of individual requires participation (finding 98 L.Ed.2d 782 stand- in the lawsuit. Hunt Wash. members Comm’n, newly Adver. where enacted statute had not Apple State 342-43, compliance yet been enforced because (1977). held that Plain take required plaintiffs sig- The district court would “to have measures,” standing. costly As ex tiffs had established nificant and and “the below, [was], we that the district plained alleged danger conclude statute th[e] measure, correct. self-censorship; court was large one of can without an harm that be realized even Injury-in-Fact A. Moreover, as elabo- prosecution”). actual below, 238-40, upon forming rated difficulty finding have We little infra remedy grantee’s cannot inju an affiliate have alleged Plaintiffs constitutional resulting compelled injury being actual or imminent ry-in-fact, face affirmatively posi- Policy Require government’s state the harm as a result They allege Requirement prostitution. tion on ment. adopted allege twenty anti-prostitution of GHC's mem- bers have

2. Plaintiffs wish to make. did not twenty-eight bers and of InterAction’s mem- statements

229 remedy, if granted, the will inure to the Standing B. Associational of benefit those members of the association contend that Defendants GHC injured”). However, actually Agen- as the standing lack associational and InterAction assert, correctly cies the prong third of the prong fail third of the they because the test is not “automatically Hunt satisfie[d]” test, which must estab Hunt under an “request[s] equi- whenever association nor lish that the claim asserted “neither table relief rather than damages.” Bano requested requires partic the relief Corp., v. Union Carbide 361 714 F.3d in ipation of individual members the law (2d Cir.2004). Courts “also must examine suit.” 97 S.Ct. 2434. We the claims asserted determine whether matter, disagree. As initial the third they require participation.” individual prong associational is standing test Dinkins, Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. 5 constitutional, “prudential,” and (2d Cir.1993); Bano, F.3d 596 see 361 focusing “best of seen as on matters (“[An] at 714 organization F.3d lacks efficiency.” administrative convenience and standing to injunctive assert claims of re- United Food & Commercial Un Workers lief behalf of its members where the Grp., ion Local Brown U.S. fact injury and extent of the gives rise 555-56, L.Ed.2d injunctive to the claims for relief would (1996). Accordingly, district pos courts ” (internal require proof individualized .... in degree sess a of discretion it. applying omitted)). quotation marks Bush, Reprod. See Ctr. Law v. 304 F.3d (2d Cir.2002) J.) (Sotomayor, Agencies argue that “[individual- (“[T]he prudential requirements of stand ized proof required” this case because developed by have been the Supreme resolving whether permit the Guidelines own applied on its accord and in a recipients up adequate set alternative discretionary judi more fashion as rules of for protected expression channels necessi- cial protect, self-restraint further to fact-specific tates a determination for each circumstances, necessary extent under the First, recipient. Appellants’ Br. 25. it is purpose Article III.” quo that, self-evident as the district con- court omitted)). Here, tation marks the district cluded, proof required individualized is not correctly court concluded “neither the compelled speech vagueness for the requested by claims asserted nor the relief claims, “as it is the conduct of Defendants require any Associations would signifi Policy in the form of Requirement cant participation individual members that will be primary Guidelines III, the lawsuit.” Alliance 570 F.Supp.2d III, subject of inquiry.” Alliance at 543. F.Supp.2d respect at 543. With agree We with the district adequate analysis, court alternative channels we requested” component agree “relief with district court that while it prong “require third Hunt has been thorough satisfied will a more factual de- injunc because the Associations seek an velopment to establish the extent members,” tion barring enforcement of the Re on the burden Associations’ in- quirement, which will not necessitate the dividualized evidence members’ efforts participation individual members in the with comply the Guidelines “would be Seldin, redundant[,] lawsuit. duplicative counseling] See Warth v. 490, 515, of granting standing L.Ed.2d 343 favor associational (1975) (when an equitable economy.” seeks judicial association the interests of relief, 544; reasonably supposed “it can see be Nat’l Ass’n Coll. Bookstores

230 L.Ed.2d 690 664, 124 159 Press, S.Ct. F.Supp. 990 Cambridge Univ. v. (2004)). (“The a (S.D.N.Y.1997) fact that 245, 250 may- proof individuated of

limited amount challenge the dis- Defendants appeal, On preclude in itself necessary does be Plaintiffs court’s determination trict reasoning This standing.”)- associational They on the merits. likely to succeed itself, held which in Hunt support finds finding court’s the district not contest do had apple growers of that an association harm. conclude We irreparable of statutе, notwith- a challenge standing a likelihood demonstrated Plaintiffs have of and extent nature the varied standing merits because on the of success by the association’s suffered the burdens the First likely violates Requirement the statute. complying with members compelling by impermissibly Amendment , 343-44, 2434. See 432 U.S. espouse government’s Plaintiffs to that GHC and conclude Accordingly, we prostitution. on viewpoint alleged asso- adequately have InterAction Likely standing. ciational A. the First Amendment Violates Preliminary Injunctions II. Spending and Unconstitu- 1. Clause Jurisprudence tional Conditions grant pre review

We of the Spending Clause of discretion. injunction for abuse liminary “lay Congress to empowers Dep’t, 516 Constitution N.Y. State Educ. Alleyne v. Cir.2008). Taxes, Duties, Ex (2d Imposts and and collect “A district 100 F.3d (1) cises, provide for the pay the Debts and its its discretion when court abuses general Defence and Welfare common an error of law or rests on decision Const, I, (2) art. the United States.” U.S. finding, factual or its clearly erroneous Congress allows provision cl. 1. This necessarily prod though not decision— receipt of federal clearly “condition[ ] [the] erroneous legal uct of a error or recipient moneys upon compliance located within finding factual be —cannot and administrative statutory federal Mul with range permissible decisions.” Dole, 483 York, Dakota v. 51 directives.” South New 626 F.Sd City lins v. (internal 203, 206, 97 L.Ed.2d (2d Cir.2010) 107 marks S.Ct. quotation Klutznick, (1987) v. omitted). here, (quoting Fullilove Where, moving par 448, 474, action tak “stay[ government ] ties seek to (1980)). It is well settled to a L.Ed.2d 902 pursuant interest en scheme,” policy goals to further they Congress is entitled statutory regulatory (1) spending power indirectly through its a likelihood of success must establish by direct to achieve merits, might harm in it not be able irreparable on the 207, 107 id. at S.Ct. injunction. Alleyne, regulation. See the absence of Ar (“[Objectives thought to be within quotation marks F.3d at 100 may fields omitted); legislative enumerated Lynch City v. New ticle I’s accord (2d Cir.2009). through attained the use York, nevertheless be Ulti 589 F.3d and the conditional spending power underlying constitutional mately, “[i]f (internal quotation close, grant of federal funds.” uphold ... we should question omitted)). Congress’s Berlin, citation v. Town marks and injunction.” VIP LLC broad, Cir.2010) (2d Berlin, Spending under the Clause power 593 F.3d (alteration limitations on Con as “the constitutional (quoting original) Ashcroft power Union, exercising spending gress when Am. Civil Liberties receipt on exacting than those its authori- of federal funds not infringe are less upon Id. at regulate directly.” recipient’s First ty to Amendment rights given the other has rise to three *13 Supreme seminal Court decisions and sev- that Defendants contend because related from our eral cases Circuit. The Spending a Clause Supreme are Regan Court cases v. Taxa- enactment, and are free to de Plaintiffs 540, Representation, tion With 461 U.S. if wish to funding comply cline do not 1997, (1983), FCC conditions, Policy Require its with League California, v. Women Voters subjected ment should be minimal 468 U.S. 104 82 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d scrutiny Congress’s under But Dole. (1984), Sullivan, 278 v. and Rust 500 U.S. broad, spending power, while is not unlim 111 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 233 ited, provisions and other constitutional (1991). Our cases include a series deci- provide independent an bar to the may concerning imposed sions conditions upon grant funds. conditional of federal Pursu recipients of from Legal Ser- ant to this “unconstitutional conditions” (“LSC”): Corporation Velazquez vices v. doctrine, known, as it has come to be (2d Legal Corp., Services 164 F.3d 757 a may not condition on place Cir.1999) I”), (“Velazquez Legal Services or receipt subsidy of a benefit that Corp. Velazquez, v. 121 S.Ct. infringes upon the constitution recipient’s 149 L.Ed.2d (“Velazquez 63 if the ally protected rights, govern even ”), Brooklyn Legal II Corp. Services v. has no offer the obligation ment benefit (2d Legal Corp., Services F.3d 219 Perry first instance. See Sinder Cir.2006) (“BLS ”). mann, 593, 597, (1972) (“[E]ven though per a L.Ed.2d In Regan, plaintiff Taxation Rep- With no ‘right’ govern son has to a valuable (“TWR”), nonprofit resentation a lobbying though gov mental benefit and even corporation, a challenged statute that de- may deny any ernment him the benefit for tax to organizations nied deductions reasons, there are some rea number engaged in lobbying.” “substantial upon government may which the not sons 541, 544, 1997; U.S. see 26 may It a rely. deny not benefit to a 501(c)(3). § argued U.S.C. TWR infringes on a person basis that his consti prohibition against lobbying by substantial tutionally protected especially, interests — 501(c)(3) organizations § imposed un- speech.”). his interest freedom of As constitutional on the receipt condition reiterated, recently Court tax-deductible contributions. The Su- deny “the not a benefit preme disagreed, concluding person infringes to a on a basis that his TWR remained free to receive deductible constitutionally protected ... freedom of support nonlobbying contributions to its speech even if he no entitlement has to activity, separate, create a could tax- that benefit.” v. Forum Ac Rumsfeld 501(c)(4) § exempt pur- affiliate under Inc., Rights, ademic Institutional 544-45, activity. its lobbying sue Id. at 47, 59, 164 L.Ed.2d alternative, 103 S.Ct. 1997. Given (2006) (“FAIR”) (internal quotation Congress Court concluded that “ha[d] omitted). marks infringed any rights First Amendment or

This tension regulated any between the breadth of activity,” First Amendment Congress’s spending power “simply pay one hand not to but chosen for TWR’s principle and the condition lobbying.” on the Id. at 103 S.Ct. 1997. In projects,” provides but that no planning Justice Blackmun concurring opinion, in programs Title X funds “shall be used saving effect “the emphasized family plan- where abortion is method 501(e)(4),” stating his view § “ ning.” (quoting Id. at 111 S.Ct. 1759 501(c)(3) would be “constitution- § alone” 300a-6). 300(a), §§ 42 U.S.C. The HHS 501(c)(3) § defective],” that “[a] but ally] X regulations prohibited projects Title speak infring- right organization’s counseling or re- providing abortion [lobby] through its ed, it is free because ferrals, engaging activities that 501(c)(4) tax losing without ben- affiliate promote, or advocate abortion encourage, nonlobbying activities.” Id. efits for family planning. as a method of Id. at *14 (Blackmun, J., 552-53, con- However, 179-80, reg- 111 S.Ct. 1759. curring). in grantees engage ulations allowed to term, Supreme following Court The long abortion-related activities as as their Voters, which League Women decided “objective X in- projects Title maintained a challenge Amendment to a First involvеd activ- tegrity independence” from such Broadcasting Act in the Public provision by to made HHS ities—a determination be receiving federal prohibited stations on factors such as existence of based at “editorializing.” 468 U.S. funds from degree sep- and the separate personnel, The struck 104 S.Ct. 3106. Court project aration between the Title X fact by troubled provision, down the facilities used for restricted activities. Id. from even grantee] using that it [a “barred 180-81, 111 (quoting at S.Ct. 1759 funds to finance its editorial wholly private (1989)). plaintiffs C.F.R. 59.9 The Rust (stat- 400, 104 activity.” Id. at S.Ct. argued regulations violated that “unlike the situation faced ing they First Amendment because “diserimi- [TWR], that receives 1% of a [station] viewpoint [by] prohib- based on nat[ed] grants from [federal] its overall income iting] all discussion about abortion as absolutely editorializing”). from all barred option,” lawful and because condi- however, noted, recipi- that if The Court X funds on receipt tioned the of Title “to establish ‘affiliate’ permitted ents were engage to in relinquishing right abor- could then use the sta- organizations which 192, 196, at speech. tion-related Id. to editorialize with nonfed- tion’s facilities omit- quotation S.Ct. 1759 marks funds, statutory mechanism eral such ted). reasoning valid under the plainly would be Supreme disagreed, The Court conclud- recipient “would be [Regan],” as ing that “the Government has not discrimi- free, way in the same was [TWR] viewpoint; it has nated on the basis of free, on matters to make known its views merely activity to fund one chosen through its nonfeder- public importance 193, 111 exclusion of the other.” Id. at funded, affiliate ally editorializing without (“The can, Government without losing grants federal for its noneditorializ- Constitution, selectively fund violating the ing activities.” Id. broadcast activities it program encourage certain interest, on these Court elaborated with- to be believes Rust, which involved a facial funding themes at the same time an alterna- out regulations implement- to deal with the challenge program to HHS which seeks tive It way.”). Title X of the Public Health Service in another held problem X 177-78, not force the Title regulations Act. 500 111 S.Ct. 1759. “do grants grantee give up X to make abortion-related Title authorizes HHS “merely require that “family speech,” run but organizations help them separate although the affiliate grantee keep option might, ap- such activities plied grantees, prove Title X Id. at to some unduly from activities.” LSC distinct burdensome, there no empha- 111 S.Ct. 1759. Court was reason to think unlike the con- this would be true for all grantees. sized that this was Id. at However, League 767. provision dition found unconstitutional one in the 1996 Voters, statute, which prohibited grantees where “the Government Women on the placed recipi- representing challenging existing condition clients ha[d] [the] law, subsidy particu- than on a was impermis- ent of the rather welfare held invalid as program viewpoint lar or service.” Id. sible discrimination. 769- (emphasis original). S.Ct. 1759 turn now to three of this The Supreme

We decisions Court affirmed our invali- arising Legal under the dation of that viewpoint-based Serviсes restriction Corporation pursuant 540-41, Act of to which in II. Velazquez 531 U.S. at local grants organiza- interpreted the LSC makes S.Ct. 1043. The Court Rust as provide legal having tions that free assistance to implicitly on the rationale “reli[ed] *15 I, indigent Velazquez clients. 164 F.3d at that the counseling activities of the doctors 1996, Congress passed X legislation governmental 759. under Title amounted to that barring grants engage speech,” LSC to entities explaining “viewpoint-based that activities, lobbying in certain such as or funding decisions can be in sustained in- actions, thereby “restricting] class grant- stances in which the government is itself use of speaker, instances, Rust, ees’ non-federal federal funds like in alike.” at 760. In government order cure the which the private use[s] speakers “constitutional infirmities” of the 1996 re- pertain- transmit information strictions, “program ‍​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‍integrity” LSC issued to its program.” own Id. at 121 regulations, upheld modeled after those S.Ct. quotation marks and Rust, omitted). allowing grantees to affiliate with citation Velazquez II Court held, however, organizations engage prohibited that did program, LSC un- activities, long X, as as the entities main- like Title “designed was not adequate physical sep- promote tained and financial a governmental message,” an as lawyer aration. Id. at 761-62. LSC-funded “is not the govern- speaker,” “speaks ment’s but rather on the I, In Velazquez we considered a facial private, behalf of his or her indigent challenge to the 1996 statute and LSC client.” Id. at 121 S.Ct. 1043. There- regulations, plaintiffs argued which the fore, Rust did not save the viewpoint- “impermissibly grantees’ exer- burden[ed] seeking based restriction on welfare re- activities,” cise of First Amendment form. The Court declined to review the viewpoint-based restriction “constitut[ed] portion of I Velazquez upheld that had expression.” Judge Leval, Id. at 763. program integrity regulations. LSC’s writing for majority, synthesized Re- U.S. S.Ct. 149 L.Ed.2d 135 Voters, gan, League Women and Rust (2001) (Mem.) certiorari). (denying “that, establishing as cir- appropriate cumstances, Congress may II, burden the Following Velazquez Velazquez rights recipients First Amendment plaintiffs brought an as-applied challenge recipients BLS, benefits if the regulations. to the LSC F.3d left adequate with alternative 224. enjoined channels for The district applica- court protected expression.” Id. at 766. The tion regulations, reasoning they failed, challenge facial imposed therefore because an “undue burden” on plain- rights, Compelling Amendment as LSC’s tiffs’ First as condition integrity receiving could be ful- of program interest benefit cannot less restrictive.” Id. at be squared filled “means with First Amendment. See, appeal, e.g., Wooley Maynard, we held v. 229. On 705, 714-17, undue bur- application district court’s 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) regu- test to the (finding require unconstitutional den/less-restrictive-means error, drivers, reiterating the using standard ment as condition of lations was roads, Velazquez grantees’ I—that display articulated in state motto “Live Free or rights may plates); be burdened Die” on license Speiser Amendment First Randall, 513, 518-19, “adequate alternative they if are left with U.S. expression. Id. at protectеd (finding channels” for uncon veterans, requirement remanded for the stitutional 229-31. therefore as We program receiving property to evaluate the in- tax exemp district court condition tion, under that standard. declare that do not tegrity regulations advocate the government);

forcible overthrow of W. Va. Barnette, State Bd. Educ. v. Warrants Scrutiny 624, 633, 642, Heightened 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (finding require unconstitutional Applying these cases to the one schoolchildren, ment that as condition of us, we conclude before school, going to salute the flag; stating implemented by the Requirement, “involuntary that such affirmation could be beyond what the Agencies, falls well Su commanded on even more immediate *16 upheld and this Court have preme Court silence”). than urgent grounds and funding conditions. Unlike permissible as Here, Wooley, conditions the cases dis much as in Speiser, the and Barnette, above, silence, Policy Requirement neutrality, the or cussed does is not merely recipients engag option from for Plaintiffs. not restrict order to avoid (such expression lobbying losing Leadership they as ing funding, certain must editorializing {League opposition their {Regan), prostitution. Women declare {Rust), out, Voters), speech correctly point abortion-related As Defendants these (the litigation “compelled in- speech” or welfare reform LSC traditional cases cases)), considerably benefits, pushes already-existing public further volved but recipients affirmatively government funding programs, and mandates that not they “opposed distinguishable to are therefore in that re- say something—that where, prostitution,” spect. 45 C.F.R. But these cases teach that praetice[] here, Policy Requirement § is view as seeks to affirma- 89.1. compels recipients, tively it point-based, require government-preferred as funding, espouse speech, its efforts gov condition of raise serious First position. ernment’s Amendment concerns.3 The energy affirmatively require speech. 3. The dissent devotes considerable ment to In do- so, showing Wooley, Speiser, "put[] that we do not ... aside" the un- effort of doctrine, Barnette control this case. We do constitutional conditions Dissent at do not not Indeed, suggest although Regan realize do. as the dissent but rather that acknowledges, recognize progeny unquestionably provide expressly we and its speech distinguish- analysis, they cap- compelled these cases are framework for our do not Policy Requirement neatly able. But we draw them the under- ture the as the do lying principle suggests. The dissent asserts that the First Amendment does dissent "[njone attempts by govern- fondly [unconstitutional conditions] not look on of those (it FAIR, recently implied point-neutral as much in banned lobbying by all 501(c)(3) upheld organizations, it Amend- regardless where Solomon requirement legislation nature of the per- organiza- ment’s universities it). tion’s military position mit See 461 campus recruiters on as a U.S. at 548, 103 In League S.Ct. 1997. receiving funding. condition federal Women Voters, which viewpoint-neu- invalidаted a nothing The Court noted that “[t]here tral restriction on “editorializing,” all four approaching this case a Government- dissenting Justices indicated that if the pledge mandated or motto that the school restriction viewpoint-based, they were 61-62, too must endorse.” 547 U.S. would find it constitutionally problematic. 1297. The Requirement S.Ct. calls 407-08, See 468 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 3106 exactly that. J., (Rehnquist, dissenting) (emphasizing is also neutral,” “strictly condition was viewpoint-based, requires it recipi because directed at “editorial particu- views of one government’s ents to take the side on bent”); lar ideological id. particular issue. It is well established that (Stevens, J., (“[0]f dissenting) great- viewpoint-based intrusions on free me, significance est the statutory re- offend the First Amendment. See Rosen completely striction is opera- neutral in its berger v. Rector & Visitors the Univ. prohibits tion—it all editorials without Va., 819, 828, being distinction drawn concerning (1995) (“It L.Ed.2d 700 is axiomatic that point of that might expressed.”); view be government may regulate Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at cf. based on its content substantive or the (“When targets not Schuster, message conveys.”); Simon & subject matter, but particular views taken Inc. v. the N.Y. Members State Crime by speakers subject, on a the violation of Bd., 105, 116, Victims the First Amendment is all the more bla- (stating tant.”). principle [regulations ] “broad[ [that] The LSC cases confirm this conclusion. *17 permit which the Government to discrimi I, In Velazquez we invalidated as view- nate on the basis of the content of the point-discriminatory a restriction prohibit- message cannot be tolerated under the grantees LSC from representing (internal First Amendment” quotation seeking clients welfare reform. 164 F.3d omitted)). marks affirmed, at 769-72. Supreme The

Although viewpoint-based funding condi- concluding that justify Rust could not target tions that speech necessarily are not although, restriction because as Rust had unconstitutional, Rust, see established, 500 U.S. implicitly “viewpoint-based such funding conditions are consti- decisions can be in sustained in- tutionally In Regan, troublesome. for ex- in stances which ... the government ample, applied scrutiny the Court minimal private speakers use[s] to transmit infor- was, in reviewing a condition that unlike mation pertaining to its program,” own Policy Requirement, decidedly view- grantees LSC were not speaking on behalf alleged speech cases turned on pushes beyond whether the upheld the restrictions in Re- negative,” restriction was affirmative or Rust, Dis- cases, gan, and the LSC and that we easy say sent at but that is when none likely conclude Plaintiffs are to succeed in of those cases involved an affirmative demonstrating that it is an unconstitutional partly Policy restriction. Requirement It is because the condition. just is such a restriction that it II, (“UNAIDS”) Velazquez recognized have government. HIV/AIDS (internal 540-42, quota- advocating penalties for the reduction of omitted). BLS, in Finally, prostitution prevent tion marks such penalties —to court to for the district interfering while we remanded with outreach efforts —as “adequate alternative channels” apply the among practices the best for HIV/AIDS viewpoint-neutral pro- test to the LSC’s prevention.4 claim that being Plaintiffs regulations, expressly we gram integrity opposition prosti- forced to declare their I, Velazquez that “sub- citing recognized, credibility integ- tution “harms [their] that are directed to- restrictions stantive NGOs, rity generally taking which avoid might require “clos- speech as such” ward policy positions likely controversial to of- “[went] issue er attention” —an partner organiza- fend host nations [and] statutory challenged restrictions tions,” “offending and risks all of the[] BLS, F.3d at cases.” See [the LSC] groups whose approach HIV/AIDS substan- differ from that the government,” not to tive, and “directed toward viewpoint-based, very mention some of the people, prosti- affirmatively requires recipi- as it speech,” tutes, stop “whose trust must earn to It is this bold combination speak. ents to spread Appellees’ Br. HIV/AIDS.” speech-targeted of a funding in a condition 11-12. is both affirmative and restriction viewpoint-based that war- quintessential^ 3. Rust and the Government- scrutiny. heightened rants Speech Doctrine Furthermore, targeted speech, con- Policy In defending Require in the context of the cerning prostitution mandate, viewpoint-based effort, ment’s HIV/AIDS-prevention international Rust, Agencies upheld turn to which subject international debate. The is a viewpoint-based prohibition on abortion freely on such mat- right to communicate Rust, counseling. Since lies at the heart of public ters of concern “explained” Court has that decision as hav Amendment. See NAACP v. the First Co., ing implicitly upon “government relied Claiborne Hardware principle, stating “viewpoint- that: speech” (“[E]xpression always issues based decisions can be sustained has highest rung rested on the of the hierar- instances which Rust, instances, speaker, itself the like chy of First Amendment values.” omitted)). private quotation use[s] marks which *18 Requirement principle, speakers pertain offends that man- to transmit information II, dating affirmatively espouse ing program.” Velazquez that Plaintiffs to its own government’s position the on a contested S.Ct. 1043 omitted). quotation marks and citation public issue where the differences both example, government ap the This is because “when the real and substantive. For (“WHO”) par a propriates public promote Health funds to Organization World say to Programme the Joint Nations on ticular of its own it is entitled United validity position prop- type on the 4. The dissent declines to comment on the the of Plaintiffs’ issue, relevant; and asserts that “the sub- approach prostitution rath- er to is validity” position stantive of Plaintiffs’ er, targeted speech it is the fact that the prostitution is "not determinative of whether public a controversial issue that is concerns is constitutional.” constitutionally significant. suggest Dissent at 266. But we not do Rosenberger, regard abortion,” and, it wishes.” 515 U.S. at with what to if asked (“[W]e permitted abortion, 115 S.Ct. 2510 have about was to “free make clear regulate the content of government to that advice regarding abortion simply when it expressed what is or is not beyond scope program.” Id.5 it speaker private Here, or when enlists entities hand, on the other Plaintiffs do not Therefore, convey message.”). to its own option have the of remaining silent or neu- government disburses Instead, “[w]hen tral. they represent must as convey private gov- funds to entities to opinion they their own an affirma- —that may message, legitimate ernmental take tively oppose prostitution they might —that to appropriate steps ensure that its categorically hold. say Suffice it to message garbled is neither nor distorted that Rust would have very been a different by grantee.” government case had the gone far as requiring Title X recipients to affirmative- According Agencies, this ly adopt policy statement opposing abor- Rust, is, government-speech case like tion, in way the Leadership Act man- enacting case because in Leadership adoption dates the of a policy statement Act, Congress “sought to advance to the opposing prostitution. greatest possible message oppos extent its has, by compelling NGOs to affirmatively ing prostitution,” “chose to recip enlist the pledge opposition their prostitution, ients funding to dissem stepped beyond what might have ap- been and, inate message,” “to ensure that the propriate to ensure that its anti-prostitu- message conveyed effectively, was re message tion “garbled” would not be quired recipients that those have anti- [an “distorted,” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 32; prostitution] policy.” Appellants’ Br. 115 S.Ct. 2510. Int’l, DKT Agency see Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Dev., (D.C.Cir.2007) 477 F.3d 761-63 We do not mean imply gov- (upholding Policy Requirement). We are affirmative, ernment require never persuaded. viewpoint-specific speech as a condition of Policy Requirement goes participating well be in a program. federal To use yond upheld condition example Defendants, Rust supplied by if the compels because it Plaintiffs to voice the campaign urg- were fund a government’s viewpoint and to do so as if Say children to “Just No” to drugs, we Indeed, it were their own. the Rust Court do not doubt that it require grantees could expressly observed that “[n]othing drug [the state that oppose use challenged regulations] requires scenario, a doctor children. But in that the govern- represent is, as his own any opinion effect, that ment’s program its message. he does not in hold.” 500 That is not so here. purpose The stated fact added). (emphasis Rather, S.Ct. 1759 HIV/AIDS, the Leadership fight Act is to grantee’s tuberculosis, staff could remain “silenft] as well as and malaria.6 De- 5. The Rust Court made these *19 counter-hypothetical, observations in 6. The dissent’s involv- ing "potential grantees actually addressing plaintiffs' who do not the course of the claim children, drug by oppose tempted use but are regulations violated the First Amend- funds,” by the offer Dissent at misses staff, rights grantee’s ment of the a claim the point. analysis the Our does not turn on governed by prin- Court stated was the "same grantees actually disagree whether individual ciples” regulations the as сlaim that the vio- government-mandated speech, with the but rights grant- lated the First Amendment program. rather on the nature of the We use ee. U.S. at 111 S.Ct. 1759. own,” phrase the "do so as if it were their Leadership negotiations.” Appellants’ eral Br. 58. now recast the cannot

fendants advocacy if cen- HJV/AIDS-prevention pro- anti-prostitution But were global Act’s could, messaging government’s program, tral to the it anti-prostitution an gram as II, course, Velazquez simply choose not to fund these U.S. campaign. Cf short, (“Congress organizations. Agencies’ cannot re- the suggestion requiring a mere to on as Plaintiffs cast a condition case, every adopt anti-prostitution policy lest an statement of its program definition integral Leadership program to to the Act be reduced the First Amendment exercise.”). by If gov- govern- the is undermined the fact that the semantic simple principle high-profile, allowed Con- ment has chosen to fund ernment-speech funding recipients global organizations to affir- remain free to gress compel to viewpoint every express openly express indeed matively espouse —and —a contrary within a or at all.7 subsidiary policy, issue subsumed federal no exception the would program, spending Nor are we persuaded the rule. swallow argument Agencies’ Policy Re “leeway” that advocating quirement Defendants assert is entitled to because “central” to it against prostitution implicates “foreign Appellants’ is indeed affairs.” Act Br. Leadership program, Appellants’ govern 34-35. While mindful of the strong managing Br. but it is difficult to reconcile ment’s interest inter relations, agree with what the Act does. As we national we with the assertion dis seen, interest, Policy Requirement case, ex trict court that have this this exempts organizations three and does not pressly warrant deference that the I, agencies having comply Agencies request. all to See Alliance U.N. 7631(f) (“[T]his § F.Supp.2d Agencies’ with it. 22 sub U.S.C. 265-67. reli apply section to the Global Fund ance on DKT shall Memorial Fund Ltd. v. AIDS, Malaria, Fight Agency Tuberculosis and Development, International (D.C.Cir.1989), Organization, the World Health the Inter 887 F.2d 275 misplaced, national AIDS Vaccine Initiative or to as that case centered around restriction agency.”). previously United Nations As on the First Amendment activities for noted, eign and UNAIDS have taken receiving WHO NGOs a public position Policy at odds with the funds. The challenge impact here is to the Requirement, recognizing the reduction of of Requirement on domestic Indeed, penalties prostitution prac as a Agencies applied best NGOs. have fight against tice in foreign organi De HIV/AIDS. attempt distinguish fendants these ex zations inception, since its without chal empted recipients ground on the lenge. litigation This arose after the are “public organizations,” began international reversed course and forcing adopt such that them to an anti- applying Requirement also to U.S. prostitution policy require would organizations “multilat- based like AOSI and Path-

suprа simply highlight Congress's exempt the invasive- tion with decision to these requires recipient ness of a condition that organizations. simply Dissent at 266. We it, affirmatively represent to the world that 7631(f)’s exemption note that clause under- independent, non-governmental entity, Agencies' adoption cuts the assertion that the opinion government's opin- holds an —the anti-prostitution policy of an is central to the may ion—that in fact hold. program. Contrary suggestion, we dissent's do any "policy judgment” not make in connec- *20 501(c)(4) § Policy Requirement compels affiliate freed it to in engage finder. adopt to a state- and, domestic NGOs privately lobbying, League funded in issue, prohibits particular Voters, ment on a Women the restriction in engaging expression certain them recipient would have been saved if the at, example, conferences and forums stations had been to form allowed affiliates These fac- throughout the United States. engage privately to in funded editorializ- speech tors convince us that the is far ing. simply It does not make sense to foreign more of a domestic than a concern. conceive of the here Guidelines as some- addressing Policy Requirement’s how the 4. The Guidelines by affirmative speech requirement afford- Finally, Agencies the contend ing an engage privately outlet to funded any compelled-speech type problems silence; words, by providing other an Policy Requirement successfully in the are nothing may outlet to do at all. It very by any addressed Guidelines because well be that the afford Guidelines Plaintiffs entity unwilling opposition to state its to adequate an outlet for expressing their prostitution can form an affiliate that does opinions prostitution, on but there re- consequence, Agencies As a as so. mains, that, additional, top on affir- sert, parent organization is not com requirement recipient mative that the enti- speak any message to at all. But pelled ty pledge opposition prostitution. As this assertion fails to confront the fact that stated, aptly the district court “[w]hile the a or an recipient parent whether the is may may provide Guidelines an affiliate, required affirmatively adequate alternate channel for Plaintiffs to speak government’s viewpoint pros express regarding prostitution, their views “adequate titution. chan alternative requiring the clause to adopt Plaintiffs test, which protected expression” nels regarding prostitu- Government’s view predicated on the rationale that limita III, tion remains intact.” Alliance speech permissible grantees tions on are if Guidelines, F.Supp.2d by at 545. The elsewhere, express opinions can their does nature, very their do not account for that provide proper framework for eval requirement. uating Policy Requirement’s speech above, For the reasons set forth we mandate. The curative function of an “ad conclude Plaintiffs have demonstrated equate alternаtive channel” is to alleviate a likelihood of success on the merits of speech by the burden of a constraint on their challenge. First Amendment Be- providing an an organi outlet allows cause the engage through compels zation to use of — grantees espouse privately government’s posi- affiliate—in the expres funded issue, im tion on a controversial the district sion otherwise would have been permissibly court did not abuse its prohibited pro prelim- the federal discretion gram. inarily For example, Regan, enjoining pending its enforcement 501(c)(3) organization’s ability § form trial on the merits.8 we, ground, 8. Because we affirm on this like tion.” 45 C.F.R. 89.3. Plaintiffs contend court, Agencies the district do not reach promul- Plaintiffs' ar- that because the have not gument Policy Requirement, gated guidance regarding as im- the kinds of plemented by Agencies, is unconstitution- and activities that will be deemed in- ally vague respect sufficiently opposed prostitution, with to what sorts of it is un- prohibited prostitution-related expression as "inconsistent with clear in what not, opposition practice[] prostitu- grantees may, engage. [an] Plain- *21 I CONCLUSION A further of the explanation Leadership grant preliminary of district court’s The Act in helpful understanding be is AFFIRMED. injunctive relief purpose restriction issue 2003, Congress here. enacted the Leadership Against United States STRAUB, Judge, dissenting: Circuit HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, Act, and Malaria today Policy holds that the majority The (codified 108-25, Pub.L. No. 117 Stat. 711 beyond what the “falls well Requirement seq.). 7601 et § at 22 as amended U.S.C. up- have and this Court Supreme Court in reauthorized and amended was re- on the permissible held as conditions 7671; 2008. See U.S.C. § Tom Lantos Maj. Op. funds.” ceipt Henry Hyde and J. Global United States contrary, Policy Require- 223. On the HIV/AIDS, Leadership Against Tubercu- ment, imple- together losis, with the Guidelines and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 110-293, Defendants, No. precisely is line Pub.L. Stat. 2918 mented (codified seq.). 7601 et § at U.S.C. conditions” doc- with the “unconstitutional current version of the Act directs the applied it has been the context trine as comprehensive, President to “establish a alleged to violate the subsidy conditions integrated, 5-year strategy expand and Policy Require- Amendment. The First improve global efforts to combat HIV/ penalty a coercive imposes ment neither AIDS,” 7611(a), § provides U.S.C. rights nor protected First Amendment taxpayer fight billion of funds to $48 way in a at the sup- discriminates aimed 7671(a). id. epidemic years, over five Furthermore, pression of ideas. provides strategy The Act that this shall Policy nature Re- viewpoint-based “make the reduction of behav- HIV/AIDS quirement entirely proper is because the priority ioral risks a of all ef- prevention implicate public- Act does not means, by,” forts other among “promoting principles, forum but rather allows the activity abstinence from sexual and en- government to subsidize the transmittal faithfulness,” couraging monogamy and message part it has concluded is of its “educating boys men and about the risks fighting method of preferred HIV/AIDS. procuring commercially sex and about Therefore, heightened scrutiny is not violent the need end behavior toward Re- proper this case. Because girls,” “supporting partner women and entirely rational quirement is exercise country community identify efforts to Congress’s powers pursuant social, economic, and address or cultural Spending Clause because Plaintiffs factors, gender-based such as ... violence likely have not shown that empowerment lack of for women [and] succeed on the merits of their claim that ..., directly which contribute to the trans- unconstitutional, Policy Requirement HIV,” “promoting cooperation mission of grant I would vacate the District Court’s prosecute with law enforcement offend- preliminary injunction. Accordingly, of a trafficking, rape, ers of and sexual assault respectfully goal eliminating I crimes with the such dissent. Indeed, point argument

tiffs oral left us with the distinct out that restrictions on cases, impression have a at issue in the LSC the cases on which that not even Defendants grasp engage expres- Agencies attempted have on what it means to to model opposition regime, substantially spe- ''inconsistent” with an instant were more sion prostitution. cific than the is here. *22 crimes,” “working rape, go only organizations and to eliminate “funds that share violence, assault, sexual and gender-based disapproval prostitution the Act’s and chil- exploitation Int’l, the sexual women and trafficking.” sex DKT Inc. v. U.S. (I)- 7611(a)(12)(A), (F)-(G), § Id. Dev., dren.” Agency Int’l 477 F.3d for (J). Congress explicitly found that (D.C.Cir.2007). [prostitution and other sexual victim- Defendants the United Depart- States degrading to women chil- ization and ment of Health and Human Services dren and it should be the (“HHS”) and the United Agency States for prac- United States to eradicate such (“USAID”) Development International industry, trafficking tices. The sex (“Agencies”) implemented the Policy Re- industry, of individuals into such and quirement by promulgating regula- certain sexual violence are additional causes of tions and directives. The current rules spread and factors in the of the HIV/ require that Leadership recipients Act epidemic. AIDS agree public announcements of the re- 7601(23). §Id. funds, ceipt of in funding and award docu- light provide In goal its for ments, they “that are opposed prac- “private expanding pub- sector efforts and prostitution tices of and sex trafficking lic-private partnerships sector to combat because of the psychological physical and HIV/AIDS,” 7603(4), § strategy id. and its women, men, risks pose chil- and so, doing part, by “encouraging mono- dren.” Organizational HHS Integrity of faithfulness,” gamy “educating and men Implementing Entities Programs & Activi- boys and about procuring the risks of sex Act, ties Under the Leadership 45 C.F.R. commercially,” “working and to eliminate (2010); § 89.1 see Agency also U.S. exploitation the sexual of women and Dev., Int’l AAPD 05-04 Amendment children,” 7611(a)(12)(A), (F), (J), § id. Implementation of the [Leadership Act]— Congress imposed two conditions on Lead- Eligibility Limitation on the Use of Funds ership Act funds that are relevant to this Opposition & to Prostitution & Traf- Sex First, Congress provided сase. that no ¶ 2(A)(1), ficking Attachment A “may be to promote funds used or advo- USAID The Agencies [hereinafter APPD]. legalization practice prostitu- cate the or promulgated organizational also integrity 7631(e). § trafficking.” tion or sex Id. guidelines guidance (“Guidelines”), Second, Congress provided that recipient which allow a Leadership ... may provide funds be used to

[n]o funds to maintain an affiliation with an any group organization assistance to organization that anti-prostitu- lacks the policy explicitly that does not have a 7631(f). policy required by § tion 22 U.S.C. opposing prostitution and sex traffick- require The Guidelines the recipient ing, except that this subsection shall not objective “have integrity indepen- AIDS, apply Fight to the Global Fund to any dence” from that “engages affiliate Malaria, Tuberculosis and the World activities inconsistent with recipient’s Organization, Health the International opposition prostitution.” to ... 45 C.F.R. AIDS Initiative or to Vaccine Unit- 89.3; § see APPD also USAID ¶4®. agency. ed Nations “Objective integrity independence” 7631(f) § (“Policy Requirement”). will be found if the affiliate receives no way, Congress this ensured not Leadership transfer of Act funds from the “is, no Act funds recipient recipient would be used to and the to the ex- promote prostitution, circumstances, but practicable sepa- also tent in the organization.” thought protected by the affiliated 45 freedom of the First

rate from 89.3(a)-(b); against C.F.R. see also USAID Amendment state action includes ¶ 4(B). separation” right speak freely right APPD both the and the “[Sufficient *23 case-by-case “on a speaking Wooley will be determined basis refrain from at all.” v. facts,” totality 705, 714, 1428, of Maynard, ... on the the 430 U.S. 97 based S.Ct. (1977); including by examining five non-exclusive 51 L.Ed.2d 752 Dairy see also Int’l 89.3(b); (2d § 67, see also Amestoy, factors. 45 C.F.R. Foods Ass’n v. 92 F.3d ¶4(8). Cir.1996) (discussing APPD The factors listed right USAID constitutional (1) (2) affiliate, fact, separation of the not to legal speak). are: the (3) separate personnel,” of suggested, holding, existence has without the “[t]he separate accounting government may required existence of be “[t]he to assert an (4) records,” degree of even timekeeping compelling “[t]he more interest when it in facilities,” separation fringes right of the to refrain speaking “[t]he from signs required extent to which and other forms of than is when it infringes right distinguish recipient speak. identification that See W. Va. State Bd. v. of Educ. Barnette, organization 624, 633, 1178, from the pres- affiliated 319 U.S. 63 S.Ct. 89.3(b)(l)-(5); (1943) (“It ent.” 45 C.F.R. see also 87 L.Ed. 1628 would seem ¶ 4(B). APPD involuntary USAID affirmation could be command- only

ed on even more immediate and ur- II silence.”). gent grounds than The Su- preme government Court has struck down challenges Policy Plaintiffs’ to the Re- attempts directly compel school children quirement grounded case are in two this Pledge to recite the Allegiance of on pain government substantive restrictions on expulsion public school, from see id. at by the imposed conduct First Amendment: 63 S.Ct. or to compel drivers to prohibition against compelled bear a state’s motto on plates their license рrohibition against and the viewpoint dis- fine, on pain monetary of a Wooley, see crimination. Because the Require- 714-17, U.S. 97 S.Ct. 1428. The Court ment speech, is not a direct restriction on also has invalidated a state’s attempt but rather receipt condition on the indirectly compel speech through the deni- subsidy, analyze a federal I Plaintiffs’ al independent, of an already-existing tax First challenges through Amendment Randall, exemption. Speiser See prism of the conditions” “unconstitutional 513, 518-19, U.S. L.Ed.2d doctrine as it has been applied in the (1958). government subsidy context. As back- ground, I underlying first discuss First prohibits First Amendment also Amendment substantive at is- restrictions government directly regulating sue and then the development of the “un- “speech based on its substantive content or constitutional conditions” doctrine in the message conveys.” Rosenberger v. context of subsidies. Univ. of Va., Rector & Visitors 515 U.S. 819, 828, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 A (1995). “In private speech the realm of

The First Amendment expression, government United regulation may States Constitution provides that speaker “Con not favor one over another.” Id. gress shall make no ... abridging law against speech “Discrimination because of Const, speech.” freedom of message amend. I. presumed to be unconstitu- question There is no right that “the Viewpoint-based tional.” Id. restrictions specter regulation were direct or a crimi “raise[] ideas or view- may effectively penalty drive certain nal at stake.” Nat’l Endowment & marketplace.” from the Simon points Finley, the Arts v. 587- Schuster, N.Y. (1998). Inc. v. Members State BdL, Crime Victims conditions, Subsidy absent circum special (1991). “The 116 L.Ed.2d stances, subject “cannot be to the least- or presumptively places First Amendment analysis— less-restrictive means mode of beyond pow- this sort discrimination which, ..., like the undue burden test government.” er of the appropriate assessing govern more ment’s direct of a regulation fundamental *24 B right government creates a fed —when directly does not When spending program.” Brooklyn Legal eral only implicates First regulate speech, but 219, Legal Corp., Sens. v. Sens. 462 F.3d through Amendment interests conditions (2d Cir.2006), denied, 229 cert. 552 U.S. spending, on federal a different framework 810, (2007). 44, 128 S.Ct. 169 L.Ed.2d 11 Spending of the applies. The Clause Unit government’s power to impose con- provides ed Constitution “Con States ditions federal subsidies is not unlimit- lay To collect gress shall have Power ed. The “unconstitutional conditions” doc- Taxes, Duties, Excises, Imposts pay provides, trine the First Amendment provide the Debts and for the common context, government may “the not general Defence and Welfare the United deny person benefit to a on a basis Const, 8, I, § art. cl. 1. This States.” U.S. infringes constitutionally protected his ... provision Congress pro allows not freedom of even if he has no enti- policy to advance its vide federal subsidies tlement to that benefit.” Fo- v. Rumsfeld goals, but also to “attach conditions on the Rights, rum Academic & Institutional receipt of federal funds.” Dakota v. South Inc., 47, 59, 1297, 547 U.S. 126 S.Ct. Dole, 203, 206, 2793, 483 U.S. 107 S.Ct. (2006) (internal quotation L.Ed.2d 156 (1987). Congress L.Ed.2d ‍​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‍171 “has re omitted) ]; marks FAIR [hereinafter see peatedly employed power to further Sindermann, 593, Perry v. 408 U.S. 597- objectives by conditioning broad re (1972) 2694, 92 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ceipt moneys upon compliance federal (reaffirming government may by recipient statutory with federal employee terminate an based on the exer- administrative directives.” Id. rights cise of First Amendment because omitted). quotation marks For constitu deny “if the could a benefit to purposes, subsidy program tional a federal a person constitutionally because of his fundamentally is different from “direct associations, protected speech or his exer- particular state interference” with a activi cise of those freedoms would in effect be Roe, 464, 475, ty. See Maher v. 432 U.S. inhibited”). (1977). penalized and The “unconsti- “Con not, tutional conditions” doctrine does greatest stitutional concerns are when the however, give rise to a constitutional claim attempts impose by State its will force law; right; in its own the condition must actu- power encourage the State’s ally cause a violation of a substantive First actions deemed to be in the interest FAIR, right. Amendment See at necessarily far broader.” Id. at result, 59-60, (declining S.Ct. 2376. As a “the 126 S.Ct. 1297 to address Government may competitive funding according allocate unconstitutional conditions issue because to criteria impermissible underlying that would be no constitutional violation ” restriction); ‘bounty5 ‘privilege’ from direct does not mean that

would arise cf. Sullivan, M. Unconstitutional denial infringe speech.” Kathleen “its Id. Conditions, Harv. L.Rev. explained 78 S.Ct. 1332. The Court that “constitutional in- (explaining Speiser, that in exemp- “the denial of a tax rise to the level of a terest at issue must tion engaging certain neces- right indeed, preferred recognized sarily will have the effect of coercing the — judicial strict normally protected right claimants refrain proscribed from the review”). purpose “unconstitu- The denial speech. ‘frankly aimed at ” govern- conditions” doctrine tional the suppression dangerous ideas.’ context, therefore, pro- is to subsidy ment (quoting 78 S.Ct. 1332 Am. subsidy on when a condition guidance vide Ass’n, Douds, Commc’ns v. C.I.O. 339 U.S. ... actually “infringes person’s] consti- [a 382, 402, (1950)). 94 L.Ed. 925 freedom of tutionally protected Having tan- characterized the condition as FAIR, speech,” fine, tamount to a the Court struck it down Regan Repre- With 1297. See Taxation pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the sentation, lacking Fourteenth Amendment for suffi- *25 (1983) 1997, (explaining 129 76 L.Ed.2d protections. cient procedural Id. at 520- scrutiny heightened required that is not of 29, 78 S.Ct. 1332. government funding on all conditions “ Representation, In Taxation With merely that exemptions [ ] tax ‘affect ” Supreme was on apply Court called to (quoting rights’ First Amendment Taxa- Speiser the context of a condition on Representation Regan, v. 676 tion With nonprofit groups’ ability to retain tax-fa- (D.C.Cir.1982)) 715, (emphasis F.2d 728 Specifically, vored status. the Court ad- Supreme opinion)); Speis- added in Court Congress’s prohibition dressed whether er, 518, (noting 357 U.S. at 78 S.Ct. 1332 lobbying by nonprofit organizations that exemption “may that of a tax the denial were allowed to receive tax-deductible con- infringe speech”). tributions amounted to an unconstitutional The “unconstitutional conditions” doc- organizations’ ability condition on the to applied trine was the context of a First money. receive tax-deductible See Taxa- to challenge Amendment the denial of 545, Representation, tion at With U.S. Speiser. In that government benefit lobbying clearly 103 S.Ct. 1997. While is case, attempted to State California Amendment, by protected the First see require eligible veterans otherwise for a E.R.R. v. Presidents Noerr property exemption sign loyalty tax to Conference Inc., 127, 137-38, Freight, Motor they oath that did not advocate the stating (1961), 81 S.Ct. government. violent overthrow disagreed argument that Court with Supreme Court first observed is “[i]t nonprofit had violated effectively can limit- settled be groups’ rights by First Amendment declin- ed To taxing power. the exercise of the ing “pay lobbying for the out of deny exemption to claimants who en- monies,” Representation, Taxation With gage in certain forms of is effect 461 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 1997. The penalize speech. them for such Its “reject[ed] ‘notion that Court First deterrent effect is the same as if the State rights fully Amendment are somehow speech.” Speis- were to fine them for this er, (citation by the at realized unless are subsidized U.S. 78 S.Ct. 1332 ” omitted). Therefore, (quot- at concluded State.’ Id. 103 S.Ct. Court States, exemption the fact that “a tax Cammarano United U.S. quoting in turn 498, 515, Speiser, 3 L.Ed.2d 462 S.Ct. 1332). J., concurring)). The (Douglas, The Court val- that the condition was reasoned found “no indication the statute was Court deny [plain- did “not Congress suppress any any id because intended to ideas or Representation Taxation With tiff demonstration that it has had that effect.” (“TWR”) right to receive deductible ] explicitly rejected It also holding Id. non-lobbying support contributions Appeals of the Court of below that “ activity, deny nor does it TWR inde- scrutiny’ required ‘strict because the on account of its intention pendent benefit rights First statute Amendment affect[s] ” Congress had not denied lobby.” Id. discriminatory on a basis.’ Taxation right to receive tax-deductible TWR Representation, With support non-lobbying ac- contributions (quoting S.Ct. 1997 Taxation Repre With because, Congress’s despite tivities restric- Regan, sentation v. 676 F.2d tion, to use a dual the law allowed TWR (D.C.Cir.1982)) (alteration emphasis whereby could continue to structure TWR Supreme opinion). added in Court receive tax-deductible contributions to con- Supreme explained Court it “is not non-lobbying activities while an affili- duct the law” that “strict scrutiny applies any lobby- could conduct organization ate Congress whenever subsidizes some ing activities with non-deductible funds. Rather, speech, speech.” but not all Id. 1997. The “appropriations comparable to tax ex that, therefore, “Congress explained deductions, emptions and which are also a infringed any has not First Amendment can, grace Congress matter [that] *26 rights regulated or First Amendment course, ... disallow as it chooses.” Id. at activity[;] Congress simply has chosen not (internal 549, quotation 103 S.Ct. 1997 546, lobbying.” for Id. at pay to TWR’s omitted). The еmphasized marks Court 103 S.Ct. 1997. again governmental provi that “[w]here rejected also sion of at sup subsidies is ‘aimed had violated Congress claim that TWR’s ideas,’ pression dangerous ‘power its to by to al rights continuing constitutional encourage actions deemed to be organizations veterans’ to tax-exempt low necessarily interest far broad ” lobby with tax-deductible contributions. 550, (quoting er.’ Id. at 103 S.Ct. 1997 546^17, Congress Id. at 103 S.Ct. 1997. Cammarano, 513, at 79 S.Ct. particular free to ... enti “select[ ] was Maher, 432 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. persons ties or for entitlement to this sort 2376, respectively). largesse wa]s decision ob [because concurrence, Blackmun, In a Justice viously a and discretion matter Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and open judicial review in cir to unless pointed Congress reality out that had in cumstances which here we are not able merely subsidy a lobby- “not den[ied] at find.” Id. 103 S.Ct. omitted). suggested, the Court had activities” as quotation marks The Court prohibited organization had an from re- cautioned, however, that case would “[t]he ceiving “tax-deductible contributions for all Congress be different if were to discrimi activities, whenever one of those activi- invidiously nate in its subsidies such a ” lobbying.’ ties at way is ‘substantial Id. suppression danger ‘to aim at the ” (Blackmun, J., concurring). ous ideas.’ Id. at 103 S.Ct. 1997 S.Ct. (some omitted) Blackmun quotation urged internal marks Justice therefore this Cammarano, (quoting “den[y] signifi- 358 U.S. at 79 restriction would in fact a (for organizations choosing government program example, by cant benefit and, rights” constitutional as restricting lobbying exercise their TWR from even with con- result, contributions), a be unconstitutional would non-deductible or if it * 552 & n. 1997. dition. denied benefits to which the conclusion, this Justice support As would be recipient otherwise entitled and cited, opinions, among other Blackmun independent provided that are from those in Cammar- concurrence Douglas’s Justice (for by program issue ano, Congress’s noted while which by example, denying property tax ex- business-expense deduction for denial of a oath). emption loyalty for failure to take a constitutional, was lobbying activities Second, 1997. See id. for a tax- all business deductions denial of Representation With Taxation cautioned lobbied, placing payer who “would be purpose of condition when is not exercise of First Amend- penalty on to define the of federal spend- boundaries Cammarmo, 358 U.S. at rights,” ment ing, rather certain suppress but view- J., (Douglas, concurring) points, the condition be unconstitu- (cited With Representation, in Taxation 548,103 See id. at tional. S.Ct. 1997. It is (Black- *,n. at 552 103 S.Ct. 1997 as a penalty viewpoint either coercive as mun, J., concurring)). Justice Blackmun’s then, suppression, denial gov- that the of a concur- Representation Taxation With may “infringe benefit person’s] [a ernment explain lobbying rence went on ... constitutionally protected freedom of in that case restriction was saved even if he has no entitlement nonprofit organization fact could that a benefit,” FAIR, 547 U.S. at create an affiliate to “make known its (internal quotation S.Ct. 1297 marks omit- losing legislation views on without tax ted). its nonlobbying benefits for activities.” sections, following two I Representation, first Taxation With 461 U.S. at cases analyzing funding this address Because of dual conditions structure, explained penalties Justice Blackmun and then turn to *27 that Congress’ purpose “the Court finds in discussing funding alleged cases conditions imposing lobbying restriction was to impermissibly discriminate on the basis merely to ensure that ‘no tax-deductible viewpoint. of pay contributions are used to for substan- ” tial Id. at lobbying.’ Representation Taxation With therefore term following Taxation With

expanded ways SpeiseVs in two on initial decision, Representation the Supreme discussion of the “unconstitutional condi- League decided Court FCC v. Women as it applies tions” doctrine to conditions of Voters, on government benefits or subsidies that (1984), L.Ed.2d 278 which underlined the First, affect rights. First Amendment of importance structure a affiliate avail- noted that would condition able in Taxation Representation. be unconstitutional if it a With operated as coer- Voters, League cive on Women penalty exercise First rights. Congress’s prohibition Amendment Court ruled that suggested The Court ways editorializing by any two that condition noncommercial broad- could if do this: that a federal recipi- grant restricted cast station received ent’s First “sufficiently Amendment outside of was not limited to justify the scope recipient’s of the in participation abridgment important the substantial regulations preventing federally First freedoms which the funded journalistic jealously protects.” projects providing Amendment from abortion counsel- By denying federal 104 S.Ct. 3106. “engaging in activities that ‘encour- editorialized, that Con- to stations grants promote or age, advocate abortion as a ” merely had not refused subsidize gress family planning.’ method of Id. at sta- editorializing by public broadcasting (quoting S.Ct. 1759 C.F.R. tions, it had caused a “station but rather 59.10(a) (1989)). The Court ruled that income only that receives 1% of its overall regulations did “not force the ... grants barred abso- [to be] from [federal] grantee give up speech; abortion-related editorializing.” all Id. at lutely from they merely require[d] grantee way no ha[d] 104 S.Ct. 3106. “The station keep separate such activities and distinct limiting the use of its federal funds to [government-funded] activities.” Id. and, activities, noneditorializing more all 196, 111 govern- S.Ct. 1759. When the using barred from importantly, it [wa]s simply ment “insist[s] funds be finance its wholly private even funds to spent purposes they for the for which were activity.” explicitly editorial Id. The Court authorized,” [g]overnment “the is not de- noted, however, main- Congress if nying anyone” a benefit to and there is no but allowed broad- tained the restriction penalty speech. unconstitutional on free organiza- affiliate cast stations to establish regulations Id. The Court noted that the money, tions to editorialize with nonfederal organi- Rust continued to allow healthcare statutory plainly mechanism would “such abortion; zations to advocate for reasoning be valid under the of Taxation “simply required tо [were] conduct those Representation.” With Id. The Court through activities programs that [were] Voters, therefore, League Women separate independent project from the Representation both the Taxation With that receives funds.” Id. In this [federal] 544-46, Court, 461 U.S. at way, regulations in Rust like were concurring and Justice Blackmun Representation those Taxation With case, 552-53, id. had protected lobbying that allowed for to con- that a suggested, concluded federal fund- contributions, tinue with non-deductible that not ing condition limited the in League and unlike those Women Vot- scope program, but prohibited ers that stations from editorial- a recipient right spend also denied izing private even with funds. See id. at money in private support protected 197-98, 111 S.Ct. 1759. The Rust Court activities, far. First Amendment went too explained that *28 Sullivan, 173, In Rust v. 500 111 U.S. [b]y requiring that program] the [federal 1759, (1991), 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 233 grantee engage in abortion-related activ- Supreme applied the “unconstitu- Court ity separately from activity receiving in tional conditions” doctrine the context of has, funding, Congress federal consis- subsidy program appropriated teachings League tent with our in organizations grants oper- to healthcare Rep- Women Voters and [Taxation With family planning projects. Congress ate resentation], right not denied it the grants conditioned the with the restriction in engage abortion-related activities. that none of the federal funds were to be “ Congress merely has programs in where refused to fund ‘used abortion is ” 178, public fisc, such activities out of the family planning,’ method of id. at Secretary 111 42 (quoting simply required S.Ct. 1759 U.S.C. 300a- has a cer- 6). Supreme upheld agency degree separation The Court tain from the [fed-

248 (some in order

erally project to ensure funded] internal quotation marks omit- ted). federally integrity pro- plurality funded expressly also distin- guished cases that gram. penalties, “involved true such as promotion denial of a outright or 198, 1759; Id. at see also Ve discharge employment,” from “non- Legal Corp., Sews. lazquez v. F.3d subsidies,” like the one at in issue Ameri- Cir.1999) (2d [hereinafter Ve Library can Ass’n. Id. at 212 n. lazquez (explaining restriction I] S.Ct. 2297. limited to Rust “was at odds way, this American Library Ass’n Congress seeking with the values was precisely was Speiser, line with Taxa- grant program”), through affd, advance tion Representation, With League 149 L.Ed.2d Voters, Women acting Rust. When (2001). pursuant Spending to its powers, Clause Finally, United States v. American Congress may attach conditions to federal Ass’n, Library subsidies that have the effect of limiting (2003), L.Ed.2d 221 recipients’ First Amendment rights, as upheld a law that denied li- long as the conditions do not limit free provide braries Internet access speech outside of scope govern- unless the libraries installed software to program ment deny and do not indepen- obscenity block access to and child pornog- dent recipients benefits to which are other- raphy prevent and to children from access- wise entitled an attempt penalize ing inappropriate material.1 The plurality First Amendment activity. Even when oрinion rejected argument that the law funding conditions limit or affect speech, imposed an unconstitutional condition on such limits are generally permissible if receipt of federal funding because it they are meant govern- to ensure that “penalized] library failing to install ment funds are used for purposes filtering software on every one of its Inter- they which were authorized. This is be- computers.” net-accessible Id. at 123 cause, special circumstances, absent there (quoting S.Ct. 2297 id. is no coercive force behind a funding con- (Stevens, J., dissenting)). plurali- truly dition that is cabined to the federal ty explained that the law subsidy program to which it is attached. “penalize” does not libraries that If potential recipients choose do not wish to abide software, not to install deny condition, such by the they simply can choose right them the to provide patrons their not to accept the funds. Library See Am. Rather, Ass’n, (“To with unfiltered Internet access. 539 U.S. at 123 S.Ct. 2297 simply [the Congress’ law] reflects deci- the extent that libraries wish to offer unfil- sion not to subsidize their doing access, so. To tered are free to do so without the extent that libraries assistance.”); Rust, wish to offer federal access, they (“[T]his unfiltered are free to do so 111 S.Ct. 1759 limitation is a without federal assistance. A refusal to consequence of their accept decision to *29 protected more, fund activity, employment without in project, scope of cannot equated be with imposition of permissibly which is restricted a “penalty” on that activity. funding authority.”); 5, id. at 199 n. 111 judgment The of the judgment Court was announced Justices concurred in the and each opinion by in an Rehnquist Chief Justice opinions. filed their own joined by three other Justices. Two other

249 (“[Subsidies that, available, just 1759 sub- alternative channels are re- S.Ct. in recipient way The no com- protected sidies. strictions on First Amendment [federally operate pro- pelled activity funded] within imposed scope of the simply subsidy.”); it decline the ject; can only program apply federal to that federal- Bell, 555, College City v. U.S. Grove ly program funded and therefore are not (1984) 1211, 575, 104 79 L.Ed.2d 516 S.Ct. equivalent of direct restrictions (“Grove City may partic- terminate its Ass’n, penalties,” “true Library Am. in ipation program and thus [federal] 6, at 212 U.S. n. 123 S.Ct. 2297. See Brook- requirements avoid the condi- [the Servs., 231; lyn Legal 462 F.3d at Ve- tion].”); Legal Soc’y Chapter Christian I, lazquez cf. 164 F.3d at 766. Coll, Cal., Hastings Law v. Univ. — Martinez, -, 130 S.Ct. (2010) (“[Plaintiff] 177 L.Ed.2d 838 Speiser and Representa- Taxation With effectively subsidy, a state seeking what emphasize tion also that funding condi- modify pressure faces indirect may tions be if they unconstitutional “dis- membership policies.”); Ass’n Guardians invidiously criminate way such a Comm’n, ‍​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‍582, 586, v. Civil 463 U.S. Serv. suppression to ‘aim at the of dangerous (1983) (plu 103 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 866 ” ideas,’ Regan v. Taxation Repre- With (“[T]he rality opinion) receipt of federal sentation, 540, 550, 461 U.S. typical Spending legis funds under Clause (quoting 76 L.Ed.2d 129 Cam- lation is a consensual matter: the State or marano, 524). 358 U.S. at grantee weighs other the benefits and bur Supreme Court and this Court have agree the funds accepting dens beforе addressed claims that conditions comply with the conditions attached impermissibly discriminate on the basis of receipt.”); to their Pennhurst State Sch. & Rust, viewpoint Rosenberger, Finley, Haldeiman, 17, 27, Hosp. v. cases, Velazquez and American Li- (1981) (ex brary Ass’n. “legislation pursuant enacted plaining Rust, recipients family plan- power is much in the spending ning grants argued regulations contract; in nature of a return for federal restricting being federal funds from used funds, [recipient] agree to com States impermis- for abortion services constituted federally imposed ply with conditions” viewpoint sible discrimination in favor of concluding that “the court below failed to position. an anti-abortion 500 U.S. at recognize the well-settled distinction be Relying 111 S.Ct. 1759. on Taxation With congressional ‘encouragement’ tween Representation, they argued that because imposition programs state and the of bind to fund States”). “continue[d] ing obligations on the This is speech ancillary pregnancy testing in a why usually “Congress it is the case that manner that is not evenhanded re- with rights burden the First Amendment spect to views and information about abor- recipients benefits if the tion, invidiously discriminates on the ba- recipients adequate are left with alterna viewpoint.” quotation sis of protected expression.” tive channels for omitted). I, 766; marks Court re- Velazquez F.3d accord jected challenge this and found that Con- Brooklyn Legal Corp. Legal Servs. (2d gress had not Corp., Servs. 462 F.3d Cir. discriminated favor of denied, 2006), position, “merely anti-abortion cert. but had (2007). 44,169 adequate activity L.Ed.2d When chosen to fund one to the exclusion *30 193, Id. at 111 S.Ct. 1759. ities Fund to a creating “metaphysical” of the other.” “ ‘[tjhere reiterated that is a The Court speech. limited forum for student between direct state inter- 829-30, basic difference Id. at 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Court activity a and state protected ference with explained that once the opened State “has activity alternative encouragement of.an forum, a limited ... the State must re- ” legislative policy.’ Id. consonant with spect the lawful boundaries it has itself Roe, 464, 475, v. Maher 432 U.S. (quoting may set. The State not exclude (1977)). 2376, L.Ed.2d 484 97 S.Ct. where its distinction is not in reasonable words, Rust was “not a case of the other forum, light purpose of the served the ‘suppressing dangerous a Government may against speech nor it discriminate on idea,’ prohibition a on a project but of 829, viewpoint.” the basis of its at Id. employees engaging grantee or its quotation S.Ct. 2510 citations and project’s scope,” outside of the activities omitted). marks Court re- 194, 111 S.Ct. 1759. This was so id. at jected University’s attempt rely cannot be that though it denied even proposition Rust for the that it could make government-funded project in scope of the funding content-based decisions when nec- necessarily recipients’ ability limited Rust essary accomplish its educational mis- viewpoint a pro-abortion to advocate with- 832-33, sion. S.Ct. 2510. In so government scope program.2 in the doing, the acknowledged Court that it was applied The Court Rust the context of true that “we permitted govern- have public-university provision funds to regulate ment to the content of what is or groups Rosenberger v. Rector student & expressed speaker not when it is the University Virginia, Visitors private convey when enlists entities to 2510, 819, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 115 S.Ct. 833, message.” its own Id. at 115 S.Ct. (1995). case, University In that pointed 2510. The Court a Rust as case Virginia denied from its Student where organization to a student Activities Fund government pro- did not create a publish newspaper that wished to that gram encourage private viewpoints. advocated Christian The Su- but preme analogized private Court the Student Activ- speakers instead used to trans- did, fact, explained prohibit particular 2. While the Rust Court that "the issue in Rust II, position Velazquez Government has not discriminated on the ba- on abortion. See ("We viewpoint; merely sis of it has chosen to fund U.S. at 121 S.Ct. 1043 have said other,” activity viewpoint-based funding one to the exclusion of decisions can be Rust, 500 U.S. at 111 S.Ct. sustained in like instances in which way stating private speakers have been another the conclu- 'used impennissi- specific pertaining had not sion transmit information to its ” bly viewpoint. program.' (quoting Rosenberger discriminated on the basis of own v. Rec- Va., Legal Corp. Velazquez, Servs. tor & Visitors Univ. Cf. 533, 541, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 Rust, (“The (1995))); Velazquez [hereinafter 1} 500 U.S. at (Blackmun, J., ("The place explicit dissenting) regula- did in Rust reliance on the based.”); counseling clearly viewpoint rationale that the activities of the tions are also id. program] (quoting agency [the doctors under federal amount- 111 S'.Ct. 1759 governmental speech; interpret- regulation stating project "may ed to when cases, however, holding encourage, promote in later we or advocate abortion” Rust)); explained understanding.”); (emphasis have Rust on this added in see also Robert C. I, Post, ("[W]e Velazquez Speech, 164 F.3d at 770 doubt 106 Yale L.J. Subsidized (1996) ("The regulations reliably plainly words [in Rust} these can be [Rmsí] value.”). regulations viewpoint....”). taken at face discriminate on the basis of *31 “give restriction would not rise to pertaining gress’s to its specific mit information that recognized program. suppression protected expression.” own We the appropriates pub- government when the In doing, Id. at 118 S.Ct. 2168. so the particular a promote lic funds to Supreme distinguished Court the nature of it say what of its own it is entitled program Finley at issue in with that in disburs- wishes. When Rosenberger. Supreme The Court ex- private funds to entities to es plained Rosenberger, govern- that in may message, convey governmental a “indiscriminately ‘encourage[d] ment a di- ” appropriate steps to legitimate take and versity private speakers.’ of views from gar- message that its is neither ensure (quoting Id. at 118 S.Ct. 2168 Rosen- grantee. bled nor distorted 2510). berger, 515 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. omitted). (internal The citations Court Id. hand, Finley, In on the other the NEA however, held that it had never explained, judg- was mandated to “make esthetic restrictions “viewpoint-based that “inherently content- ments” that were University does not itself proper when the purpose program, based.” Id. The transmittal of a mes- or subsidize speak therefore, subsidy “apart sеt NEA funds to expends it favors but instead sage subsidy Rosenberger— from the at issue in pri- encourage diversity of views organi- which was available to all student Id. at 115 S.Ct. 2510. speakers.” vate comparably objective zations ... and from sum, University offered In because the benefits, allocating public decisions on such to “en- groups specifically funds to student as access to a school auditorium or a mu- courage diversity private of views from theater, nicipal mailing or the second class intended to facilitate the speakers” and privileges newspapers available to all convey who private “speakers periodical publications” other at issue messages,” University could their own viewpoint other cases where discrimination not, quasi-limited public having created impermissible. found ci- was speech, then “silence the forum student omitted). quotation tations and marks Id. at expression viewpoints.” of selected warning Supreme Court reiterated its 834-35,115 S.Ct. 2510. that, nevertheless, may to further opportunity The Court had an “leverage power not to award subsidies explain Rosenberger National Endow subjective criteria into a on basis Finley, ment the Arts v. viewpoints,” penalty on disfavored (1998). 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 suppression danger- aim at the case, National Congress directed the ous ideas. Id. at 118 S.Ct. 2168. (“NEA”) to Endowment for the Arts con- Having suppres- found no evidence of such decency “general sider standards sion, however, logic of Rust v. Sulli- for the diverse beliefs and values respect van, public” determining of the American (1991), applied: govern- L.Ed.2d 233 grants whether to award federal to artists. competitive ment was free to “allocate Performance Id. at 118 S.Ct. 2168. funding according to criteria would be funding denied claimed artists who were regulation of impermissible were direct condition constituted at penalty or a criminal stake.” Id. against art viewpoint discrimination 587-88, (relying part decency offended standards of or did Rust, 1759); 580,118 respect mainstream values. Id. at Sens., Legal Brooklyn accord F.3d rejected S.Ct. 2168. The (“[T]he government may allocate com- challenge this and concluded Con- 230 *32 I, funding according to criteria that In petitive Velazquez upheld we also all almost against restrictions impermissible regula- viewpoint would be were direct dis- crimination stake.”). challenge because we found tion of at they were in viewpoint fact neutral. apply was called on to these Our Court However, 164 F.3d at 767-69. we conclud- (2d I, Velazquez in 164 F.3d 757 cases ed that the limitation that precluded a Cir.1999). case, lawyers In that employed lawyer who received LSC funds from chal- by Legal grantees Corpo- of Services lenging existing welfare rule in a suit (“LSC”)3 challenged ration a law that on behalf of a client for welfare benefits being funds from used per- barred LSC viewpoint was not neutral. We noted that activities, including lobbying, form various the restriction “clearly seeks to discourage actions, participating seeking challenges quo.” in class at- to the status at Id. 770. The majority declined to follow fees, then-Judge torneys’ seeking to reform or chal- view, concurring Jacobs’s in part and dis- lenge existing laws. welfare We first ana- senting part, in viewpoint whether lyzed Representation, Taxation With FCC permissible discrimination was in the con- Voters, v. League Women of text of the proviso at issue turned on (1984), L.Ed.2d 278 government, whether the through funding pro- Rust and summarized those cases as LSC, sought promote a diversity of viding circumstances, that “in appropriate private views as it had done in Rosenber- Congress may burden the First Amend- ger. (Jacobs, J., See id. at 775-77 concur- rights recipients government ment of ring part, in dissenting part) (arguing recipients benefits if the are left with ade- additionally that the proviso viewpoint was quate protected alternative channels for neutral). Judge Jacobs concluded that the I, expression.” Velazquez 164 F.3d at 766. program LSC was not created to fund a upheld We all of the restrictions at issue diversity private views and that when from a facial challenge burdened government does not a limit- “create[ ] recipients’ ability private to use funds public ed expression forum for the of di- engage protected First Amendment viewpoints,” verse at princi- id. “the activity. Id. at 765-67. We relied on the ple[ jexplicitly announced in Rust and not teaching Representation of Taxation With by implicated the facts Rosenberger” (and and League Women Voters the fact “[Wjhen applies: government funds cases”) that “Rust is consistent with these specific services it deems to be in the subsidy acceptable restrictions are if interest, require grantees to “adequate there are alternative avenues get program,” with its id. at 776. The expression through affiliates.” Id. at majority, hand, on the other reasoned that case, 766-67. We left for a future ulti- Rust’s conclusion that Services, mately Brooklyn Legal 462 F.3d that case had “not discriminated on the 219, 222-23, question at whether the viewpoint; merely basis of it has chosen to provided alternatives under pro- the LSC activity fund one to the exclusion of the gram adequate were fact in the context other,” Rust, as-applied of an challenge. See “reliably could not be taken at face infra value,” I, Velazquez at 770. In- F.3d non-profit government-fund- 3. The LSC proceedings is "a persons financially or matters to corporation, ed created legal [an Act of Con- unable to afford assistance.” Id. at 759 gress], purpose providing for the financial quotation citation and marks omit- support legal ted). assistance in noncriminal encourage funds to diver- ” expends stead Jacobs’s frame- adopting Judge stead private speakers.’ type sity on the of views work, majority focused issue, (quoting criticism of Rosenber- noting that speech at 2510). strongest garners the ger, 515 U.S. at *33 “ at 771. case, Id. protection. ‘it does not follow First Amendment the latter lawyer’s that a majority found prop- the viewpoint-based Because restrictions that ” statute is invalid that a welfare argument (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. er.’ Id. official to criticism of 2510) (omission сloser was 834, in Ve- at in at issue cases type the than to II). acknowledged The lazquez Court rejected had Supreme Court where was different from program that the LSC (abor- challenges discrimination viewpoint at issue in Activities Fund Student in indecent art counseling in Rust and tion did Rosenberger program because the LSC on it held that the restriction Finley), “encourage diversity a not seek to subject laws was challenging welfare views,” concluded that “the salient but scrutiny. at Id. First Amendment strict that, program like the in Rosen- point 771-72. designed was berger, program the LSC speech, promote not to Legal private in Services facilitate

Granting certiorari 533, 121 message.” S.Ct. Id. at 121 Velazquez, governmental 531 U.S. Gorp. [hereinafter 149 L.Ed.2d 63 nature of the private S.Ct. 1043. The II], ap- Supreme Court Velazquez was underlined speech facilitated Judge to endorse Ja- peared generally use an government sought fact that the “to comparing the LSC framework for cobs’s existing expression” medium of law- —the in at issue with the restrictions restrictions yer relationship to control —client —“and Rosenberger, although disa- Rust and it, cases, ways in a in which distort class conclusion that Judge with Jacobs’s greed functioning.” Id. at its usual more like the for- program was the LSC S.Ct. 1043. The Court

mer than the latter. rejected II also Velazquez Court “did that while the Rust Court explained the restric- government’s argument rationale reliance on the place explicit challenging tion suits welfare laws was doctors un- counseling services of the con- “necessary scope to define the governmental Title X amounted to der program” “help[ ] tours of the federal on this explained ... we have Rust in a system current welfare function II, understanding.” Velazquez by remov- more efficient and fair manner The Court therefore 121 S.Ct. 1043. challenges ing program complex from the funding deci- “viewpoint-based noted that existing welfare laws.” Id. in instances can be sustained sions 1043. The Court ruled “Con- S.Ct. speaker, is itself which gress cannot recast a condition on Rust, instances, gov- like which program definition of its as mere speakers to transmit private ernment ‘used case, Amendment be every lest the First to its own pertaining information specific ” simple reduced to a semantic exercise.” II, Velazquez program.’ “in omitted) explained the con- citation S.Ct. statute, program- text of this there is no 833, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at (quoting 2510). recognized of the kind message matic The Court contrasted those S.Ct. and which sufficed there to allow Rust govern- in which the cases with situation “ specify the advice deemed Government to speak or subsidize ment ‘does not itself objectives.” necessary legitimate it favors but in- message of a transmittal ultimately 1043. In apply Id. at in American Library Ass’n be- invalid, holding the restriction the Court “public cause libraries do not install Inter- private speech emphasized “[w]here is net provide terminals to a forum for Web involved, Congress’ even antecedent fund- publishers themselves, express but rath- sup- decision cannot be aimed at the prоvide er to patrons with online material pression thought of ideas inimical to the requisite appropriate quality.” Id. Government’s own interest.” Id. at 548-

49, 121 (citing Regan S.Ct. 1043 v. Taxa- Ill Representation, tion With case, majority this (1983), concludes that *34 Randall, Policy 513, 519, Requirement Speiser height- and 357 U.S. “warrants (1958)). 1332, 2 scrutiny” ened L.Ed.2d 1460 because it is a “bold combi- nation in a speech- condition of a Finally, in United States v. American , targeted restriction that is both affirmative Ass’n, Library 194, 539 U.S. 123 S.Ct. and quintessentially viewpoint-based.” 2297, (2003), 156 221 plurality L.Ed.2d a Maj. Op. However, at 236. Policy explicitly rejected argument the Court Requirement permissible is a funding con- Velazquez II limited Rust to eases dition under the “unconstitutional condi- government “‘in which the seeks to com- ” tions” doctrine as it has applied been in municate a specific message.’ Id. at 213 government subsidy context because it n. 123 S.Ct. 2297 (quoting id. at 123 neither imposes a penalty protected (Stevens, J., 2297 dissenting)). S.Ct. Dis- First Amendment rights nor discriminates senting, Justice Stevens relied on Ve- in way suppression aimed at the lazquez argue II to of ideas. that the condition re- Furthermore, quiring public viewpoint-based filtering libraries to install nature Policy attempt Requirement software was is entirely prop- ] “distort[ th[e] medium” er because no comput- “Internet-accessible forum principles are 227-28, at ers.” Id. implicated S.Ct. 2297. Jus- in this case. rejected

tice Stevens the American Li- brary plurality’s Ass’n assertion that Rust A Congress allowed to restrict the scope of obvious, Although it is it must be noted subsidy its own programs by arguing that at the outset that the Requirement involved, only only to, “Rust applies does not actually compel anyone speak governmental is, instances of speech —that government’s favored viewpoint. The situations in which government seeks is a condition on the specific to communicate a message.” Id. voluntary receipt 123 S.Ct. 2297. plurality, how- ever, funds—funds which only are available explained that “Velazquez held groups participate that wish to viewpoint-based gov- im- l’estrictions are ernment’s proper “global strateg[y] [government] ‘when the to combat does not 7603(1). HIV/AIDS,” speak itself U.S.C. or subsidize The Su- transmittal of a preme message explained it Court has expends favors but instead is “[t]here a basic encourage diversity difference between direct in- views state funds private speakers,”’ terference with a protected activity id. at 213 n. II, (quoting encouragement S.Ct. 2297 state Velazquez of an alternative ac- 1043) tivity U.S. at (emphasis S.Ct. consonant legislative policy.” with Ass’n). Roe, added American Library The Maher v. 432 U.S.

plurality that Velazquez (1977); reasoned II did see also Tax- not, special cir- government except Representation, With ation cumstances, may simply be (“Although TWR does coercive and wants, recipient. money potential much declined See have as “[S]ilence, its freedom supra cannot exercise cited at 248^19. thus cases like, the Constitution is, fact, as it would Plain- neutrality” option as much “an to such confer an entitlement does not Maj. Op. at 234. tiffs.” See necessary to realize all may be funds as course, progeny teach Speiser Of and its of that freedom.” advantages instances, that, the denial of a in some omitted)); 549, 103 id. at marks quotation government benefit can have same (“[A] decision not legislature’s as the “deterrent effect” on free the exercise of fundamental to subsidize Speiser, regulation speech. direct See right, and thus infringe does not right The “un- 78 S.Ct. 1332. (not- scrutiny.”); id. subject to strict provides conditions” doctrine constitutional like appropriations, analyzing when the de- the framework deductions, grace matter of are “a tax rises to the nial of a benefit can, course, disallow Congress [that] infringement speech. level of an on free *35 (internal quotation marks it chooses” as thorough in a discussion Despite engaging omitted)). contexts, “In Su- [the diverse cases in of “unconstitutional conditions” decisions have distin- preme Court’s] context, subsidy the ma- government the ac- policies require that guished between and jority puts appears that doctrine aside those that withhold benefits.” tion and funding that when a condition to conclude — Martinez, Legal Soc’y v. Christian nega- rather than imposes affirmative -, 2971, 2986, 177 130 S.Ct. U.S. always it speech requirement, “raise[s] tive (2010); Library see also Am. L.Ed.2d 838 concerns,” Maj. serious First Amendment Ass’n, 6, 212 n. 123 2297 539 S.Ct. support proposi- for this Op. at 234. As penalties” “true from “non- (distinguishing tion, majority pieces offers two of evi- the States, subsidies”); 618 v. United ACORN First, majority the observes that dence. Cir.2010) (2d 125, (noting F.3d Board Education v. Virginia West State determining whether a law purposes Barnette, 624, 1178, 319 U.S. 63 S.Ct. the punishment violation of constitutes (1943), Wooley Speiser, and L.Ed. 1628 plaintiffs “the are Bill of Attainder Clause Maynard, 430 U.S. activities; prohibited not from (1977), compelled speech were L.Ed.2d 752 only prohibited receiving federal heightened scrutiny ap- was cases where activities”), cert. funds to continue their at issue plied or where the restrictions — denied, U.S.-, Second, struck down. the were otherwise (2011). 2011 WL 704331 L.Ed.2d FAIR, to majority points one sentence seeking partner organizations to with 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d dangling prostitution, Congress “is oppose (2006), suggests that it believes subsidy, wielding not the the carrot affirmative-speech conditions prohibition.” Legal Christian stick of beyond,” Maj. Op. at 234 n. “push[] Soc’y, 130 S.Ct. at 2986. Plaintiffs’ Amendment what the First allows. if Plaintiffs do compelled because First, majority recognizes, Bar- as the Policy Require- to the not wish to ascribe nette, Wooley and are not cases Speiser, ment, they may simply chose not to seek appropri- government sought the to where funds. The public scope funds and then limit the ate repeatedly has concluded that sub- Bar- subsidy program. Wooley and provided or motive the the sidy, temptation, traditionally described as on government have been called benefit turned re- nette attempt government’s to com- quiring recipient to speak message cases through the force of law. direct pel unrelated to government was ben- See, Mktg. e.g., v. Livestock Johanns efit at The issue. in those Ass’n, existing cases threatened the denial of an (2005) ‍​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‍(describing Bar- L.Ed.2d 896 school, (going benefit to tax property “outright compulsion as a case of nette roads, exemption, using respec- can those be crea- speech”). While cases tively) a means of coercing recipients as to recast, does, be, tively majority as the give up rights. First Amendment along Speiser, conditions with cases about Barnette, Speiser, restrictions and Woo- placed governmental on the benefits of ley merely attempts were to confine (Barnette) “going “using school” government spending scope of a (Wooley), roads” at- government’s course, subsidy program, there because tempt deny the benefits in those cases subsidy program was no relevant at all in quite different from Re- was those Represen- cases. Taxation With Cf. In Barnette quirement issue here. tation, 461 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 1997 Wooley, accepting alternatives (“But just certainly incorrect TWR government’s be not to benefits would Speis- when claims this case fits the go public school or not drive model.”). er-Perry Therefore, actual roads, public respectively. govern- purposes regulations ment, therefore, monopoly power used its and they properly were revealed were public over education and the roads found invalid. *36 put recipients to to a choice that was obvi- It to is difficult understand rele- what ously coercive—there realistic al- was no determining vance these cases can have to accepting ternative to the conditions and whether a true subsidy condi- giving up rights. First Amendment See Speiser, partic- tion is constitutional. and Comm’n, 583, 593, v. R.R. Frost U.S. ularly Wooley, Barnette and only provide (1926) (explain- 70 L.Ed. 1101 underlying the substantive Plain- basis for ing that the choice of to whether use the case, tiffs’ compelled claims in this public highways or a submit to burden on just in Taxation Representation, as With plaintiff rights gave constitutional the “no example, underlying for the substantive choice, except a the choice between rock that provided Congress doctrine vio- would case, whirlpool”). the and In this Plain- First directly late the Amendment if it do argue tiffs that id., the right lobby, restricted to see funds vital to their continued survival (Blackmun, J., U.S. at 103 S.Ct. 1997 they only or even that are the source of concurring) (citing E.R.R. Con- Presidents fight to funds Nat’l En- HIV/AIDS. Cf. Inc., v. Noerr Motor Freight, Finley, the dowment Arts v. ference for 137-38, U.S. 596-97, 5 L.Ed.2d 141 L.Ed.2d (1961), proposition lobby- for the (Scalia, J., that concurring in the protected activity). is a The existence judgment) (viewing skeptically poten- the underlying of an argument tial substantive First Amend- entirely denial of however, voluntary prohibition, ment subsidy may coercion did not resolve constitute equivalent constitutionality to a the compulsion speak direct to the condition if it were a only recipient’s Representation; source of issue Taxation With Barnette, funding). Moreover, Rather, Speiser, nor it here. does this case calls whether, Wooley, of a so- despite threatened denial us to determine Con- in funding to affirm award docu- recipients to conditions power impose gress’s broad funding they opposed condition are in fact to spending, ments that on federal re- an affirmative imposes Requirement The is prostitution. that equal a so coercive as to quirement Congress’s precisely therefore aimed speech. majority The compulsion direct in the Congress did not determine goal. from with struggle a blank slate need not fight Leadership Act that it wished to proper way approach determining the through strategy of remain- HIV/AIDS has question. this prostitution on the ing neutral issue for us already provided framework contribute to other behavioral risks that Rust, Representation, with Taxation that it would epidemic and the HIV/AIDS “un- of cases applying line entire by simply that with- implement strategy in the conditions” doctrine constitutional support holding groups context. government subsidies 7631(e). Rather, id § it prostitution, of. cases on whether of those turned None prostitu- wanted to specifically “eradicate” affirma- alleged speech restriction was Id other risks. tion and behavioral Rather, the foundational negative.4 tive Rust, Congress 7601(23). § While Representation Taxation With principle of to activities wished fund abortion is allowed and Rust is that family grants, here through planning spent be for funds “insist[ ] sought prostitution Congress eradicate which author- were purposes affirmatively and decided to fund Sullivan, 173, 196, ized,” Rust v. 500 U.S. groups particular approach that shared its (1991). 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 It fighting perfectly HIV/AIDS. does Policy Requirement in this case Congress’s Spending powers Clause within Congress that. determined precisely pub- “insist[s] to craft condition that “the part fighting spread HIV/ spent purposes lic funds be for the “it epidemic,” should be AIDS Rust, authorized,” they were which “[pjrostitu- to eradicate” United States 196, 111 S.Ct. 1759. 7601(23). It also de- 22 U.S.C. tion.” majority reason con- The second fight termined desired HIV/ *37 require- speech cludes that affirmative through strategy specifically AIDS always ments “raise serious First Amend- risks” “reducing] behavioral HIV/AIDS concerns,” Maj. Op. at is ment “eliminatfingj exploita- the sexual “[tjhere nothing is FAIR’s statement that Id women children.” tion of approaching in this case a Government- (a)(12)(J). 7611(a)(12), It therefore pledge mandated motto that school organizations authorized federal funds for endorse,” FAIR, at must 547 U.S. affirmatively its desire re- that shared FAIR, 1297. In various law schools risks, including behavioral duce HIV/AIDS challenged Congress’s to withhold eradicating As a decision prostitution. end, institu- Agencies require grants federal from educational means to this majority certainly note Amendment should control 4. The is correct First concern funding condition of the unconstitutional conditions whether that none "[tjhere even involved unconstitutional. That is because cases an affirmative Maj. Op. inter- at It is the in- a basic difference between direct state condition. 234 n. 3. pro- protected activity with a and state of those two doctrines ference tersection question encouragement activity an con- before alternative vides the novel constitutional Roe, remains, howevеr, legislative policy.” Maher v. point there sonant with us. The 464, 475, suggestion mere 97 S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d never been has (1977). particular type of a of substantive existence military tions that denied recruiters access funding and a compul- direct equal to that of other recruiters. Id. speak. sion to Supreme 1297. The Court did in an “unconstitutional engage condi- B analysis tions” because concluded that Because there is a precise- doctrine that prevent “the First Amendment would not ly addresses whether a government subsi- directly Congress imposing from the ... dy condition is pursuant constitutional on requirement” access universities in Amendment, the First I would apply it 59-60, event. id. See S.Ct. 1297 Policy here. The Requirement imposes when a (declining “determine condition neither of the types two of burdens identi- university placed funding goes beyond in Regan fied v. Taxation Represen- With the reasonable choice offered in City Grove tation, and becomes unconstitutional condition” (1983), L.Ed.2d 129 as penalizing free omitted)). quotation marks speech such that a subsidy ap- condition context, Supreme Court ad- proaches the coercive effects of a direct argument dressed the law schools’ First, restriction. Policy Requirement requirement access constituted compelled deny does not any independent govern- forced, because schools were if ment benefit to which Plaintiffs are other- they posted sent e-mails and notices re- wise entitled. The only consequence if recruiters, garding campus other to do the Plaintiffs do not subscribe to the Leader- military 61-62, same for recruiters. Id. at ship Act’s Requirement is that 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Court set will receive Leadership Act funds. eompelled-speech out the pursu- doctrine (and This Speiser is unlike Barnette and ant and Wooley to Barnette and concluded Wooley if government- re-characterized as “recruiting assistance ... is a far cry cases) funding where the denial of inde- compelled speech in Barnette and pendent, already-existing benefits was Wooley.” Id. 126 S.Ct. 1297. The threatened. It is also unlike the denial of explained that Congress’s Court restriction all business deductions for a taxpayer who “does not dictate the content of the speech lobbied contemplated in Douglas’s Justice at all.... There is nothing this case concurrence in Cammarano v. United approaching a Government-mandated States, 498, 515, pledge or motto that the school must en- (1959), L.Ed.2d 462 penalty as “a on the dorse.” therefore found exercise of First rights.” Amendment necessary that a but not sufficient element only government benefit at risk is the sub- of an unconstitutional condition *38 sidy government that the chose to restrict was absent —there underlying would be no in order to policy goals. achieve its First Amendment violation if the condition The Policy Requirement applied directly. was also does not The Court had no restrict need Plaintiffs’ to address whether a First funding condi- Amendment speech tion required scope that outside of the recipients espouse to a of the Leader- particular ship Act message program. would be This constitutional is because the under organizational integrity the First guidelines Amendment and said noth- imple- ing FAIR, therefore, about by that issue. mented the Agencies allow for exactly has little key relevance to the issue in the affiliate this case structure that saved the fund- Barnette, the same reason that Speiser, ing conditions at issue in Taxation With Wooley and are not Representation determinative: There Velazquez and I and was is a basic difference between the denial of missing found in FCC League Women of Voters, remedy compelled cannot a channel” (1984). case, “by speech affording In Plaintiffs condition an outlet to L.Ed.2d 278 this privately Maj. to re- organizations engage create affiliate funded silence.” may Leadership comply logic point and at 239. This of Op. funds misses ceive Leadership Policy Require- “adequate gov- Act’s alternative channels” in the with the Plaintiffs, therefore, subsidy free to again are ernment context and fails to ment. espouse Policy a for the fact Re- to remain silent or to account that continue condition, merely subsidy non-Leader- a pro-prostitution message quirement with speak.5 to al- way, Act funds. this not a mandate Provisions ship lowing recipients government funding Requirement coupled with the Guidelines organizations that Act funds affiliate to either ensures establish govern- oper- within the of the receive the funds or to spent scope is, exclusively private with organizations on ate funds are im- program ment —that they Congress’s portant remedy way that share desire to “eradicate” because one that condition, “[pjrostitution funding merely and other practice although condition, “are ad- sexual victimization” because could be so coercive as spread causes of and factors in the to rise to the level of restriction on ditional direct epidemic,” 22 Affiliate speech. prevent of the U.S.C. structures subsi- HIV/AIDS 7601(23). dy reaching beyond The conditions from penalty subsidy impose scope program therefore no and restrict- Guidelines organization may may an rights. ing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment what say program. outside of the scope rejects majority argument The way in this that subsidy It is conditions Policy Require- save the Guidelines penalties become on First Amend- could infringing right from Plaintiffs’ ment rights equivalent ment to a direct restric- speaking. majority ex- refrain Taxation Representation, tion. See With cases, pro- in previous affiliate plains (“The S.Ct. 1997 Code provided like the Guidelines an visions deny TWR right does to receive say allowed organizations “outlet” its non- support deductible contributions to “impermissibly prohib- what was otherwise lobbying activity.... merely has Congress Maj. subsidy programs. ited” federal pay lobbying refused to for the out of (citing Repre- at 259 Op. Taxation With monies.”). Voters). League sentation Women above, argues is dif- majority explained that this case For the reasons an “adequate speech ferent because alternative fact that an affirmative condition explained surprise we it It is true that have and therefore is no "Mak thought contemplated dual-structures were Representation, League With [Taxation “adequate alternative channels” for re- Voters, Congress together, ] Women Rust right rather stricted than for may rights burden the First Amendment case, speaking. refrain from In this be recipi recipients of benefits if the it does not make think of the sense to adequate ents are left with alternative chan engage providing Guidelines as “outlet I, expression.” Velazquez protected *39 for nels 239, silence,” privately Maj. Op. funded added); (emphasis F.3d at 766 accord 164 pro- but that does visions, affect whether affiliate Brooklyn Legal Corp. Legal Servs. Servs. v. Guidelines, prevent subsidy the like 219, Cir.2006), (2d Corp., 462 F.3d cert. conditions, Policy Requirement, like the from denied, 552 U.S. amounting penalties to on First Amendment (2007). we summa- L.Ed.2d 11 The cases rights. why I see no reason an affirmative- however, rized, subsidy all with condi- subsidy dealt speech treated condition should be imposed differently. negative restrictions on tions prostitution.” Maj. negative speech Op. condition is at 239. It bears rather than change analysis repeating: Policy Requirement does not the The at issue here to- subsidy gether with the require of whether a condition rises the Guidelines do not of regulation adopt a constitu Plaintiffs or affiliates to the govern- level of a direct supra viewpoint right. regarding prostitution tional See discussion at 254- ment’s or Moreover, a say anything. 58. direct restriction on to as offensive to the is a condition it just funding is First and must be ana- compulsion lyzed as is a pursuant addressing Amendment direct to the cases speak, v. Nat’l Fed’n Riley govern- Blind “unconstitutional conditions” on N.C., Inc., 781, 796, cases, 487 U.S. ment Applying subsidies. those (“There (1988) Policy 101 L.Ed.2d 669 Requirement is and the Guidelines do certainly penalize difference between com not some coerce First Amendment silence, pelled speech compelled protected but conduct and do not compel protected speech, the context of the differ scope govern- outside reasons, signifi program. ence is without constitutional ment For all of these ”), Requirement cance .... see also v. subject Glickman Wile- is Elliott, Inc., man heightened Bros. & U.S. First scrutiny. Amendment 481, 117 S.Ct. majority While the does not address (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[Cjompelling cog- issue, argue Plaintiffs additionally speech officially just nizable suspect is not in provide Guidelines do fact an ade it, as suppressing typically subject and is quate alternative for protected channel scrutiny.”), level of same and fund- activity First Amendment because ing implicate conditions that princi- these are too in practice. burdensome The Dis ples subject analy- should be to the same trict Court challenge, below addressed this sis.6 although it did so in error reviewing the why This the District is Court’s heightened scrutiny. dismiss- Guidelines under any saving al of effect of the Guidelines in 548-49. We have explained height this case requiring scrutiny because “the clause ened or an “undue burden” test adopt Plaintiffs to apply Government’s view does not question whether prostitution intact,” regarding remains alternative channels like those at issue Int’l, Open Soc’y Alliance Inc. v. here are in fact an adequate as-applied on Dev., Agency Int’l 570 F.Supp.2d challenge. Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. (S.D.N.Y.2008) ], Legal [hereinafter Corp., AOSI Servs. 462 F.3d 230-32 and, turn, (2d Cir.2006), majority’s quotation denied, cert. sentence, (2007). inexplicable. is So too is L.Ed.2d 11 Rath- er,

the majority’s assertion that “there proper question re- is whether mains, Guidelines], top plaintiffs [the the addi- burdens on the organiza- under tional, requirement affirmative tional integrity guidelines “in pre- effect entity recipient pledge opposition clude the plaintiffs establishing an Virginia While it true that funding is dicta West actually when a condition com- Barnette, State pels speech. Board Education v. govern- The level of interest the 624, 633-34, L.Ed. 1628 ment must demonstrate is relevant once (1943), suggests that infringement once the rights of First Amendment compelled speech, may found to question have be demonstrated. in this case is required to offer "even more actually immediate and whether the condition in- urgent grounds” fringes rights than when it restricts First Amendment in the first instance; speech, speak that case does not to determin- would I hold that it does not. *40 so, private funding speech tends to demon- If alternative channels affiliate. any viewpoint-based attached inadequate, plaintiffs may pre- strate that and are challenge.” at condition to influence primarily is intended as-applied on their vail prelimi- suppress I behavior or ideas rath- vacate to certain Because would legitimate objective this than to a or injunction remand case to er achieve nary and Court, would How- promote government message. Plaintiffs be free a the District ever, challenge spending a is not program to the “when as-applied to raise limited, Brooklyn proper providing under the Le- universal but benefits Guidelines (as time. of recipients” at that a restricted number is gal Services standard Rust), that the case here and and when forum, C a program public “does not create proving virtually impossible, coercion is na- concluding that the affirmative After denying subsidy because a does not simply ser- ture of “raises belief, coerce because of the criterion concerns,” the ma- ious First Amendment unconstitutionality is whether denial of the ultimately heightened jority asserts subsidy threatens to drive certain ideas or scrutiny applies in this case because of the viewpoints from the marketplace.” Ve- combination” of an affirmative- “bold II, 552, lazquez at 531 U.S. requirement viewpoint- is also (internal (Scalia, J., dissenting) quotation 234-35, Maj. Op. 235-36. For at based. omitted). marks and citation above, nothing explained reasons about Policy of the Re- the affirmative nature First, do not and the urge, Plaintiffs requires scrutiny to quirement heightened conclude, majority correctly does not Likewise, majori- contrary аpply. Policy at Requirement aimed viewpoint-based funding ty’s suggestion, suppression any dangerous ideas. inherently are not “constitution- conditions There is no that Con- simply evidence troublesome,” at Maj. Op. and the ally enacting gress’s purpose of the con- viewpoint-based nature Policy attaching Requirement Act and issue in case does not war- this dition (or pro-prostitution was to views suppress heightened scrutiny. rant issue). neutrality Congress even on the thought way to Funding hardly that discriminate on could have the best conditions prostitution in the only subject suppress support are viewpoint the basis (1) would be federal scrutiny they when are discourse to offer heightened range groups funds to narrow dangerous at the a suppression “aimed Randall, HIV/AIDS, ideas,” if Speiser v. wished combat but U.S. (1958) they espoused anti-prostitution position. (2) omitted), Both the quotation purpose marks effects far Requirement cry in the a are a from those imposed when context of designed encourage diversity cases where the condition was program clearly suppression in a at the or com- private of views or to facilitate aimed See, context, pulsion qua speech. e.g., of speech forum see Rosenber- quasi-public Co., Grosjean Am. Press Ve- ger, II, S.Ct. 1043. L.Ed. 660 lazquez (“[The because, light of are not in the tax] These classes cases unrelated. bad history present setting, of its it is viewpoint discrimination its presence seen to and calculated de- government program in the context be deliberate of a tax to limit the policy objective guise has no other than vice *41 262 information.”); see sages, government may of also Min- the not discrimi-

circulation Co. v. Star & Tribune Minn. nate neapolis “against otherwise within the Revenue, 575, 579-80, 830, Comm’r forum’s limitations.” Id. at 115 S.Ct. (1983) (dis- 1365, 295 75 L.Ed.2d 103 S.Ct. example subsidy 2510. One of a program Speiser, 357 Grosjean); U.S. at cussing pays private speakers does but Rather, 518, 1332. the 78 S.Ct. public program create a limited forum is a “ achieving at Requirement is aimed Con- government in which private ‘use[s] legitimate goal eradicating pros- gress’s speakers specific transmit information ” reducing behavioral risks a titution and pertaining to its own program,’ Ve- technique fighting More- HIV/AIDS. II, 541, lazquez at 121 S.Ct. 1043 over, integrity organizational guide- 833, (quoting Rosenberger, 515 115 U.S. precisely Plaintiffs with lines leave 2510), S.Ct. or transmittal of “subsidize^] ability speak to remain silent or same favors,” message Rosenberger, 515 if message they choose. pro-prostitution 834, event, U.S. 115 S.Ct. 2510. In Policy Requirement and Guidelines however, “salient point” the Su- way government in no silence therefore preme analysis programs Court’s of those contrary prostitution views on criticism viewpoint which discrimination has been Only affiliates that volun- and HIV/AIDS. improper programs found is that those accept Leadership tarily choose Act were “designed private to facilitate oppose prostitution; funds must Plaintiffs II, speech.” Velazquez 531 U.S. at speakers speak are free to and all other 1043; see also United States v. including messages, messages their own Ass’n, Library Am. 539 213 n. U.S. contradictory separate to those of affiliate (2003) S.Ct. L.Ed.2d groups. (plurality opinion) (explaining Rust regard category to the second With apply only government does not when the cases, “has recognized specific message). seeks to communicate a existence of a Government subsi case, In it is plain govern- this dy, in the form of Government-owned “encourage ment does not seek to a diver- justify does not property, restriction of sity of from private speakers,” views as it in areas that been have traditional in Rosenberger, did U.S. ly open public expressive activi 2510, by offering S.Ct. to reimburse stu- Sullivan, ty.” U.S. Rust 199— groups publication dent for newspaper 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 purpose Leadership costs. The Act omitted). quotation marks Ro- variety non-governmen- is not to fund senberger v. Rector & Visitors Universi- tal organizations fighting interested Virginia, ty HIV/AIDS, might each of whom have a (1995), and Ve- viewpoint prostitution different and sex II lazquez principle extended this to con- trafficking. contrary, On Leader- viewpoint clude discrimination is im- ship specifically seeks to advance an public fora, proper not traditional anti-prostitution, anti-sex-trafficking ap- but also in cases where the proach combating See 22 essentially public creates a limited forum HIV/AIDS. 7601(23), 7611(a)(12). §§ U.S.C. enact- “offerfing] pay private speakers Act, convey messages,” Congress who their made an own Rosen- viewpoint-based judgment berger, inherently 515 U.S. at con- Once pay cerning has offered to the allocation of resources HIV/AIDS, private speakers speak fighting pro- their own mes- which sets the

263 in ernment has chosen to fund a method of subsidy from the at issue “apart gram comparably ob- Rosenberger combating pri- ... and from includes its HIV/AIDS allocating public bene- partners taking anti-prostitution, on jective decisions vate the Arts v. fits,” Endowment position Nat’l to the exclu- anti-sex-trafficking 2168, 569, 586, 118 S.Ct. Finley, 524 U.S. program sion of an alternative that would (1998), at issue in cases grantees allow to remain silent on the found discrimination was viewpoint where speak pro-prostitution issue or to mes- words, public forum invalid. In other cases, in the sage. Velazquez Unlike in this case because apply do not principles strategy of values” government’s “set Act Leadership not authorize Congress did combating would be weak- HIV/AIDS public “in to create a forum funds order distorted,” I, ened, Velazquez “diluted or themselves,” Am. express for [Plaintiffs] partners 164 F.3d at if its were al- Ass’n, at Library 539 U.S. speak pro-prostitution, pro-sex- lowed to principles forum (ruling public stay trafficking message or to silent on the public library apply not because “[a] do vehemently issue. No matter how Plain- acquire not Internet terminals or- does may disagree government’s tiffs with the public pub- create a forum for Web der to HIV/AIDS, prostitution towards themselves”), express but rather lishers to anti- Congress part decided of its particular policy goals. to achieve strategy was to “eradicate HIV/AIDS Likewise, Leadership of the purposе 7601(23). prostitution,” U.S.C. “facilitate generally private Act is not to Rust, case, government this like purpose as of the LSC speech,” was specify grantees’ position allowed to cases. In those Velazquez program necessary “deemed prostitution for its le- cases, “Congress grantees funded LSC ],” II, objective[ gitimate Velazquez attorneys represent the inter- provide reducing U.S. at S.Ct. II, indigent Velazquez clients.” ests of HIV/AIDS. 542, 121 1043. The U.S. at S.Ct. LSC rejects majority application Rust’s advancing any particu- “not program was Re- here because believes the might be diluted or lar set of values quirement “compels Plaintiffs to voice the I, distorted,” Velazquez 164 F.3d at if it were government’s viewpoint speech or decision not grantee-lawyers’ own,” First, Maj. Op. at 237. it must their Indeed, lawyer’s role speak. LSC be reiterated that the speak against gov- was to specifically compel any speech. discus- does See in court in a claim for welfare ernment Second, just supra sion at 254-58. as with “on the behalf of benefits —the was addressing subsidy the cases whether con- client” lawyer’s] private, indigent [the coercive, none of the ad- ditions cases inherently govern- not on behalf of the dressing allegedly viewpoint-discriminato- II, 531 U.S. at Velazquez ment. ry subsidy conditions have turned on Therefore the case was distin- S.Ct. 1043. negative speech whether an affirmative or because, with guishable regard from Rust Rather, requirement was at issue. program, pro- “there no [was] to the LSC point” viewpoint-discrimination “salient recognized grammatic message of the kind Here, analysis is whether the has 121 S.Ct. 1043. Rust.” Id. effectively created a limited forum. contrary, generally instead of facili- on the case, government’s program In this purpose tating private speech, designed “encourage diversity program is to combat way. private speakers,” particular gov- in a views from Rosenber- HIV/AIDS nor is to receive get, funding. The ma- private speech, jority’s to facilitate Ve- own example it intended of a situation in which II, it believes an lazquez speech require- affirmative *43 funding decisions ment would “viewpoint-based permitted suggests And be recipient in instances in which the risk that a tempted can be sustained would be to private speakers opinion ... to state an it government ‘use[s] did not hold—in other words, information to specific pertaining government lie—to receive transmit fund- ” Id. at does not program.’ government its own invalidate a sub- omitted) (quoting sidy citation majority condition. The “do[es] not Rosenberger, government 515 U.S. at doubt” that the require could 2510). grantees Say of a “Just drugs No” to program they oppose to state that drug majority’s only professed additional by Maj. use Op. children. at 237. But casting progeny rationale for Rust and its potential grantees what about who do not aside is that the Rust stated that actually oppose children, drug by use but “[n]othing in challenged regulations] [the by are tempted the offer of It funds? requires a doctor to represent as his own cannot be that their rights constitutional any opinion that he does not in fact hold” are violated because as a condition of re- and always noted doctor is free “[t]he ceiving money, they federal must “voice regarding make clear that advice abor- government’s viewpoint and do so simply beyond scope tion is of the as if it were Maj. Op. their own.” at 237. Sullivan, program,” Rust v. this, 114 L.Ed.2d all Despite majority concedes (1991). However, this observation came government may impose an affir- mative, only in the viewpoint-based Rust Court’s consideration of funding condition by is, the claim plaintiffs government’s effect, in that case that if program “the or, “traditional relationships message,” such as that be- perhaps, if the message is tween doctor patient enjoy pro- should “central” to the program. Maj. Op. at 238-39, tection however, under the First Amendment from majority, 239. The con- regulation, Government even when subsi- cludes because the “stated purpose Government,” HIV/AIDS, dized Leadership id. at 111 the fight is to tuberculosis, malaria[,] S.Ct. an issue the Court did not as well as De- Instead, reach. the Court concluded that fendants cannot now Leadership recast the because the doctors in Rust were global HIV/AIDS-prevention not re- Act’s pro- quired to any opinion state gram anti-prostitution did as an messaging (footnote not hold simply say Maj. and could that abor- campaign.” Op. at 238 omitted). tion II, advice was scope enough. outside of the of the True Velazquez See program, regulations signifi- did “not (“Congress 531 U.S. at 121 S.Ct. 1043 cantly impinge upon doctor-patient re- cannot recast condition on aas case, lationship.” In this there is no mere program every definition of its case, such relationship traditional that should lest the First Amendment be reduced enjoy exercise.”). protection, extra First a simple Amendment semantic But this nor any relationship would as sensitive as case is not like II Velazquez where the the doctor-patient im- relationship be Court found that there was “no pinged if recipient Leadership Act programmatic message recog- of the kind Rust,” funds did not actually oppose prostitution nized in id.

and sex trafficking, support lawyers’ but said did order that would restricting case, public-forum principles termine whether this rights. Amendment First attempting Maj. Op. to recast a to this case. See at 236- apply is not 37(“The merely provide that was meant program purpose Leadership stated speakers speak private HTV/AIDS, to allow funds fight Act is to as well as tuber- program into a messages omitted)). own (footnote their culosis, and malaria.” Policy Requirement. support could why There is no reason Rather, obvious- subsidy program actually must be a mes- policy goals of the ly related to substantive campaign message or even have a saging beyond, differ- goals Act— component sup- as a “central” order to *44 from, private simply subsidizing ent discriminatory port viewpoint condition sake. See U.S.C. speech for its own germane legitimate that is to substantive 7601(23) (“Prostitution § and other sexual Rust, program. goals Rosenberger, degrading victimization are to women and Velazquez II did not address the size of the children and it should be the of, of, purposes any or potential number prac- States to eradicate such United issue[s],” Maj. “subsidiary Op. (a)(12)(J) (di- tices.”); 7611(a)(12), § id. government programs in which those strategy that President’s to recting suggested viewpoint cases discrimina- shall “make reduction fight HIV/AIDS tory permissible. conditions would be priority behavioral risks a of HIV/AIDS eliminating] ... prevention all efforts majority questions also the Leader- exploitation the sexual of women and ship partnering Act’s commitment to with children”). This is not case where groups oppose prostitution as a means from the funding condition is so attenuated combating because the Poli- HIV/AIDS were for which the funds purpose cy specifically exempts four Requirement as to invalidate the condition. appropriated groups compliance: the Global Fund Dole, Dakota v. Compare South AIDS, Malaria; Fight to Tuberculosis and 203, 207-08, 107 97 L.Ed.2d Organization; Health the Inter- World (1987) (concluding that while “conditions Initiative; national AIDS Vaccine if grants might illegitimate be on federal agencies, United Nations see U.S.C. are unrelated to the federal interest 7631(f). organizations, § One of these projects pro national or particular Initiative, International AIDS Vaccine imposed by “the condition Con grams,” of an development focused on the AIDS directly related to one of the main gress is Congress vaccine. The fact that deter- purposes highway for which funds are ex only generally mined that while it wished pended interstate travel” —safe groups opposed pros- with partner omitted)) at 213- quotation marks with id. titution, it fund nevertheless wanted to (O’Connor, J., dissent 107 S.Ct. 2793 for an vaccine does not call research AIDS (“In view, mini my establishment of a ing) question Congress’s into desire to eradi- sufficiently drinking age mum prostitution part cate of its efforts to highway related to interstate construction Congress simply combat HIV/AIDS. justify conditioning appropriat so funds have determined that re- AIDS-vaccine purpose.”). ed for that important priori- search was even more ty. remaining groups “pub- The three Moreover, majority support no cites lic in which organizations” international implication purpose for its of the participates the United States and which Leadership Act must be examined at the up primarily exclusively to de- are made possible generality broadest level of generally states. See id. sovereign Policy determinative of whether the Re- “public organiza- international (discussing quirement pursuant is constitutional tions”). nothing about the fact that Again, “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine and make Congress chose to viewpoint-discrimination cases dis- available to these international or- funds cussed above. Because I conclude that the requiring without them to com- ganizations subject is not Policy Requirement under- ply with the event, heightened scrutiny I need strong desire Congress’s mines Nevertheless, arguments. not reach these groups opposi- share its partner with my I believe sufficiently observations dis- prostitution. Congress may tion to have pose of them. goals

determined above, For all of explained the reasons I Requirement outweighed by were sensitive Policy Requirement’s conclude that majority diplomatic considerations. viewpoint-based nature is permissible Congress suggests truly that if wished to subject this case and that it is not support “anti-prostitution advocacy ... heightened judicial scrutiny. could, course, simply choose not to fund *45 organizations.” Maj. Op. these at 238.

But the whether to decision withhold IV Act funds from Leadership organiza- these “A plaintiff seeking preliminary in- provide exemption tions or instead to junction likely must establish that is to [it] Policy Requirement precisely from the merits, succeed on likely the to [it] policy judgment Congress, the kind of suffer harm in irreparable the absence of courts, not the is entitled to make. Cf relief, preliminary equi- that the balance of Regan Representation, v. Taxation With favor, tips ties that an injunc- [its] (1983) public tion is in the interest.” Winter v. (“Congressional L.Ed.2d 129 selec- Council, Inc., particular persons tion of entities or for Natural Res. Def. 7, 20, 365, 374, of largesse entitlement to this sort is obvi- (2008). ously a matter of and discretion not review a grant We district court’s open judicial to review unless circum- of a preliminary injunction for abuse of stances which here we are not able to Alleyne discretion. v. N.Y. State Educ. omitted)). quotation find.” marks (2d Cir.2008). Dep’t, 516 F.3d “A district court abuses its discretion when Finally, majority the relies on the fact its decision rests on an error of law....” “prostitution in the context of the York, City Mullins v. New 626 F.3d HIV/AIDS-prevention international ef- Cir.2010) (internal (2d quotation marks subject is a of international fort[ ] debate” omitted). The District Court this case that it and notes concerns a “controversial granted request Plaintiffs’ a prelimi- issue,” argue that Plaintiffs’ injunction nary because it concluded speech rights important. Maj. Op. at Policy Requirement “would not survive majority rejects 236-37 & n. 4. The also heightened scrutiny, impermissi- and also argument Defendants’ scrutiny strict bly compel[s] speech” and therefore it “vi- apply Policy Require- should to the AOSI, implicates olate[s] ment because it the First Amendment.” foreign affairs. (S.D.N.Y.2008). validity But the 570 F.Supp.2d substantive or controver- above, position prosti- explained sial nature of Plaintiffs’ For the reasons I con- any foreign tution and repercus- affairs clude that the District Court erred because sions for Policy Requirement subject both are not is not decided, scrutiny, compel does not when DKT International was heightened rejected plaintiffs violate the First also speech, argu- and does not Court Rust, Furthermore, that, pursuant ment funding Amendment. because Con- re- may only gress’s apply particular pro- decision to enact Re- strictions entirely jects recipients general. is an rational exercise and not to quirement powers pursuant Spending explained to the Court that there was no consti- Clause, Leadership I would cоnclude that Plaintiffs tutional violation in the “[njothing prevents a likelihood of suc- plaintiff] have not established because [the remaining claim that from itself ceeding setting on the merits of their neutral and subsidiary up organization is unconstitutional. that certifies I Accordingly, prelimi- policy opposing prostitution.... would vacate the it has a nary injunction parent organization adopt and remand the case for The need not proceedings policy.” Finally, further consistent with the Court my rejected views.7 also the plaintiffs compelled Barnette,

speech challenge, distinguishing Speiser, Wooley from the case before decision, today’s majority un With it: necessarily splits Ap cases, In each of those penalty peals for the District of Columbia Circuit refusing propagate the message was very on this issue. the D.C. already-existing denial of an public ben- Appeals rejected an al Circuit Court government’s efit. None involved the challenge most identical organizations selective best *46 potential grantee that refused to equipped to message. communicate its adopt policy opposing prostitution. See Offering organizations to fund who Int’l, Agency DKT Inc. v. Int’l U.S. with agree government’s viewpoint (D.C.Cir.2007). Dev., 477 F.3d 758 promote government’s and will pro- explained viewpoint- Court that the Act’s gram is far removed from cases which permissible restrictions were be based coerced its citizens into cause “the has not created a promoting its message pain losing program encourage speech,” private education, Barnette, public their Rosenberger it did in v. Rector & Visitors 1178, U.S. or access to University Virginia, 515 U.S. roads, Wooley, 430 2510, 132 (1995), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 1428. Voters, League FCC v. Women Int’l, DKT All F.3d at 762 n. 2. (1984), 82 L.Ed.2d 278 rather, Rust, government’s Furthermore, above, explained but “as and as I message being DKT own delivered.” believe that the “unconstitutional condi- Int’l, 477 at 762 quotation addressing F.3d tions” doctrine and the cases omitted). organizational marks viewpoint govern- While discrimination in the yet in integrity guidelines place subsidy provide were not ment context appro- course, appellate Court did reach The District Plaintiffs' that a federal court does vagueness granted claims because the Court passed upon not consider an issue not be- preliminary injunction grounds on the 106, Singleton Wulff, low.” Policy Requirement and Guidelines (1976). Be- violated the First Amendment because majority cause the also does not reach Plain- heightened scrutiny, "would not survive vagueness challenge, pass upon tiffs' I do not AOSI, impermissibly compel speech,” also it here. rule, F.Supp.2d general at 549. "It is the analyzing framework for priate this case.

I conclude that those cases demonstrate is constitu- Nevertheless,

tional. it has been said that

the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine [Supreme

is a “troubled area of Court] Rust,

jurisprudence,” 500 U.S. at Supreme and that the Court’s

unconstitutional conditions cases “seem a gingerly,”

minefield to be traversed Kath- Sullivan, ‍​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‍Unconstitutional Condi- M.

leen

tions, 102 Harv. L.Rev. 1415-16

(1989). majority today, Because the how-

ever, complicate does more to further it, clarify

doctrine than to grant wish to certiorari to set straight.

us respectfully

I dissent. COMPANY,

MLSMK INVESTMENT

Plaintiff-Appellant, *47 CO.,

JP MORGAN CHASE & JP

Morgan Bank, NA, Chase

Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 10-3040-cv.

United Appeals, States Court of

Second Circuit.

Argued: May 2011.

Final Submission: June 2011. Kleinhendler, Howard Wachtel & Ma- July 7, Decided: (Julian Schreibman, syr, LLP D. Sara G. counsel), York, NY, Spiegelman, of New Plaintiff-Appellant. Hynes, Overy Patricia M. Allen & LLP (Andrew Davies, Hall, Rhys Laura R.

Case Details

Case Name: Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v. United States Agency for International Development
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Jul 6, 2011
Citation: 651 F.3d 218
Docket Number: Docket 08-4917-CV
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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