175 Mo. App. 344 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1914
A suit for divorce by a wife on tbe ground of indignities. The husband denied the allegations of the petition and filed a cross-bill. A trial wras had and the circuit court refused to grant a divorce to either party and dismissed both the petition and the cross-bill. The defendant abided the result; the plaintiff appealed. She asks this court to review the evidence and reverse the judgment because the evidence shows that she is entitled to a divorce under ' the law.
It is true that in a proceeding for divorce, the appellate court is not bound by the findings of the trial court, but can and must examine the' evidence and decide for itself whether the proper conclusion has been reached. [Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192 ; Barth v. Barth, 168 Mo. App. 423.]
It is also true that where the evidence shows a party is entitled to a divorce, the courts have no power or discretion to refuse it. [Lynch v. Lynch, 87 Mo. App. 32 ; Hamburg v. Hamburg, 147 Mo. App. 591.] But the question is, does the evidence in this case establish clearly plaintiff’s right to a divorce?
Before taking up this question it may be well to dispose of a complaint made by plaintiff as to the action of the court in overruling her motion to strike out portions of defendant’s cross-bill. As the court dismissed the cross-bill, thereby finding against defendant on the pleading attacked, it is not seen what ground of complaint can accrue to plaintiff even if the court’s action on the question was erroneous. It is not seen in what way the court’s mind was diverted from the issues by the matter in the cross-bill which plaintiff Sought to have stricken out. As the record is presented to us, it is somewhat uncertain just what portions were
It is unnecessary to go into a detailed statement of the evidence. Plaintiff and defendant were married January 16, 1906, and lived together on plaintiff’s farm until August, 1912, when without warning or notice of any kind, she brought suit for divorce, and after the papers had been served upon her husband, she directed him to get his mortgaged property away from there. Defendant obeyed the direction and, taking the broad hint implied, took himself away also.
The charge in the petition is that defendant was an habitual drunkard; that he spent his time in idleness and failed to properly support plaintiff and their little girl; that he was cross and unkind to plaintiff and generally neglectful of her. If these charges, or any of them, were clearly established by the evidence, no doubt plaintiff’s complaint at being refused a divorce .would be well founded. We have carefully read the evidence, however, and are constrained to say that we have_ reached the same conclusion as the learned trial judge. The evidence wholly fails to show that defendant was an habitual drunkard. Nor does it show that he failed to support his wife and little girl. It is doubtless true that defendant has not been as successful in business as some other men, or as successful a financier as his frugal, energetic, ambitious wife
It, of course, is possible that the defendant may not have been as kind and thoughtful or considerate of his wife’s feelings as he should have been. Men can be brutes at home and subject the members of their families to many grievous indignities by little acts too numerous and elusive to be enumerated or stated with their proper force and effect. They can do all this at home and yet be considered model gentlemen elsewhere. But it must also be remembered that a little thing, amounting to nothing at the time— an impatient word or look or hasty demand — arising solely out of the vexations of life, and understood by all to be the result of a mere temporary and evanescent feeling and not of a settled and fixed disposition or of constant recurrence, can afterward be seized upon and related in such way as to appear momentous and of great importance. It is true that little unkindnesses and discourtesies, constantly repeated and uninterruptedly shown, can render a woman’s life miserable and make her condition intolerable. When such is the case, the evidence, ought in some way, to disclose that fact. But, in the instances adduced in this case to prove the indignities heaped upon the wife, we have an illustration of how little things can be magnified and made to appear out of all proportion to their importance until reduced to their proper size and place
Again, apparently he was wantonly tyrannical and arbitrary in his demand that the little girl should not sleep with its aged grandmother, and, without reason or excuse, objected to her doing so. But when it is
It is needless to analyze the evidence further. As presented it did not furnish grounds for a divorce to either party, and the trial court so found. After a careful reading of the testimony we cannot say the trial court was wrong. The testimony as it appears to us in cold type inclines us to the same conclusion manifested by the judgment rendered. Unless it strongly inclined us the other way we would be disposed to defer considerably to the superior advantages the trial court had of weighing the testimony, since he saw and heard the witnesses; observed their demeanor and was fully cognizant of the general atmosphere of the case.
As to the court’s action in excluding certain testimony, we cannot say it was erroneous because, in some instances, we do not know what the excluded testimony was, nor what, if admitted, it would tend to prove. As to certain other testimony excluded, its admission could have had no possible effect upon the result of the case. Judgment affirmed.