Allen v. StateAllen v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- McMlLlian, Barnes, Ray
Appellаnt Rodney Allen entered negotiated guilty pleas to multiple charges1 set out in two separate indictments on May 9, 2013. The trial court orally pronounced Allen‘s sentence and signed the final disposition sentencing sheet on that same day, but the final disposition was not stampеd filed by the clerk of the Dougherty County Superior Court until May 16, 2013. On June 7, 2013, Allen filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and following a hearing at which Allеn was represented by counsel, the trial court denied his motion. Allen now appeals from the denial of his motion, arguing that the withdrawal оf his pleas is necessary to correct a manifest injustice because he was incompetent at the time he entered his pleas and that he is now incarcerated and serving a mandatory minimum ten-year
1. We first consider the question of whether the motion to withdraw guilty plea was timely filеd such that the trial court retained jurisdiction to determine the merits of the motion. See Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299, 299 (612 SE2d 798) (2005) (“Once the term of court in which a defendant was sеntenced has expired, the only available means for an appellant to withdraw his guilty plea is through habeas corpus proсeedings.“). Although no statute sets forth the procedures by which a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be entertained by the trial court after а sentence has been pronounced,2 it is well settled that a “motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within the same term of court as the sentence entered on the guilty plea.” (Citation omitted.) Lay v. State, 289 Ga. 210, 212 (2) (710 SE2d 141) (2011). McKiernan v. State, 286 Ga. 756, 757 (692 SE2d 340) (2010); Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002). “This is a judicially created rule, which evolved from the established common law tеnet that a court cannot set aside or alter a judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proсeeding for that purpose was begun during the original term.” (Citations omitted.) McKiernan, 286 Ga. at 757.
Ordinarily, the term of court is readily determined. But here, the guilty plea was еntered, and sentence was orally announced, reduced to writing and signed by the trial court on May 9, 2013, which was within the March term of court.
“An oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is nоt the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is.” Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 185 (4) (281 SE2d 604) (1981). This is because “[w]hat the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw v. State, 163 Ga. App. 819, 820 (2) (296 SE2d 119) (1982). See also
2. We now turn to the merits of Allen‘s appeal.
After sentencing, the decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the trial court‘s discretion and withdrawal of the plea is аllowed only when necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Walden v. State, 291 Ga. 260[, 261] (1) (728 SE2d 186) (2012); Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 33.12. Wright v. State, 292 Ga. 825, 826 (1) (742 SE2d 468) (2013).
Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 876 (2) (750 SE2d 340) (2013).
The test for manifest injustice will by necessity vary from case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.
(Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 318 Ga. App. 744, 745 (734 SE2d 745) (2012). “The trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence, and its refusal to allow a withdrawal will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discrеtion.” Green v. State, 324 Ga. App. 133, 133-134 (749 SE2d 419) (2013).
The crux of Allen‘s argument is that he was not competent to enter his pleas and thus his pleas were not entered knowingly or voluntarily with аn appreciation of the consequences of pleading guilty. As to this issue, the record shows that at the time of the guilty plea heаring, the trial court had been made aware of Allen‘s mental health and substance abuse history, and it was placed on the record thаt Allen had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and anti-social personality disorder and that he was being given medication at the jail to control his conditions. The record further shows that Allen had
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the trial сourt reviewed the steps it took to ascertain Allen‘s competency prior to accepting his guilty plea and made a finding thаt he would not have accepted Allen‘s guilty pleas “if [he] had had any hint” that he did not believe Allen was competent at the time he entered his pleas. The trial court also noted, as it did at the guilty plea hearing, that he followed the State‘s recommendation and sеntenced Allen to the minimum amount of prison time and noted that he took Allen‘s mental health issues into account in imposing that sentence. Other than the fact that he had a history of mental illness and was taking psychotropic drugs to control his illness at the time he entered his guilty plеa, Allen points to nothing to indicate that he was not competent at the time he entered his guilty plea. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s denial of the motion on this basis. Phelps, 293 Ga. at 878 (2) (b). See also Jones v. State, 325 Ga. App. 845, 847 (2) (755 SE2d 238) (2014); Williams, 318 Ga. App. at 749 (2).
Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.