14 Wash. 461 | Wash. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The appellant, plaintiff below, instituted this actien to foreclose a real estate mortgage executed and delivered by the respondents on May 28, 1894, to one Jessie M. Johnson, to secure’ the payment of a promissory note of that date for $400, due sixty days'
The complaint, after setting up the execution and delivery of the note and mortgage, alleges that on the 28th day of May, 1894, the said note was, for a valuable consideration, sold, transferred and assigned by said Jessie M. Johnson, by indorsement, to plaintiff who has ever since been, and now is, the owner and holder thereof, and that no part of said note or mortgage has been paid except the interest thereon up to August 28, 1894. The respondents, in their answer admitted the execution and delivery of the note and mortgage, and that no part thereof had been paid except as stated in the complaint, but denied that the plaintiff was the owner thereof, or that the said note was sold and transferred for value to plaintiff, and affirmatively alleged, in substance, that on October 1, 1894, one W. J. Potts commenced an action in the superior court of Snohomish county against the said Jessie M. Johnson and R. Johnson, her husband, and on said day caused a writ of garnishment to be issued and served on the respondents, requiring them to answer upon oath whether they were indebted to, or had in their possession any property belonging to, the said Jessie M. Johnson and Robert Johnson, and that they, on that day, in answer to said writ, stated that they were indebted to said Jessie M. Johnson in the sum of $421.35, upon the promissory note described in the complaint; that said Jessie M. Johnson is, and at all times since the date thereof has been, the owner of said note, and that the same was delivered to plaintiff for the purpose of placing her prop, erty beyond the reach of her creditors, and of defrauding, hindering and delaying the said Potts in collecting his said claim against the said Jessie M.
Upon the issues thus raised the cause proceeded to trial and the court found, among other things not material to the disposition of this case, that the note described in the complaint was indorsed by the said Jessie M. Johnson and delivered to the plaintiff without consideration, and that the plaintiff at the time of receiving said note knew that said transfer was made by the said Jessie M. Johnson for the purpose of hindering and delaying the said W. J. Potts in the collection of his said claim against the said Jessie M. Johnson and R. Johnson and that at the time said Jessie M. Johnson delivered said note to the said plaintiff as aforesaid, she was, and is now, the holder and owner of said note and mortgage. This finding is properly excepted to and it, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether or not it was justified by the evidence.
We find by an examination of the record that there is some conflict of testimony on this question, but the cause having been tried by the court without a jury, the evidence upon which the finding of the court was based must, under the appeal act of March 8, 1893, he examined de novo by this court; (Laws 1893, p. 130.) And we are constrained to say that a careful examination of the evidence has forced us to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the learned trial court. The plaintiff Allen testified positively that he bought the note and mortgage in question on May 28, 1894, the day they were executed, and paid therefor the full face value, viz., $400; that the note was endorsed by the payee, Mrs. Jessie M. Johnson,
It is claimed, however, that this evidence was overthrown by the testimony of Mr. Swerdfiger that it was not true, as stated by these witnesses, that the in-dorsement of Mrs. Johnson was on the note on May
But it is claimed by the respondents that the original note and mortgage, both of which are in the record, absolutely contradict the statement of appellant and Shattuck, that the mortgage had not been taken out of the safe, and that the note had not been removed more than four times and only for a few hours each time, for, as they say, the mortgage shows that it had been carried on the person of some one, and the noté-is worn as if it had been doubled up and carried in a pocket book for some time, and had been handled considerably. We fail to see anything in the appearance of the mortgage incompatible with the testimony on behalf of appellant, that it had been kept in the safe ever since it was delivered to appellant. It is
Nor is the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Johnson after they were notified that Mr. Swerdfiger had been garnished did not go into the auditor’s office and state to him that they were not the owners of the note and mortgage, sufficient to impeach their testimony, especially as it is corroborated by other evidence. It appears that the mortgage had not been regularly assigned upon the record, and it was therefore thought that it would be necessary for Mrs. Johnson to cancel it of record and both the plaintiff and Johnson testify that Mrs. Johnson went to the court house for that purpose, and not to receive the money which they say belonged to appellant. Neither does it follow that appellant’s testimony should be disbelieved because he did not go and inform Swerdfiger, on hearing of the garnishment proceedings, that he was the owner of the note and mortgage and demand payment. If he was the owner of the note he had a perfect right to commence his action without first demanding payment, the note being then overdue; and the fact that the note and mortgage were in his possession and were produced by him upon the trial was itself prima facie evidence that he was the owner of them. 2 Rice, Evidence, p. 1124.
We fully agree with counsel for respondents that the
We think the court also erred in permitting several witnesses to testify to statements made by Johnson in the absence of appellant, to the effect that Swerdfiger was indebted to him upon a note and mortgage, presumably the same note and mortgage now in suit. It is here claimed that this testimony was offered for the purpose of impeachment, but, if that was the object, a proper foundation for its introduction should have been laid.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree of foreclosure in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.