OPINION
Richard V. Alien appeals his conviction of Leaving the Scene of an Accident,
We affirm.
The facts most favorable to the conviction are that on Christmas day, 2003, at approximately 1:22 p.m. in Lafayette, Indiana, Maria Velasquez was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Teal Road and 4th Street. Maria was southbound on 4th Street. Allen was also headed southbound on 4th Street, driving a white van. He approached Velasquez from behind and struck the rear of her car as she sat waiting for the light to turn green. Allen got out of his vаn and approached Velasquez. When she told him that they needed to call the police, he returned to his van, got in, and drove away. Maria got back intо her vehicle and drove to the police station. There, she spoke with Officer C.A. Cudworth and told him what had occurred. Officer Cudworth examined her vehicle and reported its condition as follows: "I observed the Ford to have seuff marks across the rear bumper that were fresh. There was no paint transfer. The sides of the rear bumper had buckled outward." Appellant's Appendix at 9. Velasquez had noted the white van's license plate number, which she gave to Office Cudworth. He ran the number through BMV records and learned that the vehicle was registered to Allen. The officer showed Velasquez a photo of Allen and she confirmed that Allen was the driver of the van that had struck her, although Allen's hair was shorter in the photo.
Police attempted to locate Allen and discovered that the address on his driver's licеnse was that of a homeless shelter. On January 13, a worker at the shelter told Lieutenant Reed, the investigating officer, that Allen did not stay at the shelter, but he had a mailbоx there where he picked up his mail. Lt. Reed asked the worker to give Allen a note directing Allen to contact Lt. Reed concerning the accident in which Allen was involved on Christmas day. Lt. Reed returned to the shelter on January 19 and was told the message had been delivered to Allen, but that Allen had indi
Allen challenges his conviction on the ground that the evidence prеsented by the State was not sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. Specifically, he claims the evidence did not demonstrate that he knew Velasquez's vehicle had sustained damage in the collision.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. McHenry v. State,
The duties set out in I.C.. § 9-26-1-2 arise when a driver is involved in an accident that "does result in damage to a vehicle that is driven or attended by a person." Thus, thе elements of the offense include damage to another vehicle and the defendant's knowledge of same. See Washington v. State,
Allen testified that he stopped after the accident and spoke with Velasquez, who told him there was no damage to the vehicle. Allen notes that Velasquez did not testify. Therefore, аccording to Allen, his claim that he did not know Velasquez's vehicle was damaged was uncontroverted. This would seem to suggest that the State was required to prove he had actual knowledge that the collision caused damage to Velasquer's vehicle. Yet, he acknowledges in his brief such is not the case. He is correct.
We can find no case that discusses whether the State is required to prove the defendant had actual knowledge of property damage in order to оbtain a conviction under I.C. § 9-26-1-2. We do, however, find an analogous situation arising in prosecutions under the statute pertaining to the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury. In Micinski v. State,
This is not to say that the State must prove actual knowledge of an injury accident in order to obtain a conviction. That would make it virtually impossible to prove up a case of "hit-and-run". Moreover, as Judge Miller said so well in his opinion below: "Such a requirement would reward the callous who refuse to stop and investigate." [Micinski v. State,479 N.E.2d 632 , 686 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), rev'd,487 N.E.2d 150 ]. The jury moy infer that a defendant knew that an accident occurred or that peoplе*537 were injured from an examination of the cireumstamces of the event. Where conditions were such that the driver should have known that am accident ocсurred or should have reasonably anticipated that the accident resulted in injury to a person, the requisite proof of knowledge is present.
Micinski v. State,
Allen admitted that he collided with the rear of Velasquez's vehicle. The evidence favоrable to the conviction demonstrated that Velasquez wrote down his license number and immediately drove to a police station to report the cоllision. When she arrived, Officer Cudworth examined her vehicle and observed fresh scuff-marks across the rear bumper, the sides of which had buckled. This version of events is incоnsistent with Allen's claim that Velasquez told him there was no damage to her vehicle. If such were the case, she would not have recorded his plate number and driven immediately to the police station to report the accident. This was circumstantial evidence that in Velasquez's opinion, something was not right. Moreover, Allen admitted getting out of his vehicle and inspecting his own vehicle. To do so, he would have been very near the rear of Velasquez's vehicle, and certainly close enough to have seen the damage that was quite obvious to Officer Cudworth just a few minutes later. Viewed in its entirety, the cireumstantial evidence permits a reasonable inference that Allen knew there was damage to Velasquez's vehicle when he drove away after the accident. See Micinski v. State,
Finally, we оbserve that our holding is not inconsistent with State v. Gradison,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Ind.Code Ann. § 9-26-1-2 (West, PREMISE through 2005 1st Regular Sess.).