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Allen v. State
700 S.W.2d 924
Tex. Crim. App.
1985
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*1 majority if I trolled Act stood as the new The reaches the result. Substances concur. law had never been enacted.

Thus, appellant is not the victim of a law changed punishment for a crime

which committed, the crime had been which

after law, post he the

would be an ex facto nor is greater inflicted a

victim law

punishment, an ex which also would be contrary,

post facto law. To but parte Crisp, what this held Ex ALLEN, Virgil Appellant, Dean supra, appellant’s conviction stands as though he had been convicted under the v. law, considerably decreased former Texas, Appellee. STATE provided by the punishment that was 271-84. No. he convicted. law under which was Texas, Appeals of Court of Criminal bar, this In virtue of the case En banc. supra, parte Crisp, in Ex

Court’s decision range punishment appellant’s for Dec. considerably has decreased offense been the new law. See from it was under what Scott, compare parte 471 S.W.2d 54 Ex instance, appel-

(Tex.Cr.App.1971). In this punishment that lant received minimum law, and provided the former under had the former law

there is no claim that appellant pled guilty in effect when

been punish- a different

he would have received parte This decision Ex

ment. Court’s the trial court’s admo-

Crisp, supra, caused to the maxi-

nition to be incorrect punishment that could have possible

mum State, 610 Taylor assessed.

been (Opin- (Tex.Cr.App.1981),

S.W.2d Rehearing), a

ion on State’s Motion in admon- this Court held that

majority of defendant, judge states

ishing a the trial punishment, possible minimum correct possi- incorrectly the maximum states

but pun- but the defendant’s punishment,

ble within the correct is assessed

ishment notwithstanding the punishment,

range compli-

error, has been substantial there 26.13, of Art. V.A. provisions

ance with cause, Thus, in this the admonish-

C.C.P. from the trial appellant received

ment compliance with in substantial

judge was formerly in effect. that was law did not trial court’s admonition

error plea to become invol- appellant’s

cause the subject any type ex nor is he

untary,

post facto law. *2 Gilbert, McKinney, Danny

Bob D. Burns (court Read, III, John H. appointed), Grand Prairie, appellant. for Atty. Roger H. Dist. V. Ownby, A. Dickey, Randall Blake and Amanda Green, Attys., McKinney, Dist. Asst. Rob- Huttash, Austin, Atty., ert State’s State. consent, PETITION the issue of

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S the evidence on we FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW granted appellant’s petition to said deter- Ap- mine the correctness of the Court of ONION, Judge. Presiding inadmissibility peals’ holding as to aggravated Appellant was convicted of purpose impeaching evidence for the rape. punishment assessed his Thus, credibility prosecutrix. we *3 years’ imprisonment. 30 appellant’s shall consider first and third appeal appellant On advanced five grounds of review. grounds grounds of error. The first three granted the Prior to trial the court of error read: prohibit ap- in limine to the State’s motion allowing “The trial court erred in not pellant inquiring prosecu- from into the testimony prosecutrix’s prior of sexu- trix’s sexual conduct other than that in- misleading testi- activity al to refute the alleged in volved offense without mony elicited the State. hearing contemplated by in-camera V.T. excluding in “The trial court erred evi- C.A., Code, 21.13, then in effect. Penal prosecutrix’s prior dence prosecutrix first The was State’s wit- activity which evidence was material 17-year-oldprosecutrix testified ness. theory the defensive of consent. p.m. night of that about 9:40 on Febru- limiting appel- erred in “The trial court 1, 1982, ary place employ- left her of she right fully cross-examine the lant’s ment, department a store Collin activity prosecutrix prior on her As reached her Creek Mall Plano. she impression after she left a false lot, appellant parking drove car the mall jury.” know up pickup in a truck. She did not Appeals The Dallas of affirmed Court prosecu- gunpoint he him. At abducted State, the conviction. Allen v. 666 S.W.2d spot in rural trix and drove to a Collin 1984). The (Tex.App.-Dallas 245 clothing her County, forcing her to remove V.T.C.A., Appeals under Penal held that prosecutrix re- along way. There the Code, 21.13, evidence of sexual ac- appellant raped2 her and threat- lated the tivity prosecutrix’s not evidence of the was anyone if told what ened to “find her” she relationship appellant, consent to the to the happened. He drove her back had State, citing Young 547 S.W.2d lot, parking her father was mall where (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Wilson v. Appellant waiting for her near her car. Further, (Tex.Cr.App.1977). S.W.2d nearby. stat- prosecutrix She released the Appeals the evidence the Court of found night at the she was examined ed later offered for properly excluded when was report police. to the hospital and made a impeaching prosecu- purpose of credibility.1 trix’s on, di- prosecutrix testified on Early examination, he appellant told her rect grounds of review appellant’s Three of love home after she made would take her discretionary corre- petition for review his and asked to be taken to him. She refused error. Con- spond grounds to aforesaid worry parents her would home because Appeals reached cluding that the Court of suggested He p.m. home inadmissibility of she wasn’t correct result as to felony by showing prior impeach credibility Appeals Court of wrote: 1. The Thus, the statute does conviction....’ “Appellant the evidence also contends that pri- contemplate the admission of evidence purpose for the should have been admitted impeachment purposes or sexual conduct for credibility. complainant’s impeaching Sub- the evidence is in the form unless (a) allows admission of of Sec. 21.13 section felony conviction." complainant’s prior sexual activi- evidence that, if, ty ‘only to the extent penis appellant’s prosecutrix testified that 2. The judge evidence is material to finds that the vagina, did not believe penetrated her but she (d) of fact at issue in the case.’ Subsection "any or reached kind of an erection” he had does not 21.13 states that section *[t]his state or the accused Sec. climax. limit the parents she gone tell her she had for a State its case-in-chief also called father, prosecutrix’s drink with friends. told him she who testified as to She was his on age night question. under actions From couldn’t drink. The record testimony strong his it is he then clear was reflects: disciplinarian. The State further offered “Q he you any question Did ask after appellant evidence that when arrested was that, you after suggested he tell day the next a .22 caliber revolver was parents your you gone for had pickup Appellant’s found in his truck. ex- drink? trajudicial confession was introduced in “A I don’t recall. prose- which he he related that ordered the “Q say anything you “Did he else cutrix, know, get he whom did not into point? gun,” his he truck as “had a and that she Yes, “A he did. did what he asked of her she because guns. afraid of He could not remember “Q say? else What did he . *4 completed whether “we sexual intercourse “A if I virgin. He asked me awas or not.” “Q you question? Did his answer Appellant offered evidence from one wit- Yes, I “A did. ness he and appellant that each had “Q you What did tell him? 13 beers p.m. between noon on the him, “A I told No. day question. Appellant’s wife testified when she him 7:30 p.m. saw at he was “Q Why you did him tell that? go intoxicated and she would not ato club thought him, “A I Because I told in Dallas with him for that Ac- reason. Yes, was, I he certainly that would cording appellant’s testimony, he had want more. purchased had about 22 beers and another “Q you frightened point? Were at that six-pack alleged sometime before the of- Yes, “A I was. prosecutrix fense. He testified the volun- “Q doing was gun What he with the tarily entered his after truck he offered her you driving were north on Parker? prosecutrix drink. He stated the when got gun in the truck his and holster were “A pointed He had it toward me.” on the seat where it had been since the Shortly after com- cross-examination weekend, previous when he had hunt- been menced the court conducted an in-camera ing, placed that he showed it her and it hearing V.T.C.A., contemplated by Penal drunk, under the He he seat. claimed was Code, 21.13(b). hearing At such the and did not achieve an erection and the prosecutrix virgin testified she was not a completed sexual act was not but that the alleged offense, the time of that she prosecutrix had consented to sexual ad- him) had boyfriend (naming an older who Appellant vances. drove her back to the Baylor University attended with whom she parking mall lot he where saw a man stand- relations, had had they last had ing by car prosecutrix’s and she asked approximately intercourse two him suggest give some excuse to her alleged weeks before the offense. being (appellant). father out him prosecutrix alleged related after the of- Appellant during related con- their examining fense she told the doctor she night prosecutrix versations that told offense, virgin was not a before the but him boyfriend Bay- she had a who went yet father, she had not told her was who University. lor He did relate whether disciplinarian. strong At the conclusion of any there whether was discussion about hearing, appellant denied court prosecutrix virgin. was a No issue was opportunity prosecutrix elicit from the made fact. of the jury’s presence foregoing evidence. springs appellant examining physi- From this action of the court called the cian, Rovner, grounds of review. Dr. Ivan who testified he that, finds that judge extent penetration. to the evidence of actual found no trauma, bruising material to a fact at issue He found no evidence the evidence is Further, appellant elicit- inflammatory lacerations. or of and that its case find medical witness he did not ed from the outweigh its prejudicial nature does not any type of sexual any physical evidence of probative value. cross- past. the recent On conduct within “(b) proposes If to ask the defendant Rovner testified examination Dr. concerning specific instanc- any question pen- possible for there to have been was evidence, es, reputation evi- vagina by the male sexual etration conduct, ei- of the victim’s sexual dence being any physical evidence organ without or cross-exam- by direct examination ther left. witness, the defendant ination of pros- of the Appellant called a co-worker hearing inform the court out must recently at- testified she had ecutrix who asking any such jury prior given a hotel graduation party at tended a notice, court After this question. girl, another prosecutrix hearing, in camera re- shall conduct an boy- her there with prosecutrix reporter, to deter- by the court corded name) prosecu- and the (giving friend his proposed evidence is mine whether the drinking. trix was (a) of this under admissible Subsection under court’s action From the shall determine what The court section. hearing ap- arises following the in-camera shall accord- is admissible and evidence prosecutrix left complaint that the pellant’s questioning. The defend- ingly limit the *5 jury he and was impression false nor go these limits shall not outside ant misleading testi- unable to refute thus ruled inadmissible refer to evidence Appellant ar- by the State. mony elicited prior approval of the in camera without virgin, prosecutrix was not gues that the jury. presence of without the court boy- her intercourse with had had sexual “(c) the record of The court shall seal friend, unaware of her father was still that hearing required in Sub- camera fact, demonstrates and that this delivery to (b) this section for of section testimony. Appellant her trial motive for an in the event of appellate court is entitled to that a defendant argues also appeal. and cross-examina- the full confrontation limit the “(d) does not him, This section Sixth tion of the witnesses im- Constitution, accused to the state or the Amendment, right of United States Constitution, felony by showing prior I, 10, credibility and peach Texas and Article § con- prevents such of the accused any statute which nor the convictions fall. must sexu- promiscuous and cross-examination of produce frontation evidence to 308, Alaska, 94 S.Ct. 415 U.S. or older years Davis v. 14 old of a child al conduct (1974). 1105, child, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 sexual rape of a defense to as a child, indecency awith of abuse 21.13, V.T.C.A., Code, in effect Penal § felony previous of a If evidence child. trial,3 read: appellant’s of at the time or ev- involving sexual conduct conviction of instances “(a) of Evidence conduct is sexual promiscuous of idence conduct, opinion evi- the victim’s sexual admitted, shall instruct the court conduct, and sexual dence of the victim’s as and of the evidence purpose to the as sexual of the victim’s reputation evidence 1975, by Acts its limited use.” [Added Sections under may be admitted conduct 3, 203, Sept. 477, eff. Leg., p. ch. 64th § (rape, code through 21.05 of this 21.02 (Hereinafter referred to 1, abuse, ag- and 1975.] rape, sexual aggravated 21.13.) if, abuse) only and gravated § sexual Evidence, 412, Rule Proposed Rules of Criminal renumbered since been 21.13 has 3. Section 933, 8, Journal, 48, Sep- p. 1983, No. Leg., Vol. Bar by Texas Acts 68th amended 22.065 and § 1, 977, 4, 5315, Sept. tember 1985. See also p. eff. § ch.

929 1975, Before no statute If Texas had con- a defendant claims a victim’s past relevant, sexual conduct cerning up of a is it is to the admissibility rape victim’s showing defendant to a preliminary make prior sexual concerning conduct. The law that the issue is material to an issue in the admissibility evidence such was de- case. merely This is not raised assert 21.13, veloped enacting the courts. In § ing showing that it is so. There must be a joined Congress many Texas and other believing of a reasonable basis that the in enacting rape states shield laws. See past pertinent. sexual conduct If there Trial, generally Berger, Man’s Woman’s questions concerning is no showing, such Courtroom, Rape In the Tribulation: Cases past sexual are to If conduct be excluded. (1977); Weddington, 1 Colum.L.Rev. made, a showing relevancy such Rape Law In Texas: 284 and H.B. balancing applied test of 21.13 is to be Reform, (1975). Road Am.J.Crim.L. admissibility. determining Harrison, 656, In Bell v. F.2d Review, Baylor p. Law Vol. (6th Cir.1982),the Court wrote: Rape—Admissibility Victim’s Prior Sex- “The rationale behind these statutes is Texas?, ual Conduct: What is the Law in evidence prior victim’s was written: activity probative sexual is of dubious “Before the enactment of section 21.- highly value and relevance embar- evidence of sexual conduct rassing prejudicial. Often such evi- impeach credibility admissible to prose- dence has been harass used to complainant in three instances: cuting victim. Sponsors of these stat- complainant’s testimony, rebut a es- they encourage utes assert that victims indicating tablish a course conduct report of sexual assault the crimes prostitution, to show felonies and having past without fear of their involving turpitude. misdemeanors moral history exposed public.” to the 21.13, Under section evidence of conduct should be admissible can There be little doubt that testimony complainant, rebut how- represents explicit legislative decision to ever, testimony must first meet the practices may eliminate trial have *6 materiality superior and proba- burden of effectually society’s frustrated vital inter- imposed value section tive 21.13.” prosecution the est in sexual crimes. balancing test Where the has been admissibility standard of of evi met, where the balance inclines toward parts. First, under dence 21.13 has two § accused, Texas trial courts are free and must evidence be material to an issue admit should not hesitate to evidence of the case, secondly, in and even if the court prior victim’s sexual conduct to attack her finds evidence is material to an issue in her, A credibility, impeach if it does. case, inflammatory prejudicial its reading of 21.13 demonstrates it was § outweigh probative nature must not its val designed prohibit to forever all evidence Herrera, ue. See cf. State 92 N.M. v. instances of victim’s sexual 7, (Ct. 1978) (cert. P.2d 384 Appeals reputation 582 conduct or evidence 1978). den. of such conduct.4 If the of the evidence prior prosecutrix are some 4. There cases in sexual afforded to a RSA 632-A6 may probative (Supp.1979) [rape yield to conduct become relevant and its must statute] shield outweigh impact right value of its detrimental the defendant’s confront the evidence Johns, 1260, prose- See introduction. State v. 615 P.2d him. The sexual activities of a (Utah 1980); Joyce, rape immediately prior alleged v. 1263-64 Commonwealth to an cutrix 181, 222, (1981); 185 may 382 Mass. 415 N.E.2d State be a for cross-examination. relevant area LaClair, 743, (1981). Kasto, 268, (8th v. 121 N.H. A.2d 1326 433 United States 584 F.2d 272 v. Cir.1978); Pope Superior ex rel. v. see State LaClair, supra, State v. the Court In wrote: 22, 29, Court, 946, P.2d 113 Ariz. 545 953 above, "As State we have stated v. Howard (1976) (in banc). especially This is true 53, (1981) N.H. 426 A.2d established ] 457 [121 where, here, prior evidence of protection undue harassment from 930 contemplated by appellant’s

victim’s sexual conduct as must next consider We attack in upon being the statute becomes material to an issue 21.13 as violative of the Sixth § test, I, 10, balancing the case and meets the it is Amendment and Article Texas Con- § if in the admissible even it is form stitution. Further, impeachment evidence. subsec- upon attacks There have been numerous (d) expressly provides tion 21.13 does not § rape the so-called statutes as viola- shield right impeach credibility by limit the tive of the Sixth Amendment and these showing felony convictions nor the prior generally rejected. have 1 A.L.R. 4th been right produce evidence of of defendant (1979); Harrison, supra; 283 San- Bell v. 14 promiscuous sexual conduct of a child Bocchino, Rape ford and Shield Laws and rape years old or older as a defense Amendment, 128 V.Pa.L.Rev. 544 Sixth child, indecency of a child or abuse (1980); Trial, Berger, Woman’s Man’s Trib- Appeals mis- with a child. The Court of Courtroom, 77 Rape ulation: Cases particularly reads the statute and subsec- (1977). Colum.L.Rev. 1 (d) arriving at the conclusion that tion Fortney, v. 301 N.C. North Carolina contemplate does not the admission § 31, (N.C.1980), Supreme 269 S.E.2d 110 of evidence of sexual conduct for upheld of North Carolina the consti- impeachment purposes unless the evidence tutionality law of that state’s shield prior felony form of a conviction. 8, 58.6). (G.S., There the court wrote: prosecutrix In the instant case the mistaken on several “Defendant gun testified that after abduction First, grounds. is no constitutional there among

point, appellant inquired, other right questions that are to ask a witness things, virgin. if answered she was a She McKenna, People v. irrelevant. explained in her negative him the (1978); People v. Colo. 585 P.2d 275 testimony why so under the circum she did Blackburn, Cal.App.3d 128 Cal. that at the stances. She did not assert (1976); Thompson, People v. Rptr. virgin. time she was in fact a Whether she (1977); Mich.App. 257 N.W.2d 268 virgin not a not material to was or was Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d Smith Even if the evidence an issue the case. (Ky.App.1978). issue, to an its was relevant and material “Second, application, impact inflammatory prejudicial nature certain procedural and primarily this statute value, probative any. ly outweighed its any of defendant’s sub- does not alter appellant his failed to establish third, there are val- rights. And stantive credibility prosecutrix attack reasons, relevance policy aside from id with her sexual conduct under support this statute. questions, which prop guidelines of 21.13. The trial court *7 the Constitu- erly testimony “The sixth amendment of under excluded the offered tion, criminal applicable to state made 21.13.5 § intercourse, seeks to introduce might explain physical injuries his denial of activities activities, 106, prosecutrix, Murphy, past State v. 134 Vt. of the victim’s sexual evidence 346, 111-12, (1976), origin through 353 A.2d 350 show medical he must be able to Court, Pope Superior of semen. State ex rel v. sperm motile could remain evidence that 29, 953; supra Pack v. 113 Ariz. at 545 P.2d at prior intercourse the time of the sexual from 241, (Wyo.1977). In P.2d 245-46 571 after the al- to the examination conducted however, cases, must es- the defendant such- State, supra leged rape. at 245.” Pack v. par- through medical evidence that the tablish Judge supplied Miller’s (Emphasis in view of prosecu- activities of the ticular sexual opinion.) her to raise are relevant to trix that he desires Williams, physical Wash.App. See State v. 18 condition. interpretation that our It must be remembered 5. 402-03, 1190, 398, 1192- 569 P.2d time. See now of 21.13 in effect at the defendant, (1977). example, where the 93 For 412, Code, V.T.C.A., and Rule Penal presence of attempt that the in an to establish Evidence, Criminal proposed Texas Rules of vagina sperm prosecutrix’s at the motile 8, 933, Journal, 48, Sep- p. No. Vol. Texas Bar af- examination conducted time of a medical tember, 1985. alleged rape is not inconsistent ter the

931 proceedings Texas, language Pointer v. 380 ed at As trial. we construe its 400, 1065, U.S. 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 923 permissible application, rape vic- (1965), guarantees right of an ac- law, 8-58.6, tim pri- shield G.S. codifies in a cused criminal trial to be confronted marily procedural rules and does thus against with the witnesses him. Davis v. unduly impinge upon not defendant’s Alaska, 308, 1105, 415 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 39 right substantive confront to his accus- (1974). However, right L.Ed.2d 347 ing in witness. Unlike the situation Da- to confront and to cross-examine is not Alaska, vis v. supra, where the defend- cases, inmay, appropriate absolute and totally ant prevented by an Alaskan bow to other in- legitimate accommodate protection witness law from cross-exam- process, terests the criminal trial ining a witness him about fact Mississippi, 284, v. Chambers 410 U.S. give that would sup- rise to reasonable 295, 1038, 1046, 297, 93 S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d position bias, and unlike the situation (1973), Stubbs, 3098 citing v. Mancusi Mississippi, again Chambers v. supra, 204, 2308, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d totally prevented where state law a de- (1972). Alaska, 293 See also Davis v. presenting fendant from that evidence 321, supra 415 U.S. at 94 at 1112— S.Ct. another had confessed to the crime 13, J., (Stewart, L.Ed.2d at 356 concur- charged, G.S. 8-58.6 contains such no ring). Thus, prohibitions. total although statu- Thus, may generally while a defendant tory, victim shield anal- law is impugn credibility to cross:examine of a ogous judge-made rules of evidence witness, this is not inviolate. prevent which the admission of Supreme expressly Indeed the Court has evidence, hearsay testimony and convic- protect stated that a duty court has a very standing pro- tions of old where the questions go a witness ‘from be bative value of the evidence is out- yond proper the bounds of cross-exami weighed by possibility preju- harass, merely nation annoy humiliate seriously dice. oneNo considers that the States, hi m.' v. United Alford policy admit anal- decision such 687, 694, 218, 220, U.S. 51 S.Ct. 75 L.Ed. ogous evidence is on its face a violation 624, (1931) quoted in Davis v. Alas of the fifth sixth amendment ... If ka, 320, supra, 415 U.S. at S.Ct. at any question concerning arises evidence 1112, 39 L.Ed.2d Implicit at this history, victim’s recognition statement is the in such question may presented at an cam- cross-examination, probative value of hearing opposing may era where counsel outweighed by preju admission is evidence, present cross-examine witness- question proper dicial effect. The generally attempt es discern scope cross-examination, therefore, in proffered testimony relevance resolving volves the ‘tension between proceeding crucible of adversarial right of confrontation and the State’s ’ then, away jury. summary, from protecting policy of the witness.... merely G.S. 8-58.6 contains and channels Alaska, supra at Davis S.Ct. long-held by provid- tenents of relevance at 39 L.Ed.2d at 352.... [269 statutory ing a definition of that rele- S.E.2d 113.] by providing procedure vance any previous idea “The test that definition within the context *8 per of a victim se rele- rape behavior sub- particular case. Defendant’s rape proceeding vant based on was right to not im- stantive cross-examine is two of human behavior which no views permissibly compromised.” longer scrutiny withstand the of rational investigation.... is not While the North Carolina statute 21.13, many however, totally like it is similar in say, is not that evi-

“This § respects language Fortney sexual behavior dence victim’s present- can be to an issue here instructive. never relevant 932 “Of rape course shield statutes We conclude that 21.13 is con §

should not be highly used exclude rele stitutional its face applied on and as to the vant evidence and appellant violate the reject defendant’s in the instant case. We his right of confrontation or other constitution claim that is violative of the Sixth rights.” Harrison, I, 10, al supra, Bell v. Amendment and Article 670 Texas Con § p. responsibili reject F.2d at stitution. We also Courts have a his claim that the ty protect Fifth and questions the victim from Fourteenth Amendments were violated in the proper process within the instant case. Due bounds cross-examina was appellant tion and accorded the designed only which are for the reasons to har- rass, I, 19, stated. See also Article annoy See, Texas Con e.g., humiliate. Alford stitution. States, 694, 687, v. United 282 U.S. 51 218, 220, (1931); S.Ct. 75 L.Ed. 624 State v. In arguing prosecutrix left a Davis, (Iowa 434, 1978); 269 N.W.2d 438 impression false with the and he was Justice, A.B.A. Standards for Criminal misleading unable to refute the testimony 6-2.2, (2d 1980). standards 6-2.3 ed. This State, appellant elicited cites several part rape of the thrust of the shield laws. dealing suppression cases of evidence “In order to assess the shield laws one by prosecution. upon The reliance such interests, must ask whether these state misplaced. appellant cases is Here the particular statutory embodied in standards trial, during knew of the evidence see applied contexts, factual out 490, (Tex. Means v. 429 S.W.2d 496 weigh the right defendant’s valued to meet Cr.App.1968), but was unable to refute it prosecution's proof case with that he is for already the reasons discussed. Fur indeed innocent. Where the in balance ther, showing there is no prosecu that the accused, clines toward the any provision deliberately presented tor picture a false excluding his squared evidence cannot be knowingly using perjured facts tes Berger, with the Constitution.” Man’s Tri timony failing to correct its own testimo al, Rape Woman’s Tribulation: Cases the' ny when it apparent became it was false. Courtroom, 1, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 54-55 Pate, 1, 785, Miller v. 386 U.S. 87 S.Ct. (1977). (1967); Illinois, Napue L.Ed.2d 690 v. U.S. S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 right The constitutional to confront (1959). Appellant’s grounds of review are adverse witnesses is fundamental and is of overruled. importance such that a State’s interest Although Appeals Court was protecting a certain class of witnesses from holding impeachment error in lim- embarrassment right must fall before the ited under 21.13 to the use of felo- of confrontation and cross-examination. convictions, ny the court reached the purports Thus a statute that prohibit judgment Ap- result. The completely the introduction of the victim’s peals is affirmed. activity consensual sexual persons other than the defendant is unconstitution McCORMICK,J., dissents. given

al judicial gloss requiring unless hearing jury’s presence out of the so that TEAGUE, Judge, concurring. defendant, motion, upon may given opportunity demonstrate due oh,My, my, Judge how Miller does fulmi- process requires the admission of such evi Presiding Judge nate over use in Onion’s probative dence because in the con value majority opinion age-old legal his particular outweighs text of that case “prosecutrix”. yet, word And the Dallas prejudicial prosecutrix. effect on the State Appeals escapes Judge Court of Miller’s Howard, censure, v. though openly N.H. 426 A.2d 457 even that court (N.H.1981). LaClair, “complainant”, See also synonym State used the word (N.H.1981). “prosecutrix”, A.2d 1326 when it referred to the *9 person My female jury expository heavily that the had been style found relies on the raped by appellant. singular, the exemplary and the construction up “everybody ... his” therefore comes I am to of deeply concerned that make frequently. generic, gen- This is not ‘his’ seriously this cause a feminist issue will clumsy dered. “His or her” becomes detract importance from the what is repetition suggests with that “his” Nevertheless, before us. I so that will not masculine, it alone elsewhere is person, be considered a I sexist must also isn’t. “Her” draws to alone attention write. topic at itself and distracts from the First, however, point I to would like out neatly problem hand. ‘Their’ solves granted petition this Court for but substitutes another. ‘Ter’ is bolder discretionary review that was filed on be- I ready than am for. defeats the ‘One’s’ Allen, Virgil half of Dean appellant, not so construction, purpose of the which is this Court’s members could become particular. meant to vivid “It’s” a engaged legal in debate over word joke. too a play harsh Rather than but, instead, “prosecutrix”, granted it was the language, hob with we feminists in order to consider whether Dallas might adopt position pitying men Appeals correctly Court of appel- overruled being pronouns forced share their to that, lant’s contention because female Leunen, A Handbook for around. Van person raped who found had been Scholars, pp. (Alfred Knopf, 4-5 A. appellant impression left a false 1978). jury, before the the trial erred in not court agreement I am stylistic with the permitting present him to evidence of her changes advocates; however, Judge Miller activity, namely, previous- her myself dramatically I find at odds with the her, ly having had sexual relations with gives changes. I reasons he for such boyfriend. Although agree I appel- separately, therefore write to en- lant, person the female did leave a courage a modernization our terminolo- impression false I jury, before the am un- expressly my- gy, but also to disassociate agree to able with him that such suffi- Judge self from Miller’s analysis cient to reversing warrant this cause. problem. person Whether the female was was not virgin offense; a is not an element of the many, this Members of Court have for virginity longer being her her no a vir- many years to referred the victim of gin was not to any relevant material ele- prosecutrix”, sexual assault as “the such offense; ment of the virginity her or her no person complainant a criminal was the longer virgin being does not the least prosecution. usage always And such has possible it tend make that she consented per- been understandable most rational having ap- intercourse point fact, sons because of semantical pellant; and, least, to me at I am unable victim of not erroneous call female agree any that such have would been prosecutrix” in a sexual assault “the very at least little interest rational indeed, has, proceeding ap- criminal if she juror deciding appellant’s guilt. If there peared as chief witness for State. evidence, excluding was error in it was precisely “prosecu- That is what word certainly beyond harmless a reasonable according trix” means all of the authori- doubt. State, In Arnold Tex.Cr.R. ties. (Tex.Cr.App.1945), does, 186 S.W.2d

I believe that if no else one least Leunen, private Mary-Claire prosecutor” Van this defined “a one of the most prefers delightful “one expositors (generic) who an accusation and incisive suspects scholarly writing, Judge party guilty.” will whom he to be enjoy Mil- Van Leunen once Also see Williams v. concurring opinion. 321 S.W.2d ler’s (Tex.Cr.App.1958). wrote: *10 “victim”, noun, “complain- agent is but then neither is “Prosecutrix” is an which action, ant”. denoting performer a noun the of an etymological *11 not, however, appellant’s sexist in the trial. intrinsically sense that it a in treat- difference “make[s] I Having my piece, concur said

ment favor on a than or basis other individ- judgment of the Court. Dictionary ual English merit.” The Oxford reports also “dis- these various senses of MILLER, concurring. Judge, criminate”. disposes appellant’s majority of con- however, “prosecutor”, The word at least I acceptable manner. take tentions wise, surface neither discriminates between majority’s improper use issue the sexes nor does it discriminate “prosecutrix” of the term instead generic either be one. It can either or a “victim,” referring term proper when term, upon depending masculine the con- person sexually appellant assaulted text in which it is used. its etymolo- While “raped”). (formerly denominated as gy preclude would seem to reference to a prosecutor, female as the word Black’s Dictionary (5th Law ed. “prosecutor” may pros- be used refer to 1979) “prosecutrix” defines as “a female general, including ecutors both men and prosecutor.” Both the third and fourth women without distinction. editions of dictionary that restrict the term to criminal law. “Prosecutor” is defined as

Judge posits Miller “If are that there prosecutes who one another for a murders, robberies, crime of kidnappings, victims government. the name of the assaults, Id. at and burglaries, why can there not English Dictionary, Oxford Oxford of victims sexual assault?” The short Press, University page also de- query answer to his lies in fact that prosecutor.” fines term as “a female be, there can under either the former Penal The term appear does not in Webster’s present Code am Penal Code. I Collegiate New Dictionary, G. Mer- & C. Judge unable understand how Miller can Co., cursory riam 1981. A review of the an aggressive state that “Use of word such using Texas cases the term no defi- reveals ‘prosecutrix’ gives rise to an inference nition, “prosecutrix” but indicates that has really that victims sexual assault are not been used to refer to the victim of a may unfairly ‘victims’ and such use dimin- at since least 1911. See Ross degree ish harm actually suffered.” (Tex.Cr.App.1911). S.W. it Even then I go should like to on that I record cannot was an use according incorrect of the term anywhere readily find makes (2d 1910) to Black’s Dictionary Law ed. immediately apparent in etymology gave the definition as: “In criminal “prosecutrix” “prosecutor” the words prosecutor.” A law. female might suggest any pejorative con- be, was, notation should ever attached majority opinion, In the the term is also marking these words. The reason for specific definition, used without a but clear- place, perhaps distinction the first soon ly refers to the victim of the sexual as- occurred, speech after the dawn of human sault.1 The use this term in this manner unclear, certainly but it nev- almost improper least three reasons. Therefore, slight er intended to either sex. Presiding Judge First, Onion will no doubt be use of the term in this manner is surprised to learn that of the word his use inconsistent with its definitions found in “prosecutrix” majority opin- in this Court’s preceding source materials. None of ion harm “prosecutrix” diminishes the suffered the definitions of make refer- person female had who found been ence the victim of a sexual assault. “prosecutrix” raped appellant or the interest Since does not mean “victim” "complainant,” referring appeals opinion 1. The court of uses the term when to the victim. in this sense it should not be used Procedure were when Code Criminal referring to a sexual assault victim.2 classify rape amended to and sexual abuse Second, blatantly sex- use of the term is offenses, they are acts as assaultive since why Initially, is no reason we ist. there Also, crimes. of- of violence and not sex gender of the specify would need to gender neutral fenses were defined Thus, refer- attorney in case. State’s could terms so that both men and women prosecutrix prosecu- instead of ence to a charges. Study Group, file House Dai- See unnecessary tor would be and would thus 11, 1983, ly Report, May Floor C.S.H.B. demeaning. More- appear patronizing and 2008, page Appendix 29-30. [attached *12 over, to refer to those if the term is used purposes only] Although A for conference actions, has initiate criminal its use who adopt legislative required are not we cases, sexual- assault been restricted to policy changes language opin- of our overwhelming number of victims where the ions, adopt this would do well to gender distinction have been women. Such changes appropriate. spirit of those when Also, is used to unnecessary. if the term Legislature by has moved ahead ad- The sexually imply who was woman dressing problems generated by unnec- case, actually prosecuting assaulted essary gender descriptions; we should fol- implies that in sexual assault then its use improper low its lead and discontinue our cases, prose- pursue not the State does language. use of such rather, cution; of the the woman-victim sum, “prosecutrix” In the term should be are All other crime victims assault does. trunk, relegated along to the attic attorney. See represented by the State’s pantaloons, and the term “vic- corsets and 2.01, there- Art. “Prosecutrix” V.A.C.C.P. placed in its tim” stead. rights of the women implies that the fore majority’s posture, I concur this cases are not in sexual assault involved holding.3 must by the and the women defended State fend for themselves. Third, “prosecutrix” term of the use A APPENDIX to the prejudicial than “victim”

rather analysis bill HOUSE STUDY GROUP no vic- there is implies that it since victim If there are case. assault in a sexual tim 5/11/83 robberies, murders, kidnappings, of victims why there assaults, burglaries, can and HB 2008 Use of assault? of sexual victims be “prosecutrix” such aggressive word C. Evans of that victims inference rise to an gives “victims”, and really are not assault sexual (CSHB Danburg) degree unfairly diminish may use such of criminal sexual Redefinition SUBJECT: actually suffered. harm of offenses the term for improper use Jurisprudence: Criminal COMMITTEE: sufficiently three reasons should preceding recommended committee substitute rather than using the term “victim” justify Smith, Waldrop, ayes Peveto, T. VOTE: independent rea- “prosecutrix.” Another — Granoff, Burnett, Danburg, Hernan- the 1983 may in the acts of son be found dez, Hudson S. year, the Penal Code Legislature. That Judge Teague’s portion concur- join And Query, "prosecutrix" refer to the 3. is used to assault, agreement with ring opinion "I am in would not the that states of a sexual female victim advocates;". appropriate Judge "prosecutor” stylistic changes for a male be Miller term language has Such of a sexual assault? victim never been used. will for prosecution allow homo- 0 nays assaults, cover but would also Hury cases in which women attack men or absent — in male on assist attacks women. This None WITNESSES: types bill clarifies the ac- assaultive replaces “he” “his” DIGEST: This bill and past tions that have in the been the gender-neutral terms in sections for of- basis for convictions dealing Penal Code with assault And clear a mar- fenses. it makes gender- New aggravated assault. riage license is not a commit license to are also created for neutral offenses spouses sexual assault in cases where “aggravated sex- “sexual assault” divorced, excluding are separated existing of- place ual assault” of spouse from the definition married rape, rape, aggravated for sexu- fenses persons living apart who are or who abuse, abuse, aggravated sexual al pending have court action divorce child, indecency with a separate maintenance. child. OPPONENTS SAY: This bill provision should “sexual assault” covers *13 permit prosecution to currently amended of all rape, acts defined abuse, child, rape sexually spous- those assault indecency of a and who their Language changed spouse child. es. A not prosecuted a is to would specify precisely spouse conduct con- offensive unless other doesn’t in second-degree felony involved this sent to act. This would more ade- Existing define consent. de- quately problem address the serious preserved fenses are rape marriage. and a new de- within regarding fense is added the offense of OTHER OPPONENTS SAY: The existing on a assault child for conduct that is a offenses for rape and sexual abuse part of medical care. stay should the same. Juries will “aggravated assault”.provision in- usually assess a much stiffer penalty corporates the illegal currently acts de- rape for they than will for type some aggravated fined aggrava- Rape assault. already perceived ted sexual penal- abuse. The criminal by people most as the ultimate assault. ty, first-degree felony, and the de- essentially NOTES: CSHB 2008 fenses and pros- affirmative defense to 1730, Danburg, same as CSHB ex- ecution are carried over from current cept that CSHB 1730 eliminates law. The defense for medical care to a exception for nonconsensual conduct child is also added. spouses. CSHB between 1730 has throughout Other revisions are made reported favorably by been the Crimi- the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Jurisprudence nal A com- Committee. Procedure to conform to the substan- 966, by mittee substitute for SB Whit- changes tive made this bill. mire, companion HBto has been SUPPORTERS SAY: This bill sev- makes reported Jurisprudence the Senate improvements in existing eral law. Committee. major change reclassify rape is to CLINTON, Judge, dissenting. assault, and sexual abuse as an act of majority opinion violence rather than a sex This In crime. note 1 sets out help stigma Appeals would eliminate the rationale of the Dallas Court of Code, rapes go finding one out of ten unre- causes that V.T.C.A. Penal ported police. Secondly, contemplate this bill “does of evi- the admission impeach- gender removes references to dence of conduct purposes law both men and women can file ment evidence is so unless the charges. particular, change prior felony form of conviction.” Allen this (Tex.App.— 666 S.W.2d impeach of the defendant to the victim’s 1984). credibility Dallas This grant by showing any prior felony Court did indeed con- involving victions finding review to determine whether that sexual conduct on her Weddington, Rape interpretation statute, record.” Law in correct Texas: Reform, H.B. 284 And the Road to majority Am.J. says appeals now the court of (1975)(Weddington). By Crim. Law at 6 through reached its conclusion “a misread- explanation pur- the clear tenor of her ing particularly of the entire statute and pose, development and evaluation of the (d).” subsection legislation, Weddington strongly implies majority Nowhere its does the testimony that other sexual activi- reading delineate its own of the statute to ty is not admissible launch an attack demonstrate that "evidence of the victim’s general credibility testify- prior sexual conduct” is admissible “to at- ing victim. her, credibility, impeach tack her if it The law review editor also examined global challenge does.” That smacks of a Weddington and from that account and general credibility by showing specific major other sources concluded that a Yet, acts of sexual conduct. the Court has change along way made “evinces “consistently rejected evidence of legislative intent to exclude evidence of unchastity acts of offered to attack when prior sexual conduct in most circumstanc- witness,” credibility Ray, of a female es,” Comment, at 320. With that in mind (Third Edition) Texas Law of Evidence he further observes: 655, 1 Texas Practice 581.1 The law re- past chastity equated “In the was view majority comment from which the veracity unchastity while associated quotes support position; does not *14 dishonesty. As societal values merely says comments editor that such evi- activity changed, about sexual have dence “should be admissible to rebut testi- legal community recognized prop- ‘a has mony complainant My con- ...”2 skepticism er for the view that sexual cern in rejecting is that rationale of the activity equated can be with moral char- Appeals majority opin- Dallas Court of acter and thus testimonial reliabili- laying proposition ion is down admit- pri- ty.’ Under section 21.13 evidence of ting testimony activity of sexual even unchastity probably or would not be ma- any broader than extant before enactment ‘Insight into terial to a fact at issue. 21.18. of § rarely mores of a witness metamorp- A coauthor of the bill determining if the help to a wit- in- ultimately certainly hosed into disposed ness is towards untruthful- ” preserve tended to take care “to ness.’ Texas, Reflecting existing practice statutory clarity, "As a of a lack of 1. Rule result 608(b) inquiry scarcity appellate interpretation of Texas Rules of Evidence bars and the of proof by sources, and evi- on crossexamination extrinsic explanatory other absence of dence of instances of conduct for the largely remain ramifications of section 21.13 purpose attacking supporting credibility of or of attempt unknown. In an to stimulate mean- witness, showing other than conviction of ingful guidelines, suggestions concerning some 608(b) provided by crime Rule Rule of aspects conduct— of evidence of sexual proposed by Evidence Criminal Rules of consent, credibility, physical and evidence— Judiciary Senate-House Select Committee on the are offered." prohibition. is an identical See Vol. No. 8 Comment, (1979) Baylor at L.Rev. 1985) (September Bar Journal at 938 Texas (Comment). (All throughout emphasis is mine Journal). (hereafter Bar indicated.) unless otherwise II, appears 2. The text in Part entitled “Future explains At the threshold the writer Effects." endeavor, his viz: Id., at 325-326.3 sexual conduct unless is “material to the inflammatory prejudicial and “its case” State, (Tex. In Young v. 547 S.W.2d 23 outweigh probative nature does not val- Cr.App.1977), the trial court excluded evi- Id., ue.” at 322. In terms the statute does dence of an and abortion an act of sexual “relevancy,” opinion not mention but the of night alleged intercourse before the the Herrera court does and dwells on it at rape. Contending existing case law length. What the Comment writer did good authority” despite was “still enact- was to read the statement 21.13, Herrera Young urged ment of that such offering party prior sexual conduct —that must first make a was “relevant on the issue of credibility preliminary showing relevancy consent and the of evi- victim, alleged the immoral character past dence as to mean behavior—to mitigation punish- and the the woman something other than “material Comment, supra, ment.” See at 320-321. Then, returning case.” to terms of the Though alluding particularly “consent,” up statute he came part itself with a three Young Court held the trial court cor- test: the first from Herrera and the sec- rectly proffered excluded that evidence be- However, ond and third from the statute. germane cause “not to the issue misapprehends he in Herrera. acquiescence, any victim’s other issue Patently explain all Herrera does evidence,” Young, supra, raised at that as used in the statute “material to the State, 25. See also Wilson v. 548 S.W.2d case” discussing means “relevant.” After (Tex.Cr.App.1977): revealing matters defining “relevancy” —“exists prior sexual conduct sought accused to in- a relation between an item of evidence and germane troduce “not to the issue of the properly provable a matter in a ease” and acquiescence, victim’s other fact relevancy to raise an issue there must be 21.13, required issue in the case as Sec. believing shown “a reasonable basis for supra. Young [supra] See past pertinent sexual conduct is to [an cases there cited.” issue in the Herrera court con- case]”—the my Young view were Wilson cludes: followed; correctly decided and should be showing sufficient to raise “Absent they are not due the criticism leveled relevancy, questions an issue as to con- Accordingly, respectfully them.4 I cerning past sexual conduct are to be *15 dissent and now turn to address v. State showing excluded. Once such a Herrera, 7, (Ct.App. 92 N.M. 582 P.2d 384 made, balancing test of Evidence 1978), perceptions meaning. and other of its ap- Rule 403 and is to be [the statute] seen, As shall be errs in its Comment determining admissibility.” plied in Herrera, understanding of the ma- does jority believing step P.2d at Thus one need that Herrera somehow 582 393.5 supports admitting past balancing apply prescribed evidence of taken to be credibility. 8, conduct to attack test. See note infra. judge allows a trial to admit states that the Mexico Our statute

Comment New precludes past upon finding a that it is shield statute evidence of evidence described omitted, meaningful guide- Emphasis original. that it "establishes more *16 upon cused and offered the accused 1106, (S.Ct.1984); Gillette, State v. alleged issue of whether the victim consented 626, 695, (Ct.App.1985); State P.2d N.M. Romero, is the to the sexual behavior which basis of 94 N.M. 606 P.2d charged; the offense (Ct.App.1980). (C) that relates to the motive or bias is, course, 8. The current definition the same victim; alleged Proposed Federal Rule 401. Rule (D) [Impeach- admissible under rule 609 Evidence is identical. Texas Rules of Criminal Crime]; ment Evidence of Conviction of (E) constitutionally required that is to be written, promulgated presently If Rule 412 admitted; and proposed Rules of Criminal Evidence re- outweighs danger probative value places repeals 22.065. The rule excludes prejudice. unfair past "reputation evidence of the sex- Journal, at Bar 933-934. alleged [pre- ual behavior of an victim of such the notes as confirmed Judge Miller’s rhetorical In answer to appear both New Inter- Webster’s opinion, his the question, see footnote Dictionary English Lan- national would, course, ap- be “prosecutor” term English Dictionary. guage and Oxford of a sexual propriate for a male victim through “prosecutrix” is derived word assault, long appeared he as chief so as English, ending from a feminine Middle Especially is this so witness for the State. nouns, agent the current Latin for where Chapter changes the recent made in since “- “-or”; generic ending or is masculine say that 22 of the Penal Code. To ending usually asso- tress” is feminine way language has been used in this never ending generic with the masculine or ciated so, false, recklessly since only is not but “-er”, Eng- taken in this instance from Old judi- usage supported by centuries of lish, evidently it from Greek which received history. To note but cial vernacular through late Latin. authority upon single example from the Judge himself no less than Miller which Thus, observed, easily the word but as English Dic- heavily, most the Oxford relies nicely meaning “prosecutrix” fits into the tionary reports that in 1769 the immortal noun, “prose- agent just as the word of an that, himself commented Blackstone “[o]n Further, does. because word cutor” larceny particular, a conviction of by appending a “prosecutrix” is formed his have restitution of prosecutor shall “prose- to the verb gender-specific suffix n did Surely, great Blackstone goods.” cute,” is neces- resulting construction suggest by mean to this statement not Likewise, “prosecutor” is sarily feminine. to receive King’s lawyer was entitled so, masculine, necessarily although not job property booty for a well the stolen function; generic since it also serves done. in which sense the context will determine understood. word is to be Thus, reason for con- Judge Miller’s first usage “prosecu- of the word demning the times, recent Until terms “prosecu- utterly. trix” fails universally un- “prosecutrix” tor” and were synonymous roughly to be derstood reasons, remaining one is at As for his “complainant”, “complaining witness” or wayward suspect some alerted to once participle from a words are derived politics, or so it would feminist form of the addi- “complaint”, not from of the verb of the term his characterization seem from it, and do agent noun suffix to so tion of an “blatantly The word “sexist” sexist.” and femi- separate exist in masculine not English Dictio- reported by the Oxford usage may Although such nine forms. the word “sex- now has nary. Webster’s citizens who slightly odd to those sound in its addenda comfortably ism” nestled I find that Web- County, in Dallas reside and “sex “sexidecimal” between section yet report that the word “preju- ster’s does not kitten”, given to mean where it is regional, sex; “prosecutrix” esp: is either archaic based on dice or discrimination women”, It is therefore let alone rare or obsolete. and “be- discrimination conditions, maintain that the word foster patently havior, false to or attitudes that on sex.” does not have above roles based “prosecutrix” stereotypes of social may also adjective, others as well. meaning, even if it has is its “Sexist” I believe that one who is. used to describe Therefore, Judge Miller’s assertion sense. Judge it in this latter Miller intended used “prosecutrix” should not be word inherently sex- “prosecutrix” it does The word referring to a victim because when between as it discriminates especially uncon- ist insofar is an not mean “victim” women, That is to boys girls. sure, men and sequitur. To be how- vincing non distin- perceive[s] the say, ever, synonymous is not “prosecutrix” “mark[s] during guishing peculiar gender. defending rights of” It State in her feature

Notes

3. added in Notes 741, Comment, People Dawsey, Mich.App. at but see lines." 322-323. 236, 238, (1977). N.W.2d at 5.New Mexico Evidence Rule 403 is the func- equivalent part perceives "as of Texas Rules of Evi- 4. The law review writer Wilson tional dence, 403, germane” general simply requiring and of our own rule to the evidence be Rule —an probative interpretation “provides guid- value of tendered evi- he believes little the effect that outweigh prejudicial determining See ance in if sexual conduct is dence must its effect. cit., 1481, 167-168; preference Ray, op admissible." His is "the three-fold Texas Practice § 403, proposed provided by Rules of test era," the New Mexico court in Herr- see also Rule Texas Evidence, Journal, majority opinion Bar at cited in the in this Criminal cause. proffered “material to a in the pertinent at issue case” evidence must be to a fact applying prescribed balancing disputed and then material issue the case. Cor- rectly opinion read the Though “material,” Herrera does not test. it uses the term statutory provi- convert the New Mexico statutory language taken as a whole that test;8 part sions into a three rather it is an “relevancy” formulates a matter more of generally construing aid in own statute. “materiality.”6 than Herrera dealt offer of sex- Ray Professor has articulated a state- ual conduct on a defensive issue of con- relevant, ment of the former: to be evi- sent, appellate and the court found the trial dence must “tend to the truth establish correctly proffer court excluded the proposition material to the issues.” Ray, purpose. sup- that The decision does not cit., op 2 Texas Practice 167. The port finding majority of the here that Supreme experimented Court for while such evidence is admissible attack Relevancy” respective- with “Test of that general credibility testifying victim. ly “materiality” “relevancy,” defined jurisdic- Nor does other in this up admissibility. and made a test for See acknowledges tion legal com- former rule Texas Rules of Evidence. munity “proper skepticism that for the Recently Supreme Court abandoned activity equated that sexual can view dual all definitions favor of one encom- with moral character and thus with testi- definition, passing viz: reliability.” ante, p. monial See “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence majority Because the would have this having any tendency to make the exist- lay pierces down a rule which our ence of a fact consequence that is of law, I respectfully own victim shield the determination of the action more dissent to that as well. probable probable or less than it would be without the evidence.”7 Any currently acceptable definition of “relevancy” includes the notion of “materi- ality.” require Therefore isit consistent to preliminary showing relevancy “a conduct;” is, the victim’s sexual crime,” 6. A shorthand rendition often used is that to be but allows "evidence of alleged scribed] past admissible evidence must be relevant to a mate- instances of an victim's sexual be- rial issue in the case. in accordance with control havior" if admitted 21.13(b) provisions and it is similar to evi- subsequent opinions 7. At least three confirm dence: showing requires preliminary that Herrera (A) necessary explain to rebut or and, relevant, relevancy immediately then scientific or medical evidence offered subjecting balancing evidence to a test state; weighing probative prejudicial value (B) past with the ac- sexual behavior Fish, effect: State v. 101 N.M. 681 P.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Allen v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Dec 4, 1985
Citation: 700 S.W.2d 924
Docket Number: 271-84
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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