Allen v. StateAllen v. State
We review Allen v. State, 515 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), based on certified conflict with Lane v. State, 470 So.2d 30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). We have jurisdiction.
The issue presented is whether a youth sentenced for multiple felonies under the Youthful Offender Act may be sentenced consecutively so that his total commitment exceeds the six-year youthful offender maximum prescribed in
Petitioner pled guilty to grand theft and bail bond jumping and was sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act, Chapter 958, Florida Statutes (1979), to four years imprisonment followed by two years of community control for each offense, the sentences to run consecutively.
On postconviction appeal, the First District agreed with petitioner that the sentences were excessive under State v. Milbry, 476 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1985), which held that a youthful offender cannot be sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum sentence an adult could receive for the same crime. Because grand theft and bail bond jumping each carried a maximum penalty of five years, the district court held that petitioner‘s total commitment on each charge must be reduced to not more than five years.
The district court rejected, however, petitioner‘s argument that the imposition of consecutive sentences impermissibly exceeded the six-year maximum prescribed by
We disagree and find this case controlled by this Court‘s analysis in State v. Goodson, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1981). In Goodson, this Court held the existence of multiple felony convictions does not preclude a defendant from being classified as a youthful offender but merely excludes him from mandatory classification as such. Id. at 1340. In reaching this conclusion, we specifically considered section 958.05(2),* which provides, in pertinent part:
958.05 Judicial disposition of youthful offenders. — If the court classifies a person a youthful offender, in lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law, the court shall dispose of the criminal case as follows: ... .
(2) The court may commit the youthful offender to the custody of the department for a period not to exceed 6 years. The sentence of the court shall specify a period of not more than the first 4 years to be served by imprisonment and a period of not more than 2 years to be served in a community control program. (Emphasis supplied.)
We construed this language as “mandate[ing] that a trial judge not commit a youthful offender to the custody of the Department of Corrections for more than 6 years.” Id. at 1339. In so doing, we specifically recognized that a defendant sentenced under the act who had been “convicted of more than one felony would go unpunished for the other felonies if he received the maximum penalty for the first felony.” Id. at 1339-40.
We adhere to this construction. To interpret the Youthful Offender Act in any other way would violate the express intent of the legislature to provide a “sentencing alternative,” see
Additionally, we note the Florida Youthful Offender Act was patterned after the Federal Youth Corrections Act and the Alabama Youthful Offender Act. Senate Corrections, Probation and Parole Committee, Final Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Statement on Senate Bill 165 (April 25, 1978). Analogous provisions of those acts have been interpreted consistent with our position here. See U.S. v. Ortiz, 513 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.) (where defendant committed under Youth Corrections Act on one count, court held it was inconsistent with purpose of Act to treat defendant as adult on second count and impose additional consecutive sentence), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 843, 96 S.Ct. 78, 46 L.Ed.2d 64 (1975); Ex parte Jackson, 415 So.2d 1169 (Ala. 1982) (where statute establishes maximum probationary sentence of three years, defendant convicted simultaneously of two separate felonies and sentenced to three years probation in each must serve the probationary time concurrently rather than consecutively).
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the state‘s suggestion that
Accordingly, we hold that once a defendant has been classified a youthful offender, the court must adhere to the six-year cap established by the legislature. If trial courts wish to impose consecutive sentences “for the protection of society,” as
We quash that portion of the district court decision pertaining to this issue and remand for the imposition of concurrent sentences. We approve the decision of the Fifth District in Lane as to this issue.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.