58 W. Va. 197 | W. Va. | 1905
William H. Allen filed in the circuit court of Barbour county his bill of complaint against J. N. Wilkinson, Buy N. Wilkinson, D. M. Willis, W. W. Haines'- and J. Truman Nixon, partners trading under the firm name of the South Penn Coal Company, alleging that prior to the 19th of April, 1902, he was negotiating with the defendants through the defendant J. N. Wilkinson, attorney-in-fact for said partners, concerning the purchase of certain coal lands on which the defendants had or were about to secure options to purchase; that the lands so to be purchased are described in a general way in a paper filed with the bill marked exhibit “Option and Acceptance,” as follows:
“This agreement made this 19th day of April, 1902, between The South Penn Coal Company, by J. N. Wilkinson its Attorney in fact, party of the first part, and Wm. H. Allen, of Pittsburg, Pa., party of the second part. Witnessed, that the said party of the first part in consideration of one dollar in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby agree to grant and option unto •the said party of the second part the sole and exclusive option of purchasing all the coal under those certain tracts of land locally known as the Freeport and Kittanning or Ka-nawha River coals, located in the County of Barbour and the District of Philippi, State of West Virginia, and which coal lands contain about eight or ten thousand acres more or less, and to include all the farms on which the coal has been optioned and purchased in the name of the South Penn Coal
“Clarksburg, W. Ya. April 19th, 1902. Mr. J. N Wilkinson, Atty. for South Penn Coal Co. Dear Sir: — I hereby accept the options on Ten Thousand (10,000) acres coal and three hundred and thirty-six (336) acres in fee in Barbour County, West Yirginia, at Lillian Station on the B. & O. R. R. Win. H. Allen.’'
That this agreement was the result of the negotiations between the plaintiff and the said Wilkinson acting for and on behalf of the partners known as the South Penn Coal Company; that the ten thousand dollars was paid by plaintiff to defendant under the agreement; that on the 23d of May, 1902, upon the false and fraudulent representations made by said Wilkinson that an additional payment made by the plaintiff on account of the said options would expedite the securing of the field plaintiff caused to be paid to him the further sum of ten thousand dollars on account of 0said purchase price of said property, making the entire sum of twenty thousand dollars paid On account of said lands; that on the 30th day of July, 1902, plaintiff having become convinced that the defendants had no title to and could not get title to and deliver to him at least, three hundred acres of surface and coal designated as front land and did not and could not secure title to at least twenty-five hundred acres of mineable and mai-ketable coal or Freeport and Kittanning or Kanawha River Coal in a compact and contiguous body lying-adjacent to said front lands and mineable therefrom, notified the defendants by letter to Wilkinson, attorney in fact, that he would decline to accept a tender of the field as then controlled by them, and demanded the return of his twenty thousand dollars, which they declined to refund and prayed that the defendants might be required to refund to him the twenty thousand dollars with interest from the dates of the two payments of ten thousand dollars each respectively, and that he have a personal decree against the defendants for the same with interest and that on .default of the payment thereof
To which bill the defendants, the firm of South Penn Coal ■Company, filed their demurrer assigning the following .grounds:
“1st. There is no equity in the Bill, the same setting up merely an alleged contract existing between the plaintiff and the defendant J. N. Wilkinson, member of the defendant company, and the breach thereof by said defendant, and accruing damages to the plaintiff by reason thereof, to the. extent of $20,000.00. This is purely a legal demand for which there is a complete and adequate remedy at Law, as shown by plaintiff’s exhibit ‘Option and Acceptance, ’ dated April 19th, 1902, filed with the bill.
“2nd There is no averment in the bill that said defendant committed, or attempted to commit, any fraud upon the plaintiff, or that he acted within the scope of his authority as the Attorney in Pact of Defendant Company.
“3rd. There is no averment that defendant Company was advised of the alleged negotiations between said defendant and plaintiff, as to the object of plaintiff in contracting with said defendant, or of the extent and character of his negotiations, or that said defendant pretended or claimed to act for it in this respect.
“4th. There is no allegation that defendant himself even agreed to transfer any options to plaintiff, or to abstract and transfer to him the abstracts of titles thereunder, or to convey or cause to be conveyed to him any deeds therefor, or to make any particular application or appropriation of the money received by him of plaintiff, or to account for the same.
“oth. There is no allegation that said defendant, or any of the members of the said defendant Company, acting for it, or the Company itself, drilled upon the land embraced in said options or located the drilling as any part of any con
“6th. There is no averment made, or reason given, in plaintiff’s Bill which imposed upon said defendant Wilkinson any obligation to transfer options to plaintiff, or take title to him .for land embraced therein, and there is therefore no premise to predicate the prayer of the Bill that the options be sold and the deed surrendered to plaintiff, neither is there any allegations upon which to predicate the prayer that said abstracts be sold.
“7th. The bill is multifarious in that it avers that subsequent to the 9th of April, 1902, the date of the alleged contract between the plaintiff and said defendant, the plaintiff on the 30th day of July, 1902, declined, in a letter to said defendant, to comply with said contract, and yet prays substantially, in default of the re-payment of said $20,000.00, for a comx>liance therewith on the part of said’defendant. This prayer is inconsistent with said aArerment.
“8th. There is no imputation of fraud upon the part of said defendant Company, no prayer for discovery and no averment of the ground of equitable jurisdiction.”
On the 10th of November, 1903, the plaintiff joined in said demurrer and the same being argued was sustained and the plaintiff given leave to amend his bill.
The plaintiff filed an amended bill making parties thereto the same parties defendants as in the original bill, and also' T. Moore Jackson, surviving partners of themselves and C. Spriggs Sands, in his own right, and also as partners doing business under the firm name of South Penn Coal Company, and TjuIu Sands, executrix of C. Sprigg Sands, deceased, and Edward H. Compton, clerk of the county court of Barbour county, alleging that the defendant, J. Neuton Wilkinson, represented himself to plaintiff as the agent and attorney in fact, for all of the other defendants, including the said coal company, and having full power and authority to act for them in his representations and negotiations in respect to said coal and lands; that he falsely and fraudulently represented to the plaintiffs that the- South
The defendants, by counsel, entered their demurrer to the plaintiff’s amended bill assigning the same grounds assigned in writing to the plaintiff’s original bill, in which the plaintiff joined and same being argued was sustained bjr the court and the plaintiff’s bill and amended bill were dismissed and decree for costs, the dismissal being without prejudice.
It is contended by appellees that there is no equity in the bill, the same setting up merely an alleged contract existing between the plaintiff and the defendant J. N. Wilkinson, a member of the firm, and that the same is purely a legal demand and there was complete and adequate remedy at law. This would be a proper legal proposition if plaintiff was suing alone to recover the twenty thousand dollars which he shows by his bill Avas fraudulently procured from him by the defendant J. N. Wilkinson, acting for himself and the other defendants all of whom together constituted the firm of or partnership of South Penn Coal Company, and which fraudulent acts on the part of defendant J. IST. Wilkinson Avere on behalf of himself and the other members of the company, of which they all had notice, and it is distinctly alleged that the said Wilkinson as agent and attorney in fact had full power and authority to act for the other defendants in his representations and negotiations in respect to the coal and land properties mentioned. The bill and especially the amended bill, is not brought to enforce the contract of April 19, 1902, but to rescind the same and for a discovery as to the disposition made of the twenty thousand dollars so fraudulently obtained from the plaintiff and to disclose all the purchases and payments made in the name of plaintiff with his money and all the titles to all land or coal taken in his name and to require them to surrender the contracts, deeds and title papers in respect thereto, and for a discovery as to the purchase and contracts and deeds for coal lands whether taken in plaintiff’s name or the name of the defendants or any of them, and paid for wholly or in part with the money of plaintiff. The bill distinctly charges the fraudulent changing
The demurrer interposed in the name of the South Penn Coal CompanjT was the demurrer of all the defendants in their partnership capacity and is an admission of the truth of the allegations of the amended bill. In Shaw v. Allen, 184 Ill. 77, (56 N. E. 403), it is held that: “On demurrer to a bill all the material facts well pleaded are taken as true.” Grieg v. Russell, 115 Ill. 646, (4 N. E. 780); Clark v. Assurance Association, 43 L. R. A. 390. The meaning of a demurrer is, that admitting the allegations of the bill or declaration to be true they are not sufficient to sustain the action. It will hardly be contended that in an action at law for the recovery of money the plaintiff could recover the lands which .were conveyed to him, nor the possession of the deeds for the same, which were fraudulently withheld from him, nor could it charge with plaintiff’s debt the land purchased and paid for with the money of plaintiff so fraudulently obtained from him by false representations of the defendants and their agent and attorney in fact, the title to some of which lands was claimed to be taken in the name of said Wilkinson. It is well settled that if a bill in equity shows any cause for relief the general demurrer thereto must be overruled. In Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, (syl. pt. 1), it is held: “A bill in equity, notwithstanding it contains many vague and irrelevant allegations will not be held bad on demurrer if taken as a whole it states facts which entitle the plaintiff to relief.” And in Miller v. Hare, 43 W. Va. 647, (syl. pt. 1): “A general demurrer to a bill in equity is properly overruled, if the bill as a whole states facts which entitle the plaintiff to relief.” And in Whitlock v. Duffield, 2 McCoun (N. Y.) 365: “If a right to any relief be shown by a bill, a demurrer will be overruled.” Gay v. Skeen, 36 W. Va. 582, and in Chrislip v. Teter, 43 W. Va, 356, it is held: “When fraud is sufficiently alleged with proper parties to a bill a demurrer will not lie. ” And “When a court of equity takes jurisdiction of a cause for one purpose, it will go on and dispose of the questions involved to avoid a multiplicity of suits. ” Hanly v. Watterson, 39 W. Va. 214; Yates v. Stuart, Id. 124;
The decree of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings to be had therein according to the rules governing courts of equity.
Reversed.