*1 Marilyn ALLEN, Representative Personal Terry deceased, Allen, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA, municipal Bentley Smith,
corporation; Don Mc
Donald, Farmer, Crull, Brian and James
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 96-7021. Appeals,
United States Court
Tenth Circuit.
July 1997. *2 Matthews, Brennan, R.
Juliet N.
Albert
Bonds, Matthews,
Hayes, Musko-
Bonds &
OK,
gee,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Whitten,
(Reggie
Woodrow K. Glass
N.
Whitten,
brief),
him
Mills
&
OK,
Priest,
City,
T.
David
Oklahoma
Jim
Walls,
Warden,
Cathy
McKinney,
A.
Webster, P.C.,
City,
Stringer
Oklahoma
&
OK, Defendants-Appellees.
BRISCOE,
KELLY,
hand,
a gun
right
He had
in his
Before
which was
LUCERO,
resting
Judges.
on the console
Circuit
between the seats.
repeatedly
As Lt. Smith
told Mr. Alen to
KELLY, Jr.,
Judge.
Circuit
PAUL
drop
gun,
Bentley
his
Officer
McDonald ar-
Plaintiff-Appellant Marilyn
appeals
Alen
joined
rived and
Lt.
Smith
the driver’s
*3
rights
ruling
on her civil
from
adverse
door.
Smith
side
Lt.
then reached into the
personal
§
42
1983 as
claim under
U.S.C.
attempted
vehicle and
to seize Mr. Alen’s
alleging that the
representative,
defendants
gun,
Bentley
while Officer
held Mr. Alen’s
against
force
her
excessive
deceased
used
Farmer,
arm.
Bryan
left
Officer
ar-
who
Fourth
in violation of the
Amend-
husband
Bentley, approached
rived with Officer
Mr.
summary
granted
ment. The district court
side,
passenger
Alen’s car from the
and at-
judgment
Defendant-Appel-
to the individual
tempted
open
to
a passenger side door. Mr.
ground
they
on the
did
lee
officers
by
pointing
gun
Alen reacted
toward
Having
the Fourth
not violate
Amendment.
Farmer, who
Officer
ducked and
be-
moved
no constitutional violation
determined that
the ear.
swung
gun
hind
Mr. Allen then
occurred,
summary
granted
the court also
McDonald,
toward Lt. Smith and Officer
and
judgment
Defendant-Appellee City
exchanged.
shots were
Smith
Lt.
Offi-
and
jurisdiction
Muskogee.
28
Our
arises under
cer McDonald fired a total of twelve rounds
panel
§
A
1291.
unanimous
reverses
U.S.C.
vehicle,
striking
into
Mr.
four
Alen
officers,
judgment
as
the individual
sequence,
times. The entire
from
time
city.
panel
a divided
reverses as to the
and
Lt. Smith arrived to the time Mr. Mien was
killed,
approximately ninety
lasted
seconds.
Background
brought
against
§
Plaintiff
1983 claim
20,1994,
February
Ter-
morning
On
against
the officers involved
and
ry Alen left
home after an altercation
his
Muskogee.
subsequently
Defendants
moved
with his wife
children. He toоk ammu-
summary judgment,
set forth state-
a
him,
guns
nition and several
with
and later
supporting
ment of facts in their brief
parked
Muskogee
in front of the
residence of
response,
motion.
In her
Plaintiff
not
did
sister,
Lee-Oakley.
his
Rhonda
The alterca-
dispute Defendants’ statement of
The
facts.
reported
Wagoner
to the
tion was
motion,
granted
court
district
Defendants’
Department,
teletype
Sheriffs
which sent a
holding
genuine
that there was no
issue of
(MPD),
Muskogee
Department
to the
Police
fact and that Defendants
enti-
material
were
describing
car
Mr. Alen and his
and advis-
judgment
as a
tled
matter
law.
Mr. Alen
was armed and had
family
teletyрe
threatened
members.
Discussion
a
also advised that there was
1983 warrant
summary
grant
We review
outstanding
imper-
for Mr. Mien’s arrest for
novo,
legal
judgment
apply
de
the same
sonating an officer. Lt. Donald Smith of the
under
standard used
the district court
relayed
offi-
MPD
the information to other
56(c).
Inc.,
Learjet,
90
Rule
Goldsmith v.
during
meeting
squad
p.m.
cers
at 1:30
(10th Cir.1996).
1490,
Summary
F.3d
1493
only
meeting,
appropriate
if
is no
judgment
Some time after the
Lt. Smith
is
“there
might
genuine
any
Mr.
his
fact
...
was advised that
Alen
be at
issue as
material
Muskogee.
moving party
judgment
sister’s house in
Before he could the
entitled
56(c).
officers,
A
dispatcher
meet
other
a radio
a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
him
if it
affect
disputed
might
that a 911 call had been made
fact is “material”
advised
Oakley’s
governing
from Ms.
Alen
the suit
home and
Mr.
the outcome of
under
law,
dispute
proceed-
evi
threatening
“genuine”
suicide. Lt. Smith
and the
home,
by-
Oakley
approached
jury
is such that a reasonable
could
ed to
dence
standing
nonmoving party.
who
near Mr. Alen’s
for the
standers
were
return
verdict
Inc.,
vehicle,
back,
Liberty
step
Lobby,
and ordered them to
Anderson v.
242, 248, 106
they
sitting
which
did. Mr. Allen was
in the
L.Ed.2d
(1986).
driver’s seat with one foot out of the vehicle.
We construe the factual record
Connor,
light
v.
in the
stances. Graham
inferences therefrom
reasonable
L.Ed.2d
the nonmovant.
Gullick
most favorable
Lawrence, Kan.,
Assoc.,
Thompson
Pilots’
Airlines
v. Southwest
son
Cir.1995).
(10th
Cir.1996).
F.3d
The dis-
1176, 1183
genuine
materi-
trict
found
issues of
party need
affirma
moving
fact,
in an
al
and held
acted
claim in order
tively negate the nonmovant’s
conclude,
way.
objectively
We
reasonable
Corp.
summary judgment. Celotex
to obtain
however,
the individual Defendants
322-23,
Catrett,
carry
their initial burden of demon-
failed
(1986).
2551-52,
In
strating
genuine
the absence of
issue
stead,
the initial bur
only
bears
movant
material fact.
“
is,
‘showing’
pointing out to
den of
—that
in
inquiry
The excessive force
*4
is an
there
absence
the district court —that
only
not
the
actions at the
cludes
officers’
party’s
support
nonmoving
the
evidence to
presented,
moment that the
but
threat
325,106
Id.
at 2554.
case.”
at
S.Ct.
may
actions in the mo
also
include their
granting summary judgment,
In
the dis-
suspect’s
leading up to the
threat of
ments
beyond
agreed-upon
the
trict court went
Kan.,
Lawrence,
60
force. Sevier v.
findings.
court
its own
facts and made
(10th Cir.1995).
695,
course, the
F.3d
699
Of
found,
example,
knew
for
the officers
per
judged
use of force must be
from the
had
to have killed
that Mr. Allen
claimed
spective
a reasonable officer “on the
at
arriving
his sister’s
people
three
before
scene,”
split-
is “often forced to make
who
the
knew
not
home. Whether
does
the
judgments
second
... about
amount
review,
Plaintiff is
our
but
correct
alter
particular
necessary
force that is
in a
situa
finding
the
is not
pointing out that
court’s
Graham,
396-97, 109
490
tion.”
U.S. at
S.Ct.
the
supported by
record.
However,
at 1871-72.
as we stated in Sevier:
reasonableness of Defendants’ actions
“[t]he
Although
Supreme
the
Court has said
depends
both on whether the officers were
helpful to
of fact are sometimes
findings
danger
precise
they
at
used
the
moment that
summary
re
appeals
judgment
an
court on
and whether
reck
force
Defendants’ own
Anderson,
6,
view,
at 250 n.
106
U.S.
during
less or deliberate
the seizure
conduct
at
n.
the
court on sum
S.Ct.
district
unreasonably created the need
use such
to
mary judgment should determine “whether
at
will
consid
force.” 60 F.3d
699. We
thus
any genuine
factual issues
...
are
prior
suspect’s
to
er
officer’s conduct
the
by
only
properly
be resolved
a finder
can
“immediately
if the
is
threat
force
conduct
fact,”
In
id.
at 2510.
at
suspect’s
connected” to the
threat of force.
sense,
inap
“findings of fact” are
traditional
Comm’rs,
Romero v. Board
order,
summary judgment
propriate in a
be
Cir.1995),
n. 5
de
F.3d
cert.
summary judgment
proper
cause if
-
nied,
-,
116 S.Ct.
findings
need made
the case
of fact
be
(1996);
Chamberlain,
L.Ed.2d 728
Bella v.
as a matter of law.
read
can be resolved
We
(10th Cir.1994),
1256 n. 7
cert.
only
helpful
that it
Anderson to mean
be
denied,
898, 130
513 U.S.
115 S.Ct.
undisput
the
when
district
summarizes
L.Ed.2d 783
see also Tennessee
Regalado City
ed facts.
See
Commerce
Gamer,
1, 8-9,
(10th Cir.1994)
City, 20
n. 1
(1985)
1699-700,
(objective
L.Ed.2d 1
rea-
(findings
required,
are
the
of fact
not
but
inquiry requires
to exam-
sonableness
courts
summary judgment
granting
reasons
totality of
circum-
ine “whether
the
the
record).
should
stated
justified particular
sort
or
stances
of search
seizure”).
The Individual
I.
Officers
not
analyze
§a
exces
Defendants have
shown
We
1983 claim of
genuine
issue material
by determining
sive force
whether the offi
there is
lack of
regard
to
officers’
objectively
cers’ actions were
fact
reasonable
reasonable
Celotex,
light of
facts
ness.
surrounding
and circum-
See
Indeed,
summary
judgment
at 2553.
it seems
us that Defen
City,
reasoning
pointed
presence
municipal liability requires
of a
dants have
out
a constitu-
acknowledged
by
tional violation
genuine issue. Defendants
officers. Even assum-
ing
correctly
the court
interpreted
before
district court that there are differ
that law
municipal liability, question
among
eyewitness depositions.
we need not
ences
resolve,
and do
court еrred
enter-
example,
deposition testimony
some
For
indi
ing summary judgment
ground
on that
up
Lt.
be-
“screaming”
cates that
Smith ran
plaintiff presented
cause we have concluded
immediately
car
began
Mr. Allen’s
shout
sufficient evidence that the officers commit-
car;
Allen
get
at Mr.
out of his
other
ted a constitutional violation to withstand a
testimony
ap
indicates
that Lt. Smith
summary judgment motion. We review the
proached
talking
cautiously and tried
Mr.
propriety
summary
judgment
for the
giving up
gun.
Allen into
de novo and
support
plain-
find sufficient
“minor,”
Appellees
disputes
label these
against
tiff’s claim
to withstand sum-
but the substantive law indicates otherwise.
mary judgment.
Romero,
(an
705 n.
See
60 F.3d at
officer’s
prior
suspect’s
conduct
threat of force
moving party
Once the
has car
56(e)
“immediately
burden,
“requires
relevant
the conduct is
ried
Rule
force).
suspect’s
nonmoving party
go beyond
connected”
threat of
pleadings
incident,
affidavits,
by ...
‘depositions,
The entire
from the time Lt. Smith
or
*5
only
shooting,
interrogatories,
arrived to
time of the
took
answers to
and admissions
file,’
ninety
Clearly,
preced-
designate ‘specific
seconds.
on
showing
officers’
facts
that
”
ing
“immediately
genuine
actions were so
is a
connected”
issue for trial.’ Celotex
Catrett,
they
317, 324,
of
Corp.
to Mr. Allen’s threat
force that
v.
477 U.S.
106 S.Ct.
2548, 2553,
(1986).
should be included in the
in-
reasonableness
L.Ed.2d 265
“[T]he
56(c)
eyewitness
quiry.
plain language
The
testi-
differences
of Rule
mandates the
mony regarding
approach
entry
are
of summary judgment
officers’
adequate
after
motion,
disputes.
therefore
material
factual
discovery
upon
against
time for
a
Anderson,
party
who
U.S. at
To
I’m not aware
In
a four-
of
court held
significant
by plaintiffs expert
paragraph
debate in
law enforcement
affidavit
wit
expert
community
or
genuine
witness
about the
to create
issues
ness was insufficient
principles
conclusory
fundamental
talking
allega
we’re
about
of
fact
material
because
Cover
specific
here.
is better
than
cover.
were
on
tions
not based
facts. Dr.
Communicating
deposition
from a safe
is bet-
comparable
distance
Kirkham’s
not
to
ter than not. Getting
people
conclusory
innocent
as
in
the brief
affidavit
Evers. The
safely
way
possible
out of the
as
deposition
pages
length
is desir-
is over
in
and
trying
gun
opinion
specific proaching
grab
was based on
and
to
from
Dr. Kirkham’s
disturbed,
emotionally
person
suicidal
creat-
de-
in
record. His extensive and
facts
officers,
high
ed a
risk of death for
the armed
although
he
testimony shows
tailed
civilians,
person,
other
and was reckless.
documents,
he was
have
all relevant
not
read
There was evidence
officers were trained
circumstances of the
very familiar with the
and, thus,
in
to act
such manner
werе trained
Cincinnati,
Russo v.
incident. See
of
thing.
precisely
wrong
to do
The causal
(6th Cir.1992)
1036, 1046-47
(reject-
training
link
and the
between
officers’
testimony
ing argument
plaintiffs
of
alleged
deprivation is more di-
constitutional
procedures
conclusory
expert
police
in
in
in
not
rect than
cases which officers are
preserve genuine question
to
and insufficient
given enough
to know the correct
liability).
city’s
over
Bak
of material fact
Cf.
dangerous
response
situation. Dr. Kirk-
to
(5th Cir.1996)
Putnal,
er v.
F.3d
to improper
ham
the incident
attributed
(unsubstantiated
in
of
conclusions
affidavit
training,
in the
stating:
police
“[I]f
trainers
expert
preclude
purported
insufficient
to
using
of
are
this case as an
State Oklahoma
summary judgment
city);
in favor
Bena
example
you
men-
properly
of how
handle a
Wilson,
vides v.
individual,
tally
ill
then
will
officers
(5th Cir.)
purported expert
(deposition of
die,
mentally
assuredly
people
ill
and other
subjective opinion
giving only
not based
Ap-
probably
people
innocent
will die.”
expertise
proven
or
insuf-
factual foundation
It
pellant’s append.
Ill at 574.
was his
summary judgment in fa-
preclude
ficient to
opinion
properly
if the
had been
officers
city),
cert. denied
U.S.
vor
principles
in
trained
the fundamental
845
require
plaintiffs
§
simply
upon
cases
evi-
1983
such
deprivation. These
cases
as this
one,
to the
of a
there
absolutely
dence in addition
occurrence
where
has been
rely
plaintiff
properly
showing
pattern
A
can
of a
single incident.
of constitutional viola-
if
might
put
incident
there is other evi-
tions which
single
on the
have
of Mus-
Vineyard
training.
kogee
notice
inadequate
training program
dence of
See
1207, 1212-14
Murray,
inadequate.
990
County
v.
See Board
of
—
(11th
1024,
Cir.),
Brown,
U.S.-,-,
denied
114
v.
cert.
510 U.S.
Comm’rs
(1993); Russo,
1382,
1391,
(1997);
S.Ct.
S.Ct.
Diaz
accompanied
rights,
by showing
that a mu-
(D.N.M.1996). By providing direct evidence nicipality
employees
has failed to train its
above,
training,
inadequate
as discussed
recurring
presenting
handle
situations
an ob-
plaintiff
beyond
sufficient
provided
evidence
potential
vious
for
...
trig-
such a violation
single
of the
to with-
the occurrence
incident
—
Brown,
ger[s] municipal liability.”
summary judgment.
stand
at-,
(citing
KELLY,
part.
Judge, dissenting
Circuit
element,
party
establish
and on which
trial).
proof
I
II
Ms.
respectfully dissent from
of will bear
burden of
Section
*9
dispute
Muskogee
opinion. Permitting
the court’s
this case Allen does not
that
against
go
requirements
Muskogee
training
forward reverses the
exceeds Oklahoma’s
fact,
Supreme
In
training.
burden that
deliber-
for
enforcement
Court has
law
ately
Muskogee’s
place
party opposing
only
chosen to
on the
a
on the content
evidence
summary judgment.
motion
at all
of two law en-
training
It also is
are affidavits
placed
the strict
officials that
individual officers
inconsistent with
standard
forcement
eventually
program
Al-
be
notice that
new
training. Ms.
on
a
that
in accord with
acted
Kirkham,
for.”);
be-
City
that
v.
expert, Dr.
stated
is called
Zuchel
len’s
Cir.1993)
were,
opin- Denver,
(10th
730,
actions
in his
the officers’
740-41
cause
police practices, and
ion, contrary
proper
(holding
municipality
that the defendant
was
stated
officials
two law enforcement
deliberately
because
it failed to
indifferent when
accord with
the officers acted
despite
deadly
that
change
training
its
force
six
training
have
Muskogee’s
must
training, then
period,
within a six-week time
incidents
admitted,
inadequate. Dr. Kirkham
been
repeated
by
despite
requests
the district at-
however,
not read either Musko-
that he had
case,
torney
training).
In this
how-
new
The
training
or Oklahoma’s
materials.
gee’s
ever,
previous
allegation
there
that
emphasizes
supports
this
that
evidence
put
had
of Musko-
similar incidents
City Muskogee
“inference” that
an
on
that
its
was inade-
gee
notice
police
Al-
inadéquately trained its
officers.1
quate.
Supreme
Court has cautioned
though we must
all factual inferences
draw
cases,
only
plaintiffs
in such
succeed
will
nonmovant,
inferences
those
favor
range of circumstances.”
in a “narrow
v. South
must be reasonable. Gullickson
—
Brown,
at-,
at 1391.
U.S.
S.Ct.
Assoc.,
1176,
Airlines Pilots’
west
Thus,
prove
Ms.
must
indif-
Allen
deliberate
Cir.1996)
(citing
Elec.
Matsushita
by
showing that
violation of federal
ference
Corp.,
v.
Radio
475 U.S.
Indus. Co. Zenith
predictable”
“highly
conse-
rights
587, 106
1348, 1356,
89 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
its
train
quence
adequately
failure to
its
(1986)).
testimony, grounded
Dr. Kirkham’s
city
fact that
officers.
Id.
mere
speculation, may raise an inference
may
have
unconstitution-
acted
officers,
Muskogee inadequately trained
ally
municipal
cannot
basis for
liabili-
be thе
summary
it is not sufficient to withstand
but
Servs.,
ty.
Department
Monell v.
Soc.
Rather,
inference,
this
if it can be
judgment.
U.S.
98 S.Ct.
constitutes,
best,
called,
at
a “mere scintil-
so
(1977) (“[A] municipality
cannot be held
evidence,
judgment
which a
in favor
la” of
on
superior
§
a respondeat
liable under
1983 on
upheld.
cannot
the nonmovant
theory.”);
see also
Oklahoma
Inc.,
Lobby,
Liberty
411 U.S.
Anderson
Tuttle,
808, 823-24,
471 U.S.
2505, 2511,
242, 252, 106
gee.
The DENVER & RIO GRANDE WEST COMPANY,
ERN RAILROAD Plain
tiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, COMPANY,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD ndant-Counter-Cl
Defe aimant-Appellee.
No. 96-3050. Appeals,
United Court of States
Tenth Circuit.
July 1997.
