*1 784 A.2d ALLEN, Aрpellant, v. Elizabeth A. Pennsylvania, Kenneth E. and Commonwealth of MELLINGER Department Transportation, Appellee.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued Nov. 1999. Aug. 2001. Decided *3 Nast, P.C., Joseph Roda, F. Roda & Eric L. Keepers, Lancaster, for Elizabeth A. Allen. Fisher, Attorney General, Koons,
D. Michael R. Calvin Sr. General, Knorr, III, Deputy Attorney Chief John Deputy G. General, Attorney Com., Dept, of Transportation. ZAPPALA, FLAHERTY, C.J., CAPPY, Before NIGRO, SAYLOR, CASTILLE, NEWMAN JJ.
OPINION ZAPPALA, Justice: appeal, this we interplay re-examine the between the (Pa.
procedural
rule governing
damages in civil actions
R.C.P.238)
statutory provisions
and the
governing sovereign
(42
immunity
§
seq.)
Pa.C.S.
8521 et
and several
(42
7102(b)).
liability
31,1989,
May
Appellant
On
Elizabeth A. Allen commenced a
*4
personal
action
injury
against Appellees
Mellinger
Kenneth E.
Pennsylvania, Department
the Commonwealth of
and.
Transportation, seeking damages
-injuries
related to severe
which
she suffered
a collision between automobiles driven
by
Mellinger.1
herself and
defendant made a written
Neither
that,
13, 1987,
Specifically,
alleged
1.
Allen
on December
her vehicle
Mellinger’s
by
County
was struck
on Route 501 Lebanon
as she was
turning
traffic
parking
shopping
across
into the
lot of a
establishment.
alleged
Mellinger
traveling
Allen
speed
was
at an excessive rate of
trial,
a
jury rendered
Following
of settlement.
offer
negligent, apportion-
were
parties
that all three
finding
verdict
to
forty
each
percent
to Allen and
twenty percent
fault
ing the
monetary
awarding total
and
Department,
and the
Mellinger
seeking
motion
$2,883,366.
filed a
Allen
for
to Pa.R.C.P. 238
damages pursuant
$1,430,077.07 delay
with the
commencing
seven-year period
approximately
March
the date
ending
and
filing
complaint
of the
Subsequently, Allen
was rendered.
on which the verdiсt
Mellinger providing
agreement with
into a written
entered
Mellinger’s
that,
of the limits of
exchange
payment
for
($300,000),
would
policy
Allen
liability insurance
automobile
assets
against Mellinger’s personal
not
to execute
undertake
specified that
agreement further
satisfy
judgment.
The
to
to
the amount of
not intended either
reduce
its terms were
liable, or to
Department would be
release
for which the
verdict
Department
to
for contribution
Mellinger
liability
delay damages.2
or
respect
to either the verdict
motions for new
Department’s
trial court denied the
The
verdict,
notwithstanding
granted
judgment
trial and
to
general liability verdict
to mold the
Department’s motion
$250,000 imposed by 42
statutory cap of
conform
8528(b),
delay
dam-
granted
and
Allen’s motion
by
limitation
the trial
imposed
basis. The
ages on
limited
delay damages against the
in assessment of
court resulted
share of the
only upon
forty-percent
its
Department calculated
verdict, yielding
verdict,
than on the entire
million
rather
$2.9
$501,654.11.
imposing
this
award of
delay
highway
recently painted
Department had
lines on the
and that the
an
location.
directed her to turn at
unsafe
which
agreement
pertinent
is as follows:
2. term of
pro
tortfeasor
agreement
not intended to be a
rata or
This
is
liability
Mellinger’s
for cither the verdict or
of Mr.
release
damages,
any way
liability
nor
it intended to affect
his
to
the verdict or
on either the amount of
PennDot
contribution
$300,000
reduce,
(1)
by
of the
damages,
the amount
other than:
above,
verdict for which
payment referred
the amount
liable;
(2)
severally
Mellinger
end,
jointly
and PennDot
$300,000
by
payment
is received Ms. Allen’s
as
date
damagеs may
sought
on the
attorney,
period
for which
($300,000).
payment
amount of
*5
limitation,
trial court acknowledged
holding
this Court’s
Commonwealth,
295,
Woods v.
Dep’t
531 Pa.
Transp.,
(1992),
A.2d 970
that an
delay damages against
award of
Commonwealth
is to
party
be calculated on the basis of the
$250,000.
entire verdict rather than on a maximum of
Never
theless,
Department
the court ruled that
jointly
was not
severally
and
liable for the
of delay damages
entire amount
pursuant
holding
of the Commonwealth Court in United
Fidelity
States
&
Guaranty
Royer
Co.
Garden Center and
Greenhouse, Inc.,
31,
(1991),
143 Pa.Cmwlth.
simply stands for proposition that an award of damages against the Commonwealth be calculated on the entire verdict party just Commonwealth and not the amount of statutory cap. Woods does not stand for proposition that the Commonwealth shall be liable for the entire amount of damages against all defendants. Opinion Memorandum at (emphasis 7-8 in original). The Commonwealth Court did not agree- refer to the settlement ment and Mellinger analysis. between Allen in its argues
Allen
the Commonwealth Court’s
holding
Royer Garden is inconsistent with
Superior
Court’s hold
ing
cases such as Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, 330 Pa.Super.
Liability normally Therefore, follows verdict. appellants jointly severally are responsible for the entire amount severally jointly they delay damages because This result verdict. amount of the for the entire liable which, while Rule [238] from the new obtains logically *6 pre- nature of really in the damages,” is “delay labeled damages compensatory to to be added judgment interest Moreover, of express language awarded at verdict. of part “become damages delay for that requires Rule verdict, or award.” decision Tindal, at 560 A.2d 189. with the lan- in accordance established
Royer Garden for calculated damages should be delay guage of Rule assessed compensatory on the based each defendant jury’s apportionment according against that defendant 238(a)(1) part: provides, relevant negligence. of seeking action in a civil request At the damage, bodily injury, property death or monetary for relief compen- amount delay shall be added damages for or addi- defendant satory damages awarded each liable to the tional defendant found verdict, jury of a ... and shall become verdict or award. decision “damages phrase opinion emphasized Royer Garden compensatory amount of be added to the delay
for shall defen- or additional against each defendant damages awarded Garden, jury at 592. Since the 598 A.2d Royer dant.” See another Township, 40% to negligence 40% to the apportioned damages against the defendant, delay plaintiff, and 20% to the 40% share of Township’s be calculated on the Township should verdict, damages against delay damage total molded damage molded its share defendant on the other verdict. Reilly, with extent, not conflict Garden does Royer
To this damages among Tindal, liability Apportionment al. et damages or fashion, compensatory whether in this defendants applica- with in and of itself conflict damages, does not Likewise, liability. and several joint rule of tion of the than more any from defendant to recover allowing plaintiff pro defendant’s rata damages, share of compen- whether satory damages or damages, pursuant to the rule of joint and several liability, is not inconsistent with determining percentage liability share of Indeed, to each defendant. calculating each defendant’s share would prerеquisite be a determining a defendant’s entitlement to contribution for hav- ing paid more than his share. however,
It appears,
Royer
Garden opinion went
beyond simply approving the calculation of each defendant’s
liability
share of
damages in
accordance
jury’s allocation of fault. The court
plaintiffs’
dismissed the
argument on appeal that
apportionment
the trial court’s
damages prevented
recovering
them from
the full amount of
any
defendant under
principle
liability.
several
See
Thus, we hold that as a general precept Rule 238 damages against awarded all in negligence defendants a action are properly aggregated with the verdict that the such defen dants jointly are and severally aggregated liable for the damages. fact damages under may Rule 238 be in calculated the first on an instance individualized basis being aggregated before general liability the verdict does not alter analysis. the
This, however, complete does not inquiry the in this case. joint The rule of liability several is stated 42 7102(b) § Pa.C.S. as follows: recovery
Where is against allowed defendant, more than one each defendant shall be proportion liable for that of the total dollar amount damages awarded as in the ratio of causal to the amount negligence of his causal amount recov- against whom to all defendants negligence attributed full amount may recover the plaintiff allowed. The ery is against whom any defendant recovery from allowed recovery. Any defendant plaintiff is not barred from share compelled pay percentage more than his who is so may contribution. seek added.) Act, Immunity Sovereign Pursuant to the
(Emphasis “a bar to an sovereign immunity § 8521 et is seq., Pa.C.S. waived parties” has been against action Commonwealth set sub- specified [the] circumstances “to the extent forth and within the limits set forth section chapter 8522(a) damages).” § (relating to on 42 Pa.C.S. limitations added). in excess of (emphasis respect Since with amounts statutory cap, party is a defendant the Commonwealth plaintiff recovery,” is barred from under “against whom the 7102(b) permitted not the terms recovery full allowed from” to “recover the amount of the words, Sovereign Immu- party. In other Commonwealth exposure to to limit Commonwealth nity party’s Act serves compensa- liability. and several the limitation Where reached, has can recover tory been attribut- party only those the Commonwealth able Commonwealth. manner implicates parties’
This in turn discussion of the party in which Commonwealth calculated, particular Department’s argument case, Depart- overrule In that we should Woods. where defendant, jury was the sole returned verdict ment *8 $250,000 million, pleas which common court molded the $1.5 8528(b). plaintiffs § the pursuant ruling on the post-trial motion under Rule court calculated $250,000 jury than the damages on rather verdict $1.5 affirmed. This Court re- million. Commonwealth Court versed. language part analysis first the focused on the 238(a)(1). entirety, setting After out the text in its the
Rule
be
provides
delay damages
“Rule 238
shall
Court stated:
added to the ‘verdict
the
...
jury,
the decision of the court
nonjury
trial
...
or
the award of
appointed
arbitrators
Code,
under section 7361 of
the Judicial
42 Pa.C.S.
”
verdict,
and shall
part
become
of the
decision or award.’
Woods,
Not would there be no incentive for a Commonwealth agency to suit, seek a major settlement of a there would be a distinct disincentive since the would be upon predictable based constant and there would be no unknown which would motivate the Commonwealth to dis- cuss settlement. The same encourage disincentive would prolonging of litigation as filing well as the of appeals. Additionally, who statutorily already has been compensation denied the full him due or her would оnce again deprived money to which he or she would be entitled, otherwise only a minimum sanction being imposed on the defendant.
Id. opportunity
Given the presented by this case to reexamine Woods, holding compelled we are acknowledge this reasoning fundamentally was flawed and the decision First, must be analysis overruled. language proceeded from a misleading paraphrase of the text. language The actual of the rule “damages states for delay shall be added to the compensatory damages amount of awarded each defendant or additional defendant found liable to the in the verdict of a jury, in decision of the court ... in or the award of arbitrators ...
11 verdict, (Empha- or award.” of the decision part shall become added.) however, empha- ignored the oрinion, Woods sis that “provides that the Rule language and declared sized ... jury decision be added the ‘verdict of damages shall 612 A.2d at ... or award of arbitrators....’” of the court full, added delay damages is the text read 971. When each against awarded defendant compensatory damages to the to Woods According then the verdict. become to the verdict. simply delay damages are added paraphrase, all the more meaning readily apparent is The difference analysis character- step the next of the Woods critical because factfinder’s representing or as ized the “verdict award” it damage and contrasted with plaintiffs assessment of the legally is entitled to recover. amount the analysis is in its opinion similarly inadequate The Woods rule’s underlying respect 238. With purposes Rule receiving his compensating for purpose for suggest it basis recovery, or her defies reason anything than compensation could be other calculating such actually respon party could the amount the Commonwealth plaintiff. plaintiffs compensa paying sible Since statutory cap, can be tory can never there exceed if cap. And receiving no amounts excess of delay, justification compensating is there no the stated Simply illusory. put, plaintiff with may who seek hardships plaintiffs which befall consequence a direct against parties Commonwealth occur as been statutory upon damages, limitations which have challenge province within the upheld constitutional as Commonwealth, See, Assembly. e.g., Lyles of the General (1986). 516 A.2d Transp., 512 Pa. Dep't оf Further, encourag purpose in its of the rule’s treatment settlements, from a failure to ing the Woods rationale suffers this other valid interests. When give any consideration to our rejected argument first exceeded Court authority enlarged it the substantive rulemaking because Authority Alleghe v. Port rights plaintiffs, Laudenberger (1981), acknowledged we ny 436 A.2d County, that the had and procedural rule both substantive elements but that the effect on rights merely concluded substantive was *10 Id. at In Craig Magee collateral. 155. v. Memorial Rehabili Center, 1350, (1986), tation 515 A.2d with faced “a perspective,” different set facts viewed from a different id. at that recognized we the same rule more than had a duties, effect on and pro collateral substantive violated due well, imposed responsibility cess as the extent it regard on defendants without to fault. aAs result we suspended as it ultimately the rule was then written and replaced it with present rule in 1988.
Unfortunately,
presented
yet
when
with
set of
another
facts
Woods,
the Court failed to recognize the need to view the
from
it
perspective,
matter
another
as
had in
v.
Craig Magee.
recognizing
Sovereign Immunity
Instead
Act cre-
unique relationship
a
of rights
ates
and duties
plain-
between
parties,
and
analyzing
tiffs
Commonwealth
and then
whether
application
setting
of Rule 238 in
only
still has
duties,
effect on
rights
collateral
substantive
and
the Court
simply
party
treated the
any
Commonwealth
the same as
other
if
party.
The Court reasoned that
were
on
computed
statutory cap
“there would then be no
which
unknown
would motivate the Commonwealth to discuss
settlement,” Woods,
so,
Mr. SAYLOR Justice CASTILLE, majority opinion. joins who also Mr. Justice *11 concurring dissenting and files a Mr. Justicе GAPPY and Madame Justice in which Mr. Justice NIGRO opinion join. NEWMAN
SAYLOR, Justice, concurring. holding in are join majority
I
validly
and
within the
aggregated with a verdict
properly
jointly
severally by
and
liability
of the
borne
scope
join
overruling
I also
in
Woods
Common
tortfeasors.
(1992),
295,
wealth,
A.2d
in
531 Pa.
612
970
Dep’t Transp.,
authorizing delay
judicial
rule
which the Court held
express legislative limitation
damage awards surmounted the
in a tort
against the Commonwealth
awardable
acknowledge Mr.
point,
this
I would
Justice
action. On
latter
decisis.
for the doctrine
stare
Cappy’s legitimate concern
emphasize that it is most critical
I would
Nevertheless
reexamine,
examine,
necessary
carefully
and where
the Court
maintain an
in which it seeks to
making
its
matters
decision
the Gen
power, thereby preventing
of its
exclusive assertion
its own constitutional rolе
Assembly
performing
eral
Pennsylvania’s sub
significant areas of
development Co.,
Rayon Importing
v. N.Y.
law.
United States
stantive
Cf.
(1947)(stat-
654, 663,
L.Ed. 577
67 S.Ct.
U.S.
ing that
immunity
“the
of the
liability
United States from
[cjourts
...[;]
interest is not to
by policy arguments
be waived
lack
power
to award
against
interest
the United States on
they
the basis of what
think is or is not
policy”).
sound
Indeed,
reasons,
for the same
I believe that
the Court’s
exclusivity
assertion of
prejudgment
the area of
interest
generally as
manifested
v. Port
Laudenberger
Auth. of
Allegheny County,
(1981),
Mr. Justice joins CASTILLE this concurring opinion. CAPPY, Justice, concurring dissenting: I agree with majority that the amount in Pa.R.Civ.P. damages that a defendant owes a in a negligence action is to be calculated accordance with the factfinder’s allocation of fault and that Rule 238 awarded all defendants aggregated with the follow, verdict. For all of however, the reasons that I dis- agree with respectfully dissent from the remainder of the *12 majority opinion. V, approach
1. This
particularly appropriate,
would seem
since Article
10(c) speaks explicitly
Section
purpose
terms of
and not
effect
providing that
abridge, enlarge,
Court’s rules shall "neither
nor
modify
V,
rights
any litigant.”
the substantive
of
art.
Const.,
Pa.
10(c).
§
pоsited
Thus it can be
that
the framers of the Constitution
type
power
limited the
afforded to the
procedur-
narrow area of true
rulemaking.
Ry.
al
Morgan,
Monessen Southwestern
Co. v.
486 U.S.
Cf.
331, 336,
1837, 1843,
at
108 S.Ct.
(1988)(stating
My majority’s analysis fundamental of all of on its resort to statutes to decide these issues centers judicial procedure. matters of 10(c) V, Pennsylvania empow §
Article Constitution “prescribe general governing practice, this ers court to rules all if such are procedure, and the conduct of courts... rules abridge, enlarge, this consistent with Constitution neither ” modify litigant.... Pa. rights any nor the substantive 10(c). V, this power § art. have Const. We held 1703, 522, § 444 exclusive. In re 482 Pa. A.2d (1978). procedural, and
We have also held that
represents
legitimate
exercise of our
Pa.R.Civ.P.
V,
10(c) rule-making
authority. Laudenberger
Article
(1981),
Port Auth.
496 Pa.
mandated example, For In re 12 § waiting without for an adversarial challenge, express we declared an Assembly mandate of the General subjecting our procedures adoption of rule to certain sections V, Agency Open Meeting the Public Law violative Article 10(c) separation powers and the Similarly, any doctrine. effort by the legislature upon opera- encroach the terms or tion of through Act, Rule 238 the Comparative Negligence Sovereign Immunity Act or any other statute would be uncon- am, therefore, stitutional. I perplexed by troubled majority’s willingness to legislative deciding defer to action in questions procedure appeal this raises.
In my opinion, the first us issue before concerns what responsibility, any, imposes upon if Rule 238 a defendant to pay damages against his assessed co-defendants. I would pose as the issue follows: Where defendants, assessed 238 against multiple under Rule is a allowed to recover the entire award from any plaintiffs one of those recovery defendants or is from any one defendant limited to the attribut- able to him? 1. I find of this liability discussion issue terms of and several unproductive. liability principle Joint several is a tort law that is premised theory on the conduct of tortious two or more wrongdoers or an combined concurred to cause indivisible harm that apportioned, injured parly may cannot be such that the seek satisfac- against jointly tion judgment of an entire any all of them or one Glomb, by individually. Salopek of them Pa.Super. Glomb of our governs the construction Rules Pa.R.Civ.P. *14 Rule Civil Procedure. 127 states: Intent of Supreme Rule 127. Construction of Rules. Court Controls
(a) of all construction of rules object interpretation The and of Supreme to and the the ascertain effectuate intention Court.
(b) construed, give if shall effect Every possible, rule be words a rule are and to all its When the of clear provisions. disregarded of it to be ambiguity, free from letter is not the pursuing spirit. under of its pretext the (c) the explicit, When words of a rule are not intention the by considering, may of the Court be ascertained Supreme (1) for the among necessity matters occasion and other the (2) rule; promulgated; under which it was the circumstances (3) (4) remedied; object the to be the mischief be (5) attained; prior including if rules practice, any, the other (6) subjects; Assembly the same оr similar upon and Acts of (7) interpretation; of the consequences particular the a (8) rule; the contemporaneous history practice of the followed under rule.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 127. first, language Rule
Turning requires, as Rule 127 of 238, part: provides pertinent in latter Bodily Action Damages Delay For An For 238.
Injury, Damage Or Property Death (a)(1) seeking action request plaintiff in a civil At the damage, bodily injury, property for death or monetary relief of compen- shall added to amount for addi- satory damages against each defendant or awarded tional to be liable to the found defendant nonjury of court a jury, verdict a decision of 623, denied, (1987), appeal 530 A.2d 538 A.2d contrast, (1988). question we By face concerns terms settlement, encourage operation procedural rule which serves to cases, expeditiоus facilitate and alleviate the adverse resolution delay. Laudenberger, consequences financial sustains due to 436 A.2d 147. at trial or the award of arbitrators .... and shall become verdict, or decision award. (2) Damages period shall be awarded for the time
* * * (ii) action August in an on or commenced after year original process from a date one after the date was up award, first served the action date of or verdict decision.
ü; * [*] (b) which period time for shall be (a)(2) calculated under subdivision shall period exclude the time, any, if *15 (1) after which the defendant has a written made offer of
(i) in a specified prompt settlement sum with cash pay- plaintiff, the ment to or
(ii) by a structured settlement underwritten a financially responsible entity, ninety days
and continued that for at offer least оr until trial, occurs, commencement of whichever first which offer accepted plaintiff award, was not and did by the not recover decision, damages delay, verdict or exclusive of for more percent specified than 125 of the of either sum the actual cost of plus any payment the structured settlement cash to plaintiff; or (2) during which plaintiff delay caused of the trial. 238.2 Pa.R.Civ.P. written,
As not explicitly Rule 238 does answer whether a plaintiff may upon call any multiple against one defendants My agreement majority delay damages any 2. with the that that particular plaintiff light defendant owes the should be calculated in apportioned the defendant’s fault is based on the words Rule 238 provide "damages delay which that compensa- for shall be added to the tory damages awarded each defendant or additional defendant plaintiff jury, found to be liable to the in the verdict of a the decision nonjury of the court a or in the trial award of arbitrators ....” 238(a)(1), interpretation Pa.R.Civ.P. and on our Rule in of the Woods delay damages apply that are to "actual factfinder’s assessment
19
satisfy
delay
are
to
all of
assessed
whom
fact,
ambiguous,
I find the Rule
he is awarded.
In
damages
hand,
delay
by requiring
question. On
one
as to this
award,
verdict,
it
decision or
become
defendants
intended
all
appear
vrould
drafters
claim bear
plaintiff
underlying
on the
liable to the
found
delay damages recovery.
full
responsibility
plaintiffs
for
other,
it
that a
can
drafters made
clear
defendant
On the
timely
damages by making
a
imposition
delay
avoid the
however, would
protection,
This
reasonable settlement offer.
complied
who
disappear
if a defendant
large measure
responsible
plaintiff
to
non-
the Rule remains
damages.
complying co-defendants’ share
238
Looking
for and aims of Rule
next to the reasons
ambiguity,
I
guidance, as
127 allows in instances
rule
Rule
Pa.R.Civ.P.
previously
what this court has
decided.
reiterate
(4).
127(c)(1),
encourage
288
Rule
seeks
settlement
disposition of
so as to unclutter the
prompt
cases
achieve
Rule
With I that generally- these conclude speaking, plaintiff multiple under Rule a in a defendant may delay damages lawsuit recover all awarded him view, This, in any my one defendant. increases the a plaintiff likelihood that will his entire award by receive shifting from him financial of an risk insolvent or other- conclude, however, recovery-proof wise defendant. I also plaintiffs ability by Rule 238 restricts a to do distinguishing so comply by who with tendering between defendants the Rule qualifying offers and defendants who do not. This is consis- in advancing meaningful negotia- tent Rule’s interest Thus, tion and I would hold settlement. that Rule 238 allows plaintiff a to collect his from any entire award non- defendant; complying non-complying allows a defendant who pays to more than his assessed share of the total delay damages recoupment award to seek from those defen- delay damages upon dants whose assessment ishe called to cover; a plaintiff not allow from comply- does to a collect any ing delay damages defendant attributable to other defen- dants from the date the offer which tolled Rule 238 was tendered.3 ability to plaintiffs pursue party
As to a Commonwealth award, for the full of his I amount see no basis in either words of the Rule or its to purposes treat the just Commonwealth a different manner than I have stated. point, briefly At this I turn majority’s to the merits determination since in the limited amount he may compensatory damages recover from a Commonwealth party Sovereign Immunity $250,000 cap, under Act’s 7102(b) rule of liability and several Negligence Act not Comparative apply plaintiffs does I3. would Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 to refer the Civil Procedural Rules Committee propose any necessary it amendments deemed be certain that the regards accomplish terms of the are clear these these results.
21 once 42 the Commonwealth delay damages from recovery of 8528(b)’scap is reached. § Pa.C.S. I approach, cannot majority’s agreed if I with the
Even
majority
my perspective, the
conclusion. From
agree with its
which is
statutory
construction
cardinal rule
violates the
is to ascertain
statutory interpretation
of all
object
plain
mean-
expressed
intent as
Assembly’s
the General
§ 1921.
language.
a
1 Pa.C.S.
ing of
statute’s
it,
only
has
if
majority’s construction
merit
I read
As
Sovereign Immunity Act’s
that the
accepts
proposition
one
is
“damages”
plaintiff
permitted
on
a
“limitations”
8528(b)
§
42
under
Pa.C.S.
from the Commonwealth
recover
Act’s
Comparative Negligence
thing
[thе
the same
as
means
his entire award
plaintiff
that a
is unable collect
provision
is “barred” from “recov-
against
from a
whom he
defendant
7102(b).4
not,
a
§
42
I do
and cannot see how
ery”.
Pa.C.S.
concept
encompasses
which
the under-
limit on
—a
recovery against
permitted
a defendant
standing that
—can
recovery
which bars
from a
equated
provision
with a
entirely.
defendant
(1986),
Orluck,
Pa.
In Elder v. 511 a phrase “against whom legislature that when the used Pa.C.S; 7102(b) § recovery” from plaintiff is not barred jointly and who could not be held to describe those defendants it plaintiff’s recovery, full intended severally liable or who are who settled exclude defendants I that our liability. Id. at 520. believe immunized from Sovereign language in Elder and the of' both the holding Negligence Acts leave no room Immunity Comparative accept I present case. cannot majority’s conclusion to use the intended the Commonwealth legislature that the 7102(b) Comparative Negligence provides Act 4. Section recovery "plaintiff may full amount of the allowed recover against barred from any whom the is not defendant 8522(a) 7102(b). Sovereign § § recovery.” 42 Pa.C.S. Section sovereign immunity Immunity “as a bar to an action Act waives parties” "within the limits set in certain instances and Commonwealth (relating damages)....” to limitations forth section 8522(a). *18 8528(b) compensatory damages in 42 cap § to escape Pa.C.S. consequences the full tortfeasor status under 7102(b) where, here, as the Commonwealth was not from liability immune and did not plaintiff prior settle with the to verdict.
Lastly, majority opinion provides the three bases for aban- doning holding our in Woods to delаy damages against assess verdict, the Commonwealth based on the actual opposed as to Sovereign Immunity me, the Act’s cap. For not one them persuasive. is majority begins by
The
taking issue with this
prior
court’s
interpretation
Woods,
language.
Rule 238’s
In
we focused
phrase
provides
the
which
that “delay damages shall be
jury,
added to the ‘verdict of the
...
the decision of the court
nonjury
in a
trial
...
or
the award of
...
arbitrators
and shall
verdict,
part
award....’”,
become
of the
decision or
Pa.
238(a)(1), and
that
determined
the Rule “is indicative
R.Civ.P.
of the intent to
damages apply
have
to
verdict or
the
award
itself, which represents the actual factfinder’s assessment of
plaintiffs damage,
opposed
the
as
plaintiff
to the amount the
Woods,
legally
is
entitled to recover.”
Next, majority determines that Woods inadequate was analysis its compensatory purpose. the Rule’s According illogical suggest it for this court majority, was anything can be other calculating basis for $250,000 actually responsi- than the that the Commonwealth paying plaintiff ultimately the amount a recovers ble since cap. can compensatory damages never exceed that however, we majority, unfairly characterizes observation stated: who statutori- made in Woods when we “[TJhe compensation him or ly already has denied full due been deprived money to which he or she again her would be once entitled, only a minimum sanction would be otherwise (emphasis A.2d at imposed on defendant.” 612 being added). intent, an as the stating, so we did not voice claims, delay on majority сompensate *19 Rather, sought can we to avoid the amounts he never receive. deprivation. By calculating of dam- imposition a second awarded, $250,000, we the amount instead ages on actual in to it is not both the amount saw denied and the in to compensatory damages amount statutory but cap. which he would be entitled for the failed in to Finally, majority the concludes that we Woods had in perspective”, this from “another as we view matter by cap Sovereign Craig, recognize virtue of the Act, 8528(b), Immunity application 42 of Rule rights and 238 has more than a collateral effect on substantive 768). According majority, at to (Majority Opinion duties. by an impermissibly rights “creat[ing] we affected substantive no un- uncertainty of to outcome motivate settlement where exists”, at certainty (Majority Opinion otherwise outcome 768) if (emphasis original), when reasoned that we “ statutory cap would computed were ‘there to no unknown which would the Commonwealth motivate ” 768) (quoting at (Majority Opinion discuss settlement.’ 972). Woods, opinion regard, majority 612 A.2d at this ques- logic begs a familiar and fatal flaw of contains —it the truth of the say, majority tion. That assumes prove by concluding it the first instance proposition seeks “uncertainty 238 creates is substan- that the outcome” Rule settled; 238 procedur- It is and Rule tive. 24 See,
al. e.g., Laudenberger, Uncertainty A.2d at 147. a procedural procedural, outcome in matter is not substantive. Thus, majority’s argument, final like its others overrul- Woods, ing fails. me, our analysis
For in Woods regarding language, operation correct, history and 238 is not only but is as 1992, compelling today as it was in when we the case. decided salutary purposes settlements, encourage of the Rule—to courts, compensate unclutter and to delay in receiving recovery his worthwhile and must —remain would, therefore, be actively promoted., continue to I uphold Woods,' our keeping decision with the doctrine of stare decisis, which repeatedly we have termed a “wise course of action”, Lenker, judicial 272, Fadgen v. 365 A.2d (1976), and which disregarded only we have when faced prior holdings clearly support. that we were unable to Educ., Ayala Philadelphia Pub. Bd. Pa. (1973). A.2d 888-89 I Accordingly, would affirm the order of the Commonwealth
Court, affirming order, the trial court’s but for different reasons.
Mr. Justice NIGRO and Madame join Justice NEWMAN concurring this opinion. dissenting
Argued Jan. 2001. Nov. 2001. Decided