ALLEN, APPELLEE, v. MCBRIDE ET AL., APPELLANTS.
Nos. 2004-0242 and 2004-0407
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted October 26, 2004—Decided December 30, 2004.
105 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-7112
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Ann Barylski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Jeffrey J. Whitacre, Erie County Public Defender, for appellee.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{11} This appeal requires us to consider a single narrow issue—whether
{12} The relevant facts concerning the certified question before us are undisputed. We focus only on the details necessary to place that issue in context.
{13} On March 22, 2002, plaintiff-appellee, Patsy J. Allen, filed a will-contest action in the Probate Division of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court
{14} On March 12, 2003, defendants-appellants Mary Baker, Shirley Lyttle, Shirley Stringfellow, and Dennis L. Lyttle answered and moved to dismiss, asserting that
{15} The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed the judgment of the probate court, holding that
{16} The issue certified for our review is straightforward: “whether
{17} Former
{19} Alakiotis reasoned that because a will-contest action is a cause of action created by statute and is unknown to the common law, and because there is a specific statute of limitations applicable to will-contest actions,
{110} The appellate court below, on the other hand, found that even though the rule of Alakiotis had governed this issue since that case was decided, recent decisions of this court have undermined the validity of Alakiotis and the cited appellate cases based on it. The court of appeals recognized that three decisions of this court involving
{111} In Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 162, 6 OBR 221, 451 N.E.2d 1196, syllabus, this court held, ”
{112} In Lewis v. Connor (1985), 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 21 OBR 266, 487 N.E.2d 285, syllabus, this court held that
{113} Both the trial court and the court of appeals in Lewis had found that the saving statute did not apply to such complaints, with the court of appeals accepting the arguments that the statute at issue created a substantive right of
{114} Most recently, in Osborne v. AK Steel/Armco Steel Co., 96 Ohio St.3d 368, 2002-Ohio-4846, 775 N.E.2d 483, syllabus, this court unanimously held that
{115} This court in Osborne extended the holding in Lewis, remarking, “Like the court in Lewis, ‘[w]e decline to hold that Osborne has entered the “twilight zone” where dismissal of her complaint without prejudice after expiration of the limitation period of [the relevant statute] has the same effect as a dismissal on the merits, barring any further action with respect to the same claim.‘” Osborne, at ¶ 5, quoting Lewis, 21 Ohio St.3d at 4.
{116} We fully agree with the court of appeals’ observation that ”Osborne eviscerated the rationale underpinning Alakiotis and the appellate decisions relying on it. Although
{117} When this case is compared to Osborne, the similarities are apparent. As the court of appeals stated:
{118} “[T]he ability to bring a will contest action is no more or less a right created by statute than the ability to bring an age discrimination action. While the statutes governing will contests have been referred to as providing a right that previously had not existed, so, too, have provisions of
{120} Consequently, we fully accept the court of appeals’ conclusion that this case at bottom is indistinguishable on its key points from this court‘s holding in Osborne. As the court of appeals declared, “In the end, the parallels between this case and Osborne are compelling. Both the action in Osborne and the one plaintiff brought here legitimately may be characterized as creatures of statutes that create rights unknown in the common law. Both causes of action have been characterized as remedies or remedial. While the statute of limitations in the will contest is short, the statute of limitations in Lewis was even shorter, but that did not dissuade the court from applying the savings statute.”
{121} The court of appeals recognized that when a will contest is dismissed, the administration of the will continues. This factor distinguishes a will contest from an age-discrimination action, which is terminated if the complaint is dismissed. However, this distinction is not significant enough to remove this case from the ambit of Osborne‘s analysis. As the court of appeals determined, “The issue before us [reduces] to whether application of the savings statute so adversely affects the administration of the estate that the legislature could not have intended to apply the savings statute to will contest actions. In the final analysis, the adverse effects are no greater than those inherent in the administration of an estate in the absence of the savings statute, and thus we conclude the savings statute applies to plaintiff‘s dismissal of her will contest action.”
{122} The court of appeals made several further observations to support its conclusion that we find apposite:
{123} “Without question, the statute of limitations for will contests[,] changed from four months to three months, is short. In the case of an expedited estate, however, the administration of the estate may be completed before the statute of limitations for a will contest has expired. A successful will contest, in such an instance, may require that, at least in part, the administration of the estate be undone, much as might occur if a refiled will contest complaint proved to be successful. Moreover, application of the savings statute to will contest actions does not slow the administration of the estate significantly more than does the right to appeal various rulings of the probate court during the administration of the estate. Indeed, because nothing requires that an estate be held open to determine if a dismissed will contest eventually will be refiled, the failure to refile before the administration of the estate is completed arguably may preclude further action and instead become part of the risk a will contestant takes in dismissing a will contest.
{126} “The savings statute ‘is neither a statute of limitations nor a tolling statute extending the statute of limitations. Instead, it is clear that
{1127} We fully agree with the cogent analysis of the court of appeals that led it to disagree with the other districts on this issue, and we further emphasize several points. First,
{1128} Second, there is no indication within
{29} Finally, adopting the approach advocated by defendants would require that we overrule Osborne and would also require that we either overrule or severely limit Reese and Lewis. Given all the reasons set forth above, we decline to repudiate those cases and instead reaffirm them. Plaintiff Allen‘s voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) should not place her in the
{30} Based on all of the foregoing, we hold that
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and O‘CONNOR, JJ., concur.
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O‘DONNELL, JJ., dissent.
O‘DONNELL, J., dissenting.
{131} The majority‘s narrow focus on the application of the saving statute to a will-contest action misses the broad impact that today‘s decision has on the administration of estates in Ohio.
{32} Without question, well-settled Ohio law is upended, and questions regarding application, retroactivity, and the effect of this decision on pending estates and current litigation are created with this opinion. Moreover, today‘s decision disturbs the doctrine of stare decisis et no quieta movere, i.e., to stand by things decided and not disturb settled points of law. Further, we recently adopted a test in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph one of the syllabus, regarding when established legal precedent or settled application of law should be disturbed—of course, referring to our own precedent:
{133} “A prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it.”
{134} Although this standard generally applies to the situation where this court decides to overrule its own precedent, the legal principles embodied therein apply equally to the situation confronted by today‘s decision. By changing the well-settled law in Ohio today, the majority violates every part of this test. Patently, none of the parts of the Galatis test are drawn into question as a basis for the court to rule in the fashion the majority sees fit to embrace today. Rather, by announcing its decision, the majority will vault Ohio probate into a frenzy where the potential for delayed estate administration will flourish.
{1135} At the time of the events in this case,
{137} Of equal significance here is
{138} There is longstanding authority in Ohio, going back five decades, holding that existing precedent and public policy considerations support the proposition that the saving statute does not apply to will-contest actions. See Alakiotis v. Lancione (1966), 12 Ohio Misc. 257, 41 O.O.2d 381, 232 N.E.2d 663 (the saving clause of
{139} The real issue confronted by the courts considering these matters is best exemplified by the general rule catalogued in 34 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1958) 505, Limitations of Actions, Section 19, as cited by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 162, 165, 6 OBR 221, 451 N.E.2d 1196 (Holmes, J., dissenting):
{40} “Where by statute a right of action is given which did not exist at common law, and the statute giving the right fixes the time within which the right may be enforced, the time so fixed becomes a limitation or condition on such right and will control.” (Emphasis added).
{41} Justice Holmes concluded in his dissent in Reese that when the legislature placed a two-year limitation on the commencement of an action in the statute creating the right and not in the general statute of limitations, it strongly denoted that such a limit on filing became part of the statutory right granted.
{142} In the instant case, however, the court of appeals further recognized a key distinction between claims against the state, workers’ compensation appeals, and age-discrimination cases seen in Reese, Lewis v. Connor (1985), 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 21 OBR 266, 487 N.E.2d 285, and Osborne v. AK Steel/Armco Steel Co., 96 Ohio St.3d 368, 2002-Ohio-4846, 775 N.E.2d 483, on the one hand, and a will contest on the other: dismissal of the former causes of action leaves nothing pending, while dismissal of a will-contest action does not stay the continuing administration of an estate. The appellate court opined, “A successful will contest * * * may require that, at least in part, the administration of the estate be undone * * *.”
{143} In its opinion, the Tenth District further highlighted a concern with respect to extending the trend of our most recent line of cases to will-contest actions because it noted that will contests are favored with an increasingly shorter statute of limitations, presumably to speed the administration of estates.5 However, applying the saving statute to a will-contest action would neither stay nor prevent the probate court from distributing the assets of an estate; therefore, it is entirely conceivable that an estate could be closed and a final account filed during the one-year period of the running of the saving statute. Such a circumstance could result in litigation to recover estate assets that had been distributed by administrators, executors, or probate courts or could lead to long delays in the ability to transfer real estate or bank accounts due to potential liability or future claims, all as forecasted by the appellate court and all contrary to the legislative intent expressed in
{144} Nor can any meaningful insight be gleaned from the fact that the legislature has never included a provision in either
{1145} I see no benefit in retreating from earlier judicial determinations made in will-contest cases merely because our court has done so in suits against the state, in workers’ compensation appeals, and in age-discrimination cases. While each of those respective statutes created causes of action not known at common5
{46} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s determination that the saving statute,
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
Luper Neidenthal & Logan and Jack D‘Aurora, for appellee.
William T. Bonham, for appellants.