Allen v. Industrial Commission

ALLEN, Plaintiff, Robert A. COMMISSION,

INDUSTRIAL Board of

Review, Inc., Ken, State Jer Insurance Fund, Injury

Fund and Defend- Second

ants.

No. 20026.

Supreme Court Utah. 14,

Nov.

ment bed rest and A myelo- medication. gram finally disc, revealed a herniated spent claimant ten days in traction in hospital in early January. He did not return to work.

The claimant also testified he had a histo- ry prior injuries, back including a fall a telephone pole from age fourteen him to wear a back brace months, for several injury back in 1977 lifting while bags sand Logan for the District, School and another fall while Bulson, Ogden, E. plaintiff. Michael for working for employer slipped when he Martinez, Lake City, Gilbert Salt for Sec- on slick ramp concrete and broke his Injury. ond coccyx. prior None of the resulted Silvester, Black, Fred R. James R. Salt prolonged absences work. City, Lake for State Ins. Fund. testimony The from other sources varied slightly given from the report by the claim- DURHAM, Justice: ant. The employer’s report injury de- Claimant Robert Allen seeks A. a review up scribes the as “picking freight from the Industrial Commission’s denial stocking shelves, lifting and it on boxes his for motion review of administrative stacking and specif- them from truck.” No judge denying compensation law order him ic employer’s event was mentioned in the for injury a back sustained at For work. report. The treating medical records of below, the reasons stated we reverse and physicians previ- described the claimant’s remand. injuries, any ous but omitted reference to a specific Hannan, incident the cooler. Dr. 23, 1982, On November the claim who examined the claimant on December ant, aged employed night was as man 31, 1982, wrote, “He does not remember ager of Kent’s The Foods. claimant testi any episode having distinct as precipitated following fied to the version of at a events problem, his current however.” And in a hearing before an law administrative Bryner Wright letter from Dr. to Dr. dated judge. working The claimant was January history the claimant’s crates, stacking confined cooler the store was related as follows: “About six weeks milk, containing gallons1 four to six however, ago, lifting he was material at from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While work, specific injury no recalls level, lifting one crate to chest he about but developed stress discomfort in his left suddenly sharp pain felt a in his lower groin ultimately area which extended into immediately back. He crate set down the big toe.” employee asked another to continue stocking the com judge shelves. claimant The administrative law found pleted remaining injury the one-half hour in his to his Novem- claimant’s back on doing night pain shift desk work. That ber was not “an acci- increased, by morning leg arising his left felt dent out or in the course later, days apparent numb. Four or Dr. employment.” five he saw It is ad- Wright problem. using epi- Ivan Ini judge, specific about his back ministrative law analysis, tial visits no doctor December were sode concluded there was “ac- through prescribed followed with the cident” because there was no identifiable treat- judicial gallons weigh liquid weighs 1. We take notice that tamers and crate. Six of milk milk liquid approximately about the approximately pounds same water or without the containers Thus, pounds p'er gallon. gallons of S'A four and crate. weigh pounds milk about con- without the event that caused because son we now undertake a fresh look at the lifting of milk was a routine and policy the crates background and historical of the expected job. commonplace exertion compensation workers’ statute an at- judge analogized The administrative law tempt provide a clear and workable rule the facts of this case to Farmer’s Grain application by for future the Commission. Mason, Cooperative v. 1980), gradually developed I. where a back held to “by The term accident” is not defined in where condition worsened without workers’ statutes. The intervention of external occurrence or frequently most authority referenced trauma. “by the definition of accident” is the case of Carling v. Industrial appeal

The sole issue on is whether the (1965), Utah 2d claimant, P.2d 202 where the who had suffered term was defined as follows: problems injured and was as the re- typical sult of an exertion usual and for his unanticipated, connotes an [An accident] job, injured “by arising accident out of unintended occurrence different from employment” or in the course of as re- normally expected what would to oc- Act, quired by Compensation the Workers’ cur the usual course of events.... U.C.A., 1953, (Supp.1986). 35-1-45 That necessarily restricted to [T]his Act, pertinent part, provides: single some happened incident which sud- Every employee injured denly particular ... who is ... at one time and does not by arising preclude possibility out of or in the that due to exer- tion, course of employment cause, ... shall be repetitive stress or other paid compensation for might loss sustained on climax be reached such manner injury.... account of the properly as to fall within the definition of just an accident as stated above. How- prerequisites Id. This statute creates two ever, such an occurrence must be distin- finding for a injury. of a guished gradually developing condi- First, “by must be accident.” occupational tions which are classified as Second, language “arising out of or in diseases.... requires the course of employment” 261-62, there be a causal connection (citing between the Id. at 399 P.2d at 203 Jones employment. and the Corp., See Pitts- 121 Packing v. Utah California Keller, 612, 616, burgh Testing Laboratory 640, (1952), 244 P.2d 642 1367, (Utah 1983). Purity Prior deci- Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 1, (1949)). sions this Court have often failed to 115 Utah 201 P.2d 961 distinguish analysis developed accident Some confusion has as to wheth- question from the “by requires proof discussion of causation er accident” of an un- result, elements.2 As a frequently Court and the usual event. This issue arises confusing Commission are faced with employee and when the suffers an internal fail- precedent. brought often inconsistent For this rea- ure3 about exertions in the many prior opinions (foot- support 2. We note that of our so stantive in the record.” Id. at 726 intermingled analy- omitted). the causation and accident 443, 789, 1, A.C. 72 L.J.K. 5 W.C.C. is lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial appropriate. The in Milling Court Tintic Commission, 72, 92 Utah observed: (1937), where a unanimous Court held that ¶. “Since the case Thorley, of Fenton the employee, who ruptured had suffered a nothing required more is than that the riding caterpillar aorta from tractor over plaintiff harm that the has sustained rough ground, an injury “by suffered acci- unexpected.... enough shall be It is unusual, dent” since the result was “an causes, that the themselves known and unforeseen, unexpected and event or occur- usual, produce should a result which on place. rence” and definite as to time and particular occasion designed is neither 92, And, Id. at 66 P.2d at in 134. Thomas expected. nor The test as to whether an Hospital D. Dee Memorial Ass’n. v. Indus- so, unexpected, is and if received 61, trial 104 Utah 138 P.2d single occasion, accident,’ on a ‘by occurs (1943), 233 sustained an Court award of is that the sufferer did not intend or benefits to a claimant who had suffered expect that would particu- on that experienced from heart disease and a heart lar occasion result from what he was shortly moving attack after 52 boxes doing.” weighing pounds 50 to 100 and 28 sacks of 26, 60 (quoting Utah at 206 P. at 282 clay Boh unusually heavy fire that was —work len, A Problem in Drafting greatly The and in ordinary Work excess of his Acts, Compensation out, men’s pointed dicta, 25 Harv.L.Rev. duties. The Court in 328, (1912) (emphasis added)). 340 English Accord that the common law would have ingly, the Court in compensation Tintic affirmed a find awarded if even the exer- ing employee, previous whose res ordinary usually required tions were and piratory problems aggravated by 67-71, were part job. en 104 Utah at 138 tering roasting flue, Quoting had suffered a com- P.2d at 235-39. from the Bohlen pensable article, accident. supra, the Court observed: workplace. ty Compensation Internal failure claims under Utah A evaluated Worker’s Law: attacks, hernias, this Court include "Living heart Corpse’?, Just Result or Just Another injuries. Note, generally, See Schmidt 1981 Utah L.Rev. 393.

Industrial Injury Compensabili- Commission and

20 required legislature than

“[NJothing more is that failing to amend has plaintiff acquiesced harm that has sustained that construction.” 115 Utah unexpected.... shall be The element of at P.2d 201 at 968. unexpectedness in the word inherent ‘ac- Purity Biscuit holding also if, sufficiently supplied cident’ is ... squarely concept embraced the an that or- though the act is usual and the condi- dinary or usual exertion that results an normal, tions it causes a harm unfore- See 115 unexpected injury compensable. is by him seen who suffers it.” 18-19, Utah at 201 P. at 969-70. After Utah at 138 104 P.2d at 237. carefully considering legislative pur- Purity Biscuit Co. v. years pose statute, later the workers’ Six prior precedent, public policy, 115 Utah 201 (1949), 961 explicitly rejected proof P.2d this Court Court that English adopted the rule for activity the definition of an unusual or exertion be a accident and awarded benefits to a “by element of the defi- accident” who unexpectedly injured 14-20, claimant his back nition. 115 Utah at 201 P.2d at stepping pedal while the brake of a 967-70. The Court “there concluded that delivery ordinary truck —a usual nothing activi- justi- statute which would See ty. 14-20, fy holding Utah 201 P.2d 967-70. that an compensable summarizing early After cases inter- Utah where overexertion is shown is not but “by preting accident” the only Court concluded ordinary where “since 1922 uniformly shown, provided that this court has it both cases unexpected that an held internal failure shown inju- exertion causes requirements [“by meets the ry.” at 970. P.2d accident”] holding Purity questioned rity 4. The support Biscuit was cited in Biscuit of rule internal Comm'n, Mellen Industrial 19 Utah 2d ordinary failure from or usual exertion is an (1967), opinion accident”); where the errone “injury by Olson v. State Indust. ously Purity stated that Biscuit “has never been Comm’n, 407, 416-17, Accident 222 Or. support cited this or other court J., (I960) (O’Connell, specially con- of that case." law 19 Utah 2d at 431 P.2d at (dissent curring) Purity quoted); Biscuit Coo- fact, by Purity had Biscuit been Vinatieri, per v. 73 S.D. 43 N.W.2d upon in relied decisions from the courts of nine (1950) (Purity 750-51 Biscuit cited exam- as an Corp. other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. v. divergent ple viewpoints defining Grantham, 179, 183-84, 204, 263 Ala. 82 So.2d accident). compensable (1955) (finding 208 unnecessary of unusual strain or exertion addition, Purity decision in Biscuit support conclusion that claimant by upon majority relied in three Utah cases. injury accident); by Bryant suffered Stave & Co., Packing v. See Jones Utah 121 California 147, White, 151-52, Heading Co. v. 227 Ark. 296 640, 612, 642; Carling P.2d 244 v. Industrial 436, (1956) (Purity S.W.2d 439-40 Biscuit cited Commission, 260, 202; 16 Utah 2d 399 P.2d stating majority position as causing that usual exertion Commission, Powers v. Industrial Utah 2d 19 accident); by may an internal failure be 140, Despite support 740. 427 P.2d for the Comm'n, Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Biscuit, Purity decision in Mellen Court in 111, 628, Cal.App.2d (1964) Cal.Rptr. 231 41 635 without concluded further discussion ”[t]he that upon Biscuit); (relying Purity causation rule of Purity certainly healthy decision Biscuit needs a Co., 308, Battaglia Spivey v. Fruit So.2d 138 314 reappraisement.” 19 Utah 2d at P.2d at 431 1962) (back (Fla. rupture herniation from of in- years Warehousing later in Two Redman statutory requirement tervertebral disc satisfies Comm'n, Corp. v. Industrial 22 Utah 2d 454 suddenness); Minneapolis Ry., of Roman v. St. (1969), again questioned P.2d the Court 283 367, 380, (1964) Minn. 268 129 N.W.2d 559 analysis Purity superficial decision Biscuit in a (calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered work “Purity unique enjoys that concluded: and compensation supported men’s case” that an being living corpse.” of doubtful distinction many disability); where award factors led to After Co., 22 Utah 2d 454 P.2d at 286. Murphy v. Anaconda 133 Mont. considering (1958) those cases from Utah and other (quoting favorably P.2d 1100 321 Biscuit, Stave, jurisdictions Purity that have relied on Purity Bryant reliance on Biscuit in 151-52, 439-40, agree “living cannot it 227 Ark. at holding we now was a 296 S.W.2d at Moreover, lay may corpse.” Purity that a usual even if Biscuit lead to a dormant, compensable injury it was v. In- (Utah resurrected Schmidt where the causal relation established); Co., Commission, ship Neylon 617 P.2d 695 v. Ford Motor dustrial (Pu- 325, 327-28, (1952) 1980). 10 N.J. 91 A.2d 570

21 Biscuit, Purity numerous cases Since cases denied because the that an internal be have held claimants’ ordinary precipitat work duties compensable if it from either a results injury. ed the Consequently, there were no or the course of usual unusual exertion events exertions were unusual or See, employment. Champion e.g., Home extraordinary qualify “by accident.” Commission, 703 Builders v. Industrial See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar (Utah 1985) (perforated P.2d ulcer 306 (Utah 674 ango, 1983) P.2d 104 (compensa lifting unusually heavy caused tion for knee denied where circum beam); Testing Pittsburg v. Laboratories precipitating stances the injury were com Keller, (unforeseen 657 P.2d at 1367 usual); monplace and Sabo’s Electronic unanticipated resulting heart attack from Sabo, (Utah 1982) Service v. 642 P.2d 722 structure); inspecting exertion while roof (back injury loading from of box twelve Monfredi, P.2d Corp. Kaiser v. 631 Steel compensable); into radios van not Farm (Utah 1981)(back 888 from injury resulting Mason, Cooperative er’s Grain v. 606 P.2d shoveling compensable despite coal usual (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant activity preexisting of presence ness resulting condition from conditions); Ostler, 617 Painter Motor v. delivery 100-pound compensa- sacks not (Utah 1980)(back injury resulting P.2d 975 activity ble since was not unusual or moving heavy installing from boxes and unexpected); Church Christ Jesus equipment); electrical v. Schmidt Industri Latter-Day v. Saints Industrial Commis Commission, (Utah 1980) al 617 P.2d 693 (Utah sion, 1979) (back 590 P.2d (back injury resulting carrying from steel janitor standing up suffered not plates prior history compensable despite compensable without evidence that activi ordinary activity); back disorders and unusual); ties were Redman Warehousing Corp. Draper, United Steel v. States Corp. v. Industrial (Utah 1980) (heart P.2d 508 attack result (1969) (back injury 2d ing rushing from exertion while to drown sitting driving precipitated by a mov accident); Martin, ing IGA Food Fair v. ing proof van without (Utah 1978) (heart re P.2d 828 attack event). an unusual These will not cases sulting heavy lifting); from Nuzum Roo collectively to as referred the Redman line Corp., Mining sendahl Construction & of cases. 1977) (truck driver repeatedly suffered heart attack after We are convinced now Red- long climbing steps); Residential & Com line of cases has misconstrued the man mercial Construction Co. logical “by acci historical and definition of (Utah 1974) line of cases relied on dent.” Redman (back injury resulting moving lum abridged following version the defi ber); Commission, Powers v. Industrial Carling nition of an accident found in v. (1967) (heart 19 Utah 2d 427 P.2d 740 con Industrial Commission: “[Accident] period occurring distress over of several unanticipated, an unintended occur 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. § II. unworkability The second element of a of the usual-unusual requirement requires proof of a causal connec-

event is further evidenced worker’s comparing seemingly deci- tion between the and the irreconcilable employment Pittsburg Testing sions duties. Compare this Court. Kaiser Keller, 1367, 1370 Monfredi, (back inju- Laboratory v. 657 P.2d Steel v. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1983). compensation In ry previous problems to miner with workers’

23 failures, key involving Computer Corp. cases internal 104, v. 674 Tarango, P.2d (Utah 1983); usually issue is of causation. 106-07 one Ordinari- Sabo ’sElectronic Ser Sabo, ly, proved by production 722, (Utah vice v. 642 causation is P.2d 726 n. 12 1982); interpretation of medical ei- evidence Church Jesus Christ Latter- of Day v. together Commission, ther alone or with other Saints evidence. Industrial 328, (Utah 1979); Keller, 1367, 1370; 590 P.2d 329 P.2d at See 657 IGA Food Martin, 828, Commission, Fair v. 584 P.2d 829 617 Schmidt v. Industrial 1978); 693, (Utah 1980). Nuzum v. Roosendahl P.2d 695 Because Construc Mining Corp., 1144, tion & 565 P.2d diagnosis 1146 difficulties internal failures (Utah 1977); Jones v. preex- Packing possibility and because of the that a California 612, Corp., (1952); 121 Utah 244 P.2d 640 isting condition have contributed to Commission, v. Robertson 109 injury, special have causation rules 25, (1945); Utah Thomas D. developed been for internal cases. failure Dee Hospital Memorial v. Ass’n Industri 7-269; 38.81, at supra, See Pu- Commission, 61, al 104 138 P.2d at rity v. Biscuit Co. Industrial Commis- 233; Schmidt, see 617 P.2d at 697-99 20-21, sion, 1, 115 Utah 201 970-71 P.2d (Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer’s Grain (Wolfe, J., concurring specially). Mason, Cooperative v. 606 P.2d 238- initially responded This Court (Utah 1980); 39 Mellen v. Industrial Com problem of causation internal failure mission, 373, 374, 19 Utah 2d 431 P.2d by suggesting cases that the Commission (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at convincing use a clear and evidence stan- J., (Latimer, 201 P.2d at 975 dissenting). dard when an internal failure was caused argue Defendants that rule that workplace.5 an exertion See compensation awards based usual exer Hospital Thomas D. Dee Ass’n. Memorial open floodgates payment tion will for v. Industrial 104 Utah injuries for benefits all internal that (1943). The clear and coincidentally They occur at work. claim convincing rejected, standard evidence was requirement that the unusual exertion however, in Lipman Industrial Com- necessary prevent employer to mission, (Utah 1979), 592 P.2d general becoming They argue insurer. with the that such rationale a standard rule, the unusual without em compensation would make workers’ bene- opportunities ployment persons for with a nearly impossible fits to recover where the history physical disability or indication of deceased from a condi- preexisting suffered handicap will be reduced. Accordingly, prove tion. the standard to Despite precedent supporting the “un- preponderance causal connection rule, urges usual exertion” us claimant evidence. Id. separate authority to line follow The second to method has been used awards that oc- ensure causal connection internal failure ordinary workplace usual cur require proof cases is to that an unusual activity. typically These cases award com- precipitated injury. activity event or pensation engaged where the claimant Presumably, was used workplace activity in a and where there is prevent compensating person predisposed adequate evidence of medical causation. preexisting to internal failure where the See, e.g., Corp. Monfredi, Kaiser Steel condition contributed more to the (Utah 1981) (award for com- activity. than his usual work The follow- pensation affirmed for a coal miner’s back ing incident); internal injury despite failure cases illustrate that evi- absence of unusual activity dence of an unusual event or v. Industrial Schmidt (compensation awarded for necessary prove Billings P.2d at 695 causation. Nebraska, Omaha, N.W.2d proof 211 Neb. an enhanced standard of employee (1982). still used where the suffers from City condition. See Mann v. ago ordinary recognized long as 1949 when Jus- arising from duties medical causal connection that a “Pandora’s upon proof of tice Wolfe wrote box inju- workplace may opened by exertions and the difficulties ... the re- between unusual, ry); and Commercial Con- finements between usual and ex- Residential overexertion, ordinary v. Industrial ex- struction Co. ertion and 1974) (carpenter’s back traordinary 529 P.2d exertion measured the indi- bending, twisting in lifting, injury from vidual involved or the industrial func- compensable); ordinary course of work the performed by him or Purity tion both.” Commission, 19 23, Powers v. Industrial Biscuit, 115 Utah at 201 P.2d at 972 (1967) 2d 427 P.2d J., Utah (Wolfe, concurring specially). The con- (awarding compensation to fireman for ex- tents of the Pandora’s box feared Jus- employ- in normal course of ertions plethora in tice Wolfe are now evident ex- rejecting the unusual ment—the Court struggling of our cases with a definition exertion); ordinary test in favor of ertion accident based Commission, 17 Utah Baker v. Industrial activity. usualness or ordinariness of an (1965) (back 2d Professor Larson has also criticized the filing papers in lower drawer of cabi- distinction because the ordi- usual-unusual Purity compensable); net Biscuit Co. activity fails to nariness of the consider 1, 201 115 Utah occupations routinely require that some (1949). Although the usual exer- P.2d 961 capable causing injury. usual exertion questioned in Mellen v. In- tion rule was Likewise, occupations, other such as desk- Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375- dustrial work, require physical so little effort that failed to 431 P.2d at that decision may an “unusual exertion” be insufficient explicitly the usual exertion line of overrule prove resulting arose Moreover, cases. Residential and Com- Larson, employment. supra, out of the Co., Schmidt, and mercial Construction 38.81, at 7-270.6 § have awarded Kaiser Steel present Because we find the use of activity workplace for usual after the Mel- unhelpful distinction the usual-unusual Clearly, the usual exertion len decision. inconsistent, prior precedent take our we simply in rule is not an aberration opportunity this to examine an alternative law. analysis better meet causation chronological sequence, When read compensa objectives of the workers’ opinions demonstrate an inconsistent our key laws. We are mindful that the tion approach determining and confused determining question in causation wheth arose out of or in the when an accident exertion, er, given body and this employment. Much of this con- course of injury. exertion fact contributed prob- fusion traced to fundamental can be 7-271; Biscuit, 38.82, Purity at Id. § stemming usual- lems from the use of the J., (Wolfe, at 972 Utah at proving distinction as a means of unusual concurring specially). the unusual causation. Larson criticizes “arising “clumsy language out requirement by itself as a employment” found in ensure the course of his ill-fitting device with which to U.C.A., 1953, (Supp.1986), 35-1-45 supra, 38.- causal connection.” § compen ensure that determining apparently intended to problems at 7-270. The there is a only awarded where usual or unusual were sation what activities were job great usually required by that it is so consistent with this 6. Larson’s observation is strongest rejecting he will exer- would break the man even Court’s rationale for unusual Biscuit, Purity if it is more than tion 115 Utah not be able to recover. But 201 P.2d at 968: usual exertion which causes light employee how can recover no matter is the ever test no one will [I]f [overexertion] injury. is which causes the work know what this court will consider sufficient Id. overexertion. Also under that test if the work

25 sufficient causal connection between the caused [injury].”7 Larson, supra, working and the disability 38.83(a), conditions. The at 7-276 to -277. § necessary makes it causation Legal (a) inju Cause—Whether injuries distinguish those which coin- ry arose out or in the course preexist- employ occur

cidentally at work because a ment ing in is difficult to symptoms condition results determine which where the brings during employee appear any workplace work hours en- person without a (b) al workplace, hancement from the element risk preexisting such as a occur injuries those which because some person condition. Just because suffers a by condition exertion the em- preexisting condition, he or she is not dis ployment risk injury increases the which qualified obtaining from compensation. faces in normally everyday worker Our cases make aggrava clear that “the Bryant Co., life. See v. Masters Machine tion or lighting up of pre-existing disease (Me.1982). 444 Only A.2d 337 by an industrial compensa- ” latter type injury compensable under ble— Powers v. Industrial Commis U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-45. There is no fixed § sion, 140, 143-44, 2d formula which the causation issue (1967)(footnote omitted). To meet the resolved, and the issue must be deter- legal requirement, causation a claimant mined each facts of case. with preexisting condition must show employment contributed some Professor suggested Larson has thing substantial to increase the risk he two-part causation test which is consistent already in everyday faced life because of purpose compen with the of our workers’ his condition. This additional element of determining in helpful sation laws cau in workplace usually risk supplied by adopt sation. We therefore that test. Lar greater an exertion than that son undertaken suggests can normal, everyday life. This extra exertion considering best be identified first preexisting serves to legal offset the cause of the its condition injury and then medi Larson, 38.83(a), employee likely inju as a cause supra, cal cause. at § ry, test, thereby eliminating legal impair 7-273. “Under claims for the law must resulting personal define kind ments from a rather what of exertion satisfies the risk ‘arising supra, test of than exertions at employment’ out of ... work. 38.83(b), say the doctors must 7-278. whether the at Larson summarized [then] (having legally legal exertion held suffi how the been cause rule would work support compensation) cient practice fact as follows: jurisdictions injury resulting working 7. Cases from other have ac- sation for from at nor- cepted suggested by gait the dual-causation standard mal since there was no work-related en- Distribs., Larson include: Foods risk); Market Inc. v. personal City hancement of Omaha, Mann v. Levenson, (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) 383 So.2d 726 (1982) 211 Neb. 319 N.W.2d 454 (claimant preexisting spinal with disease denied (policeman history with of heart disease award- compensation where could have been compensation ed for heart attack at home triggered at time normal movement physician where claimant’s testified that attack greater typical at work not than than, police was caused stress of work rather exertion); nonemployment Guidry v. Sline In- factors); personal risk Sellens v. Allen Prods. Painters, Inc., (La.1982) dus. 418 So.2d 626 Co., (1980) 206 Neb. N.W.2d (claimant granted compensation where (claimant preexisting problems with heart de- stress, exertion, greater resulted from and strain compensation nied attack for heart suffered life); everyday nonemployment than that unloading 28-pound while cases from truck Co., (Me. Bryant Masters v. Mach. 444 A.2d nonworking lifestyle despite sedentary trailer 1982) (claimant preexisting with condition using objective average standard of worker resulting awarded life); nonemployment Couture Mammoth from fall his stool at work because of Groceries, Inc., N.H. 355 A.2d falling employees increased risk of where (1976) (claimant prob- preexisting with no heart work); moved him around v. Herbert Barrett proof lifting lems awarded benefits Inc., (claimant Eng’g, (Me.1977) 371 A.2d 633 attack). medically beef fatal caused the heart compen- back condition denied Co., Gypsum National personal If causal contri- 348 So.2d there some [preexisting (Ala.Civ.App.1977) a con- 499 (employment in form of risk bution the “ danger must dition], employment materially the contribution ‘a or in risk great- of an must take the form exertion excess to people of that not so em- nonemployment life.... Quoting ployed exposed....’” er than that of are Howard, City Tuscaloosa v. Ala.App. 55 personal is causal If there no contribu- 701, 705-06, (1975)). 318 So.2d tion, is, 732 prior no that if there is weakness Distributors, But see Foods Inc. v. Market disease, any or exertion connected with Levenson, (Fla.Dist.Ct. employment causally 383 So.2d and connected the App.1980) (subjective employ- as a matter of medical test: “the [injury] with the adequate satisfy greater the ment an legal is to test must involve exertion than fact normally performed by employee causation. the Thus, non-employment life”). his Thus, where the claimant suffers from Id. precipitating the exertion com- must be to preexisting a condition which contributes pared usual and with the wear and tear injury, extraordinary an ex- the unusual life, nonemployment exertions of not the legal prove to ertion causation. nonemployment particular life of the work- condition, there Where is no er. ordinary usual or exertion sufficient.8 objective We an of com- believe standard accept suggestion Larson’s We also parison provide a more consistent and will comparison the between usual and predictable standard for the Commission according defined to an unusual exertion be evaluating and this Court to follow. objective standard. “Note the com typical nonemployment activity, employee’s the focus with this parison is not usual employment typical nonemployment is on activities but the what with today’s nonemployment generally expected people are exertions normal life of society, supra, particular this person.” this or other not what claimant 38.83(b), (emphasis doing. in original). Typical accustomed to activities 7-279 § also Johns-Manville Products v. In expected and of men and women See exertions dustrial part century, Ill.2d in the of the for latter 20th taking (1979) example, garbage cans Ill.Dec. 399 N.E.2d include full street, lifting baggage (compensation carrying where the the to the and denied risk of greater travel, changing no a flat an auto- employment activity “is than tire on mobile, height, lifting have a small child chest exposed that to which he would been buildings. By Strickland employed”); climbing he not and the stairs in had been so parison highlights employee’s usual exer- 8. Larson the difference between this between exertion, precipitating unusual-usual exertion test today adopt the rule we and the there tions following examples of ex- suggested with the compensation. would be Under the area: treme cases the heart attack depend rule result would on whether Suppose job frequent lifting of personal X’s involves causal element there was 200-pound bags, 200-pound and one such lift previously If weakened heart. form of medically produces a attack. Under the heart not, compensation would be award- there was ed, no old unusual-exertion rule there would be compensation, employment contributed some- since the previous regardless of heart personal nothing thing employee's life and suggested there condition. Under the rule collapse. [a of the If there was the cause presence compensation, would be even heart], compensation previously weakened disease, history people of a because of heart spite medical causal would be denied generally 200-pound weights do as not lift contribution, legally personal because life, part nonemployment and therefore substantial, while the contribution was causal episode be ascribed to the ordi- cannot employment nothing usual wear added nary wear tear of life. certainly includes lift- of life—which tear lifting. Sup- Suppose job involves no Y’s bags ing weighing pounds objects such weight job, pose 20-pound he lifts a clubs, golf pails, step ladders. minnow testimony suppose is medical there 38.83, (footnote Larson, supra, at 7-280-81 this lift heart attack. Under the caused his omitted). test, exclusively concerned with com- old standard, using objective the ease law Builders typical eventually 1985). will define a standard for “nonemployment activity” way in much the We have previously stated that the developed case law has the standard of key element of whether an occurred care for the man in law. reasonable tort “by accident” is whether the injury was unexpected. reviewing record, After

2. Medical Cause—The second we no part find re substantial evidence that Larson’s dual-causation test unexpected. quires prove It disability that the claimant clear from the testimony uncontradicted medically result of of the the an exertion or that he experienced claimant an unexpected injury that occurred a work-related unanticipated and injury his to back as activity. of he purpose The the medical cause lifted of cramped a crate milk in the area of medically test is to that there ensure is a the Although cooler. the claimant had in link the demonstrable causal between jured back prior jobs, his on he had not unexpected work-related exertions and the complained pain of or job limitations at his injuries that resulted from those strains. with Kent’s Foods. is no There evidence pre The medical causal will which indicates injury predict that this was employer vent an becoming general able or it developed gradually as with employees discourage insurer of his occupational an progressive disease or fraudulent claims. employer’s report disorder. While the of being primarily With the issue one of the injury and medical do records not cor causation, importance the of the ... that a roborate sudden and identifiable in panel medical It becomes manifest. cooler, jury reports occurred in the the are through expertise pan- the of the medical unhelpful in determining inju the whether el that the Commission should able to be ry unexpected. make the determination of whether the appears It the administrative law injury by causally sustained claimant is judge applied the event or “unusual trau- connected or claim- contributed to the in defining ma” rule an accident. We have employment. ant’s rejected that test in a test lieu of based on Schmidt, J., (Wilkins, 617 P.2d at 697 con- Moreover, unexpectedness. the adminis- test, curring). Under the medical cause the judge’s emphasis prior inju- trative law evidence, claimant must opinion, show ries determinative whether an stress, strain, or otherwise exer- or previously accident occurred. We have required by tion or her led occupation to aggravation “lighting up” the or held that resulting injury In the disability. by an of a condition internal event the cannot claimant show a medical failure ais accident. Powers connection, compensation causal should be Commission, 19 Utah 2d denied.9 (1967). We conclude that the decision of the Commis- therefore III. “by sion that claimant’s was not apply We undertake to now evidence, accident” was not based on foregoing analysis the case us. before therefore, is, decision erroneous. reviewing findings of fact of the Indus case, trial key we determine whether The issue in like cases, there is support substantial evidence to most internal failure whether the findings. Champion Commission’s Home “arose out of or in course of were defeated be- Evidence of the where claims ordinariness or usualness inadequate proof employee’s may causation. be cause of of medical exertions relevant 38.83(i), supra, at 7-319 to -321. medical See conclusion causal connection. Painters, Inc., Compare Guidry symptoms Where the v. Sline Indus. results from latent (La.1982) (heart disease, triggered proof with an attack illness such heart 418 So.2d by stress, exertion, greater especially and strain than sed- medical causation difficult. compensable). average many entary worker examples Larson's treatise cites cases life pre- Since the claimant had whether the employment.” aggravated work incident legal to meet the cau- problems, vious back preexisting condition such as would war- he requirement must show that mov- sation compensation.1 However, rant an award of piles dairy prod- ing lifting several join I do not adopting the Court in thirty fifty pounds weighing ucts “unexpected applied result” standard to be of the cooler exceeded the confined area in determining the compensa- existence of a average person typically exertion that the accident. ble nonemployment life. The ev- undertakes I do not believe that this Court has “mis presented by the claimant was insuf- idence construed logical” the historical and defini to make a determination re- ficient for us It is garding legal “by causation. unclear from tion of accident” in the bulk of its many the record how crates were moved concerning recent cases the issue at bar. claimant, the distance the crates were majority’s The reliance Purity Bis moved, crates, precise weight cuit Co. v. Industrial Commission2 is lifting and the size of area which the misplaced. holding therein is without moving place. Because took the claim- precedential value because it has been sim ant did not have the benefit of the fore- ply ignored.3 only The case which this going opinion, we remand for further fact- Purity Court followed Biscuit is Schmidt finding on this issue. Commission,4 support v. Industrial which Moreover, the record is insufficient to similarly precedential without value be show medical causation. It is unclear from ignored beginning cause it has also been reports the medical whether the doctors Ostler;5 very Painter Motor Co. v. the specific were aware of the incident in the next accident case handed down. In that Further, cooler. the case was not sub- case, the Court cited and relied Car panel mitted to a medical for its evaluation. ling again v. Industrial Commission6 and sufficient Without evidence medical cau- defined unanticipated, “accident” as an sation, we are unable to determine whether unintended occurrence different from what medically there is a demonstrable causal normally expected would be to occur in the link the lift in the cooler between and the view, my usual In course of events. Puri injury to the claimant’s back. We there- emerge ty Biscuit and as Schmidt aberra fore remand to the Industrial Commission post-war tions in our case law. findings for additional evidence on the question of medical causation. majority opinion The holds that hence- The decision of the Commission is vacat- injury by forth an accident “is an unex- ed and remanded. pected may or unintended occurrence that either the cause the result of be or an ZIMMERMAN, JJ., HOWE and concur. However, injury.” (Emphasis original.) HALL, (concurring Chief Justice: legislature, prerogative the whose it is to dissenting). policy, wording establish has chosen precludes interpretation. such an The rea- remanding I concur in this case to the purpose determining soning Commission for the of Justice Latimer’s dissent in Puri- son, Comm’n, (Utah 1980); 1. Powers v. 606 P.2d 237 Church Jesus Industrial 19 Utah 2d 143-44, Comm’n, (1967). Latter-Day Christ Saints v. Industrial 427 P.2d (Utah 1979); Warehousing 590 P.2d Redman (1949). 2. 115 Utah 201 P.2d 961 Comm’n, Corp. v. Utah 2d Comm’n, (1969); Carling P.2d 283 v. Industrial DeFriez, Mining Emery Corp. 694 P.2d 606 (1965). 16 Utah 2d 399 P.2d 202 (Utah 1984); Comm’n, Giles v. Industrial (Utah 1984); Jacobs, Frito-Lay, P.2d 743 Inc. v. (Utah 1980). 4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1983); Corp. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1980). 5. 617 P.2d 975 Sabo, Sabo’s Elec. Serv. v. 642 P.2d 722 1982); Monfredi, Kaiser Steel v. (1965). 6. 16 Utah 2d (Utah 1981); Cooperative Grain v. Ma- Farmer’s shortcomings legal the ty impose Biscuit illustrates and medical causation require- U.C.A., 1953, majority’s interpretation. ments. See the The word 35-1-45. § “accident,” isolation, may when viewed in Curiously, the “legal cau- unexpected oc- used to denote both an sation” has two different meanings, de- as as produces injury currence which well pending upon physical the condition of the unexpected injury. word “injury,” worker at the time he is injured. A worker hand, result on the other denotes a having preexisting no medical condition legislature only the a cause. Had the used handicap only prove need that the accident (U.C.A., “injury” word in section 35-1-45 was caused a “usual or ordinary exer- 4B, ed., (Repl. 35-1-45 Vol. congenitally tion.” But for handicapped persons Supp.1986)), persons then that statute would cover and for who have suffered (which industrial regardless pre- all results of the cause. Had sumably have left worker legislature only with some used the word “acci- physical deterioration), weakness or legal dent,” agree then I majori- would with the causation has meaning. a different Such holding today legislature in- ty’s that the worker receive if only cause tended cover both the “employment contribution” to inter- fact, however, legislature In result. “greater nal breakdown than “injury” has used both words and “acci- nonemployment According life.”. dent.” It follows word “accident” majority, such prove a worker must now interpreted focusing upon must be that his internal breakdown was caused short, cause and not the result. “an extraordinary unusual or exertion” majority’s interpretation writes the word requisite legal in order to establish the “injury” out of the statute. Such a deci- causation, though even majority opin- my sion is unwarranted in view. length ion itself the criticizes “usual-un- legislature recently The amended section usual distinction as a of proving means 35-1-45,7 to intact but chose leave the stan the majority reject causation.” How can payment which the of compen dard limits persons having that standard preex- for no injured “by arising sation to those condition, isting yet embrace that standard out of or in the course of ... employ persons conditions, for preexisting with 8 Moreover, singular ment.” the “injury baffling. accident” standard has not or been altered Furthermore, the difference the between inception amended since its 1917.9 The extraordinary “unusual or exertion” which legislature being thus satisfied with the preexisting a worker with a condition must interpretation Court’s of the term “acci demonstrate and the “usual exertion” long beginning dent” line of cases person with no condi- Commission,10 Carling with v. Industrial tion must demonstrate is far from clear. I decline to a new to embark effort judged latter The standard to be with redefine that term. “ respect nonemployment ‘normal ” other The person.’ life of or STEWART, (dissenting). Justice: emphasizes that “precipitating Court majority I The dissent. defines stat- compared must with the usual utory term “accident” to mean “unex- and tear and wear exertions nonem- result,” pected regardless life, of whether it nonemployment ployment not the life produced by a or particular usual an unusual event. worker.” What the term “arising majority term tear The also defines the “usual wear and and exertions of non- or in to employment” employment” out of the course of means not defined 18, 1917, 52a, § 7. of Jan. ch. 9. Act of March ch. § Act 1984 Utah Laws 610. Laws 322-23. U.C.A., 1953, 4B, (Repl.Vol. 35-1-45 (1965). P.2d 10. 16 Utah 2d ed., Supp.1986). law, examples set out do different workmen’s The few majority. at, really a for tort law concept aimed other which is substitute explain the little to short, previ- handicapped means some- that the term remedies. suggest to than life-sustaining injured by ac- simple, ously injured persons who are thing more than simply industrial accident are discrimi- tivities. having majori- against by nated to meet persons why wholly fail to understand I rigorous legal requirement. ty’s cause should be preexisting condition have a who position, in- disadvantaged placed understand how an I am also unable to position, that the near-remediless deed the judge, the Industrial administrative law The imposes upon them. opinion majority appellate sup- court is or an Injury Fund is the Second purpose of “typical posed to determine what nonem- for workers who provide compensation today’s are “in socie- ployment activities” conditions preexisting medical have purpose for the ty,” they now must do greater risk of when run a therefore determining legal causation for workers hazards of expose themselves to the they preexisting medical conditions. Does with should en- place. But the law the work typical sixty-five-year-old that mean what rather than courage persons such to work twenty-one-year-old does typical does or a the work encouraging them to abandon nonemployment activi- during his or her support. kind of unearned force for some professional football ties? Is it what in his leisure time or what a player does repeatedly stated that the This has Court sedentary Is it what a ballet dancer does? designed to en Fund was Injury Second in his or her off-hours or what worker does employers persons to hire courage ranger forest does? by spreading the preexisting conditions industry to assure such throughout risk meaningful defining a stan- Instead of for be cared persons that their will dard, majority provides examples which extraordinary imposing liabilities without unarticulated supposedly illustrate hire them. Inter employers who taking principle. examples “include Corp. Capitana, Smelting mountain street, lifting and garbage full cans to the 1980); (Utah McPhie travel, baggage changing a carrying Corp., 551 States Steel United automobile, lifting a small flat tire on an 1976). ought Society certainly climbing height, chest child to encourage peo policies which favor those examples, buildings.” These few stairs work, that deter policies rather than ple to arguable event I find to be gainful employ offering from employers only people some they since reflect what higher risk of have a ment to those who time, do not substitute may do from time to person injury. There is little work-related seriously I wonder legal standard. for a policy that tends from a al or social benefit changing a flat tire on an automo- whether working discourage persons from be to society, activity today’s typical is a bile prior injuries or disabilities. cause of luggage the I not know how much and do lifts or how far he or “typical” individual Further, fundamentally unfair and it is majori- point is that the carries it. The purposes she flatly the basic inconsistent with standard at ty has not set forth a workable laws to compensation of the workmen’s fact, doubt that such In I have serious all. for impose higher standards “typical nonem- construct as condi- an artificial medical on those with fair produce more gen- ployment activities” will law without. Tort tions than on those past our cases. decisions than in a and rational A defendant erally not do so. does “typical” majority simply assumes a The to take the is negligence action establishing a him; purpose individual for finds whatev- defendant victim as the Unfortunately, disabili- standard. rational the victim er unusual vulnerabilities “average” people, not to happen to real principle ties disregarded. That are have recognized always has been, and the law be, people, has not and until now should short, I not think as much. do newly will

majority’s established standard HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, Richard E. produce decisions one more consistent whit produced than rational those INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the past.1 UTAH, STATE OF Richard E. Hollo majority The also holds that an injured way Trucking [Employer], and the person prove disability must that [Insurance State Fund Insurance carri “medically inju- the result of an exertion or Employer], for er Defendants. ry that occurred work-related ac- No. 20621. tivity.” degree hope think With that I unwarranted, majority Supreme states Court Utah. pre- causal medical will “[t]he Nov. employer becoming general vent an employees discourage insurer of his Virginius Dabney, City, Salt Lake for plaintiff. fraudulent claims.” I fearful am that that

hope seriously misplaced. Wilkinson, L. Atty. Gen., David James R. Black, Mary Rudolph, A. City, Salt Lake

Certainly largely Professor for defendants. source Court’s new standards and analysis, highly acclaimed field STEWART, Justice:

law, but there is much to be said case-by-case approach in out hammering Plaintiff E. Holloway Richard is a self- doctrine, legal even if it does on occasion employed truck driver. On July produce I readily inconsistencies. concede driving hours, after for about six he present law to be needs rationalized stopped stop. at a rest He claims that he and that some cases should be overruled slipped walking spill while across an oil on they way hopelessly because are slip inconsistent restroom and that the cases, jerk regain him to caused to his balance. Af- other but I do not believe returning restroom, Holloway ter from the law needs be revolutionized in such a inspect bent over to one of his truck tires. manner as to policies defeat those humane experienced crouching, While he an imme- intended to allow for the of work- sharp pain diate in his back which made ers work place who come to the in an him ground, landing fall on his arms impaired condition. wife, driver, jaw. His also a truck join I also Chief Justice’s dissent. trip. drove for the Two days rest Holloway

after the incident a chi- consulted ropractor Georgia. He consulted anoth- chiropractor returning er to Salt Lake City. slip spill on the oil was not chiropractors reports mentioned the Holloway, who examined in the First Re- port Injury, report or in the claimant’s of how the occurred. denied

The Commission review judge’s administrative law order. judge plaintiff’s injury ruled that the result of an “accident” as term view, my goes body particu- 1. In one the decisions of this are in our law is not Court event, generally only larly unexpected. glaring reconcilable I doubt that the few unwavering exceptions approach prior produce consist- most of them new will years. ency That there are more over the inconsistencies the further notes See also Church Jesus Christ impossible Comm’n, segregate ses that it Latter-Day them and Saints v. Industrial of P.2d 328, (Utah 1979); determine the basis for the Court’s decision. 329-30 Pintar v. Industri- example, opinion Comm’n, (1963). For in Sabo’s Elec. Serv. v. al 14 Utah 2d 382 P.2d 414 Sabo, (Utah 1982), the acci- opinion sepa- mixes example For an of an which does following dent and causation elements in the analysis, rate the accident and causation see language: appears "It to be mere coincidence Latter-Day Church Jesus Christ Saints v. that defendant's ... occurred at work. Comm’n, Industrial 590 P.2d 330-31 showing Defendant bears the burden of other- J., 1979) (Wilkins, dissenting). relationship wise. Proof of the causal of duties category An failure” to a "internal refers employment unexpected injury simply of lacking.... general organ that arise from or struc- Commission’s [T]he conclusion brought tural failure about an exertion in the that an accident occurred is without sub- clear, however, workplace. It is that our After Tintic Milling, the tempo- Court “by rarily cases have defined rejected accident” to include the “unexpected result” def- resulting internal failures inition of from both usual Fenton Thorley in internal ground and unusual exertions. failure cases on See Schmidt v. that the defini- Commission, “by tion of Industrial 617 P.2d accident” an unusual (Utah 1980). occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. Commission, 66 Utah This Court first discussed “by the term (1925), P. 1103 compensa- Court denied Milling accident” Tintic Co. v. Industri- tion to a worker who unexpectedly suf- al 60 Utah '206 P. 278 fered a heart attack while manually unload- (1922), where an accident was said to be ing a railroad car of coal on ground “something out of the ordinary, unex- that no overexertion occurred pected, definitely located as to time work. 66 Utah at 240 P. at 1104. place.” 60 Utah at 206 P. at 281. That overruled, decision was apparently distinguish This definition was used to inju- however, when the Court embraced the ries gradually which occurred and were “unexpected result” rule and awarded com- statutory provisions covered under for oc- pensation employee to an who suffered a cupational disease. Id. The Court Tin- heart attack after overexertions while rou- tic Milling acknowledged also that where tinely cleaning the weirs city to a reservoir. the claimant suffers an internal failure the Hammond v. Industrial “unexpected result” rule seminal (1934) (Mof- English Thorley, case Fenton v.

Notes

[1903] fat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol-

notes compensable despite preexisting months rence what would normal different from conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commis ly expected occur in the usual be to sion, (1965) 2d P.2d 613 Utah 16 Utah at course events.” of (back resulting filing injury papers from added; (emphasis at 203 footnotes compensable). lower drawer omitted). Redman, highlighted interpreted require to an un phrase Despite strong precedential support there an acci event before can be usual applying rule “unexpected result” interpretation This misconstrues cases, dent. of Purity Biscuit to internal failure and is inconsistent Carling decision itself separate opposing authority line of has accident” English “by of with the definition developed requires or overexertion key since by this Court 1922. an event oc- used prove unusual to an of accident under Car- “by curred an Typically, accident.” these decisions, decision, prior despite as held to be a ling as well unanticipated, being by shoveling was that occurrence be caused coal in the usual unplanned highlight- unintended. The employment), course of with Farmer’s phrase emphasized ed that where either the Mason, Cooperative Grain 606 P.2d 237 the result of an (no cause previous accident where worker with exertion was different from what would problems sustained back while occur, normally expected be to the occur- delivering 100-pound bags whey); com- unforeseen, unplanned, rence was unin- pare Baker v. Industrial “by tended and therefore accident.” (compensable Utah 2d 405 P.2d 613 injury resulting accident for back fil- from Policy considerations also militate in fa- drawer) ing paper in Billings lower rejecting phrase vor notion Computer Corp. Tarango, “by requires accident” an unusual event. (no accident where worker sustained kn'ee nothing in There is the term “accident” injury resulting bending pick up to suggests only that which is un- parts). small usual accidental. See Robertson v. In- dustrial We believe that the Court’s real (Wade, J., concurring; 163 P.2d at concern in the Redman line of cases was Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does presence proof or absence of causa simply not occur because a worker is in- support compensation. tion to an award of jured during activity. an This ar- unusual generally See Church Jesus Christ gument is illustrated Professor Larson Saints, (Wil Latter-Day 590 P.2d at 332 treatise on workmen’s kins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed following example: with the section, in the developed next the Court has employee intentionally If an and know- parallel authority two lines of on the causa load, ingly undertakes to lift an unusual issue, requires tion one of which an un (i.e., lifting) the cause is no more statutory usual event in order meet the deliberately if accidental than he lifted a requirement. Although proof causation gardener if normal load. Or deliberate- may helpful in an unusual event be deter rain, ly continues to in the mow lawn causation, mining it is not as an passerby observing say him would not “by element of accident” section 35-1- undergoing that he was an accident indispensable ingredi basic and “[T]he merely it is because unusual mow unexpectedness.” ent of ‘accident’ is lawns rain. Schmidt, (Wilkins, J., 617 P.2d at 696 con Larson, Compensation 38.- Workmen’s curring) (quoting IB Workmen’s (1986) (footnotes omitted). at 7-162 (1980). Compensation, at 7-5 We there Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual fore reaffirm those cases which hold that being practice. distinction as unexpected unworkable or unintended an accident Realistically, impossible it is to determine may occurrence that be the cause or either require- what are the usual and normal injury. the result of an We thus necessar job. People good ments of a work in ily analysis “by abandon the accident” bad, heavy weather and lift items as well predicates the Redman line of cases which ones, light long and work for hours as the “accident” determination the oc well as short ones. None of these activi- currence of an unusual event. unexpected. ties unusual or Id.

Case Details

Case Name: Allen v. Industrial Commission

Court Name: Utah Supreme Court

Date Published: Nov 14, 1986

Citation: 729 P.2d 15

Docket Number: 20026

Court Abbreviation: Utah