145 Ga. 652 | Ga. | 1916
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
There is no presumption that a deceased person died leaving a will which disturbed the ordinary course of descent of land. One who relies on that fact for recovery or defense carries the burden of establishing it. Miller v. Speight, 61 Ga. 460 (2), 462. If the allegations of the petition sufficiently showed that the plaintiffs were all of the heirs at law of the deceased owner of the lot, it was not necessary for them to allege and prove intestacy of their father. If there was a will which prevented their inheriting, that might be set up as a defense. There was also a claim of right to redeem the land under a tax sale. Civil Code (1910), §§ 880, 1173. The petition was not subject to the general grounds of demurrer that it set out no cause of action.
A widow is not unconditionally and in all events an heir of her deceased husband. She may elect to take a dower or a child’s part. There is no presumption, in the absence of any direct or inferential evidence on the subject, that she elected to take a child’s part; and in a suit by children of the decedent, as his heirs, to recover land owned by him at his death, it is not necessary to allege that he left no widow, or, if he left one, that she did not take a child’s part.
There was an allegation, perhaps informally made in the exhibit to the petition, that there were no debts and no administration, which was sufficient to comply with the ruling in Greenfield v. McIntyre, 112 Ga. 691 (38 S. E. 44).
Some of the grounds of the demurrer are sufficiently dealt with in the headnotes. Except as indicated, there was no error in overruling the grounds of the demurrer.
Judgment reversed.