Tracy ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Intervenor-Appellant, One United Bank, Defendant.
No. 11-55129.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 15, 2013.
708 F.3d 978
Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 2013.
Filed March 15, 2013.
Daniel M. Graham, Torrance, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.
OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves the straightforward construction of a statute that gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC“) the right to remove actions from state court to federal court:
the Corporation may, without bond or security, remove any action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the appropriate United States district court before the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date the action, suit, or proceeding is filed against the Corporation or the Corporation is substituted as a party.
BACKGROUND
The underlying action was brought in California state court by Tracy Allen, who sued One United Bank (“the Bank“), a federally-insured, FDIC-supervised bank, for wrongful termination stemming from her complaints about the Bank‘s lending practices. In discovery, Allen requested documents relating to lending practices, including annual FDIC exams/audits. The Bank objected on the basis that the information was confidential under FDIC rules and regulations.1 The court rejected this argument and granted Allen‘s motion to compel
The court, however, declined to enter the agreed-upon order, expressing concern that it limited the court‘s review of confidential information and disclosure of information relevant to trial. The court permitted the parties to modify the protective order to make it workable and “allow[ed] [the] lawyers to keep dealing” with any grievances by the FDIC.
While negotiations of a revised protective order were ongoing, Allen filed a motion for sanctions against the Bank for failing to comply with the court‘s earlier order compelling production of the FDIC documents. About a week before the hearing on that motion, the FDIC moved ex parte for leave to file a complaint in intervention or, alternately, for an order shortening the time for consideration of its motion for intervention to a date before the hearing on Allen‘s sanctions motion. The judge rejected the request to shorten time for consideration of intervention, characterizing it as “complete hogwash” since the FDIC had “not act[ed] in a way that was in harmony with the dates that were going on in the case.” He also noted that the FDIC‘s reasons for seeking expedited relief “don‘t satisfy any kind of standard concerning timeliness . . . or satisfy the requirements of the California Rules of Court showing an emergency.” The judge denied relief without prejudice to consideration on a non-expedited basis and set a hearing on the intervention motion for about a month later.
The FDIC removed the action to federal district court under
The FDIC appealed, and we granted the FDIC‘s motion to stay the remand order pending appeal. The FDIC and Allen engaged in protracted negotiations under the auspices of a Ninth Circuit mediator. The parties reached a settlement under which they would jointly request the district court to remand the case to state court with “special instructions” for the state court to enter a new stipulated protective order. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal without prejudice to reinstatement should the district court not grant the joint motion for remand or if upon remand the state court did not enter the agreed-upon protective order.
The district court granted the joint motion for remand with special instructions. On remand, however, the state court “respectfully decline[d] to enter the order” because, in its opinion, “the order . . . raise[d] significant and deep issues of federalism and the relationship between state and local government and relationship between courts.” The court was of the “view . . . that a district court may not enjoin or stay proceedings in any state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The court further expressed that its approval was not automatic simply because the parties had agreed to the order.
ANALYSIS
I. THE FDIC‘S SPECIAL REMOVAL AUTHORITY
Without doubt, Congress granted the FDIC broad removal authority in
In considering whether this provision permits removal where the FDIC is not a party at the time of the removal, we need look no further than the language of the statute. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009). Removal is authorized in two situations: (1) where an “action, suit, or proceeding is filed against the Corporation,” and (2) where the FDIC is “substituted as a party” in the state court action.
The first circumstance involves claims brought against the FDIC as a defendant. In Bullion Services, for instance, we readily determined that “[FDIC-Corporate] was made a party to the present action” when the plaintiff amended the complaint to add it as a defendant. 50 F.3d at 706-07.2 We went on to note that it was “[o]bvious[]” that “before being added as a party, FDIC Corporate lacked the ability to remove the case to federal court.” Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
The second scenario, where “the Corporation is substituted as a party,” is typically invoked when the FDIC, in its receiver capacity, is substituted for a failed bank in litigation—either as plaintiff or defendant. Not surprisingly, courts have held that the filing of a notice of substitution, which makes the FDIC a party to the action, immediately triggers the right to remove under subpart (2)(B). See, e.g., Buczkowski v. FDIC, 415 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir.2005) (“Any litigant, or the court on its own motion, can substitute the FDIC for the failed bank as a party. That would open the 90-day window for removal.“); Diaz v. McAllen State Bank, 975 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that after appointment as receiver for a defendant bank, “the FDIC removed the case on the same day it intervened [and] therefore the removal was within the 90-day period“). The term “substituted as a party” is also broad enough to embrace situations in which the FDIC becomes party to litigation in capacities other than as receiver—so long as it obtains party status in accordance with the governing law. See generally Buczkowski, 415 F.3d at 596 (“The FDIC may be a bank‘s receiver or insurer or regulator (its three statutory capacities) but is not a ‘party’ to anything in particular in any of these capacities. It becomes a ‘party’ only in court.“).
We emphasize that a substitution motion, however styled, is distinct from the
Substitution of the FDIC for a failed bank is essentially a ministerial matter, unlike affirmative intervention for other purposes. The FDIC is appointed receiver when a bank has failed and the FDIC, upon substitution, immediately becomes the real party in interest. As the FDIC recognized in its briefing, “a state court can have no basis at all for denying a receiver‘s substitution motion.” The same cannot be said for the FDIC‘s motion to intervene in this case, which rests on its interest in discovery between third parties, and is subject to the procedural and substantive requirements of state law. See
We conclude that
The Sixth Circuit reversed, “read[ing]
II. THE FDIC‘S EFFORTS TO EXTEND THE REACH OF § 1819
In the absence of statutory language favoring its position, the FDIC offers two
In Village of Oakwood, the Sixth Circuit suggested that, notwithstanding a state court‘s failure to grant an intervention motion, the FDIC might be permitted to remove a state action that poses a threat to federal interests. The court explained:
[T]here may be an instance in which the FDIC, recognizing that it has a substantial interest in the litigation, wishes to intervene in a state court proceeding between nondiverse parties, but the state court denies its motion to intervene. In such a case, the FDIC—despite its status as a federal institution, and despite the threat to its interests—would not be able to protect those interests because a state court has refused to crown the FDIC with the requisite “party” status, thus preventing removal to federal court.
Id. at 369 n. 3. The court accordingly “le[ft] open the possibility that a federal court could determine that the FDIC is a party under
Importantly, the state court never denied the FDIC‘s motion to intervene. Contrary to FDIC‘s characterization, the court‘s refusal to grant the FDIC‘s motion to intervene on an expedited basis does not reflect serious adversity to federal interests. The FDIC was on notice for months that the confidentiality of its examination reports was at issue. Nonetheless, it did not seek to intervene and remove the dispute to a federal forum until late in the game, when it perceived that Allen was committed to pursuing sanctions for the Bank‘s failure to produce the reports.
Although the FDIC reasonably explains that it delayed seeking intervention because it hoped for a negotiated resolution, the FDIC‘s miscalculation did not oblige the state court to leap to its rescue. The court denied the ex parte motion without prejudice to the merits, which it was prepared to consider approximately one month later. The FDIC argues that this ruling was patently unreasonable in light of the impending motion for sanctions. But it is speculation to assume that disposition of that motion would have resulted in the immediate disclosure of the reports or serious damage to federal interests, particularly because the federal regulations on FDIC records do not provide for a blanket blackout on disclosure but rather permit disclosure under certain conditions. See
In short, the record does not support the FDIC‘s picture of a “recalcitrant state court.” Respect for the state court system counsels strongly against micromanaging the state court‘s scheduling decisions and imputing to the court a nefarious motive of obstructing federal interests. See generally Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990) (“Under our system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.“) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, even if the potential carve out suggested by Village of Oakwood is sound—a
Finally, we reject the FDIC‘s proposition that remand is precluded because the district court has jurisdiction under
The FDIC urges us to adopt the Fifth Circuit‘s approach in Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, 297 F.3d 416 (5th Cir.2002). There, the court considered whether the FDIC‘s attempted intervention in federal district court empowered that court to maintain jurisdiction over an action improperly removed by the defendant bank. Id. at 419-20. No claims were asserted against the FDIC, but the Corporation wanted to intervene to advocate for a particular interpretation of a statute relevant to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 424. Although the grounds for the defendant‘s removal were indisputably unsound, the Fifth Circuit evaluated the merits of the FDIC‘s intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 and decided that “the remand order was wrong because the FDIC was entitled to intervene in the case, conferring instant federal subject matter jurisdiction under the broad rubric of
We decline to embrace Heaton. To begin, its analysis is in tension with the established proposition that federal jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal, not after a case has been removed. See, e.g., Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that jurisdiction must be analyzed “at the time of removal, as that is when the case first appears in federal court“); Local Union 598 v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir.1988), aff‘d, 488 U.S. 881 (1988) (recognizing that “removability is generally determined as of the time of the petition for removal,” and noting exceptions not relevant here, such as when a “case has been tried on the merits and the federal court would have had original jurisdiction had the case been filed in federal court in the posture it had at the time of the entry of final judgment“). Although the FDIC in Heaton moved to intervene “immediately” after the defendant removed the action, Heaton, 297 F.3d at 420, its attempted intervention was ancillary and subsequent to the notice of removal.
Under the Heaton approach, there is nothing to stop the FDIC from, for instance, filing a notice of removal beyond the clear 90-day time limitation specified in subpart (2)(B) and then arguing that remand is nonetheless precluded because the federal court has original jurisdiction under subpart (2)(A). Accepting this argument would read the requirements of the removal provision out of
In sum, Congress granted the FDIC far broader access to the federal courts than is available to ordinary litigants, but that access is not unlimited. Whether the FDIC‘s access should be broader is a question for Congress, not the court. As drafted,
AFFIRMED.