OPINION
¶ 1 .Jаmes P. Allen seeks review of the Workforce Appeals Board’s (Board) decision that he is ineligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) under the Trade Act of 1974. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2296 (1998). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Allen worked for nineteen years as a metallurgical engineer, a field that specializes in the extraction of minerals from ore.' For eight years of that timе, he was also a supervisor and manager. Before December 2002, when Allen’s employer laid him off, Allen earned $87,500 per year.
¶ 3 Alen applied for numerous engineering jobs throughout the country, but could not find a position. Eventually, Alen enrolled in law school at the University of Utah. Alen applied to the Department of Wоrkforce Services (Department) for reimbursement of his law school costs. Alen’s law school expenses were much more than the highest amount that the Board had ever before approved. The Department rejected Alen’s application because, as it informed him via form letter, his employment gоals could not be met within the Department’s cost or time limits or within reasonable proximity to where he lived. The Department recommended instead that Alen pursue either an advanced engineering degree or an MBA, both of which would cost one-third the amount of law school, could be completed much faster, and in the Department’s view, were more “suitable.”
¶ 4 Alen appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ), whp reversed and awarded him TAA benefits. The Department appealed that decision to the Board,, which remanded the matter to the ALJ to .elicit additional evidence.. The ALJ then did not reach the merits of the easе anew, but rather determined that the Department had stipulated and was estopped from contesting all but one issue. The Department again appealed to the Board, which again reversed the ALJ and reinstated the Department’s original denial of Alen’s application for benefits. Alen now seeks review of that decision.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5 Alen argues that the Board incorrectly interpreted the law, that the Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts of the case, and that the Board’s factual findings are in error. Athough Utah courts have not specifically defined the applicable standard of
¶ 6 Thus, “[i]n reviewing [an agency’s] interpretations of general questions of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the expertise of the [agency].”
Utah Dep’t of Admin. Servs.,
ANALYSIS.
¶ 7 Under the Trade Act, the government offers assistance to certain displaced workers. Specifically, the program provides funds to retrain or relocate those workers. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2296 (1998). The Trade Act provides that, if the TAA’s six criteria aré met, the United States Department of Labor should pay the worker’s cost of retraining. See id. Through its rulemaking authority, the Department of Labor has passed the tаsk of determining whether a worker is eligible for TAA on to state agencies. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 617.1-617.52 (2004). In Utah, the Department of Workforce Services makes such decisions, and its decisions can be appealed to the Board.
¶ 8 The Department “shall” approve a worker’s training if the TAA’s six criteria are met. Id. § 617.22(a). Those criteria are (i) “thеre is no suitable employment” available; (ii) “the worker would benefit from appropriate training”; (iii) the worker would have “a reasonable expectation of employment following completion of such training”; (iv) “training ... is reasonably available to the worker”; (v) “the worker is qualified to undertake and complete such training”; and (vi) “such training is suitable for the worker and available at a reasonable cost.” 19 U.S.C.A. § 2296(a)(1). The United States Department of Labor has promulgated extensive regulations that further define these criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 617.1-617.52.
¶ 9 As initial matters, Allen asserts that the Board erred because it based its decision on matters to which the pаrties had stipulated. Parties are certainly entitled to stipulate regarding facts.
See
73 Am.Jur.2d
Stipulations,
§ 4 (2001). But, parties cannot make stipulations as to what the law is; that
¶ 10 Allen also argues that the Board exceeded its authority by basing its decision on matters that had not been raised by or before the ALJ in the initial hearing. The Board may affirm, reverse; modify, or remand a case to an ALJ. See Utah Code Ann. § 35A-l-304(2)(a)-(c) (2001). In his initial decision, the ALJ made findings only on the sixth criterion and ignored the other five necessary criteria. Accordingly, the Board was within its authority to remand to the ALJ to elicit the previously unestablished evidence. In the second round, the ALJ allowed the appropriate evidence. But, the ALJ decided erroneously that the parties had stipulated as to the other factors and did not address them.. Hence, the Board did not exceed its authority by remanding the matter to the ALJ or in basing its decision on the statutorily required criteria.
¶ 11 As to the substantive matters, the Board determined that Allen’s law school expenses could not be reimbursed under TAA because he or the training did not meet the first, second, third, and sixth criteria.
A. Suitable Employment
¶ 12 The first criterion requires that “there is no suitable employment ... available” for Allen. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2296(a)(1)(A) (1998). “ ‘[S]uitable employment’ means ... work of a substantially equal or higher skill level than the worker’s рast adversely affected employment, and wages for such work at not less than 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage.” Id. § 2296(e). The Department of Labor’s regulations further specify:
[t]his means that ... no suitable employment is available at that time for that worker, either in the commuting area ... or outside thе commuting area in an area in which the worker desires to relocate with the assistance of a relocation allowance ..., and there is no reasonable prospect of such suitable employment becoming available for the ’ worker in the foreseeable future.
20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(1)(i).
¶ 13 The Board argues that Allen has not shown that “no suitable employment is available” because the Board construes “available” employment to include all job openings in Allen’s field, not just those that actually had been offered to Allen. The Board accepted the Department’s evidence that in the Salt Lake Area there are annually ten to fifteen openings for engineers in Allen’s “degree area” and sixty openings for engineering managers. The Board also notes that Allen submitted resumes to thirty-one prospective employers in response to advertised positions. Thus, the Board concluded that Allen has not satisfied this criterion.
¶ 14 We give no defеrence to the agency’s interpretation of statutory provisions. “When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute’s plain language to determine the Legislature’s intent and purpose. We read the plain language of the statute as a whole.... ”
Miller v. Weaver,
¶ 15 In this case, because the Department is bound by both, we reаd the statute together with the United States Department of Labor’s regulations “as a whole.”
Id.
The regulation’s language, “[tjhis means that ... no suitable employment is available at that time
for that
workerclearly refers to the worker as the particular individual whose ease is considered. 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). The regulation also specifies that to be “suitable employment” that “is available” it can be “in an area in which the worker desires to relo
¶ 16 For further guidance, we look also to thе “ordinary meaning” of “available.”
State v. Ireland,
B. Benefit From Appropriate Training
¶ 17 The second criterion requires that “the worker would benefit from appropriate training.” 19 U.S.C.A. § 2296(a)(1)(B) (1998). “This means that there is a direct relationship between the needs of the worker for skills training or remedial education and what-would be provided by the training program under consideration for the worker....!’ 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(2)(i). 3 The Board concluded that law school was inappropriate for Allen because the average starting salary for a law school graduate in this region is far below the Trade Act’s goal of 80% of the worker’s previous salary. See 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(1)(i) (“[T]he term ‘suitable employment means ... work of a substantially equal or higher skill level ... and wages '.. not less than 80 percent of the worker’s average weekly wage.”).
¶ 18 This analysis requires that the agency determine the average starting salary for a recent law school graduate, which is a factual finding. Agencies have significant discretion in making factual findings; we will overturn an agency’s factual findings only if they are “not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review,
¶ 19 The analysis of this criterion also requires the agency to apply the findings to the facts of this case, i.e., to assess whether the average should apply to Allen particularly. Agency decisions that apply the law to facts “are [only] subject to judicial review to assure that they fall within the limits of reasonableness and rationality.”
Utah Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm’n,
¶ 20 Both Allen’s and the Board’s positions are reasonable. “[A]s between two reasonably conflicting views, ... [i]t is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve cоnflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences.”
Grace Drilling Co.,
¶ 21 Even if we considered the Board’s apрlication of the facts to Allen’s circumstances unreasonable, this criterion “includes the further criterion that the individual will be job ready on completion of the training program.” 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(2)(i). The Board concluded that law school would not meet this “job ready” requirement because, before Allen could practice law, he would have to take and pass the bar examination. Allen asserts that the Board misconstrues this meaning of this provision and that the bar exam should be considered part of the training program. Allen urges us to adopt a construction of the regulation that would limit programs that, require some additional training or apprеnticeship, instead of programs that require some further licensing.
¶22 We note that, at present, Utah requires that its prospective attorneys pass its bar exam, and it administers its exam only twice per year. Even after passing the exam, one cannot practice law until having been sworn into the bar. Assuming that Allen were to graduate in May, he could practice law no sooner than the October of that year. While we do not broadly hold that any additional certification or licensing requirement would preclude a program from qualifying, the plain meaning of “job ready” cannot include programs under which the worker would not be “ready” for over four additional months.
CONCLUSION
¶ 23 Allen has not shown that law school is the .appropriate training for him and has failed to establish that he meets one of the six criteria required to qualify for TAA benefits. All six criteria must be met. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 24 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding Judge.
¶ 25 I DISSENT: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
Notes
. We decline to address the propriety of the Department of Labor’s action under
New York v. United States,
. While we recognize that a court in another state has held differently,
see Marshall v. Commissioner of Jobs & Training,
. Because neither party raised the issue, we will assume here that law school,' a professional degree program,- fits the definition of "skills training or remedial education.',’ 20 C.F.R. § 617.22(a)(2)(I) (1986).