13 N.J.L. 294 | N.J. | 1833
This was an action against the defendant and nine other persons, for a trespass charged against them jointly, to which they had pleaded severally not guilty, not by putting in one joint plea, but by each putting in this plea for himself, so that there was a separate issue for each defendant. When the trial was called at the circuit, the defendants moved for the privilege of separate trials, and insisted that the jury might assess the damages severally against each defendant, according to the degree in which he was culpable ; some of them being parties principally concerned, while others were concerned so very slightly. But the court not only rejected this motion, and compelled them to trial before the same jury, but in their charge instructed the jury that the damages could not be severed. For these and other reasons assigned, the defendants move to set aside the verdict, which was rendered'for $1000. And they insist on the hardship that must necessarily ensue ; for the sheriff may levy the damages out of the goods of one or only a few of the defendants, who will have no legal means of compelling contribution. Now there is no law requiring the judge to try one cause by ten separate juries, nor is, nor can any such law be shewn. One jury is as competent to try all these issues, as they are to try one of them ; and it is common for a jury to pass on several issues in one cause. And if he was not bound to fritter one cause into ten jury trials but was at liberty to use his discretion. he used it in this instance very discreetly; for had he consented to the motion for several juries, it would have multiplied the costs almost ten fold, and still would not have attained the defendant’s purposes, for the first jury must have assessed the plaintiff’s whole damages; and these being once found, the nine subsequent juries, instead of having any thing to do with damages already found, could have determined nothing more, than whether the remaining defendants were participators in that joint trespass. So that in every point of view it was proper to refuse the motion, and not allow the cause to be heard over and over again, as many times as the defendants amounted to in number.
The next objection is to the charge given by the judge to the
There is also an objection to the regularity of the proceedings in this action. Being commenced against twelve persons, it was carried to trial against only ten, under a suggestion of the death of the eleventh, pending the suit, but the twelfth had not plead, and of him there is no mention. This is said to be irregular; that judgment should have been taken by default against .’him before the cause went to trial, so that damages might be ¡assessed by the jury; or if the plaintiff meant not to pursue him ¡any further, he should have entered a nolle prosequi before trial, "but that such an entry would now be too late. There is nothing however, in this objection. Trespass by divers persons' being joint and several in. its nature, the injured party has his remedy against all or any of them. He has elected to proceed ¡against this one no further after declaration, as appears from his
Finally the damages are alleged to be excessive; but actions* of trespass and for assault and battery are in their nature vindictive, and when a jury gives exemplary damages the court has no graduated scale by which to measure them, and its general and safest rule, is not to interfere, unless they are manifestly outrageous, seems very well and properly settled. And these are; shewn to be so. Let the rule to shew cause be discharged.
Rule discharged.
Cited in Brewer v. Porch, 2 Harr. 378-384.