17 Conn. 67 | Conn. | 1845
Of the competency of Harris, as a witness in this case, there is no doubt; and indeed no question has been made before us on this point. If he has any interest whatever in, the suit, it is not of that certain or direct character which disqualifies him as a witness. 2 Stark. Ev. 744. 2 Phill. Ev. (by Cowen) 92.
The refusal by the defendants, to deliver to the plaintiff the property mentioned in the contract declared on, when demanded, was clearly a breach of that contract, and entitles the plaintiff to recover, unless the proceedings on the writ of error brought on the judgment, rendered in the action on which the property was attached, constitute an objection to such recovery. . *
It appears, that, after that demand and refusal, a writ of error was brought to the supreme court of errors on that
The defendants claim, that the effect of that reversal was to discharge the lien upon the property created by the attachment of it in that action ; and that, as the plaintiff, who.-was the attaching officer, is thereby exonerated from any obligation to have the property forth-coming, for the benefit of the creditor on whose behalf it was attached, the property is restored to the possession of the defendant in that action, the plaintiff cannot be rendered liable to either of them on account of it, and therefore, is not entitled to recover in the present suit; since his right of recovery depends on his eventual liability to the parties in the suit in which the property was attached. They rely on the statute, which provides, that no personal estate attached shall be held to respond the judgment obtained by the plaintiff at whose suit the same is attached, either against the debtor or any other creditor, unless such judgment creditor take out execution on such judgment, and have the same levied thereon, within sixty days after final judgment, or the removal of any prior incum-brance by attachment; (Slat. tit. Actions Civil, sect, 7. p. 44.) and they insist, that the judgment rendered in that action was the final judgment contemplated by that statute, and that therefore, the property attached could be holden only to respond that particular judgment; and that, as that judgment was reversed, and thus rendered incapable of being enforced, the property became exonerated from the attachment in that suit. Hence, it will be perceived, that the defendants’ claim rests upon the effect that is to be given to the judgment of reversal rendered by the supreme court of errors.
The judgment which was reversed, while it remained un-reversed, was, undoubtedly, what is technically termed a final judgment in the suit in which it was rendered, as con-tradistinguished from what is called an interlocutory judgment ; (3 Blk. Com. 398.) and if it had not been reversed, it would have continued to be a final judgment, because, iri the words of Blackstone’s definition of a final judgment, it would have “ put an end to the action and would, therefore, have been tire final judgment contemplated by the statute which has
Before the recent statutes were passed, providing for the entering of actions, in certain cases, for further proceedings, in the superior court, on a reversal, by that court, of judgments on writ of error, it was, and had been, from the earliest period of which we have any information on the subject, the invariable practice, on the reversal of a judgment of the superior court, to enter the cause again in that court for a re-trial, unless it was reversed on a principle which showed that the
It appears, by the finding in this case, that the judgment of the superior court, which we are now considering, was not reversed on a principle which showed that the action in which it was rendered could not be sustained. It was, therefore, under the practice which has been mentioned, clearly a case where it was proper that the action should be re-entered in the superior court for trial.
The defendants, however, further claim, that, if it was competent for the plaintiff to enter it there, the entry of it, in this instance, is to be deemed irregular, because it does not appear to have been made, by the direction, or with the sanction or approval, of that court.
The finding is, that the action was, at the next term of the superior court after the reversal of the judgment, entered, at the instance of the plaintiff in said action, in the docket of
It is further claimed, by the defendants, that the superior court had no authority to take jurisdiction of that action, after the judgment therein was reversed, because it does not appear, that there was any order of the supreme court of errors directing it to be entered in the former court. If such an order were necessary, we think, that, inasmuch as it appears, that the entry of it was allowed to be, and it was in fact, made, it is to be presumed, that it was done rightfully and in pursuance of the requisite order, at least, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. But in our opinion( no special motion of the party, nor order of the supreme court of errors, is necessary to justify the plaintiff in entering the action in the superior court, or to warrant that court to permit such an entry, in a case where it is proper, as it was in the instance before us, that further proceedings should be there had. And it has not been the practice, in such cases* to move for, or obtain, any special order directing a
Although it is not necessary to place our decision of this question on the ground that the case we are considering is governed by the 70th section of the act for the regulation of civil actions, (Slat. ed. 1838. p. 01.) and the act of 1830. in addition thereto, (p. 73.) providing for the entry of actions in the superior court after a reversal on writ of error, it may admit of a question whether it is not fairly embraced by them, their terms being sufficiently comprehensive ; but it is observable, that those acts do not, by their terms, require any action, by the reversing court, in order to authorize an entry of such actions in the superior court. The provision is simply, that on reversal, the defendant in error “ may enter” the action there ; thus strongly implying, that it is the right of the partv, independent of any order of the reversing court. In this respect, the phraseology is quite different from that used in the 63d section of the act, (p. 58.) providing for the remanding of actions which are not appealable, where it is expressly made the duty of the higher court to remand ; thus implying some action by that court, as an authority-for the entry of the cause in the court below.
The defendants, however, insist, that although the plaintiff may still further prosecute the action in which the property mentioned in the declaration was attached, notwithstanding the reversal of the judgment first rendered therein; yet, as that was a final judgment when rendered, and was of the character of the judgment mentioned in the statute prescribing the time within which property attached shall be levied on by execution after final judgment, it was, on a just construction of that statute, the judgment therein intended; and that, as the property cannot now be held to respond that judgment, the attachment of it is dissolved, and the lien created by it discharged. In support of this claim, they rely mainly on the cases of Butler v. Bissell, 1 Root's R. 102, and Clapp v. Bell, 4 Mass. R. 99. in the first of which It was decided, that an erroneous judgment in favour of the defendant, reversed for error, or annulled by the granting of a new trial, is to be deemed a final judgment, for the purpose of exonerating special bail; and in the other, that such a
Again ; that judgment being annulled by its reversal, and the action being entered in the superior court, and now there pending, a final judgment is to be hereafter rendered in it. That judgment, if in favour of the plaintiff, will, at least equally with that which was reversed, and in reality exclusively, answer the description of that mentioned in the statute. Since, then, it is embraced by its terms, what reason is there for saying, that the first judgment was intended in preference to it, and that the property attached should not be held to respond it, if execution should be issued thereon, and levied within the time prescribed 1 None, certainly, unless it is, that it was intended that a valid and invalid judgment should be equally fruitless.
The superior court is, therefore, advised to render judgment for the plaintiff, for the value of the property mentioned in the contract declared on, or for the amount which may have been recovered in the original action in which it was attached, if less than such value.
Judgment for plaintiff.