*1 MEDRANO ALLEE et al. al. et May 13, 1973 Decided Argued November No. 72-1125. *2 J., opinion Douglas, delivered the Court, in which Bren- nan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., joined. Burger, - J., opinion C. concurring filed an in the pa.rt result in and dissenting part, in which White and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 821. Powell, J., took no part the decision of the case. Ldrry York, F. First Attorney-General Assistant Texas,- argued for appellants. cause With him B. Joe Hill, Attorney General, L. John were
the brief Pena, Baker, J. Assistant Dibrell, Láng A. and Gilbert Attorneys General. brief for and filed a argued
Chris Dixie' cause appellees.* Douglas opinion of the-
Mr. Justice delivered Court. C. rights §§
This is a civil U. S. action,1 constitutionality attacking statutes, of certain Texas defendants, It brought alleges that appellees. County, members of the and the Rangers Starr Texas Texas, Department, and a Justice of the Peace Sheriff’s County, conspired deprive appellees Starr* of their rights under the Amendments, First and Fourteenth *3 unlawfully confining and them with arresting, detaining, process out due and legal justification, without and unlawfully physi threatening, harassing, coercing, and cally assaulting prevent them to their exercise of the rights speech assembly. free A three-judge court convened which was declared uncon five Texas statutes and; enjoined stitutional their enforcement. 347 F. Supp. In 605, 634. addition, permanently the court enjoined the variety defendants from a prac of unlawful tices which formed the core of the alleged conspiracy. n Five all defendants, members the Texas Rangers, have perfected appeal. 28 U. appellees § S. C. 1253. The *John B. Abercrombie Deakins, Jr., and William D. filed brief ,et Root, for Inc., & urging Brown al. as amici curiae reversal. Woll, J. Albert Gold, and Laurence Thomas E. Harris filed a brief n for the Congress American Federation of liabor and of Industrial Organizations urging as amicus curiae affirmance. 1 Jurisdiction in the District Court upon was based 28 U. C. S. and,a §13.43, three-judge properly court was convened under 28 U. S. C. § 2231. Organizing Farm Workers Com of the United consist they repre plaintiffs,2 and the class certain named mittee, judgment Court on whose behalf the sented in the District was also rendered.3 were appellees
From June 1966 until June pre- an into the union the engaged organize in effort to dominantly Mexican-American farmworkers of lower Valley. Rio Grande This effort led to considerable local controversy brought appellees which into conflict with authorities, and local state and the District Court practices found enjoined that as a result of the unlawful below the organizing efforts were crushed. This lawsuit followed. findings factual of the District Court are not
challenged here. In early June beginning effort, the organizing Nelson, one of Eugene principal strikers’ leaders, stationed himself at the Inter- Bridge Roma, Texas, national attempting, persuade from laborers Mexico support the strike. He was taken into custody by County the Starr Sheriff, detained questioned four hours, strike, about the told was he under investigation by the Federal Bureau caption Named Kathy were Medrano, Baker, Francisco Lopez, Padilla, David Magdaleno Dimas, Gilbert Benjamin Rodriguez. plaintiffs Other individual body were named complaint. judgment was also rendered for plaintiff all members of the *4 United Organizing Farmworkers Committee, AFL-CIO, and- “all persons other who because of sympathy their voluntary for or support of the aims of said Plaintiff engaged union have in. are engaging in, may hereafter, or engage peaceful in picketing, peaceful assembly, organizational or other support activities of or in of said Plaintiff engage union or who in concert of action with one or oj* agricultural more of Plaintiffs for the solicitation of workers join others to make common pertain cause with them in matters ing agricultural to the work and labor of workers.” him. filed were ever charges No
Investigation. F. at Supp., 612. sym 25 union members about In October Farms Grande Rancho alongside the pathizers picketed they were- strike; join laborers to the exhorting picket their although the sheriffs disperse by' ordered Chandler, of the Raymond one .peaceful. When ing was contest in conversation engaged an officer leaders, union- Art. under validity order, he was arrested ing the peace. breach 474 of the Texas Penal Code for is a- for this offense punishment the maximum Although two $500. When bond was for Chandler at fine, $200 set make courthouse to of Chandler’s friends came they no busi they verbally abused, told had were bond, they would they that if did not leave ness there, 612-613. placed jail Supp., in at themselves. F. They left.4 local president
Later when month, (cid:127) arrest, under union and others were the courthouse strike. they support “viva huelga” shouted la deputy gun A union official and held sheriff struck the repeat him forehead, at his those words ordering “respectful place.” in the it courthouse' because awas Id., through strike continued at 613. As the year Rangers and the Texas called the local were into there, area, were serious of violénce.. In more incidents May pickets gathered Mission, Texas, 1967 some union protest carrying produce valley from the on the Missouri-Pacific They initially Railroad. were charged trespass private property; this was changed to assembly, finally supferseded unlawful was com- plaints secondary, picketing. The Reverend Edgar' bonding process. This was not abuse of the Later Eugene threatening when Nelson arrested was the life of Texas Ranger, infra, 807,. deputy rejected see sheriff for no valid good. reason a he knew bond *5 custody Dimas were taken into Krueger.and Magdaleno held by passed, Rangers As the Rangers. the a train that their faces were prisoners’ these two bodies so Id., at 615. .inches from train. Dimas sought
A arrest Rangers few weeks later manner, in threatening a brandishing gun a allegedly for Moreno, and also him Chandler “tailing” and found expía-' no union was with members. Chandler arrested by Captain Moreno, nation who also as was was assaulted charged Allee at time. These two men were later Allee’s assisting by, with Dimas to arrest, although evade testimony they sought own were Dimas was never told Indeed, the officers Rangers. because had no-arrest complaint they formal warrant or could Dimas, him, put'in they then arrest so justice a call to a peace who on arrived scene filled a and out war- оn rant forms he carried with him. The then Rangers broke into house arrested Rodriguez, Dimas and another union member, a violent and brutal fashion. Dimas hospitalized days was four concus- brain X-rays sion, revealed he been had struck so hard the back spine that his was curved shape. out had Rodriguez cuts bruises on ear, upper his elbow, arm, back, and one jaw; of his fingers was broken and the nail torn off. at 616-617. Id.,
Earlier, May, Nelson had gone down to the office, according Sheriff’s appellees, complain that the Rangers acting priváte were as police force one farms the area. The three-judge District Court found that Nelson was then arrested and charged with threatening the life certain despite Texas Rangers, fact Captain Allee conceded there no serious Allee threat. had directed that the charges be filed to protect Rangers from censure if something happened Id., to Nelson. at 615. County Sheriff’s period Starr entire
During news- anti-union an aggressive distributed regularly office *6 up pick car would an official driving deputy A paper. back to the Sheriff’s bring week them papers' each and by various be distributed then office; they would included Court Id,, 617. The District at deputies. a opinion; appendix to its an copies paper of the in Group “Only Mexican Subversive typical headline was. Valley The Farm Workers.” Sympathize Could with similarly explicit. On were Rangers of the views Texas jobs union they offered farm a number of occasions to.the for, end in return an leaders, wage, at union demand Id., one told Rangers at 614. to the strike'. the area they had been called into union member that they would leave until had break the and strike Id., 613. done so. at three-judge
AmPng findings other Court selectively unlaw- that enforced the were the defendants 439 of assembly law, ful Art. the Texas Penal Code, treating criminal union gathering, as an inoffensive solicited'criminal, Supp., 613; complaints against F. at no appellees persons knowledge from the alleged id., Offense, 615; at filed charges baseless. appellee one an officer.5 imрersonating , The' three-judge District found the law officials essentially enforcement “took in what sides was labor-management Id., controversy.” Al- 618. though there .virtually was no evidence of upon assault
5Deputy charges against Paul. Pena Reynaldo filed these De La although Cruz offense, wearing Pena had never seen the which was badge badge question around the union hall. was óf the type, shield while type, those worn were officers of the star Pena conceded that he knew that De La Cruz Dimas had badges directing worn similar when traffic at union functions. Supp., E. at 616. strike, the officials people during anyone union law and order the maintenance “concluded that strike.” success inextricably preventing bound to of isolated incidents Ibid. were not a series these Thus, controversy. pattern throughout but a prevailing I appel- injunction against argued It is state thus the strike and lees, July 11, 1967, issued ended not the case. controversy moot. rendered- the That practices, unlawful summarizing the defendants’ After union’s efforts concluded that District Court “[t]he and this of 1967 collapsed pressure under this June it seek relief.” Ibid. Thus was filed an effort to suit subject of this conduct, was the defendants’ which is the *7 injunction, suit, strike, that ended the not the state court fed- protection which of the came afterward. With the efforts. decree, again begin eral court their appellees could limited. Moreover, injunction quite the state is acting proscribes appellees and those picketing by It only property in concert with them on or near owned Farms, Inc.,' plaintiff in the state case. La Casita appellants agreed argument But at oral that La area, major Casita in the employers is one and some of the incidents involved occurred at other injunction only, locations. Moreover the state court temporary, appeal and on the Texas Court Civil Ap- of- peals, after trial finding that most of the court findings unsupported, 'only affirmed because of limited were review, law, temporary injunc- nature of under of a Texas appellate tion. court concluded that in this “nothing Farms, Organizing Comm., Inc. La United Farm Workers Casita County, Texas, 3809, July 11, Appel Dist. Ct. Starr No. 1967. lants’ exhibit D-l in the District Court.
81Ó ruling that the evidence before to be taken as a
opinion injunc permanent of a support the issuance us would Comm. Organizing Workers United Farm tion . ...” Farms, Inc., 403. We v. La Casita S. W. 2d injunc permanent argument at oral that no were advised we can tion ever been against picketing issued, has not assume that one will be. moot argued
Nor it be the case has become can as a re- their efforts appellees because have abandoned restrain very-harassment they sought sult of the appellees requirement this suit. There can no subject physical continue to themselves violence throughout unlawful their upon restrictions liberties it pendency preserve in order to as a live action controversy. conduct, appel-' In of appellants’ the face sought lees rights their federal court. vindicate rechannelgd- In 1967 they June their from direct efforts attempts at unionizing seeking pro- the workers to 'the tection of a federal decree, they brought and hence In their complaint, amended filed in October' suit.. they charged that defendants’ aimed conduct, at all those who make common cause with appellees, “chill[ed] the willingness of people to exércise their First Amend- ment rights,” resulting, ás the three-judge District found, in the “collapse” Ap- drive. union pellees continued prosecute the suit won a judg- ment in December 1972. We not assume that be- *8 cause during this period they directed their efforts to the judicial battle, they have principal abandoned their Rather, cause. very purpose of the suit was to seek protection of the federal court so that the efforts at could unionization be renewed. It is settled that an injunction action for an does become moot merely because the conduct complained of has terminated, if there póssibility is a of recurrence, since otherwise the ‘ old free to return . defendants “would be [their] Walling v. Sanders, 368, 376; 372. ways.’Gray v. U. S. States Inc., United Payne, Helmerich & 37, 43; U. S. Ray- Co., 632; NLRB v. v. W. T. Grаnt 345 U. S. Co., SEC Committee theon Medical 25, 27; 398 U. S. Rights, Human un- appellee U. 406. The S. a' very organization goal ion remains live and its much continues to be the unionization of farmworkers. The es- controversy sential moot, very therefore not but much alive.
II We provisions first consider the federal decree enjoining police appellees.7 intimidation ordered, “It adjudged is further by and decreed the Court that Defendants, successors, agents their employees, persons acting them, permanently enjoined in-concert with are and restrained any following from ap or acts conduct directed toward or plied persons they represent, to Plaintiffs and the to-wit:.' Using any authority “A. peace manner as officers Defendants’ purpose preventing discouraging peaceful organizational for the or adequate activities without cause. Interfering by stopping, dispersing, arresting, imprisoning “B. or
any person, by any means, assembling, picketing, or other with solicitation, organizational adequate or effort cause. without Arresting any person probable
“C. without warrant or without probable accompanied by present cause .which cause is intention to appropriate complaint jurisdiction. competent written to a court of Stopping, dispersing, arresting imprisoning person “D. or adequate person.' without cause because of the arrest of some other Paragraph 16, Subparagraphs A, B D “E. As used in above, ‘adequate (1) the term cause’ shall mean actual obstruction public private passway, road, street, of a or entrance which or actually egress, ingress, causes flow unreasonable or interference traffic; (2) violence, violence, or force or or the threat of force or actually by any person by actually committed his own conduct or aiding, abetting, participating person; or in such conduct another (3) probable cause which cause a Defendant to believe good particular persons faith that one or more did violatе a criminal
812 relief, in complements the other of the decree part
This just not police conduct, on all places boundaries that it by struck upon state statutes down which is based that the complaint charged that the federal court. The en- by joined single plan of a part was but one the conduct pervasive pat- and the Court found defendants, tern in which law of intimidation enforcement author- the sought appellees' rights. suppress ities to constitutional In police only this blunderbuss effort the relied on constitutionally statutes the District defi- Court found cient, but concurrently authority exercised their under valid laws in an unconstitutional manner. While it is argued three-judge that a prop- District Court could not erly be if police convened concededly harassment under constitutional statutes were the question presented it it, properly could consider question grant jurisdiction relief the exercise of ancillary to that con- by ferred the constitutional attack state statutes plainly which required a three-judge court.8 law of the specific State of other Texas than those laws herein unconstitutional, municipal declared aor ordinance.” argued Lines, that Public Service Comm’n v. Brashear It is ancillary U. S. jurisdiction holds is three-judge there no In Brashear plaintiffs courts. pay refused to fees assessed under challenged suit; statute in their when their on the statute attack sought failed the damages, defendants and the Court held damages single judge.' action should been have heard district This proper ancillary was not a jurisdiction exercise of because the completely defendants* claim was- unrelated basis on which three-judge convened, court- purpose and there' was no by having be served it the same But determined tribunal. we have three-judge held that “[o]nce court the case [a convened is] disposed can ground, below here on whether or not justified it calling would have three-judge aof court.'” United Georgia Comm’n, States v. Public Service 285., 371 U. S. 287-288. In deed, three-judge required the nonconstitutional hear upon statute; attack Jacobsen, Florida Lime Growers That part question prohibits decree here *10 appellants using from authority peace their as officers arrest, stop, disperse, imprison or appellees, or other- organizational wise interfere their efforts, with without 85; 73, Wyman, 397, S. v. U. Rosado 397 S.U. 402. The instant nearly Milky Way is Leary, 98, case identical U. 397 S. summarily judgment which we considered and affirmed the of a three-judge regarding illegal application the of a assertedly New concededly constitutional; York statute which was de ancillary jurisdiction acquired cision was rendered in the exercise of aas a result of facial attack a but oh different related state statute. Supp. 288, 305 F. (SDNY). part.of enjoining 296 the .decree police intimately ancillary up misconduct bound the is and judgment, remainder of the the court’s and even Brashear held that jurisdiction every pertaining question prayer court has to hear to the injunction single the for “in order a afford final that lawsuit controversy parties.” and the decision of the between authoritative S., 312 U. at 625 n. 5. (cid:127) Ledesma, This view was followed Perez v. 401 S. in which U. in. .three-judge obscenity a a had sustained state statute provided the federal constitutional attack the for that basis convening But the it. the District Court on to that went determine plaintiffs arrests of the and un the seizures incident thereto were held, prior adversary hearing constitutional because no been had F. Supp., (ED La.), suppress and therefore issued order an. ing the evidence in state the court case'. that on We reviewed order merits, assuming properly appeal the it us an as an “from before granting denying interlocutory injunc order permanent or ... an required by in any three-judge tion civil” action to be court. heard , J., See 40 U. (Stewart, at 89 basis concurring). S. ancillary jurisdiction compelling.' here is at as least It is striking true that we also held in Perez an order down á parish properly local ordinance was not before us. But was an wholly involving attack on a different enactment not detailed factual inquiries ancillary challenge common with to the constitutional n supporting three-judge law jurisdiction. state court’s And finding central to our determination regarding wás that the order parish by “was three-judge ordinance issued court, but Judge Boyle, by acting single rather as judge.” Id., district obviously 87. case That not the here. ac- (1) as is defined “Adequate cause”
“adequate cause.” causing passways private public or obstruction tual or violence, force or interference,' (2) unreasonable thereof, person, actually threat committed or, (3) prob- conduct, aiding abetting such law criminal good that a able cause to" bélieve in faith than has been other violated, of the State of Texas On decree. struck remainder of the ones down injunction require its face the does more than no police requirements; to abide constitutional there is no interfere contention that this decree would with' law from by- police restraining enforcement engaging in conduct that lawful. would be otherwise
Thus
only question
us
this was
before
is whether
*11
appropriate
an
equitable
exercise of the federal court’s
powers.
portion
We first
the decree
note that
of
creates no
prosecutions
interference with
pending
courts,
special
state
so
relevant
considerations
Younger
Harris,
cases like
37,
v.
401
U. S.
do
w;as
apply
ap
here.
requirement
there
Nor.
any
pellees first exhaust state
bringing
remedies before
their
federal
under
claims
the Civil Rights-Act
fed
of
eral court. McNeese
Education,
v. Board
373 U. S.
of
v,
668; Monroe
Pape,
Such a showing was clearly made as here the un- challenged findings of the. District Court show. The .appellees sought do no to. more than organize lawful union to better the situation of one of the most eco- nomically oppressed classes of workers in the country. Because of the intimidation by state authorities, their lawful effort was crushed. The workers, aAd their lead- organizers ers and were placed in fear of exercising their free, expression, as of rights constitutionally protected their supporters Potential sembly, and association. If lending support.. their in fear of placed were cause rights continue those regain be they were to able re means, they by constitutional furthering their cause conduct. concerted protection appellants’ from quired such adequate provide remedy .No at law would be 485- Pfister, S. protection. Dombrowski v. 380 U. 489. valid under police
Isolated incidents of.
misconduct
course,
would
be
for the exércise of
not,
statutes
cause
have not
equitable powers.
federal
But
court’s
“[w]e
applications
hesitated on direct review to strike down
constitutional
statutes which we have found to
Johnson,
applied.”
unconstitutionally
Cameron v.
Louisiana,
611, 620, citing
v.
559;
U.
Cox
379 U.
S.
S.
Wright
Georgia,
284;
Edwards v. South
U. S.
Carolina,
Where,
per-
S16 orderly peaceable
to others the streets an. Id., have manner.” lower federal courts 517. The. granted also relief in similar eases.9 such relief stated, portion this For reasons to be that of holdings based on are- uncon that certain state statutes respects be In this stitutional should modified. all other portion quite proper.10 of District Court decree was the.
Ill Finally, we portion the District-Court's consider declaring five Texas unconstitutional, statutes judgment with the accompanying injunctive relief. have been We pressed by parts with arguments appellants that these of the decree are teachings inconsistent with the Younger Harris, v. Mackell, 401 U. S. and Samuels v. 401 U. 66. For explained S. reasons below, it unneces n sary to reach these' at present. contentions
Younger
companion
and its
upon
grounded
cases are
special
apply
considerations which
when a federal
9 In NAACP
Thompson,
v.
(CA5),
357 F.
2d
the Court of
Appeals
by
reversed the denial of relief
Court,
the District
conclud
ing that
plaintiffs’
defendants believed that
demonstrations “must
suppressed
that,
so,
they
order to do
intend
take
advantage
ordinance,
of ant- latv
inapplicable
however
or how
slight
transgression,
ever
and to continue to harass and intimi
Id.,
plaintiffs.”
date
findings
at S3S.
[the]
here show at least
that much.
In
Gelston,
(CA4) (en banc),
judges exception justice peace-whose of one involve ment-apparently issuing proper conasted of warrants without basis. Moreover any prosecutions, it does not in terms restrain but “arresting, imprisoning, filing threatening charges, criminal arrest, ordering advising suggesting or disperse or [appellees] authority under any portion of” the A statutes struck down. read ing of complaint suggests injunctive that no against pending- relief prosecutions requested. was ever As to whether there in fact were pending prosecutions,"our only guidance from the District Court is a passing “plaintiffs reference facing charges now in the [are] .,” Texas courts . Supp., . 347 F. impossible it but to deter mine charges might pending. be Indeed, light whom of the District Court’s failure to treat the separately statutes in their findings harassment, we cannot be certain that their.reference pending charges finding here is a charges that there are pending under each of the statutes. And if charges there are state pending, we could speculate why do no more than as to trial never during commenced five-year pendency of the federal may suit. This result of the. agreement an informal court, with the federal or it indicate
8Í8
If the in fact no relief pending prosecutions, there were in which impact could have on future events the appellants. be challenged might statutes the by invoked a such live, continuing controversy, Since this remains ordinarily appropriate justified relief would be if the Gray Sanders, merits of v. 372 U. 376. 368, the case. S. special situation, But here we have of for three the in question have been repealed statutes since the Legislature. Texas Article 474 of the Code, Penal the breach-of-the-peace provision, replaced .by has been §§42.01, 42.03, codification; 42.05 the new Art. 482, the abusive-language statute, replaced by has been 42.01; § and Art. the unlawful-assembly 439, provision, 42.02., has replaced by been § These enactments, new replaced which the 1, earlier statutes January 1974, as .of narrowly are more drawn predecessors. than their What ever the merits the District Court’s conclusions the statutes, any earlier challenge provisions new presents a different case.
Thus, although controversy there was live as to these statutes, at the time of the District Court if decree, there prosecutions are no pending under the old statutes, portions of the District judgment Court’s to. relating them has become moot.12 But because we cannot deter- mine with certainty 'whether there are prosecu- pending tions, or even whether the District Court intended to enjoin if them there “were, proper disposition is to remand the case to the District Court for further' find- these, any State has bring abandoned intention to cases law, to trial. Indeed it prosecutions that state would bar delay. now after such Const., See 1, Tex. Art. and Tex. § Proc., Code Crim. Art. 32.01. appropriate- It- is therefore to re- mand to the question. District Court findings further on this system In the federal an appellate court determines mootness as the time case, it considers the not as it time was filed. Wade, Roe v. 410 U. S. 125. Church, Baptist Central Cf. ings. Diffenderfer under prosecutions pending no If are 412. there U. S. n statutes, should superseded the District these declaratory injunctive relief as to both vacate remaining prosecutions pending If are there them. the District Court appellees,13 then against particular these as whether findings make should to. genuine in bad with no brought faith; prosecutions were finds, If the court it so expectation conviction.14 will. prosecutions pending If are members of the class there action, Court must find that not named represented. Appellants stipulated in District properly class *15 they “plaintiffs properly representative of the class that are In represent.” 2, Appeal. 33, Record on purport to Document ¶ plaintiff, and regard a named we that ".theunion was itself this note judgment on behalf of its the was issued of all members. standing plaintiff raise
. to In this case the union has as a named standing to would have of the claims a member the union that .of deprived persons 42 raise. Unions under U. C. 1983 as sue S. § rights laws, Fed. by of their the Constitution and American secured (CA8), State, Co., Emp. Woodward, & 406 2d 137 Mun. v. F. of ' protected implicitly recognized First and it has been rights members and Amendment flow to unions as well as to their organizers. 722; Carpenters Cafe, Union v. Ritter’s 315 U. S. by If, Button, 415, alleged NAACP v. S. as the cf. 371 428. U. subject complaint, union in its to arrests its members were unlawful activity pro engaging organizational and intimidation in for union Amendment, capacity tected to communicate First union’s unlawfully only through impeded, its since union can act standing complain members. has union then the arrests bring and intimidation and action. 14 Pfister, 479, “[Ajppellants See Dombrowski 380 v. U. S. 490: good enforcing appellees have attacked the faith of in statutes, they claiming invoked, have and threaten'to continue invoke, process any hope success, to' criminal without but ultimate only discourage appellants’ rights civil activities.” Cam See also Johnson, 619-620, eron v. 390 U. S. and v. Ledesma, Perez 401 (separate J.). U. S. opinion n. Brennan, may ulti- this Court appropriate
enter an which decree mately review, propriety both as to the federal as to case, intervention in the circumstances and any holding striking the merits of down the state statutes. remaining Tex. Civ. statutes, As two 5154f, necessary for Stat., 5154d it is not Arts. any Younger other reasons for us at to reach this time questions or the merits of below to the the decision as constitutionality. statutes’ As these we must also remand for a determination as аre to whether there pending prosecutions, if there are none the although appellees prosecutions still be in might threatened the future since these in But statutes are still force. only if prosecutions, ap- there are and the threatened pellees sought declaratory relief as to the statutes, Younger then the case would governed by all, not be at Thompson, but decided this U. S. 452, Steffel Term.15 The District Court, of did course, not have the benefit opinion of our of its time Steffel decision. We appropriate therefore think it to vacate judgment of the District Court toas these statutes and remand for findings further reconsideration light of v. Thompson. If are prose- pending there Steffel cutions then the District Court should determine whether they were brought faith, bad purpose of harass- ing appellees deterring the exercise of First Amend- *16 rights, ment so that allowing prosecutions to proceed will in result injury to the If appellees. irreparable no prosecutions there are pending only declaratory and is relief sought, then clearly controls and no Steffel Younger showing need be made. 15 question do not We reach reserved in as to -whether Steffel Younger showing necessary á injunctive against to obtain relief prosecutions. threatened generally Note, See Against Federal Relief Implications
Threatened State Prosecutions: The Younger, Lake Roe, Carriers (1973). and 48 Y. U. L. N. Rev. injunctive granting affirm decree summary, In we modifi- appropriate with police misconduct, relief against held statutes the five to delete reference to cations We vacate Court. the District unconstitutional statutes, and Court’s as to those five judgment District proceedings for further consistent remand opinion.
It is so ordered. decision, of Powell in part Mr. Justice took no this casé.
Mr. Chief with whom Mr. Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist concurring White and Mr. Justice join, part part. the result dissenting 1, 1966, On June Farm appellee United Workers Organizing Committee, (the union), AFL-CIO called a strike of farmworkers in County, Starr Texas. After collapsed year strike later six union and individuals active in the brought strike1 this action in United States Court for the Southern District Texas five Rangers, Sheriff, Texas two Deputy Sheriffs, Special and a Deputy of County, Starr Texas', and a County Starr Justice Peace, alleging unlawfully defendants suppressed plaintiffs and the class of union sympathizers they members and purported to represent in the exercise of their First and Fourteenth rights Amendment speech free and asso- during ciation the strike.2 suppression alleged to have been caused in part through the enforcement of six Texas which plaintiffs statutes claimed to have been (cid:127) unconstitutional. The District Court, convened as a Medrano, Kathy Baker, Francisco Lopez, Padilla, David Gilbert Magdaleno Dimas, Benjamin Rodriguez. alleged Jurisdiction is. under 28 U. 1343, 2201, S. 2202, 2281, C. §§ and 42 U. S. C. 1983 and 1985. §§
822 of
three-judge
court, agreed
plaintiffs- as to five
with
the statutes3 and
them to be
declared
unconstitutional
and enjoined their
The
Court also
District
enforcement.
injunction prohibiting
entered an.
acts of misconduct
and
defendants
those associated with them.
347
(1972).
-ap-
F. Supp. 605
five
Rangers
The
Texas
pealed the
Judgment
District 'Court’s
to this Court.
probable jurisdiction.
We
411
(1973).,
noted
S. 963
U.
today
The
judgment
Court
of the
vacates the
District
it
Court
with
the
granted against
as
deals
the relief
enforcement of
statutes,
and .remands for further
findings and
in' the
case
the relief
reconsideration,
granted
respect
to two
light
statutes,
Thompson,
v.
(1974).
doing
415 U.
452
so
S.
In
Steffel
fairly
Court avoids-significant
issues which are
legal
presented in
appeal
and which must be resolved now.
They deserve full
only
treatment
benefit not
for.
the District Court on remand but of other courts that
must
myriad problems presented
wrestle with the
Harris,
Younger
the doctrine of
applying
I in- facts as found are (cid:127) review of necessary those facts is for an dispute. A. 3 Code, (unlawful assembly), Tex. Penal Arts. (breach peace), (abusive language) (1952), and Tex. Rev. (mass Stat., Civ. picketing) (secondary picket 5154f Arts.5154d ing boycotting) (1971). *18 legal of the issues understanding of some difficult appeal. Eugene Nelson, leader, a strike (a) Ón June one 8,1966, for four hours custody taken and detained was into being any charges against, him.; without While filed , he about his strike activities and custody questioned was Investigation would the Federal Bureau of informed that threats of vio- regarding alleged him. investigating and buses used to against lence the local courthouse jobs. their When transport Mexican farmworkers to bridge into an international custody, taken Nelson atwas join the attempting persuade to workers to strike. leader, Chandler, was
(b) Raymond union Another he 1966, on site when 12, picketing arrested at a October became disperse involved obey refused an order language using in an loud and vociferous altercation deputy County. to a sheriff Starr Chandler. Art. Code, Penal apparently violating for Tex. arrested - set Bond was 474, disturbing-the-peace statute'. for violation although- punishment $500 the maximum friends $200 of Art. fine. Two of Chandler’s is a verbally who bond were came the courthouse make deputy by abused threatened with arrest sheriffs.. (c) 1966, vio- 24, deputy On October a sheriff used deadly presi- lence force to subdue threat who, dent local union while under arrest and custody courthouse, in a just had shouted out “viva huelga” la fellow with some arrestees.
(d) 1966, On 9, Rangers, November the Texas who by had help keep peace this time been called in to served, during strike, and order pendency a Reynaldo Cruz, warrant of De charging arrest La Civ. Stat., 5154f, a violation of Tex. Rev. Art. on No- when picketed vember members of the union produce located packing sheds on Missouri Pacific Rail- arrest
road De La Cruz was under tracks. While to the Rangers two made anti-union statements Texas arrestee.
(e) were filed' sheriff Charges deputy De im- Reynaldo 28, 1966, La Cruz on December personating by wearing badge an officer in and around deputy the union hall: The had not witnessed the offense; badge type, was of the shield while sheriff's deputies Rangers badges- shape and Texas in the wore deputy stars. who charges .The filed the admitted that he was of his own that similar knowlédge aware badges had been worn De when La Cruz and another *19 directing traffic Union functions. Also on that date at. attempted Librado De La Cruz grab nonstriking to a farm employee by coat, the and was arrested immedi- ately and charged with assault.
(f) evening On the January 26, 1967, about 20 supporters union gathered County. were at the Starr Courthouse peaceful to conduct a prayer vigil pro- test of arrests of union day. members earlier that Two members of the group mounted steps, the courthouse and when group was deputy ordered a sheriff's to leave.the grounds, courthouse steps the two on the refused and were arrested for unlawful assembly, ap- parently in violation of Penal Code, Tex. Art. 439. One of the two arrested was Gilbert the first of Padilla, plaintiffs named to enter chronology. The other was a minister.
(g) On February 1, 1967, persons nine were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace,- apparently in violation of Tex. Penal Code, Art. for exhorting field laborers quit work.
(h) ¿vents Three later, months on May 11, 1967, other occurred: appellant Captain A. Y. Allee of the Texas Rangers informed picketing strikers he could get them wage. union-demanded minutes at the within 10 job a con- persons shoved two Ranger Texas day Also on that plain- one of the named including strike, nected with the file attempted shoved those Both'of Lopez. David tiffs, county determined attorney but charges of assault go forward evidence was insufficient that there complaint. were May 12, 1967, strikers following day,
(i) On the Tex. accordance with picket peacefully allowed statute, picketing Art. mass Stat., 5154d, Rev. Civ. for depart being detained were allowed to after time site. period picketing short 12, 1967, arrested (j) May Eugene On Nelson was Rangers al- threatening for life of certain Texas seriously, though appellant Allee did take the threat and a could be accepted bond was not until tax records weekend, checked was no following although there valid waiting reason for to whom deputy since sheriff surety the bond was tendered well knew full that the was person landowner and a County. of substance in Starr (k) On May 1967, 14 persons were arrested trespassing. The charge was later changed to unlawful and this assembly, charge superseded by a second- ary picketing and boycott charge. persons Ten were arrested they when attempted allegedly to block a train *20 . carrying produce. The second group of persons four was arrested later in the evening. The four were apparently arrested for unsuccessfully encouraging bystanders picket and were ultimately charged secondary pick- with eting and boycotting upon complaint aof railroad special agent who had left prior the scene to the events which caused this second series arrests. Included in the group was Magdaleno Dimas, another named plaintiff. findings recite that a Mrs. Krueger, an- other one of this second group, was arrested “either for attempting of her husband's arrest
taking picture a Captain in her husband's to strike Allee with her camera 347 F. at four arrestees 615. Supp., defense.” findings the second were handled. The group roughly clarity. not with this entire incident are set concerning out (l) May 1967, Texas arrested 31, Rangers On the mass apparently pickets allegedly violating for Rev. Art. 5154d. picketing statute, Stat., Tex. Civ. (m) Rangers sought June On Texas Kathy Baker, Magdaleno arrested Dimas the home having previously plaintiff, allegedly another named gun presence in a threatening brandished manner ' special deputy County. persons of Starr Two other were arrested for assisting Benja- Dimas evade arrest. min Rodriguez, a third named plaintiff, was arrested at police same apprehended Dimas, although time the District Court does explain Rodriguez why was arrested. The arrests of Dimas and Rodriguez found were by the District Court have been accomplished in a brutal and violent fashion.
,(n) While the strike in progress County the Starr Sheriff's office assisted in regular distribution of strongly anti-union newspaper. Each deputies week pick would up and then locally distribute copies of the paper.
II In ~part;;-T problems consider the mootness In standing. III,. Part I Younger Harris, discuss U. S. 37 (1971), its.applicability facts of .the instant The injunction case. against police misconduct n (cid:127) is dealt Part IV.
The principal relief granted by the District was the declaration that five Texas statutes are uncon- injunction and the stitutional their continued enforcement. The District Court determined- on the
827 overcome the appellees had them it found as facts Harris, and the Younger supra, v. imposed by burden merits of the reach therefore, empowered was, court Although the statutes. challenges to the constitutional to arrests and recited as District -Court evidence explicit make did not filed, been having charges the time prosecutions pending at specific findings time of its. of the or at the action the commencement pend- prosecutions possible facts of decision. Since the . are cru- commencement of action ing now at the applica- mootness, standing, matters of cial to Harris, Younger v. remand to bility we should Court for findings further this area.. Three by- of the held be statutes unconstitutional (cid:127)the District repealed Court have been Texas (cid:127) Legislature newa codification of Penal Code. (unlawful Articles 439 assembly), (breach 474 peace), and (abusive 482 language) longer can no employed to appellees arrest or members of their class. On. remand. District Court should first determine appellees had standing commence this whether aCtion- respecting these three statutes. “It be alleged must plaintiff 'has sustained immediately danger of sustaining some injury’ direct as result of the challenged statute official conduct. Massa or. Mellon, v. chusetts (1923).” U.S. O’Shea Littleton, v. 414 U. S. (1974). if Even by the e., operation, i. arrest and prosecution, or threatenеd op eration of statutes, the. one or more appellees had stand ing to commence this action, the' District Court will be obliged resolve the “question as to the continuing existence a live and controversy.” acute. Steffel . Thompson, S., at 415 U. (Emphasis 459 in original.) See also Employment Indiana Division v. Burney, 409 been, U. 540 (1973). S. Since the statutes have re- *22 longer no suffice pealed prosecution threats of future can injury appel- controversy. to The that establish a live prose- pending then result from lees faced and face must now challenged statutes cutions under each of repealed. by the held unconstitutional two other statutes 5154d and Arts. Court, Stat., Tex. Rev. Civ. I on say,
5Í54f, repealed, have not been cannot record, is possibility prosecutions that of future is not real.. The District Court should examine the constitutionality standing appellees challenge to applicable of these guidelines statutes under the same as repealed statutes, except prosecution to the three that hypothetically possible remains under these two statutes. supra, Thompson, See v. at 459. Steffel Littleton, We have recently supra, held O’Shea v. 498, that standing personal must be to and satisfied who power “those seek -to invoke Bailey Patterson, federal courts.” See also v. 369 31, U. (1962); Long Columbia, S. 32-33 v. District 152 App. U. D. 187, 190, S. C. 469 F. 927, (1972). 2d If an 930 appellee individual named is.subject was and prosecu to tion under one of challenged statutes, appellee that would have to standing challenge constitutionality that statute. If an individual named appellee was and threatened prosecution with under one of' the extant statutes,.that appellee would standing have to challenge its constitutionality. Prosecutions instituted persons who plaintiffs are not named cannot form .the basis for standing of those who an In bring action. plaintiff particular, named cannot acquire standing to sue bringing his action on behalf of others' who suf injury fered which would have them standing afforded they had been plaintiffs; named it bears repeating person рredicate cannot standing injury which he acquired through cannot be Standing does not .share. Littleton, v. back O’Shea door of class action. Patterson, supra; supra, Bailey v. at 32-33.4 In any- appellees addition to individual named have, standing challenge union itself the constitu tionality of long recognized statutes. Court has speech guarantees the First Amendment’s free assembly disputes. important play have an labor role Alabama, Thornhill v. (1940); Thomas U. S. Collins, I (1945). agree 323 U. S. entities, unions, Court that as addition union organizers, members are entitled the benefit *23 may of guarantees those a union under 42 that sue Amendment, § U. S. C. 1983 to rights. enforce its First the appellee alleged Here union in the complaint that it deprived rights speech of its constitutional of free and assembly by the actions of in enforcing defendants the challenged If,, Texas statutes. as claimed the union, union subject members were to unlawful arrest and threats of arrest First protected their Amendment organizational activity on behalf of union, .the .the union would have derivatively suffered or posi have been in the tion to derivatively suffer injury real and 'would have standing complain of to that injury bring this action.5 If a person who was a member of both union at the. the time of person’s that arrest and at present the time 4The states “the that District Court must -find the represented.” Ante, at 819 n. 13. properly class was I take mean that plaintiff the appropriate named must an representative class; for the plaintiff named must have injury suffered the same as the purportedly represented, class injury and that must be sufficient to accord plaintiff standing named to sue in right. his own Bailey v. Patterson, 31, Long (1962); 369 U. S. 32-33 v. District of Columpia, 152 App. 187, 190, U. S. D. C. 469 F. 927, (1972). 2d 930 5 Morton, See Sierra Club v. 405 U. S. (1972); NAACP Button, v. 415, 428 (1963). 371 U. S. have, challenge con individually to standing
would Union then the statutes, five of the stitutionality of one inability since the standing, such would have itself freely restricts communicate member to the union the Court As ability union to communicate. only through “can act ante, union 819 n. states, members.” its III (A) with' be faced remand will Court on tbe Harris, Younger 401 U. S. applicability issue continued standing and the (1971), appellees. Since in relation controversy of a live as to action existence pendency of repealed depend statutes on the three be neces- prosecutions statutes, under will each of the it for-appellees Younger to reach sary to meet standards constitutional these merits statutes. prove
To the in- that.they standing, the extent can appellees seeking dividual will be inter- federal court ference in their own prosecutions. state court unipn, standing, extent it has will be seek- ing prosecutions interference with state Court of its mem- identity bers. There is an of interest between union prosecuted members; and its the union seek relief *24 only prosecutions because of the members,7 of' its may, course, criminal, directly-subject 6 The union of be to prosecution-. prosecuted prosecution A union or threatened with qua position in litigant union as same an individual would Younger regard Harris, standing (1971). to v. U. S. opinion are special -'designed rules outlined in this for injured being more situation wherfe the union is not commpn (by proceeded- , against directly laws, operation in the of criminal but, rather, injured derivatively prosecutions is from and threats prosecutions of its members. of 6, supra. See n.
831'
may the
prosecutions cease
insuring
such
only by
that
which it
interests
vindicate the
union
constitutional
place of
stands in the
claims are violated. The union
its own con-
it asserts
prosecuted
its
members even as
ap-
comity
The same
considerations
rights.
stitutional
ply
brought
whether the
in the name
action
individually
union member or in.the name
arrested
inequity
requiring
in
union,
and there is no
mem-
as its
legal
union to abide
the same
standards
in
If the union were unable
suing
bers
in federal court.
Younger,
to
members sub-
requirements
meet the
its
ject
prosecution
opportunity
would have a full
rights
vindicate the First Amendment
of both the union
proceedings.
and its
in the
Any
members
state court
other
result
easy
would allow the
circumvention of
Younger by. individuals who could assert their claims
through
unincorpo-
First Amendment
an
violations
rated associаtion
those
same
if the
individuals
asso-
ciation
Younger
is immune from
burdens.
'
This
contrary
result is not
reached in
Steffel
qüire petitioner con- apparent no to and had party ceedings he was not in this situation unfairness inheres No such nection with. crimi-, required to await state might be the union where rights it holds to vindicate members nal trials of its deprived of de- members and was common with those those directed prosecutions rivatively only through membefs.8 (cid:127) Younger applies be process determining when the two extant complex dealing more when comes n statutes. prosecutions against If there are state court under these statutes appellees or the union the individual If are Younger be met. there requirements then must union under these prosecutions against members of the (and standing derivatively) union asserts .statutes Younger for the hurdle must be met reasons then the - appellees If or union standing stated. of individual solely is básed on threat challenge one of the statutes pursued re prosecutions, ened and the relief below with declaratory Younger spect only, to that statute is then supra. Thompson, appellees If apply. v. does? Steffel seek, respect injunctive operation relief with to the for statute the viоlation which enforcement prosecutions threatened, question are whether of. Younger applies has not beerf'answered this Court. Thompson, supra, issue-may at 463. Since'the Steffel premature well not- arise on it would remand now attempt it.. development resolve of what re lief was and requested by appellees still is is-a matter attempt There is no need now to to further define those situ ations in which proper impute it would be the state criminal prosecution plaintiff of one who not' a federal to one who is. The association *of the state criminal plaintiff defendant and the federal necessáry (cid:127) imputation depend, uppn joint will activity facts of interest. .and-common *26 Finally, on remand.9 to the District left
best Court injury members, to basis its the union sues on the if challenged, one member since, as a statute then requirements his meet the suing behalf, if on must, own. though so, union must do even other Younger, the they if had not be burdened of its members would so Younger requirements of individually. The brought suit be not to evaded artificial niceties. are
'(B) - step analysis The in the is to define the burdens next by Younger imposed Harris. we held that There v. before a federal can interfere with state criminal great irreparable injury and proceedings, immediate must beyond be shown “above and that associated prosecution defense of a in single good brought faith.” injury 401 at except U. 48. The must in S., include, extremely rare prerequisites “the usúal of bad cases, faith Id., Younger In harassment.” at 53. the Court (cid:127) made clear that the mere fact the- statute plaintiff which the proceeded federal court being under against is unconstitutional on its face “does in not itself justify injunction an against good-faith attempts open relief to the District Court on remand is limited repeal of three of the longer statutes. Since the statutes no exist, they can no “chilling have conceivable further on effect” others in constitutionally protected rights. justi the exercise of their disappeared, fication then, permitting litigant has challenge statute, not application becausе of the of the unconstitutional conduct, as statute to his but might rather because the statute as persons applied to other be in an By unconstitutional manner. re pealing statutes, seeming State has threat- “remove[d] constitutionally protected expression,” deterrence'to. and the ' apply “strong should not medicine” doctrine, employed by overbreadth which “has been the Court sparingly as a last resort” to hold statutes unconstitutional on their Oklahoma, face. Broadrick (1973). U. S. “im- described as Id., it.” at 54. The Court
enforce
enforcing
portant
necessary” the State’s
task
inhibiting effect
statutes which
have an incidental
socially
harmful
rights, “against
Amendment
First
pun-
in
faith to be
good
the State believes
conduct that
Id.,
52.
under its
Constitution.”
laws and the
ishable
Younger principles
only mandate federal court ab-
facially
good-faith
stention
the case of
enforcement
claims
statutes,
require
but also
unconstitutional
invalidity,
other
unconstitutionality,
than facial
presented,
instance,
first
state court
*27
which;
prosecution
claimed
involving
criminal
Perez v.
deprivation is
In
constitutional
.pending.
Ledesma,
(1971),
“The admissibility and arrests ,state evidence in prosecutions criminal are ordi narily matters to be resolved tribunals, state see by Minard, 342 subject, U. S. (1951), 117 Stefanelli v. of course, to appeal review certiorari or in this or, in proper case, corpus. habeas federal Here Ledesma was free present his federal con stitutional claims concerning arrest and seizure of materials or matters to the other Louisiana courts in permitted manner in that Only State. in cases proven prosecutions hаrassment undertaken by state officials in bad faith hope without of obtaining a valid conviction perhaps and in other extraordinary 10 But see n. infra. shown injury irreparable where
circufhstances can.be pending state injunctive is federal relief nothing . . There is appropriate. . prosecutions offi that Louisiana suggest before us to the record in a prosecutions other than undertook these cials criminal attempt to enforce the State’s good-faith Id., laws.” at 84-85. presumed capable fulfilling
A to be state court enforce, its responsibility guard, “solemn 'to ... protect every right secured the Constitu granted or Connolly, tion of Robb v. the United States Thompson, S., U. 415 U. (1884).” S. Steffel Yet a fulfill effectively 460-461. state court cannot its responsibility prosecutorial when the authorities deprive take deliberate faith, unfairly bad action, person adequate reasonable opportunity application in the make state courts for of his vindication rights. deprived constitutional When such an individual, meaningful irrepa .of access to the state courts, faces injury rights of great rable constitutional immedi magnitude, either the immediate in. the suit or ate prosecutions substantial likelihood of “repeated to which Harris, he will subjected,” Younger v. at 49, U. S., *28 and injury demands prompt'relief, federal courts are prevented by of comity considerations granting from the extraordinary remedy of pending interference in state criminal prosecutions.
A judicial of the system breakdown state which would allow intervention allegation federal was appel- of Pfister, in Dombrowski v. lants (1965). U. S. In appellants alia, that case had. offered to inter prove, prosecutor public that the was holding state hearings being photostatic copies which were used of illegally seized which had evidence, already evidence ordered been suppressed by a It state court. was alleged-further that prosecutor copies threatening to use other
illegally jury seized to obtain grand documents before If proved, allegations indictments. Dotnbrowski made out a clear case of a breakdown the chbcks and balances in justice system. the state criminal The courts had prosecutor lost control of a embarked on an al- leged of' campaign appellants, designed harassment discourage rights. exercise constitutional their Under such federal intervention would circumstances authorized. Younger
To meet the plaintiff test the federal must show manifest bad faith and injury that is immedi great, ate, and irreparable, constituting harassment of plaintiff ex,ercise in the rights, constitutional his resulting in deprivation state ‘meaningful access to' the plaintiff courts. The prove federal must both bad faith requisite injury.' prosecution In judging whether has been commenced in bad faith, federal n entitled to take into cir range consideration the i.ull cumstances surrounding proseeutions fed which the plaintiff eral would have the district court interfere with: A federal however, court must be cautious, recognize our justice system' criminal works by according broad discretion to those charged enforce laws. Cf. Santobello New York, (1971). 404 U. S. In this regard, prosecutors often, good will faith, prosecúte .choose not to prosecutions or to discontinue entirely legitimate An reasbns. once individual, arrested, does not have a “right” to proceed to in order trial make 'coiistitutional .claims his respecting Con arrest. versely, prosecutors may proceed to trial with less than an “open and shut” case the defendants.- In Court, Johnson, 390 Cameron v. U. S. 621 (1968), nóted:> question for the
“[T]he District Court was not the *29 ques- the persons guilt charged; or innocence was enforced the satute tion was whether but expectation of convictions them with no The protected rights. exercise discourage to application of erroneous possibility mere the. injury irreparable amount 'to the does not statute orderly disruption of state necessary justify to Pfister, supra, at 485. Dombrowski proceedings.’ or innocence is for state of guilt The issue the required was not trial; criminal State appellants guilty procеeding the federal prove expectation had no escape the that the State finding (Footnote omitted.) convictions.” securing valid step prosecutor from decision of the removed One prosecute policeman is the decision of the to arrest. prosecution may of a bad-faith nature sometimes be inferred from common activity prosecutor police and the to employ prosecutions arrests and un- lawfully discourage the exercise of rights. civil the prosecutor conclusion police that acting are as one to persons of deprive rights their should not be inferred readily too police on the basis of action alone. Just as is the prosecutors, case with police possess broad discretion in enforcing criminal laws. Police cannot reasonably expected upon to act a realización law they are asked to enforce bemay uncon- stitutional. Even when police cross line of legality they as enforce statutes they may not be acting willfully; precise probable contours of like cause, the Fourth Amendment’s stricture against unreasonable search and seizure, are far from When policeman willfully clear.. engages patently illegal conduct in the course of an arrest there still should be clear and convincing be- proof, fore bad faith can be found, that this was part of a com- plan mon scheme, concert with prosecutorial au- *30 838 constitutional their of plaintiffs deprive
thorities, al by police, brutality of acts random Willful, rights. rem civil subject to and themselves, in though abhorrent faith. bad finding a basis will form a edies, harass campaign of on a embark police may, course, persons without group of an individual ment authorities. prosecutorial of the knowledge or assistance enjoining state would not lie remedy in such a case relief, real but provide no which would prosecutions, justice sys criminal reaching through down the State’s primary law directly tem to deal with the abuses at the Gelston, v. 364 F. 2d enforcement level. Cl. Lankford 1966). (CA4 See, infra. the injury confronting Unless criminal de- state fendant is great, con- immediate, irreparable, and harassment, prosecution stitutes be interfered cannot- Younger. under The severity of the standard re- flects extreme reluctance of federal courts to inter- fere with pending prosecutions. state criminal
If the federal plaintiff injunctive seeks or'declar- atory relief based on claimed facial invalidity of a stat- ute, the injury may derive not prosecu- from the plaintiff tions the is currently facing where a violation of that statute is alleged, but also from the probability of future prosecutions under that statute. Evidence of multiple prosecutions of persons arrests other than plaintiff federal under that statute may well bear on the likelihood of future arrests prosecutions plaintiff. federal Á state criminal defendant seeking re- t against lie more than one statute, prove must requisite degree of injury separately for each statute he challenges. Any other rule would encourage, insub- stantial and multiple attacks on the constitutionality of n by persons statutes hoping to .state meet the strict Standards of injury by accumulating effects under many constitutional order reach the provisions state Furthermore, consid only one or a few. merits Younger ill would be which underlie comity erations showing of employ if a court were served federal brought prosecutions respecting faith and bad harassment pretext for challenged as a facially under one statute searching a code .for unconstitutional statutory State’s provisions Landry, Cf. Boyle to strike down. (1971). U. S. *31 must, perforce, same rule the relief apply when
sought is in scope, by way limited of chal- constitutional lenges applied, as statutes to interference specific prosecutions. requested no relief which Since could operation affect the future or enforcement óf a (as statute would be the challenged when statute is .case on face), injury its solely must derive from the immi- single prosecution. nence of the possibility of future arrests, any under color of statutеs, is irrelevant state proof injury challenged of from the prosecution. It will be the case, indeed, prosecution pro- rare where a single harm, quantum vides the of justify that will interferehce. On the other hand, in the case of an attack on the facial constitutionality of a statute, likely prospect of multi- ple prosecutions, brought also in bad faith and without , hope conviction, of the violation of for the same statute which formed the basis for pending prosecutions of court plaintiff, might well federal constitute a suffi- cient showing of justify harm to a federal court’s decision to reach the constitutionality of the statute..
A special problem in proof Younger injury arises with the Union: shall permitted the.Union be to.aggre- gate injuries which all its members will-reasonably suffer under the operation of statutes, or must the injury test be independently satisfied by person one who was and is a member of the Union? For the reason ex- members union prosecutions of why
pressed above as to Younger pur- the. union be attributed to should easy rule would allow poses any other —that injury necessary Younger unfair circumvention of —the single If no single member.11 be confronted 'must union, which Younger injury, member faces then n realistically be operates through members, cannot its said to face such injury. is.appropriate to.
With these mind it principles Court turn The District facts in the instant case. held, that Younger applicable, assumed was requirements found, basis the facts it Younger been met. The Court‘then had proceeded to the of each of the constitutional merits challenged Younger hold- statutes. The District Court’s ing was in error.
There is no deferring of the District reason'for review legal Younger satisfied,- Court’s conclusion that although 'the' appellees allow would, apparently, to have a second proving chance .this element trial, their case. action Although 'of this took place in 1968, the District Court’s had not decision been handed Younger down the time was issued *32 1971. In September 1971, parties requested were by the District file supplementаl Court to briefs on the' impact of Younger on this cause. In their briefs, ap- pellants grgued that the federal was'required un- Younger der to abstain, while appellees argued that Younger did apply not to the case, instant and, alterna- tively, that if Younger did apply the of Younger test that, Proof other subject union members have been to bad-faith prosecutions arrests under a statute be relevant to a claim injury union member faces from a substantial likelihood being prosecuted arrested’ and in bad faith in the future under the' color of same supra, statute. See at 838.
had been Appellees met. did request hearings adduce proof further relating Younger bad faith and harassment. is, There therefore, no- basis for reopening the matter on remand, up and taking judicial valuable time relitigating an issue as to which both have sides had day their in court. Failure to decide now whether appellees have Younger met the requirements with re- spect to challenges to the five validity statutes whose remains in issue would cause delay needless in a lawsuit already far removed in pre- time from the which events cipitated respect it. With to the repealed three stat- utes, if the action is not appellees moot will be met with Younger they burden satisfy. been have unable With respect to the two statutes, extant the action will be moot, appellees will satisfy Younger, have failed to appellees' will not have satisfy Younger, only had to having been prosecutions. threatened with "any case, In Younger resolution of the issues in this case at this time by the expedite Court will proceedings on remand and remove from this suit ripe controverted matters ' judicial determination. 'can, course,
Appellees seek to further amend their amended complaint to allegations make further of fact regarding the events which place during took one- strike, year and the District Court will judge then have to nearly years whether after “justice seven requires” so amendment. (a). Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 finding's of fact the District Court do not justify, legаl any conclusion that appellees harm, danger were in of' suffering that was im- great, mediate, and irreparable, and constituted harassment, respect one of the statutes. showing Such a must be made each appellee separately regarding each I statute. now analysis turn to -of an first on facts, *33 determine then to aiid issue, injury-harassment the. was bad faith. whether there for arrested been have found to only persons assembly), (unlawful Art. Code, Penal violating Tex. 1967, prayer January 26, of the were the two leaders took vigil. place no arrests For months thereafter five other 1967, 14 May At the end of under this statute. charged trespassing, and later persons12 were arrested were charges assembly.. with unlawful These latter being dropped and pending only days for three before replaced picketing charges boy- secondary cotting. relating clearly to Art. in- The evidence 439 is any any sufficient to inference appellee, sustain that including union, prospect repeated faced the arrests in the future under this There is no statute. showing having defend the state criminal actions instituted as a result of the arrests that were made under the statute would any unusually be in manner onerous and seriously any damaging They of the arrestees. were traditional arrests with de- traditional burdens of fending against charges.
On two occasions arrests were made for violating Tex. Code, Penal (breach Art. peace): of Raymond Ghandler on October 1966, and of persons (ap- nine parently not including Chandler13) Mr. February 1, Thereafter, 1967. to June no were made arrests filed, and no charges were for violations of provision.. No inference can be made person faces the likelihood repeated and unwarranted arrests under this statute. There the-, is nothing in findings to suggest and no reason to believe that the few prosecu- tions resulting from enforcement of this 'statute will 12See 7.20 ¶ complaint, amended Supp. 605, and 347 F. (SD 1972). Tex. 13See 7.13 of complaint, ¶ the amended and 347 Supp., F. at 614. *34 differing that from extraordinary hardship any result of criminal dеfense with usual ordinarily associated action. ar- the Union were appears five members of
It that Art. 482 (abusive Tex. Penal violating Code, for rested through 26, 1967,- midway January on about language) Younger even injury of is The absence the strike.14 challenge statute. clearer in of enforcement example single of instance Another occasion, on one persons, of 13. of a the arrest statute is Civ. Art. 31, violating Stat., Rev. May for Tex. 1967, (mass insuffi- totally facts are picketing). 5154d required under injury cient for a of the serious finding Younger. trespassing for persons
Fourteen who arrested were May with unlawful 26, 1967, charged on were later only three pending for assembly, charges but those were days, which time 14 were with charged of end violating 5154f, Tex. Rev. Civ. Art. the second- Stat., ary boycott provision. only other picketing and persons charged violating time were Art. 5154f 1966, filed complaint was 9, November when persons picketing for on November illegal challenge grounds 1966. The not District Court does issu\ng complaint, but manner questions of the of the but custody following the arrest one do objectionable action nothing had whatever with the for which the individual was arrested. offense found unconstitutional, As with four other statutes Younger jury, is test serious under not met harm. showing such an of future inadequate prove Appellees prosecutions also failed might which resulted from these were have arrests Very nearly all brought bad faith. evidence complaint, and 347 F. Supp., See 7.11 of the amended at 613. ¶ Court relates to activities bad faith found the District County Rangers of the Texas and the Starr Sheriff’s on the Office, prosecutors. bearing Evidence -allegations prosecutorial bad is restricted to faith mildly critical of three items: the District Court first, an by the investigation, apparently inadequate, made County Attorney County inci- shoving into the Starr May 11, subsequent dent of 1967, and the decision not to go complaint forward with the which had been filed *35 by shoved; prosecu- two men who been .the had a second, conceivably tor something could have had to do with excessively Raymond the bond set after high Chаndler’s arrest on 1966, October but there is no 12, finding on this point; third, February on 1, those for 1967, arrested] disturbing peace by were informed the Justice of the Peace, on County from the instructions that Attorney, they if appeared ever that under again the same charge they post would have to bond.15 record does not contain finding prosecutions a were brought and promptly then dropped; in persons one instance arrested an violating unchallenged May statute on 26, 1967, were charged later violating first with Tex. Penal Code, 439, Art. a challenged statute, subsequently with violating. Rev. Stat., Tex. Civ. Art. 5154f, also a chal- lenged statute.
Nor can the isolated police instances of misconduct by Rangers Texas County Starr deputies Sheriff’s by found District Court a turn prosécutions, series.of apparently good instituted in (even faith assuming that all persons who were arrested are or were prosecu facing as a tions result their into arrests), a campaign of terror against the union which could only be remedied nothing 15 I can improper find warning. ..with this A second of (cid:127) fense usually under the same statute looked seriously on more - a than first.. Excluding federal the distri courts. by recourse'to activity could newspaper, antiunion which bution disruptive a and-immediate hardly be have direct said to other, efforts daily picketing organizational on effect days dur Union, District Court found controversy or in which law enforcement ing long judicial improper óf Texas in an fashion officers acted this is dealing strikers strike sympathizers; per an of one month. of the “abuses” average One shoving per of two found Court was the occasion, May 26, sons. On another 1967, camera was two men were held near a confiscated, passing train, and F, persons four were “roughly Supp., 615, handled,” at after All happened their arrest Texas Rangers. n May 11, 1967, Captain was that Allee of the Texas Rangers picketing get told that he could them strikers jobs all at wage. Union-demanded “[Picketing every occurred day,” exception strike with oí' id., Sundays, yet allegedly no 612, harassing action the strikers after June 8; -1966, to takеn October 1966, period months, .of over'four or after February 1,1967, May period of over three *36 months. Finally, it is surprising the. Texas Rangers deputies and Sheriff’s would have found occa sions enforce laws governing picketing, assembly, and peace of the community, against persons sought who goals by to attain their picketing, assembling, and other making wise themselves and their- cause heard in County. Judging by Starr the infrequency of occa sions enforcement of laws the such strike did not 16Captain is, apparently, longer Allee no in active having service Rangers. retired from the According, Texas appellees he is no longer\a irfe’mber of Department the Texas Safety. of Public De fendants’ Supplemental (filed District Court Brief 6 26, 1971). Oct. appellees longer If no controversy have an active Captain Allee should be the^suit dismissed as moot as to him.
n law object interest with the
become an obsessive County. personnel enforcement Starr sum, showing In cannot be read as either findings respect oper- injury with to the requisite bad faith or the challenged of the five ation and enforcement totally Appellees satisfy failed to statutes. have Harris, Younger v. .demands of 401 U. 37 (1971). S.
IV The Court not declared District Texas stat- five enjoined utes and unconstitutional their enforcement, injunction but I also issued an what term shall “police injunction against police misconduct.” mis- conduct is on behalf of plaintiffs issued the named they represent, class “to-wit, the members of Plaintiff Farm United (cid:127)
Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, and all persons other who sympathy their for or because voluntary support of the aims of said Plaintiff union have engaged in, engaging may are or in, hereafter- peaceful engage picketing, peaceful or assembly, other organizational of or in support activities Plaintiff said union or who engage concert of action with or more of one Plaintiffs for the solici- tation of agricultural workers or join others to common cause make with them in matters pertaining to the work labor of agricultural workers.” injunction appears itself as рaragraph 16 of the Judgment. Court’s Filial This remarkable in- junction reads in full as follows:
“16. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that Defendants, their successors, agents and employees, persons acting in concert *37 with them, permanently are enjoined and restrained directed or conduct following acts any from they the persons to Plaintiffs applied or toward to-wit: represent, authority any manner Defendants’ Using in
“A. or preventing purpose officers for the peace as activities with- organizational discouraging peaceful adequate out cause. arresting, Interfering by stopping, dispersing,
“B. means, by any or other imprisoning person, or organiza- or picketing, assembling, solicitation, effort adequate tional without cause. Arresting any person warrant or
“C. without with- probable out cause which cause is accom- probable present panied by appropriate intention to -written jurisdiction. complaint competent “D. arresting or Stopping, dispersing, imprisoning' any person adequate without cause because arrest of some person. other
“E. As used this Paragraph Subparagraphs A, B D above, the term ‘adequate cause’ shall (1) mean actual public obstruction of a private or passway, road, or street, entrance which actually causes unreasonable interference with ingress, egress, or flow of or traffic; (2) force or violence, or the threat of force or violence, actually committed by any person by his own conduct or by actually aid- ing, or abetting, participating in such conduct another (3) or person; probable cause which may cause a Defendant to believe in good faith that one particular more persons did violate a criminal law of the State Texas other than those specific laws herein declared unconstitutional, or a municipal ordinance.”
This jurisdiction lacks to review injunction appeal direct from the District Court; but assuming
848' portion final jurisdiction over this this Court has Court District it be remanded to the judgment, should my along judgment. part, of its For with the remainder injunction if I were to rule on the merits I police reverse. misconduct would
(A) jurisdiction appeal on over Court does have course paragraph Judgment. proper 16 of the Final portion is to vacate and the District Court remand judgment for which entry judgment a fresh from - timely appeal Appeals can be taken to the ,the Townsend, for Fifth Circuit. See Edelman (1973). U. may
This Court appeal hear on “an order granting denying, or after notice and- hearing, an interlocutory permanent injunction action, civil suit or proceeding required by any Act of.Congress be by heard and determined a district court of judges.” three 28 U. § S. C. 1253. Congress has provided, by 28 U. S. C. 2281 that no § interlocutory permanent -or injunction against the en- forcement, operation, or execution of a state statute granted ground of unconstitutionality Unless the application for the injunction is heard and deter- by mined' a three-judge district court.
“This Court has more than once stated
juris
that its
diction under the Three-Judge Court Act is to be nar
rowly construed since ‘any loose construction of the
requirements of [the
would
Act]
the purposes of
defeat
Congress ...
to keep within narrow
ap
confines our
pellate docket.’ Phillips v. United States [312 U. S.
246,] 250.”
Cox,
Goldstein v.
We reaffirmed' our Brashear holding in Perez v. Led esma, 401 (1971). U. S. 82 In Perez appellees were charged in informations filed in state court vio á parish
lations of Louisiana and a local ordi statute three-judge nance. The Federal District Court “held” the facially state statute to be ruled that constitutional,17 but arrests and seizures of materials were invalid and entered suppression required order the return seized materials appellees. to the The District Court also ex pressed parish its view that ordinance was invalid. Judge initially who referred the action to the three-judge adopted that court’s view and declared the ordinance invalid. We to review refused decision, concerning the local ordinance, stating:
“Even if granting an order declaratory judgment against the ordinance had been entered the three- judge (which'.it court below not), had that court would, acting have been capacity single- of a judge court. Moody Flowers, We held in U. 97S. (1967), that a three-judge court was not properly convened to consider the constitutionality of a statute of only local application, similar ato local ordinance. Under 28 U. § S. C. 1253 we have *40 jurisdiction to consider on appeal direct only those civil actions ‘required ... to be heard and deter- by. mined’ a three-judge court. Since the consti- of tutionality parish this ordinance was not ‘re-' quired ... to be heard and determined’ a three- judge panel, there is no jurisdiction in this Court to review that question. “The fact that a three-judge court was properly n
convened in this case to consider injunctive requested relief against the enforcement of the state statute, does not give this jurisdiction Court on appeal direct over other controversies where there is no independent jurisdictional base. Even where 18, See n. infra.
851 convened to consider properly court three-judge parties are parties, controversy between one two three-judge necessarily entitled to a that exist other controversies on appeal a direct Comm’n v. Public Service See between them. Lines, (1939).” 204 Freight Brashear 306 U. S. (Footnote omitted.) S., 401 U. 86-87.18 at authority propo for the Perez are Brashear Lines and convened under district court three-judge sition that a 18 Way Leary, Milky U. S. rely v. 397 The Court would on (1970), contrary this has proposition: Court 98 jurisdiction ancillary by way appeal matters of review direct three-judge primary exercise of its decided district court in the validity three-judge stat of state court review of constitutional summary precedential in this affirmance value of bur utes. by. problem case is the Brashear somewhat diminished fact that fact, appellees’ In of was not raised in briefs. one appellees, contrary Brashear, appears concede Court jurisdiction ancillary by a review matters decided possesses Dismiss, properly three-judge Affirm convened court. Motion to (No. Appellee Hogan 1969). T. Frank S. O. It should further,'that noted, Ledesma, analysis Perez which included full jurisdiction ancillary three-judge court, appeal direct from a Milky Way summarily was decided after affirmed. Although it Court in Perez stated that held the state the District constitutional, facially statute to be the decision of District Court appears in there that and seizures unconstitutional arrests were оbscenity fact to 'have .from a derived broad condemnation statutes, case, in that without including state statute dealt with liability provisions incorporated protecting against therein criminal occurring prior adversary judicial for acts to an determination obscenity. then, Supp. (ED 1969). effect, In F. La. broadly nullity .the District Perez acted render a .to id., statute, (Rubin,. J., dissenting), we, Louisiana see jurisdiction therefore, properly appeal properly had over the we question ruled on the of whether the District Court could have inter *41 proceedings by invalidating .fered with criminal state court- arrests any -prior adversary hearing. and seizures made without adjudication narrowly (cid:127)§ to the 2281 must restrict itself directly grant on the those matters which bear injunctive statutes. denial of relief state So pot is insubstantial long as the constitutional claim noncoiistitutional claims court consider three-judge injunctive alternatively relief, support in urged jurisdiction and we review such nonconstitu have to Florida portions tional of the district court’s decision. Jacobsen, Growers (1960).19 Lime Indeed, 362 U. S. required a three-judge give district court would to priority statutory, claim a to consideration of over Wyman, constitutional claim. Rosado v. 397 U. S. (1970). in on However, ruling nonconstitutional operation challenges to .the statutes, of state district court remains concerned with the same‘form of relief— injunctive statutes, it sáme state as —directed claim, would, if it ruling were the constitutional not, solving any involved' in “other contro therefore, (cid:127) Perez, versy” supra. between the parties. Similarly, only noninjunctive relief regularly granted three- uncpn-' judge district courts is a declaratory judgment of stitutionality. Not finding is a of unconstitution ality necessary to the enjoining of concomitant operation and enforcement of state statute on consti declaration, tutional grounds, but a of unconstitutioriality does reach its beyond effect the-same state statutes subject which are to injunction.
19The
Jacobsen reasoned that
contrary
hold
permit
would be to
“[t]o
one fеderal district
judge
enjoin
enforcement of
ground
a state statute on .the
.of
unconstitutionality
federal
ground
whenever a non-constitutional
alleged,
attack was
might,
also
and this
purpose
well defeat
S.,
2281.” 362 U.
(Emphasis
at 80.'
original.)
§
(cid:127)
three-judge
To hold that.a
district
required
is not
to hear
matters unrelated
determination
enjoin
of whether
statutes,
enforcement
pose
of state
Would
no similar
risk.
*42
beyond
A
not
three-judge district court should
venture
necessary exceptions
two
the general
these
nárrow and
rule
a
court
three-judge
required
is
to hear
any
beyond
challenge
matters
the constitutional
example,
which led'to its
For
a three-
convening.
statute
jurisdiction
judge
should not retain
to assess dam
Brashear Lines, supra,
ages,
or to insure enforcement of
decree
a
which it entered
uncon
adjudging
statute
Nakai,
stitutional.
Hamilton v.
Cf.
2d
160-
F.
161 (CA9 1971), cert. denied,
(1972).
Any other rule would
“encumber the district aat time when district court, by court calendars are consuming the overburdened, time of three in a judges federal that was matter not required by. to be determined a three-judge Wyman, supra, court.” Rosado v. at 403.
And other rule would through burden this the unnecessary expansion of jurisdiction our on direct The District injunction Court’s broad appeal. against police misconduct in case without even a semblance analysis reasoned provides example a compelling the need for a appellate’ review an intermediate tribunal out necessary sort the facts and' issues review should here; presents glar- This case a occur. ing example anof placed undue burden this Court: on to wrestle with legal on difficult issues the basis of inadequately record digested analyzed by the. District Court and untouched scrutiny of. the Court of Appeals. From its findings of fact the District Court has drawn impressionistic almost conclusions'regarding scope impact perceived of. the abuses.of and. law Texas enforcement It if is as Dis- authorities.. trict Court viewed the police conduct prosecu- tors as directed against'one individual, than rather many, periоd over brief of time, rather than year. á This appel- intervening an where remoteness instance salutary perspective provided late would review have waged impassioned debate factually complex in' the trial court. no ancil- other than that general
Even if the rule were from a lary injunctive relief should issue relief aid court, injunction police misconduct three-judge *43 ancillary to the in this could not be considered to case be jurisdiction upon this primary relief so as to confer state appeal. of Enjoining Court on direct enforcement enterprise enjoining spe7 statutes a from far different misconduct; police by first separate review of the cific appeals -this Court the second a court of would and fragmented appeal. application' not result in a In the Younger Harris, of v. of 401 U. test S. (1971), “bad faith and harassment” would to cer- a court look tain specific types police of prosecutorial misconduct merits, predicate as reaching constitu- tional attack against state statutes for the violation persons which being subject prosecution. are A find- ing police harassment-necessary for the issuance an injunction against police misconduct is not quasi-juris- ' Younger, dictional as with but is á determination on concerned, Younger merits. Under prin- a court is cipally police with prosecutorial misconduct which person to a subject op- to the denies state laws a fair portunity to have his challenges to those laws heard the staté courts, whereas, weighing.whether to issue injunction an against police a court would misconduct, likely be solely police concerned misconduct which itself persons denies their rights. constitutional While there some overlap of facts possibly relevant the quasi-jurisdictional Younger Harris determination and to the'merits of whether to grant an injunction against police misconduct, there would be no identity of apply would not proof, legal standards to the facts object samé, be the аnd the of each determi- nature and nation would be' different. police misconduct would Thus, against an(injunction
. injunctive opera- not be so related to relief unconstitutional tion of state statutes to require as three-judge district even if Perez court, Brashear and apply did our to foreclose consideration paragraph 16 of the judgment. Upon District the issuance Court’s declaratory and injunctive relief five against the Texas statutes three-judge District Court should have dissolved itself and referred-the case single .to the Judge to whom the case was originally assigned for whatever proceedings necessary. further were
n (B) arguendo, Assuming, jurisdiction has injunction review the against police misconduct, proper course por- would be to vacate remand that *44 tion-of the District judgment. Court’s injunction against police
The misconduct was entered by the District Court without benefit of independent analysis in its .findings, opinion. penultimate- in paragraph opinion sole District Court is the regarding discussion injunction was'1 provided later entered:
“In addition,-plaintiffs per are also entitled injunction manent restraining defendants any future acts enforcing statutes ..from here declared but also void, restraining them from any future interference' with civil rights plaintiffs they represent. and the class Hairston Supp. (W. Hutzler, 1971).” F. D. Pa. Supp., 347 F. at 634.
(cid:127)The catch-all District discussion of the facts Court’s appears solely to have been over- made view of Younger coming adjudication appellees’ barrier to claims legal and not rationale for the' establish injunction against police injunction’s misconduct. crucial term “adequate cause” defined, part, is unconstitutionality reference to the declarations the five Evidently, Texas statutes. the District Court’s purpose including injunctive this relief against further police misconduct judgment protect its was to integrity and aid in the primary enforcement of the declaratory injunctive relief ordered the Court. If the Court remands to the part now Court that District of the judgment encompasses primary, which relief, the- it would seem logical also send back for-reconsidera- tion the relief which the apparently prem- District' Court ised on the of the primary existence relief. Since it possible that following the remand District Court will conclude that no relief directed against opera- tion or enforcement of the challenged statutes shouíd be entered, the Court should opportunity have the to consider injunction whether against police mis- conduct any longer would appropriate!
(C) I Finally, am satisfied the District Court abused its granted discretion when it injunction ' police misconduct. . .
The injunction as entered would allow review by the federal court, by way of contempt proceedings, of claims ‘ which would; at the same time, judice be sub in ongoing state criminal proceedings. For example, dep- assume a uty sheriff made an arrest without a warrant and in- cident to that arrest seized evidence proof relevant *45 offense; of a criminal The arrestee can seek to suppress
857
ground that
state criminal trial on the
evidence in his
not based upon
seizure was
preceded
which
arrest
"the
police miscon
injunction against
The
probable cause.
in
the same claim federal
permit
would
.a trial of
duct
Ledesma,
(C). Peres v.
par. 16
Final-Judgment,
court.
Mackell, 401
and Samuels v.
U. S.
(1971),
“such a continuing equitable intrusion power of daily the fеderal courts into the conduct of state proceedings criminal sharp is in conflict principles with the equitable which .this restraint recognized .” has . . . 502. Id., at injunction, its paragraph (B), appears leave no room for' temporary investigation restraint fo? suspicious premised probable activities on less than cause which this Court has held Terry constitutional. Ohio, 1 (1968). U. S. problems injunction created by police - misconduct are In the manifold. enforcement of the in- *46 junction, likely- place itself on the District Court will Younger collision holdings course with our in and O’Shea. The fact that the law County enforcement officers Starr and, indeed, in compelled whole will be State Texas threat, to enforce contempt only law of criminal under proceedings in the United Court of the States District Southern Texas, District illustrates the reckless course action upon embarked the District Court in issuing this injunction. Federal district were not courts meant to be super-police chiefs,- disciplining individual law en- forcement officers for infractions of the rules for arrests and searches and seizures. A which district court im- properly upon police intrudes local functions “can under- mine important police values of self-restraint and self-respect.” Long a, v. District Columbi 152 U. S. App. D. 187, C. 469 F. 2d (1972) (Wright, J., concurring).
For all problems injunction likely I create, find no reason to believe provide it will meaningful for appellees. relief Comment, The Federal Injunction Kemedy as a for Unconstitutional Police Con- duct, 78 Yale L. J. 143 (1968).20 : The author of the Comment wrote “For tolerated violations, prohibitory injunction constitutional only which high police ordered officials to refrain from unconstitu- tional conduct would be problem useless —the lies not in what such officials doing they are but what doing. Purely are prohibi- tory injunctions would have to be directed the subordinate policemen acting who'were illegally. But would be courts unable injunctions enforce such they unless willing were to take over the task .of disciplining policemen. individual approach Such an would highly be inefficient since the court’s enforcing means of its directly against orders policemen contempt proceeding —a —would far too heavy-handed "cumbersome effectively to deal -large alleged numbers of violations. injunction “If the is to utility have remedy as a for tolerated police abuse, it require must affirmative action the officials Court, here, has injunction entered an which is ineffective providing appellees relief to provoke likely extreme among resentment those the injunction restrains21 and genuine concern among all who those still adhere to the proposition.that state federal governed relations should be by notions of comity.
In any event, I 'believe that the facts which were *47 found the District support Court22 do not the granting of a prohibitory mandatory injunction against police conduct,
“[Recognition of the need for a proper balance in operation concurrent and state courts federal counsels against restraint injunctions issuance of against state officers engaged in the administration State’s criminal laws in the absence ‘ ,is showing of irreparable injury which gre.at “both ’ and' [Younger immediate.” Harris, v. 401 S.U. 46 (1971).] O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S., at ”. 499
Injunctions against police misconduct should be issued, if all, at most extreme cases, see, g., e. Lank Gelston, v. 364 F. 197 (CA4 2d 1966), and ford then only to the extent the relief granted would not “unnecessarily involve the police courts in matters and dictate action in situations in which discretion flex- responsible. police J., conduct.” 78 Yale L. (Emphasis at 147. original; omitted.) footnote injunction The judicial, ruta. all the officers Texas. A Justice of the Peace is a injunction named' defendant. en joins "Defendants, successors, agents their and employees, persons acting in concert with them.” Littleton, O’Shea U. S. (1974), plainly would seem anticipatory, to forbid interference injunction an in the judicial official activities of state officers. 22See suprg. III, Parts I
ibility. are important. most In order for grant .a court to an injunction, there should a- showing there a substantial risk that future violations will occur.” Long v. Columbia, supra, at 192, 469 2d, F. 932. police, acts misconduct were few and scat . tered. There was no basis for the injunc issuance of an against police tion misconduct.