14 La. 297 | La. | 1840
delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit is brought on a promissory note, by the payees. They describe themselves as residing and trading in the parish and city of New-Orleans. The defendant, after taking a frivolous exception, and suffering a judgment by default to go against him, filed an answer. He admits his signature, pleads want of consideration, and propounds interrogatories,
When a party expressly calls for the separate answers of the members of a firm, we think that every member thereof is bound to answer, as was intimated in Martineau et al. vs. Carr, 3 Martin, 497. Some discussion took place at the bar in relation to the commission directed to be issued by article 352, of the Code of Practice, when the party interrogated resides out of the parish where the court sits ; each party to this suit contending, that it was incumbent on the other, to take out and forward such commission. We are of opinion that neither was bound to do it here. An attentive perusal of the article above cited, taken in connection with the preceding one, shows that it contemplates only the case where one party wishes his adversary to answer in open court, and in his presence. This was not asked by the defendant; no commission then was to be sent to New-Orleans, and the party living there, when notified of the order of court, had only to forward his answers to the clerk to have them filed, but this he could not be expected to do on the very morning he was called upon to answer.
The question then more properly is, on whom devolved the duty of praying for a continuance, in order to afford Allain sufficient time to be notified of, and to comply witli the order of court, making it his duty to answer? Surely on
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court be annulled, avoided and reversed; and now, this court proceeding to render such judgment as in their opinion should have been given below, do order, adjudge and decree, that the plaintiffs do recover of the defendant four thousand eight hundred and sixty dollars and eighty-eight cents, together with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, from the 18th of July, 1838, until paid, and that the defendant and appellee pay costs in both courts.