delivered the opinion of the court:
Plаintiff, Robert A. Allabastro, appeals from orders of the Circuit Court of Du Page County entered on January 16, 1980, and February 29, 1980. Defendant, Wheaton National Bank, as trustee, contends in its brief that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s appeal as it was not perfected in accordancе with Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 303(a)). Defendant had also filed a separate motion to dismiss the appeal on the same grounds аt the time of filing its brief, which we then denied.
It is the duty of this court to consider its jurisdiction to hear an appeal whether or not the issue has been raised by the parties (Johnson v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1979),
This case is brought to this court for the second time by plaintiff, and the facts underlying the litigation are set forth in our opinion in Allabastro v. Wheaton National Bank (1979),
On Fеbruary 20, that being more than 30 days after the January 16 order, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate a portion of it and to extend the closing date; this motion was denied. On February 29, plaintiff filed a petition for preliminary injunction and other relief wherein he sought to enjoin defendant from collecting and distributing the funds ordered paid to it by plaintiff until such time as the appellate court clarified its October 11, 1979, opinion in the earlier appeal rеgarding interest and taxes. Alternately, plaintiff requested that the trial court reconsider its order of January 16 and reduce the compound interest on the final installment to simple interest at 10 percent and either eliminate interest for taxes altogether or impose simple interest at 8 pеrcent pursuant to section 3 of the Interest Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 74, par. 3). By order entered February 29,1980, the trial court denied'plaintiff’s motion, and he filed his “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal” to this court on March 3, 1980, from both the January 16 and February 29 orders. On March 3, the parties also carried out the sale and purchase of the property in question in accordance with the terms of the trial court’s January 16 order.
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the January 16 order precludes consideration of it by this court in the prеsent appeal. We agree.
Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 303(a)) provides:
“* e ° the notice of appeal must be filed with the cleric of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filеd, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion. * * *”
After our remand to the trial court with directions following plаintiff’s earlier appeal, it entered the January 16 order which plaintiff now seeks to be reviewed in his present appeal. No motion was filed in the trial court directed against the January 16 order until February 20 (35 days thereafter), and it was denied. On February 29 (44 days after January 16), plaintiff filed his petition for injunction and other relief, and it too was denied. Notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the January 16 order; however, on March 3 plaintiff filed his notice of appeal from both the January 16 and February 29 orders.
Appeal was taken in apt time by plaintiff from the February 29 order pursuant tо Supreme Court Rule 307 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 307), as an interlocutory appeal may be perfected by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days frоm entry of an order denying injunctive relief. (Trophytime, Inc. v. Graham (1979),
Only a final judgment is appealable (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, pars. 301 and 303(a)), unless it is within one of those categories of judgments from which an interlocutory appeal may be taken. (E.g., Supreme Court Rules 307 and 308 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, pars. 307 and 308).) A judgment is final if it terminates the litigation on the merits of the case and determines the rights of the parties so that if affirmed the trial court has only to proceed with the execution of thе judgment. (Johnson v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1979),
In the present case, the January 16 order set the time for closing of the disputed real estate transaction between plаintiff and defendant and fixed its terms, i.e., payment of the unpaid principal balance of the purchase price by plaintiff together with interest and taxes due as was required of the trial court by our mandate. (Allabastro v. Wheaton National Bank (1979),
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Portock v. Frеeman (1977),
Nor will we consider plaintiff’s appeal of the February 29 order on its merits. His petition in the trial court was designated an “Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief” and sought to enjoin defendants from collecting and disbursing thе funds ordered paid by plaintiff until such time as this court clarified its earlier opinion. (There was no such request pending in this court nor had plaintiff sought reheаring and clarification of our opinion after it was filed October 11, 1979.) In our view the consummation of the real estate transaction between these parties on March 3,1980, pursuant to the January 16 order of the trial court, negates the existence of a present controversy permitting the injunctive relief requested by plaintiff, and as that issue is moot (Wheeler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1974),
For these reasons this court may not consider the merits of plaintiff’s appeal, and it is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
SEIDENFELD, P. J., and LINDBERG, J., concur.