91 F. 79 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Arkansas | 1899
The complainant, the Alkire Grocery-Company, a mercantile corporation organized under the laws of the
The court is of opinion that the practice does not warrant the filing either of a demurrer to the pleas or a motion to strike them from the files. It was sufficient to set them down for hearing, and the court will so treat them. Fost. Fed. Prac. § 140. The judgment in the Boone circuit court against Jesse R. Richesin was by default. It recites legal service upon Jesse R., and there is no contention that the Boone circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Indeed, the Boone circuit court had jurisdiction, as to amount, of either or all of the judgments upon which that suit was brought. The assignment of the judgments of Simmons Hardware Company and of A. Frankenthal & Bros. could not, therefore, constitute a fraud on the jurisdiction of that court as to the subject-matter, even if the assignments were without consideration, and Simmons Hardware Company and A. Frankenthal & Bros. then owned the judgments so assigned, for the reason that the court had jurisdiction of the judgment of Alkire Grocery Company independent of the others. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine. The Boone circuit court had the power to hear and determine who owned the judgments in favor of Simmons Hardware Company and A. Frankenthal & Bros. in that suit, as well as all other questions involved. As a matter of fact, it did so decide, and the judgment so recites, that the Alkire Grocery Company was the
“Article 4 of section 1 of the constitution provides that ‘full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state; and the congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such records shall be proved, anrl the effect thereof.’ Congress has exercised that power, and, in effect, provided that the judicial records in one state shall be proved in the tribunals of another, by the attestation of the clerk, under the seal of the court, with the certificate of the judge that the attestation is in due form; that such records so authenticated ‘shall have such faith and credit given to them in every other court in the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records were or shall be taken.’ When the question of the construction of that act of congress was first presented to this court, It was argued that the act provided only for the admission of such records as evidence; that it did not declare their effect. But the court refused to adopt the proposition, and held, as the act expressly declares, that the record, when duly authenticated, shall have in every other court of the United States the same faith and credit as it has in the state court from whence it was taken. . Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 483. Repeated decisions made since that time have affirmed the samo rule, which is applicable in all similar cases where it aijpears that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the defendant was duly served with process, or appeared and made defense. Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 203; D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 105; Webster v. Reid, Id. 400. Where the jurisdiction has attached, the judgment is conclusive for all purposes, and is not open to any inquiry upon the merits. Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 402; Bank of U. S. v. Merchants’ Bank of Baltimore, 7 Gill, 430. Speaking of the before-mentioned act of congress, Judge Story says it has been settled, upon solemn argument, that that enactment does declare the effect of the records as evidence when duly authenticated. * * * ‘If a judgment is conclusive in the state where it was pronounced, it is equally conclusive everywhere’ in the courts of the United States. 2 Story, Const. (3d Ed.) § 1313.”
Are the judgment debtor’s co-defendants, Caledonia and William C. Richesin, estopped, so far as this creditors’ bill is concerned, by that judgment? It will be borne in mind that the pleas of Caledonia and William C. Richesin do not question the jurisdiction of the Boone circuit court, either as to the person of Jesse R. Richesin or the subject-matter of the suit. They assail the jurisdiction of this court as to the amount on the ground that the judgments of Simmons Hardware Company and A. Frankenthal & Bros. (when the judgment of the Boone circuit court was rendered and upon which that judgment rests in part) were not the properly of Alkire Grocery Company, but were still owned by Simmons Hardware Company and A. Frankenthal & Bros. But we have seen that the judgment debtor is estopped to litigate that question here. He had his day in court in the Boone circuit court when the judgment was rendered. He did not raise that question then, and cannot be heard to do it now. If he cannot assail that judgment, then the amount is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction, for it is the amount of the debt claimed by the plaintiff which determines the jurisdiction of this court.
Admitting that the court has jurisdiction of the case and of Jesse E. and Caledonia Eichesin (the property held by said Caledonia being of greater value than $2,000), the said William C. Eichesin assails the jurisdiction because, he says, the property he holds is worth only $400, as shown by the bill. I do not think the value of the property in his hands determines the jurisdiction. It is the amount claimed by the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor, to whom he is privy (and, if the allegations of the bill be true, for whom he holds the property in trust), that determines the jurisdiction. Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 571, 10 Sup. Ct. 196; Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 11 Sup. Ct. 117; Werner v. Murphy, 60 Fed. 769; Stillwell-Bierce & Smith-Vaile Co. v. Williamston Oil & Fertilizer Co., 80 Fed. 68; Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 Fed. 593; Bank v. Hoof, 7 Pet. 168; Deposit Co. v. Hunting