Alice Lynn Harper Taylor v. In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper, deceased
1130587; 1130884
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
9/26/2014
SPECIAL TERM, 2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
Appeal from Escambia Probate Court (Probate No.: 10058)
Appeal from Monroe Probate Court (Probate No.: 3330)
These consolidated appeals involve the estate of Alice Earle F. Harper, deceased (hereinafter the “decedent“). Alice Lynn Harper Taylor, the decedent‘s daughter (hereinafter “Alice“), appeals in case no. 1130587, pursuant to
Facts and Procedural History
On March 1, 2013, the decedent died in Monroe County. She had three adult children who survived her: Alice, William C. Harper, and James R. Harper. The decedent‘s husband died in 2002. On November 12, 2013, Alice filed in Monroe County a petition to probate a 1995 will allegedly executed by the decedent. In her petition, Alice acknowledged that there was in existence a 2007 will that purported to be the will of the decedent. Alice challenged the validity of the 2007 will on several grounds, including lack of mental capacity and the existence of a reciprocal will by the decedent‘s husband that had been admitted to probate in 2002. On December 10, 2013, the Monroe Probate Court set a hearing for January 28, 2014. On January 22, 2014, the probate judge recused himself from hearing the petition. On February 20, 2014, this Court entered an order appointing a special probate judge to hear the probate proceedings in Monroe County.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 2014, William filed a petition in Escambia County to probate a 2007 will allegedly executed by the decedent. On January 17, 2014, in the Escambia Probate Court, Alice filed a motion to dismiss and/or to stay the proceeding in Escambia County until the proper venue for the probate proceeding was determined. Alice cited
On April 11, 2014, William filed in the Monroe Probate Court a motion to dismiss Alice‘s petition to probate the 1995 will. William argued that the 2007 will revoked all earlier wills and that the 2007 will gave the personal representative the right to choose the county in which the will would be probated. On April 14, 2014, the Monroe Probate Court granted William‘s motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Alice filed an appeal pursuant to
Discussion
“The jurisdiction of the probate court is limited to the matters submitted to it by statute.” Wallace v. State, 507 So. 2d 466, 468 (Ala. 1987). The statute governing the subject-matter jurisdiction of the probate court,
“Wills must be proved in the several probate courts as follows:
“(1) When the testator, at the time of his death, was an inhabitant of the county, in the probate court of such county.
“(2) When the testator, not being an inhabitant of the state, dies in the county, leaving assets therein, in the probate court of such county.
“(3) When the testator, not being an inhabitant of the state, dies out of the county, leaving assets therein, in the probate of the county in which such assets, or any part thereof, are.
“(4) When the testator, not being an inhabitant of the state, dies, not leaving assets therein, and assets thereafter come into any county, in the probate court of any county into which such assets are brought.
“(5) In the probate court of the county designated by testator in the will if the testator owns property in such county at the time of his death.”
“(a) Where a proceeding under this chapter could be maintained in more than one place in this state, the court in which the proceeding is first commenced has the exclusive right to proceed.
“(b) If proceedings concerning the same estate are commenced in more than one court of this state, the court in which the proceeding was first commenced shall continue to hear the matter, and the other courts shall hold the matter in abeyance until the question of venue is decided, and if the ruling court determines that venue is properly in another court, it shall transfer the proceeding to the other court.
“(c) If the court finds that in the interest of justice a proceeding or a file should be located in another court of this state, the court making the finding may transfer the proceeding or file to the other court.”
In the present case, the decedent died in Monroe County. Alice filed a petition to probate the decedent‘s 1995 will in
Subsequently, William filed a petition to probate the decedent‘s 2007 will in Escambia County. The 2007 will provided that William, as the personal representative, had the discretion to probate the will in any county were the decedent owned property at the time of her death. It is undisputed that the decedent owned property in Escambia County at the time of her death.
Alice challenges the validity of the 2007 will; William challenges the validity of the 1995 will. Both challenges go to the merits of the case, i.e., whether either of the tendered wills is entitled to be admitted to probate, and, if so, which one. Simply because William has submitted a will with a later date, which purports to revoke all prior wills, does not mean that the 2007 will is valid, nor does it mean that the Escambia Probate Court is the proper venue. The legislature has provided for the proper venue in probate matters when more than one probate court has venue. That is what we have before us in this case. The Monroe Probate Court is the proper venue under
William cites DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814 (Ala. 2011), for the proposition that the administration of an estate does not begin merely upon the filing in the probate court of a petition for letters of administration or of a petition to probate a will and for letters testamentary. DuBose involved a situation in which a party sought to remove the administration of the estate from a probate court to a circuit court under
“‘In regard to the administration of estates, the probate court is a court of general and original jurisdiction. See
Ala. Const. 1901, § 144 ;Ala. Code 1975, § 12-13-1(b) . The circuit court can obtain jurisdiction over a pending administration of an estate only by removing the administration from the probate court to the circuit court pursuant toAla. Code 1975, § 12-11-41 ; see Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 455, 457-58 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700, 704 (Ala. 2001). ...“‘....’
“In Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Ala. 1993), this Court stated that ‘[t]he circuit court cannot initiate the administration of an estate, because the initiation of administration is a matter exclusively in the jurisdiction of the probate
court.’ As this Court more recently explained in Ex parte Berry, 999 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 2008): “‘In stating in Ex parte Smith that “[t]he circuit court cannot assume jurisdiction over the administration of an estate when the administration has not yet begun,” 619 So. 2d at 1375-76, this Court was referring to subject-matter jurisdiction. “Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court‘s power to decide certain types of cases.” Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006). Our decision in Ex parte Smith relied on
§ 12-13-1, Ala. Code 1975 , which grants probate courts “original and general jurisdiction” over all matters enumerated in that statute, including the probate of wills and disputes over the right of executorship and administration.’”999 So. 2d at 887-88 (emphasis omitted).
“Further, the administration of an estate does not begin merely upon the filing in the probate court of a petition for letters of administration or of a petition for probate of a will and for letters testamentary. As to the former, this Court has recognized that ‘the mere filing of a petition for the administration of an estate does not in itself begin the administration; rather, the probate court must act upon the petition and thereby activate the proceedings, which may thereafter be subject to removal to the circuit court.’ Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d at 1376; see also, e.g., Allen v. Estate of Juddine, 60 So. 3d 852, 855 (Ala. 2010) (‘The administration of the estate was initiated by the probate court when it granted Willie Jr. letters of administration.‘); Ex parte Berry, 999 So. 2d at 886 (‘[T]his Court in Ex parte Smith[, 619 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1993),] held that removal of the will proceeding from the probate court to the circuit court was premature because the probate court had not initiated the administration of the estate by acting on the petition.‘); and Ex parte Kelly, 243 Ala. 184, 187, 8 So. 2d 855, 857 (1942). As to the latter, this Court has noted that, where no letters of general administration have issued from the probate court and where the decedent‘s will has not yet been admitted to probate, the circuit court ‘is without jurisdiction to make an order’ removing the administration of the estate from the probate court to the circuit court. Ex parte Pettus, 245 Ala. 349, 351, 17 So. 2d 409, 410-11 (1944).”
68 So. 3d at 821-22. DuBose is distinguishable because it involved the removal of the administration of an estate from the probate court to the circuit court.
1130587 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1130884 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.