1:24-cv-01311
E.D. Va.Aug 15, 2025 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
KHWAJA ISHRAT ALI, ef al., )
Plaintiffs,
Vv. Case No. 1:24-cv-1311 (PTG/WEF)
DANIEL B. REGISTER IV, ef ai.,
Defendants.
)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Fairfax
Realty of Falls Church LLC, Christine Blackwell, and Dana Wang (collectively, “Defendants
Fairfax Realty of Falls Church LLC, et al.”) (Dkt. 19) and Defendants Daniel B. Register, IV, J.
Nicholas D’ Ambrosia, and Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants Daniel B.
Register, IV, et al.”) (Dkt. 16). Subsequently, this Court entered orders advising Plaintiffs that
Defendants’ motions could be granted on the basis of their papers if Plaintiffs failed to file
responses within twenty-one days from the date each order was entered. Dkts. 18, 23; see also
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). As a result, Plaintiffs’ oppositions to the
motions were due on November 11, 2024, and November 28, 2024, respectively. To date,
Plaintiffs have not opposed the instant motions to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the Court
grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts, taken from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, are accepted as true for
purposes of these motions:
Khwaja Ishrat Ali, Reshma Ali, Kamal Mustafa and Fatima Mustafa (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) are Maryland residents. Dkt. 11 “Am. Compl.”) □ 1. “On May 18, 2004, [Plaintiffs]
Kamal Mustafa and Fatima Mustafa bought a property located at 18306 Bubbling Spring Terrace,
Boyds, Maryland 20841” (the “Property”). Am. Compl. {§ 2, 28. The Property was secured
through a $600,000 mortgage between Plaintiffs Kamal Mustafa, Fatima Mustafa, and Washington
Mutual Bank N.A. Jd. ¢29. On April 18, 2014, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),
which took over Washington Mutual Bank N.A., and assumed the mortgage, “assigned the deed
of trust to the Property to JP Morgan Chase NA (“Chase”).” fd. 31. On that same day, April 18,
2014, Chase “sold the loan to PennyMac Corp.” /d. 39. “On March 10, 2020, Penny Mac Corp
assigned the loan” to TransAm Holdings, LLC. Jd. 444; Dkt. 11, Ex. 4 (“Exhibit D”). “On June
23, 20220 [sic], TransAm Holdings, LLC was formed under the laws of Maryland.” Jd. J 55.
On October 2, 2023, a deed was prepared which transferred the Property to another entity
also identified as “TransAm Holdings, LLC.” /d. J 58. On June 28, 2024, “the deputy sheriff
showed up with . . . an expired eviction order.” Jd. Defendant “Long & Foster Real Estate Inc.,
dba Northrop Realty, provided the eviction crew.” /d. Plaintiff Kamal Mustafa asserted ownership
of TransAm Holdings, LLC and thus, also the Property, and attempted to cancel the eviction. /d.
86-94. Plaintiff was unsuccessful and the eviction proceeded. /d. Defendant “Long & Foster
Real Estate Inc., [d/b/a] Northrop Realty employees or contractors were involved in throwing the
furniture out on the street.” Jd. 994. On July 28, 2024, Plaintiffs were officially evicted from the
Property. Id. 4 96.
On August 8, 2024, Defendants Daniel B. Register IV and J. Nicholas D’ Ambrosia listed
the Property for sale. /d. 100. On August 22, 2024, Defendants Fairfax Realty, Dana Wang, and
Christine Blackwell sold the Property. /d. { 102.
On July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs Khwaja Ishrat Ali, Reshma Ali, Kamal Mustafa and Fatima
Mustafa, proceeding pro se, filed this civil action against Defendants Daniel B. Register, IV, J.
Nicholas D’ Ambrosia, and Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc. and Defendants Fairfax Realty of Falls
Church LLC, Christine Blackwell, and Dana Wang as well as Defendants Paul Birkett and
Matthew Cohen. Dkt. 1.
Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiffs lack
standing to bring this case and otherwise fail to state a claim as a matter of law. Dkt. 16, Ex. | at
3; Dkt. 20 at 4. Typically, standing challenges are addressed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court construes the portion of Defendants’ motions
addressing standing as arising under Rule 12(b)(1). Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308 ,
311 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting the district court recharacterized defendant’s challenge to standing
from a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal district courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp.
v, Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 , 552 (2005). “Ifthe court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may raise the defense that the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Typically, when a defendant challenges subject
matter jurisdiction factually, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that jurisdiction is proper
by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337 ,
347 (4th Cir. 2009). Ifa plaintiff does not have Article III standing to sue for each claim, a court
must dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ali v. Hogan, 26 F.4th 587 ,
595-96 (4th Cir. 2022). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 , 94 (2007). However, “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints
are not... without limits.” Zettervall v. Leidos, No. 1:23-cv-00205, 2023 WL 4494167 at *2 (E.D.
Va. July 12, 2023) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 , 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Ill. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the instant motions.
Typically, failure to oppose arguments advanced in a dispositive pleading are conceded.
Intercarrier Commc'ns, LLC v. Kik Interactive, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-771, 2013 WL 4061259 , at *3
(E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2013) (finding that where a party does not respond to an argument, the argument
is “effectively conced[ed]”). Nonetheless, this Court will still address the merits of Defendants’
arguments.
A. Plaintiffs do not have Article III Standing
As a preliminary matter, both sets of Defendants have challenged Plaintiffs’ Article III
standing. See Dkt. 20 at 3-4; Dkt. 16, Ex. 1 at 3. They argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing
to sue because they allege that during the relevant times the Property was owned by TransAm
Holdings LLC, a non-party to this action. See Dkt. 20 at 3-4; Dkt. 16, Ex. 1 at 3. This Court
agrees with Defendants.
To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege that they have suffered (1) an “injury
in fact;” (2) “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ challenged conduct; which is (3) “likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 560-61 (1992).
“An injury in fact must be concrete, meaning that it must be real and not abstract . . . and it must
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way and not be a generalized grievance.” F'DA v.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367 , 381 (2024) (citation modfied). Additionally, a fairly
traceable injury is one that “likely was caused or likely will be caused by the defendant’s conduct.”
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 382 .
Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they suffered an injury in fact or any injury that was
caused by any of Defendants. All of Plaintiffs’ claims appear to revolve around the Property and
their eviction from it. Chiefly, Plaintiffs allege that the Property was fraudulently transferred from
their name to a TransAm Holdings LLC entity they owned. Am. Compl. 55-62. Plaintiffs allege
that the Property was transferred a second time to another TransAm Holdings LLC entity which
they did not own. /d. No TransAm Holdings LLC entity is a party to this action. Indeed, Plaintiffs
attach a Substitute Trustee’s Deed which appears to indicate that the Property was foreclosed on
and sold to Transam Holdings LLC at 139 Fulton St, Ste 809, New York, NY 10038. Dkt. 11, Ex.
6. Plaintiffs appear to dispute this deed’s authenticity because they allege that the underlying Note
was never properly assigned. Am. Compl. { 32.
Even assuming without deciding that the current ownership of the Property is in question,
based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, Plaintiffs would not, on their own, have standing to bring suit. In
each count of their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “Trans Am Holding LLC was the record owner
of the [P]roperty.” See Am. Compl. {{ 100, 104, 106, 110. They do not clearly specify which
TransAm Holding LLC entity was the owner during the relevant times but, as stated, no TransAm
Holding LLC entity is a party to this action. Thus, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Property was
owned by an entity called TransAm Holdings, LLC, not Plaintiffs, during the relevant times.
Moreover, even if the appropriate TransAm Holdings LLC entity was a plaintiff in this
action, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege which Defendant(s): (1) caused the Property to be
fraudulently transferred; (2) caused the Property to be unlawfully seized; (3) made false
representations to law enforcement; or (4) otherwise caused Plaintiffs asserted injuries. See Am.
Compl. ff 97-113. Plaintiffs cannot establish that they have Article III standing because they do
not specifically allege that any Defendants have caused their asserted injuries. Thus, Plaintiffs’
injuries are not “fairly traceable” to the conduct of Defendants named in this action. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 . Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts I-IV because Plaintiffs lack Article III
standing. Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P’ship v. Beaufort Cnty, 105 F.4th 554 , 566 (4th Cir. 2024)
(“A dismissal for lack of standing—or any other defect in subject matter jurisdiction—must be
one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and
dispose of a claim on the merits.” (internal citation and quotations omitted)).!
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants Daniel B. Register, IV, ef al.’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16)
is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Defendants Fairfax Realty of Falls Church LLC, et al.’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED (Dkt. 19); and it is further
ORDERED that this case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this action and to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiffs,
Khwaja Ishrat Ali, Reshma Ali, Kamal Mustafa and Fatima Mustafa, who are proceeding pro se.
This is a final order for the purposes of appeal. To appeal this decision, Plaintiffs must file
a written notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of entry
of this Order. A notice of appeal is a short statement indicating a desire to appeal, including the
date of the order Plaintiffs wants to appeal. Plaintiffs need not explain the grounds for appeal until
1 Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not have standing and it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to address the balance of Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of this
action. so directed by the court of appeals. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal waives Plaintiffs’ right
to appeal this decision.
Entered this _/ sMaay of August, 2025.
Alexandria, Virginia ( Wis
Patricia Toffiver’ Giles
United States District Judge