Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MUSSA ALI, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 13-2030 (RC) :
v. : Re Document Nos.: 85, 88 :
CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF :
WASHINGTON, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR L EAVE TO F ILE S UPPLEMENTAL S TATEMENT R EGARDING F ILING D ATE , D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S A LTERNATIVE R EQUEST TO F ILE N UNC P RO
T UNC , & D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR R ECONSIDERATION OR L EAVE TO A MEND I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Mussa Ali initiated this matter in September 2012 by filing suit against the Carnegie Institution of Washington (“Carnegie”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. Mr. Ali alleged that he was erroneously omitted as an inventor on multiple U.S. patents co-owned by Carnegie and the University of Massachusetts (“UMass”), and he sought to correct inventorship and to recover more than $100,000 in related damages. After retaining counsel, Mr. Ali filed an amended complaint that added UMass as a defendant and that requested a portion of the proceeds that Defendants had received from the patents in question. The Oregon court dismissed UMass from the case on the basis of sovereign immunity, ruled that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Carnegie, and transferred the case to this Court. This Court subsequently granted Carnegie’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to join a necessary party: UMass. Mr. Ali now seeks reconsideration of that dismissal, arguing that UMass is not a necessary party and that the Court’s finding to the contrary relies on the clearly *2 erroneous assumption that UMass’s financial interests would be prejudiced if the case proceeded in its absence. Alternatively, Mr. Ali seeks leave to amend his complaint in an unspecified manner, perhaps by reinstating the first complaint he filed, which named only Carnegie as a defendant. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Mr. Ali’s motion for reconsideration and his request for leave to amend his complaint.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As explained in detail in this Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion, [1] Carnegie and UMass co-own five patents relating to methods of inhibiting the expression of a particular gene in a cell through a process called ribonucleic acid interference (“RNAi”). The patents were allegedly issued as a result of the collaboration between Dr. Andrew Fire and Dr. Craig C. Mello, the two lead inventors of the laboratories of Carnegie and UMass, respectively. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF No. 73-1; Am. Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 4. Mr. Ali alleges that he made a critical contribution to the discovery of RNAi while employed at UMass in Dr. Mello’s laboratory, and that he should be named as a co-inventor on the five patents. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8 ‒ 20.
Mr. Ali filed his original complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in September 2012. See Compl., ECF No. 1. He named only Carnegie as a defendant, sought to correct inventorship pursuant to 35 U.S. C. § 256, and demanded “more than $100,000” in damages for related claims of conversion, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and fraud under Oregon state law. After retaining counsel, Mr. Ali filed an amended complaint against both Carnegie and UMass in December 2012. generally Am. Compl.
*3 In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Ali again asserted a claim under § 256 to be named a co- inventor of the patents at issue, and he also asserted two alternative claims for “Legal Damages.” In his first claim for legal damages, Mr. Ali states that if he was contractually obligated to assign his rights in the patents to UMass, then he seeks his share of the patent-related proceeds that have been received by UMass and divided between the named UMass inventors. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–32. Alternatively, if Mr. Ali was not obligated to assign his rights, then his second claim for legal damages seeks a portion of the proceeds received by both UMass and Carnegie from the sale, license, or transfer of their patent rights. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–36.
In May 2013, the District Court of Oregon dismissed UMass from the case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the university was an arm of the state and entitled to
sovereign immunity.
See
Op. & Order at 10, ECF No. 41. In the same decision, the court also
provided Mr. Ali with leave to amend his complaint to include claims against UMass officials
pursuant to
Ex Parte Young
,
On August 29, 2014, this Court granted Carnegie’s motion to dismiss the case pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join UMass, a necessary party.
See
generally Ali
,
To date, Mr. Ali has not sought leave to amend his complaint to include correction of inventorship claims against UMass officials in their official capacities. Instead, on September 29, 2014, Mr. Ali filed the instant motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for leave to amend his complaint, possibly by reinstating his first complaint that named only Carnegie as a defendant. See generally Pl.’s Mot. Recons., ECF No. 85.
III. ANALYSIS
Mr. Ali argues that the Court’s determination that UMass was a necessary party was based on a clearly erroneous factual finding that UMass would be financially prejudiced if Mr. Ali prevailed in this matter and was named as a co-inventor. Id. at 2–4. He also claims that the Court erred by failing to find that he has no alternative forum in which to have his case heard on the merits. Id. at 5–6. Alternatively, if the Court still views UMass as a necessary party, Mr. Ali asks that he be granted leave “to remedy his amend complaint,” perhaps by reverting “back to the original complaint in which ONLY Carnegie was named as a defendant.” Id. at 9–10. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that Mr. Ali’s motion should be denied as untimely under Rule 59(e), that it has no basis in fact or law, and that it improperly seeks reconsideration *5 of arguments that were previously considered by the Court or that could have been presented previously. See generally Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 86. The Court considers each argument in turn.
A. Legal Standards for Reconsideration
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide three avenues for seeking reconsideration of judicial decisions. The first is Rule 54(b), which permits reconsideration of interlocutory orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.”).
Relief pursuant to Rule 54(b) is to be provided “as justice requires,” and may be
warranted when a court has “patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the
adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to consider controlling decisions or data, or
where a controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.”
U.S. ex rel. Westrick v.
Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.
,
Whereas Rule 54 governs reconsideration of interlocutory orders, Rules 59(e) and 60(b)
dictate when a party may obtain reconsideration of a final judgment. Rule 59(e) permits a party
to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of the entry of that judgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e). Such motions are disfavored, are entrusted to the district court's discretion, and
“‘need not be granted unless the district court finds there is an intervening change of controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.’”
Ciralsky v. CIA
,
Rule 60(b), on the other hand, allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment “within
a reasonable time” after entry of the judgment, but only for specified reasons.
See
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b). Such reasons include, among other things, “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect,”
id.
at (60)(b)(1), “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b),”
id.
at
(60)(b)(2), and “any other reason that justifies relief,”
id.
at 60(b)(6). The Rule “was intended to
preserve ‘the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments and the incessant
command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.’ It cannot be
employed simply to rescue a litigant from strategic choices that later turn out to be improvident.”
Smalls v. United States
,
A motion for reconsideration filed outside the 28-day window provided by Rule 59(e) is
typically viewed as a Rule 60(b) motion.
See McMillen v. District of Columbia
, No. 04-cv-2036,
Regardless of the Rule pursuant to which reconsideration is sought, “it is well-established
that ‘motions for reconsideration,’ whatever their procedural basis, cannot be used as ‘an
opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle
for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier.”
Estate of Gaither
ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia
,
Although Mr. Ali does not specify the Rule pursuant to which he seeks reconsideration, his invocation of “clear error,” see Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 2, and his statement that his motion was due within 28 days of the entry of judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. for Extension of Time, Sept. 12, 2014, ECF No. 80, suggest that he seeks relief from the Court’s order of dismissal under Rule *8 59(e). Carnegie has treated the motion as one brought pursuant to Rule 59(e), and it argues that the motion is untimely as it was filed more than 28 days after entry of the Court’s order. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4 n.1. Mr. Ali has not disputed the characterization of his motion as one brought pursuant to Rule 59(e), see Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 87, but he has asked the Court to extend the 28- day deadline or to otherwise excuse his delayed filing as the product of a mailing error, see Pl.’s Mot. for Extension of Time; Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File, Nov. 17, 2014, ECF No. 88. [2]
The Court will neither retroactively extend the time for filing Mr. Ali’s motion under
Rule 59(e) nor deny it as untimely. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), although
courts can extend most filing deadlines for good cause shown, Rule 59(e) motions are an
exception for which “[a] court must not extend the time to act . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2);
see
also Derrington-Bey v. D.C. Dep't of Corr.
,
*9 This Court need not determine under which Rule Mr. Ali’s motion was brought or should be considered, however, because as explained below, the Court finds that Mr. Ali’s motion should be denied regardless of whether it is treated as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b). [3] Mr. Ali has not shown an error in the Court’s decision to dismiss his complaint for failure to join a necessary party that would warrant reconsideration under any standard.
B. The Court’s Finding that UMass would be Financially Prejudiced At the heart of Mr. Ali’s motion for reconsideration is his contention that the Court erred by assuming that UMass’s financial interests would be prejudiced if this action proceeded in its absence. See Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 2. Mr. Ali argues that contrary to the Court’s “presupposition that UMass [policy] obligates UMass to pay an additional percentage or amount based on the number of UMass-affiliated co-inventors listed on the patents-in-suit,” UMass pays a set *10 percentage of its patent proceeds to the co-inventors, and that percentage is divided equally among the inventors. Id. at 3–4. He notes that this factual allegation was contained in paragraph 30 of his complaint, which states that under university policy, “[U]Mass would pay the co- inventors a percentage of all revenue realized by [U]Mass through exploitation of that invention . . . to be shared equally between inventors.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30. Mr. Ali has also provided a new exhibit to support his assertion: a heavily redacted e-mail from his former attorney, stating that “under UMass policy the University’s share is distributed 30% to the inventors pro rata.” May 2014 e-mail, Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 85. On these fact, Mr. Ali argues, it would make no difference financially to UMass if he were named a co-inventor and the university’s proceeds were divided among four inventors instead of three. See id. at 2–4.
In opposition, Carnegie argues that Mr. Ali’s assertion that UMass would not be affected financially if he were named a co-inventor is contradicted by his own pleadings. Def.’s Opp’n at 4. Additionally, Carnegie contends that Mr. Ali fundamentally misunderstands the Court’s decision, which did not depend on potential financial prejudice to UMass, but rather considered such prejudice as one of many factors weighing in favor of finding UMass a necessary party. Def.’s Opp’n at 4–7.
As an initial matter, Rules 54(b), 59(e), and 60(b) would each allow this Court to
reconsider a decision premised on factual error.
Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.
, 893 F.
Supp. 2d at 268 (holding that reconsideration under Rule 54(b) may be warranted when a court
has “patently misunderstood the parties” or “made an error in failing to consider . . . data”);
Ciralsky
,
First, the e-mail from Mr. Ali’s attorney that he has attached to his motion shows that it
was received by Mr. Ali months before this Court ruled on Carnegie’s motion to dismiss. May 2014 e-mail, Pl.’s Ex. 1. The fact that Mr. Ali chose not to provide that document to the
Court previously does not mean that it constitutes “new evidence that was not previously
available” or “newly discovered evidence” that would support a motion for reconsideration.
See,
e.g., Bain v. MJJ Prods., Inc.
,
The e-mail from Mr. Ali’s attorney explains that under UMass policy, a percentage of the university’s patent-related income is distributed “to the inventors pro rata.” May 2014 e-mail, Pl.’s Ex. 1. But in its prior decision, this Court expressly considered—indeed, quoted twice verbatim—Mr. Ali’s factual allegation that UMass policy “would pay the co-inventors [who *12 assigned their rights to the university] a percentage of all revenue realized by UMass through exploitation of that invention . . . to be shared equally between inventors.” Ali , 2014 WL 4260995, at *1, *5 (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 30)). And while Mr. Ali argues that this fact makes the Court’s subsequent finding of financial prejudice to UMass clearly erroneous, his argument rests on a misreading of the Court’s analysis.
Mr. Ali contends that if he is found to have assigned his rights, his “ prospective addition as a co-inventor” would not prejudice UMass financially because the amount the university pays to its inventors is fixed and would not change. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 2–3. That may well be true. But the Court did not assume that the total percentage paid to co-inventors at UMass would increase simply because another co-inventor may be added to the patent. Instead, the financial prejudice to UMass that concerned this Court stemmed from Mr. Ali’s claim for damages, wherein he seeks not only to be included in future payouts but also to be compensated by UMass for several years of unpaid royalties. Put another way, the Court’s finding of financial prejudice stemmed not from the mathematical operation of UMass policy, but from Mr. Ali’s claim for damages premised on the alleged violation of that policy.
As the Court explained, in addition to alleging a right to be recognized as a co-inventor
and a contractual right to receive a percent of patent-related revenues, Mr. Ali “also seeks
damages from UMass,”
Ali
,
Undaunted, Mr. Ali suggests that his success in this matter need not harm UMass
financially because the Court could fashion relief that would require the other UMass co-
inventors to compensate him instead of UMass. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 4–5. He notes that “it is
the UMass-affiliated co-inventors . . . who have been siphoning off Ali’s shares of the proceeds,”
so the Court “could compel the said co-inventors to pay back Ali’s share of the proceeds to him,”
or “fashion a judgment in which Ali would be entitled to a bigger share of the portion of money
distributed among the UMass-affiliated co-inventors.”
Id.
As Carnegie correctly notes,
however, Mr. Ali’s proposed alternatives would require this Court either to order non-party
UMass to restructure its reimbursement contracts so that Mr. Ali could receive a greater share of
future payouts, or to order the non-party co-inventors to pay money damages to Mr. Ali. Def.’s Opp’n at 10–11. This Court, however, lacks the authority to issue a judgment that would
bind a non-party.
See Taylor v. Sturgell
,
Moreover, even if Mr. Ali’s alternative proposals were a viable means of shaping relief to
avoid prejudice to UMass, they would nevertheless fail to warrant reconsideration of this Court’s
judgment because such arguments could have been, but were not, presented to the Court prior to
the entry of judgment.
See Kittner v. Gates
,
This strategic choice cannot be undone via a motion for reconsideration. Rule 60(b) does
not provide “an opportunity for unsuccessful litigants to take a mulligan.”
Kramer v. Gates
, 481
F.3d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Mcmanus v. District of Columbia
,
As a final matter, the Court observes that even if Mr. Ali’s claim of factual error had
merit, and even if the Court could fashion relief at the financial expense of non-parties, Mr. Ali
has still failed to establish a basis for reconsideration of the Court’s finding that the case could
not proceed without UMass, because financial prejudice to UMass was only one factor in the
Court’s analysis, and a secondary one at that. As explained in the prior Memorandum Opinion,
UMass faced not only financial prejudice if Mr. Ali prevailed on his assignment-based damages
claims, but also potential impairment of its ownership interests in the patents in question if he
prevailed solely on his correction of inventorship claim.
Ali
,
In other words, it was not only the financial prejudice to an absent sovereign that governed the Court’s Rule 19 analysis, but also the likely prejudice to UMass’s patent-ownership interests and to Carnegie if it was forced to defend the suit alone despite the fact that “UMass’s relationship with Plaintiff is much more central to the case than Carnegie’s.” Id. (explaining that “it would be highly prejudicial to Carnegie to force it to vigorously defend a suit and pay attorney’s fees in a case” where the plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to money damages exclusively from a non-party); see also Op. & Order at 6 (“Ali alleges that he has an agreement with UMass, but he does not allege any separate agreement that would entitle him to a financial benefit from Carnegie. Therefore, if Ali is named a co-inventor of some or all of the patents-in- suit and he is entitled to compensation from UMass, Ali cannot receive that compensation in this *17 suit unless UMass is a party-defendant.”). Mr. Ali’s arguments are simply insufficient to disturb this Court’s finding that, in light of the many factors bearing on the decision of whether UMass is a necessary party, [4] the case could not in equity and good conscience proceed without UMass.
C. The Availability of an Alternative Forum
Mr. Ali’s final argument in favor of reconsideration asserts that the Court should have rejected Carnegie’s position that Mr. Ali had access to an alternative forum in the Massachusetts state courts. While acknowledging that the Court’s treatment of the fourth Rule 19(b) factor was “largely neutral,” Mr. Ali nevertheless contends that the Court should have rejected Carnegie’s alternative forum proposal as unworkable and implausible. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 5. Though the precise contours of Mr. Ali’s argument are less than clear, it appears that he takes issue with the Court’s apparent acceptance of Carnegie’s argument that he should be required to go to state court to vindicate his claims when state court judges are incapable of correcting the inventorship of an issued patent. See id. at 5–6. If the Court had properly rejected Carnegie’s argument and recognized that Mr. Ali had no alternative forum available to him, he reasons, the Court may have found that this case could proceed without UMass.
There are two major flaws in Mr. Ali’s argument. First and foremost, his argument that
no alternative forum is available to him was fully briefed in his opposition to Carnegie’s motion
to dismiss,
see
Pl.’s Opp’n at 30–32, and duly considered in this Court’s prior Memorandum
*18
Opinion,
Ali
,
Second, Mr. Ali mischaracterizes the Court’s analysis. The Court did not “accept” Carnegie’s assertion of an available alternative forum for Mr. Ali’s claims. In actuality, the Court said that “[t]here may or may not be an alternative forum for Plaintiff’s claims,” that the factor was “inconclusive,” and that “it is unclear whether he can sue UMass in state court for damages, and/or whether the statute of limitations has run on his state law claims.” Ali , 2014 WL 4260995, at *8. The Court explained, however, that even if Mr. Ali had no alternative forum and no other remedy available for his claims, that was not enough “to persuade the Court that dismissal was no longer warranted,” given “the weighty competing interest of preserving . . . sovereign immunity.” Id. at *18, *19 n.13. In short, the Court expressly foreclosed the possibility that the lack of an alternative forum would alter the Court’s decision that this action could not proceed in equity and good conscience without UMass. There is thus no merit to Mr. Ali’s contention that such a finding would have changed the Court’s decision.
In sum, Mr. Ali’s motion provides no basis for reconsidering the dismissal of his complaint for failure to join a necessary party, and his request for reconsideration is therefore denied. [5]
D. Request for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [6] In the conclusion section of Mr. Ali’s motion for reconsideration, he includes an alternative request for relief in the form of leave “to remedy his amended complaint to address the concern of this Court, for example by re-amending his complaint back to the original complaint in which ONLY Carnegie was named as a defendant.” Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 9–10.
Typically, leave to amend a complaint “shall be given freely when justice so requires.”
See
Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a). In deciding whether to allow a party to amend a complaint, courts may
consider “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
*20
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”
Foman v. Davis
, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962). “An amended complaint is futile if it merely restates the same facts as the
original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails
to state a legal theory or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”
Robinson v. Detroit News,
Inc.
,
In this case, Mr. Ali’s general request for leave to amend in an unspecified manner is
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(a).
U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker
Aircraft Co.
,
Even if this Court were inclined to interpret Mr. Ali’s suggestion that he might re-instate
his first complaint as a request for leave to do the same, a grant of leave to amend would still be
inappropriate. Mr. Ali has offered no argument whatsoever as to how reinstating the first
complaint—which is premised on substantially the same factual allegations and once again
would have Carnegie as the sole defendant opposing Mr. Ali’s claims to correct inventorship and
for related damages—would affect this Court’s decision that UMass is a necessary party without
which this case must not proceed.
See Greggs v. Autism Speaks, Inc.
,
Additionally, such an amendment exceeds the limited scope of leave to amend set forth in
the Court’s Order, which constrained Mr. Ali to seeking leave “to name UMass officials in their
official capacities,” and instructed him that if he wished to do so, he must “address whether this
Court would have personal jurisdiction over these officials.” Order, Aug. 29, 2014, ECF No. 78.
Mr. Ali has not argued that this Court’s prior grant of leave was too narrow or otherwise
explained his disregard for the limitations of the Court’s August 2014 Order. Instead, he has
declined to seek leave to amend in the manner permitted by both this Court and by the Oregon
District Court, and the deadline for such an amendment has long since come and gone. Order, Sept. 19, 2014, ECF No. 84 (giving Mr. Ali until November 14, 2014 to seek leave to file
a second amended complaint);
see also Foman v. Davis
,
The Court therefore denies Mr. Ali’s request for leave to amend his complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ali’s motion for leave to file a supplemental statement regarding the filing date of his motion for reconsideration is GRANTED , his alternative request for leave to file nunc pro tunc is DENIED , and his motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to amend his complaint is DENIED . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: June 26, 2015 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
Notes
[1] The Court hereby incorporates by reference its earlier Memorandum Opinion.
See
generally Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Washington
, No. 13-cv-2030,
[2] Mr. Ali’s motion for leave to file a supplemental statement regarding the mailing error
(ECF No. 88) is hereby granted, but as explained below, the motion’s alternative request to file
the motion for reconsideration
nunc pro tunc
, apparently so that the motion would comply with
Rule 59(e)’s 28-day filing deadline, is denied.
See Justice v. Town of Cicero
,
[3] Although the parties both appear to assume that the Court’s August 2014 Order of
dismissal constitutes a final judgment, relief from which is governed by Rule 59(e) or 60(b), the
issue is not as clear-cut as the parties seem to assume. “The district court ordinarily enters a final
judgment only after it has disposed of all claims against all parties.”
Capitol Sprinkler
Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc.
,
[4] The decision of whether to proceed without a required party “must be based on factors
varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some
compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests.”
Republic
of Philippines v. Pimentel
,
[5] Mr. Ali’s motion includes a footnote that appears to invoke the possibility of a due process issue under the 14th Amendment. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 3 n.5. The footnote concludes, however, by observing that for the purpose of this case, “this Court doesn’t need to go there and or entertain that possibility.” Id. The Court takes Mr. Ali at his word and declines to address an unnecessary constitutional question, the nature of which is not clearly identified in Mr. Ali’s motion.
[6] If this Court’s Order of dismissal constitutes a final judgment subject to reconsideration
under Rule 59(e) or 60(b), then Mr. Ali’s request for leave to amend must be denied outright
given that his motion for reconsideration has been denied. Once a final judgment has been
entered, a court cannot permit an amendment unless the plaintiff first satisfies” the “more
stringent standard[s]” of Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).
See Ciralsky v. CIA
,