Lead Opinion
OPINION
This appeal requires us to interpret an exception to the general rule that an employee injured in the course of employment is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Specifically, an employer is not liable for injuries incurred by an employee while participating in an employer-sponsored “voluntary recreational program[ ],” MinmStat. § 176.021, subd. 9 (2014). The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) concluded that an employee-recognition event sponsored by relator was not “voluntary” because attendance at the event was the only option by which respondent could avoid a loss of pay or benefits. We conclude that an employer-sponsored recreational program is not “voluntary” when it takes place during work hours and employees must either attend the event or use limited vacation time in order to get paid. We further conclude that individual activities that take place during a voluntary recreational program do not constitute separate “programs.” We, therefore, affirm.
I.
Respondent Ali Shire worked the Friday-through-Sunday weekend shift as a full-time, permanent employee in the shipping department of relator Rosemount, Inc. During the last three hours of a weekend shift in October 2012, Rosemount sponsored its annual employee-recognition event, which was held specifically for the weekend-shift employees of the shipping department. Rosemount’s online employee handbook states that “recognition events are voluntary in purpose and all employees have the choice to decide to participate.... If an invitation or sign-up sheet is utilized, it should very clearly state the event is voluntary.” . The handbook does not provide , any information about an employee’s pay or the use of vacation or unpaid leave during a recognition event.
The compensation judge found, and it is undisputed on appeal, that the weekend-shift employees had three options with respect to the October 2012 recognition event: attend the recognition event and receive their usual wage for the last three hours of the shift, request tó use their accrued paid vacation time, or request to take unpaid leave.
The employee-recognition event consisted of dinner followed by bowling, then a game of laser tag. Shire injured his right ankle while playing laser tag. As a result of his injury, Shire was temporarily and totally disabled from performing his normal job duties for more than one year. He also sustained a 3.98 percent permanent partial disability of the whole body. Shire filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits. Rosemount denied liability, asserting that Shire’s injury is excluded from coveragé under Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9. Subdivision 9 exempts injuries incurred during “voluntary recreational programs” from workers’ Compensation coverage. Id.
Rosemount advanced two arguments before the compensation judge. First, Rose-mount argued that the employee-recognition event was a “voluntary recreational program” because Rosemount provided its employees with alternatives to attendance at the event — the options of requesting to use vacation time or requesting to take unpaid leave. Second, even if the employee-recognition event was not “voluntary,” Rosemount argued that Shire’s' injury falls within the voluntary-recreational-program exception because, he was injured while participating in a voluntary game at the employee-recognition event.
In response to Rosemount’s first argument, Shire countered that the event was not “voluntary” because it occurred during his shift and he was required to attend in order to obtain his wage without sacrificing his limited vacation time. Shire also argued that he could not take vacation or unpaid leave without his supervisor’s prior approval. In response to Rosemount’s second argument, Shire contended that the statute addresses the voluntary nature of the employee-recognition program, not the voluntary nature of the laser-tag game.
. The compensation judge held that "the relevant question is whether the “program” was voluntary, not whether the activities within the program were voluntary. The employee-recognition event was not a “voluntary” program, . the compensation judge, concluded, because without the option of remaining at work for the last three hours, of his shift, Shire’s only alternatives were to sacrifice either his pay or his limited vacation time. The WCCA affirmed. Shire v. Rosemount, Inc.,
II.
Generally, an employee whose injury “aris[es] out of and in the course of employment” is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2014). The Legislature created an exception, however, for injuries incurred while participating in employer-sponsored “voluntary recreational programs.” Id., subd. 9. The exception provides:
Injuries incurred while participating in voluntary .recreational programs sponsored by the employer, including health promotion programs, athletic events, parties, and picnics, do not arise out of and in the course of the employment even though the employer pays some or all of the cost of the program. This exclusion does not apply in the event that the injured employee was ordered*292 or assigned by the employer to participate.in the program.
Id. (emphasis added),
At issue here is the meaning of the phrase “voluntary recreational program” in subdivision 9, a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy,
We also interpret statutes so as to give effect to each word and phrase. Allan v. R.D. Offutt Co.,
A.
Rosemount’s principal argument is that the employee-recognition event was “voluntary” because employees had the option of either requesting to use vacation time or requesting to take unpaid leave. Shire contends that he was implicitly compelled to attend the event because attendance was the only option by which he. could get paid without using his limited vacation time.
1.
Because the workers’ compensation statute does not define the word “voluntary,” we begin our plain-meaning analysis with dictionary definitions. " According to these definitions, an option is “voluntary” when it is “[d]one or undertaken of one’s own free will” or “done willingly and without constraint or expectation of reward.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1941-42 (5th ed.2011); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 2564 (3d ed.2002) (defining “voluntary” as “proceeding from the will: produced in or by an act of choice”; “performed, made, or given of one’s own free will”; or “acting of oneself: not constrained, impelled, or influenced by another”).
Contrary to these definitions, employees were “constrained” by the fact that attendance at the employee-recognition eVent was the only means by which they could obtain their wages without expending limited vacation time. To hold that a program is “voluntary” under these circumstances would ignore the financial consequences that employees would have faced for failing, to attend: either the loss of pay or the depletion of limited vacation time.
Moreover, concluding that a program is “voluntary” under these facts would violate the canon against surplusage, which ré-quires us to give effect to each word and phrase of a statute. Allan,
Rosemount also contends that it communicated to employees,- both through, the employee handbook and orally at staff meetings, that the event was “voluntary” and that employees should speak with their supervisor if they did not wish to attend. But an analysis based solely on an employer’s conclusory statements that programs are “voluntary,” even when compensation or vacation benefits must be forfeited in order to opt out of attendance, fails to account for the economic bargain struck between employer and employee. Indeed, every employer could adopt an employee-handbook provision that deems such programs “voluntary” and thus claim the exception in subdivision' 9 to shield the employer from workers’ compensation liability. Yet, as happened here, the employer could impose consequences on an employee’s failure to attend an event that the handbook describes as “voluntary.” An employer’s classification of an event as “voluntary” should not prevail.when the facts.demonstrate that employees had only one “choice,” namely, to attend.
Similarly, Rosemourit’s contention that Shire never requested time off is irrelevant. Even if Shire had been granted time off, he would have incurred financial consequences: either the loss of his pay or the loss of his limited vacation, time. Effectively, Shire’s decision to attend Rose-mounds event, under the conditions Rose-mount imposed, was; “constrained” by his need to earn, money — -the,very purpose of employment. Under these circumstances, Rosemount’s - employee-recognition event was not “voluntary,”-. , , ,
Finally, Rosemount argues that our interpretation of subdivision 9 effectively éliminates the voluntary-recreational-program exception because some
To summarize, a recreational program is not “voluntary” when the employees’ options are limited either to (1) attending the program and getting paid or (2) forfeiting pay or benefits. To conclude otherwise fails to preserve the plain words of the statute and renders the word “voluntary” in Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9, meaningless.'
2.
The dissent would hold that Rose-mount’s employee-recognition event was “voluntary” 'for two reasons. First, the dissent argues, the relevant definition of a word “depends on the context in which [it] is used.” Yet, the dissent ignores the context in which the word “voluntary” is used in Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9. Next, the dissent relies on criminal cases to support its interpretation of the word “voluntary.”
We do not dispute the principle that we consider the context of a statute. The dissent cites State v. Nelson, in which we applied the canon against surplusage,
Rather than considering the context of the workers’ compensation statute, the dissent turns to criminal cases to support its narrow interpretation of the term “voluntary.”
Nothing in our case law dictates that we import definitions from vastly different areas of substantive law into a completely unrelated context, and we decline to create such precedent here. Rather, we rely on the text of. Minn.S'tat. § 176.021, subd. 9, and hold that Rosemount’s employee-recognition event was not “voluntary.”
B.
Having decided that the employee-recognition event was not “voluntary,” we next consider Rosemount’s alternative argument. Rosemount contends that, even if the recognition event was not voluntary, Shire’s participation in the laser-tag game at the event was voluntary. Subdivision 9 lists “health promotion programs, athletic events,, parties, and picnics” as examples of recreational programs. , Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9. Rosemount argues that the inclusion of the term “athletic events” in subdivision 9 demonstrates legislative intent to focus on the voluntariness of a single athletic activity, such as a laser-tag game, rather than the voluntariness of an entire prpgram.
Rosemount’s argument invites us to define the word “program” on an activity-by-activity basis.
Rosemount’s reading of subdivision 9 defies this plain meaning. Nothing in the plain language of subdivision 9 dictates an activity-by-activity analysis. “[Ajthletic events, parties, and pienics,” id., often consist of multiple activities.
IIL
To summarize,. we, hold that a recreational program is not “voluntary” when -.the employees’ choices are either to attend the program or risk forfeiting pay or benefits. We further hold that the relevant inquiry when applying Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9, is whether the program is voluntary, not whether individual recreational activities within the program are voluntary. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Under Rosemount’s interpretation, the statute would read:
Injuries incurred while participating in ... recreational programs ... do not arise out of and in the course of the employment.... This exclusion does not apply in the event that the injured employee was ordered or assigned by the employer to participate in the program.
See Minn.Stat, § 176.021, subd. 9.
. The dissent argues that our holding conflicts with Ellingson and Paskett, as well as Sager v. City of Roseville, 52 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 281 (WCCA), aff'd without opinion, 529
. The dissent also contends that a dictionary’s first-listed- definition of a word expresses the . word's most common meaning. Yet, the dissent maintains that we should choose the relevant definition based on the context in which the word is used.' The definitions we rely on are well-suited to the context of Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9, particularly because, in order to avoid surplusage, we must define "voluntary” as distinct from the phrase "ordered or assigned.”
. Significantly, the criminal cases cited by the dissent involving voluntary confessions and voluntary guilty pleas' do not employ the rules of statutory interpretation, See, e.g., State v. Riley,
. Rosemount proposed a different theory .at oral argument. According to Rosemount, the "program” could be alternatively (1) Rose-mount’s overall employee wellness program, (2) the employee-recognition event, or (3) the laser-tag game at the event. We need not address this theory because it was raised for the first time at oral argument. See City of Duluth v. Cerveny,
. For example, there may be a volleyball game at a company picnic. Similarly, an athletic event may consist of multiple games. Yet, a single football game would constitute a "program” when the game is the solé recreational activity.
, Depending on the dictionary publisher, the first-listed meaning is the “most commonly sought meaning,” the “most established ,.. literal and central” meaning, or the historical first-known meaning, See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, at
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The word “voluntary,”- as used in the voluntary-recreational-program exception, Minn.Stat. § 176.021, stibd. 9 (2014), is unambiguous and has one reasonable plain meaning. But that reasonable plain meaning is not followed by the court’s decision. Under the court’s definition, a program is “voluntary” only if it is attended “willingly and without constraint or expectation of reward.” And as applied by the court, the alternatives to program attendance provided by Rosemount — taking paid leave or unpaid leave — are “constraints” on “pay or benefits” such that attendance is involuntary. This is not a reasonable plain meaning for two reasons.
- In short, the only reasonable meaning of a “voluntary” recreational program in the context of Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9, is one that is attended without coercion by the employer and by an employee’s act of choice among reasonable- alternatives. Here, Rosemount’s recreational program was “voluntary” because Rosemount did not coerce Shire into attending and Shire made the choice to attend after being presented with reasonable alternatives. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act, Minh.Stat. "§§ 176.001-.862 (2014), does- not define the word “voluntary.” See MinmStat. § 176.011. In the absence of statutory definitions, we interpret the words in a statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning. 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis,
Many dictionaries define- “voluntary” broadly by referring to free will, willingness, intention, and acts of choice, rather than the absence of “constraints.” Such a broad definition is usually listed first.
By contrast, the language relied on by the court, which prohibits “constraints” and “influences,” originates from lower-listed dictionary entries See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 2564 (3d ed.2002) (“e: acting of oneself: not constrained, impelled, or influenced by another: spontaneous, free”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1402 (11th ed.2003) (“2: unconstrained by interference”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1605 (8th ed.2004) (“2. Unconstrained by interference; not impelled by outside influence”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1941-42 (5th ed.2011) (“2. Acting or done willingly and without constraint or expectation of reward”). Indeed, two prominent dictionaries do not include any senses of “voluntary” that require the absence of “constraints” or “influences.” See Oxford Dictionary of English 1990 (3d ed.2010); New Oxford American Dictionary 1938 (3d ed.2010).
Even without considering the ordering of definitions, the Relevant meaning to draw from a dictionary depends on the context of the statute an'd the applicability of that meaning to this case. In other words, the goal is not to determine the meaning of “voluntary” generally, in all situations, but rather the plain and ordinary meaning of “voluntary” as- applied to this specific statute and to the facts of this case. Nelson,
In the context of this statute, there will almost always be some incentive to attend an employee-sponsored recreational program; indeed, an employer presumably designs such a program because it has a business-related goal that is advanced by employee participation. Employees may desire to attend because a program is fun and provides opportunities to bond with coworkers. Employees may desire to attend because they will receive performance rewards, such as certificates of achievement or'other types'of recognition for their performance. The employer may encourage employees to attend because there will be beneficial activities, such as training, skill development, and team-building exercises. And, often, as here, the program may take place during normal work hours and involve the payment of regular wages. Conversely, there may be disadvantages to being absent because the em
II.
In addition to dictionary definitions and the context of the statute, we may consider precedent that has established the meaning of words in analogous contexts. See 500, LLC,
Voluntary Intoxication. In State v. Fearon,
Voluntary Confessions. If a defendant moves to suppress an allegedly involuntary confession, the state has the burden to prove the confession was “voluntary.” Doan v. State,
Voluntary Guilty Pleas, A guilty plea is unconstitutional if it is not voluntary. See Brady v. United States,
I recognize these examples are drawn from our criminal law and are not directly applicable here; that said, and recognizing the differences between “voluntary” in the context of workers’ compensation law and in criminal law, it is noteworthy and instructive that we have applied a broader meaning to “voluntary” in a context in which there is a strict constitutional standard protecting'the rights of criminal defendants. No such barrier exists here, and yet the- court applies a meaning to “voluntary” that is much narrower. Why we should do this, given the plain language of the statute, dictionary definitions, and the broader meanings of “voluntary” applied elsewhere, the court does not say.
III.
These dictionary definitions and analogous precedents indicate that the’plain and ordinary meaning of a “voluntary” recreational program, Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9, does not require the absence of all influences or constraints; rather, such external influences prevent a voluntary decision only if they amount to coercion that critically impairs willfulness and the capacity for self-determination. The most natural and common reading of a “voluntary” recreational program under this statute is one attended without coercion by the employer and by an employee’s act of choice among reasonable alternatives.
This plain meaning, focusing on an “act of choice,” is persuasively supported by similar workers’ compensation cases. In Ellingson v. Brady Corp., 66 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 27 (WCCA 2005), aff'd without opinion,
In Paskett v. Imation Corp., No. WC12-5494,
Similarly here, Shire made a choice among reasonable alternatives presented by his employer, including (1) attending Rosemount’s employee-recognition program and receiving regular wages; (2) tak-mg paid leave by using vacation hours;
But despite this clear evidence that Shire attended the program voluntarily, the court nevertheless presumes that Shire must have been “implicitly coerced” to attend. The only basis for the court’s con-elusion that Shire was “implicitly coerced” is that, among the options available to Shire — attend the program with regular wages, take paid leave by using vacation hours, or take unpaid leave — there was a financial disincentive or “constraint” in favor of attending the program. See supra at 292 (“Contrary to these definitions, employees were ‘constrained’ by the fact that attendance at the employee-recognition event was the only means by which they could obtain their wages without expending limited vacation time,”).
The court’s decision does not follow the reasonable plain meaning of “voluntary” under Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9. Restricting the definition of this term to prohibit any “constraint” on “pay or benefits,” and raising a presumption of “implied coercion” based on incentivized alternatives, without any direct evidence that an employee was actually coerced, contravenes the plain meaning of “voluntary” according to relevant dictionary definitions, the context of the statute, and analogous precedent. I would hold that the reasonable plain meaning of a “voluntary” recreational program under this statute is one that is' attended without coercion by the employer and by the employee’s act of choice among reasonable alternatives. Because Shire attended Rosemount’s program by making a choice among reasonable alternatives,. including the options of paid leave by using vacation hours or. unpaid leave, arid because there was no evidence of coercion by Rosemount, implied or otherwise, Shire’s attendance was voluntary and therefore his injury was non-compensable under the voluntary-recreational-program exception, Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd.' 9, to the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act. "For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. Although the court cites one definition of "voluntary” that refers to the absence of a "reward,” the court does not rely on this part of the definition in its analysis. It is telling that the court does not do so, because requiring the absence of "rewards” would result in an unreasonably narrow meaning of "voluntary,” and would conflict with Ellingson and Sager, in which the WCCA held that an employer's payment of wages does not result in involuntary attendance, Similarly here, Rosemount arguably provided a financial "reward” or incentive to attend its program through the payment of regular wages to the program’s attendees. But the court does not rely on .this financial “reward” to support its conclusion that Rosemount’s program was involuntary and Shire was "implicitly coerced” to attend. Thus, it appears that the court would agree that, consistent with the WCCA’s holdihgs in Ellingson and Sager, a reasonable "reward” or financial incentive to attend, through the payment of regular wages, does not result in involuntary attendance, But the court does not explain how the converse of this rule, a reasonable "constraint” or financial disincentive to be absent (by providing the options of using paid vacation hours or taking unpaid leave) results in involuntariness.