Alhambra-Grantfork Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce CommissionAlhambra-Grantfork Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission
delivered the opinion of the court:
Alhаmbra-Grantfork Telephone Company (Alhambra) appeals from an order entered by the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) canceling its wireless termination tariff on the grounds that it failed to give proper notice of the tariff to affected commercial mobile radio service telecommunications carriers (CMRS carriers). On appeal, Alhambra contends that the Commission erred in finding that CMRS carriers were customers entitled to individual notice of its proposed tariff. Alhambra also contends that section 200.90(a) of Title 83 of the Illinois Administrative Code (Administrative Code) (83 Ill. Adm. Code § 200.90(a) (2000)) and section 10 — 101 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act (Act) (
On December 18, 2003, Alhambra filed its proposed wireless termination tariff with the Commission pursuant to the special procedures for simplified noncompetitive tariff filings set forth in section 13 — 504(a) of the Act (
On January 20, 2004, a number of CMRS carriers filed a verified petition with the Commission. They sought a review of the tariffs filed by the ILECs, including Alhambra. The staff of the Commission filed a motion to cancel all the tariffs on the grounds that they were not filed in compliаnce with the notice requirements established in section 745.110(c) of Title 83 of the Administrative Code (83 Ill. Adm. Code § 745.110(c) (1996)). More specifically, the staff asserted that the tariffs should be canceled because the ILECs provided notice by publication pursuant to section 745.110(c)(2) of Titlе 83 of the Administrative Code rather than individual notice as required under section 745.110(c)(1) (83 Ill. Adm. Code §§ 745.110(c)(1), (c)(2) (1996)).
In response, Alhambra argued that section 745.110(c)(1) required an ILEC to provide individual notice to existing customers whose currently billed rates would be different as a result of the tariff. Alhambra claimed that at the time it filed its wireless tariff with the Commission, notice by publication was proper because the CMRS carriers were not being billed by Alhambra and were not paying for services received from Alhambra, and Alhambra was not voluntarily providing services to any of them.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Commission entered an order canceling the tariffs of all 19 ILECs, including Alhambra, on the grounds that they failed to give actual notice to affected customers, i.e., CMRS carriers that would be charged under the tariffs. The Commission specifically found that the CMRS carriers were potentially affected customers of the ILECs and were entitled to individual notice of the proposed tariffs. The Commission cancelled the ILECs’ tariffs without prejudice to refile them upon proper notice. The Commission did not make any findings on the issue of the justness and reasonableness of the proposed tariffs. Alhambra was the only ILEC that appealed the Commission’s order.
A reviewing court generally gives substantial deference to the decisions of an administrative agency beсause of its experience and expertise. United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n,
Initially, Alhambra challenges the Commission’s determination that the CMRS carriers were potentially affected customers entitled to individual notice of the proposed tariffs under
The parties expend an excessive amount of time in a complex debate about the meaning of the word “customer.” The word “customer” is not defined in the statute, and so we аpply the rules of statutory construction and afford the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. See People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “customer” as “2 a: one that purchases some commodity or service ***; esp: one that purchases systematically or frequently *** b: one that patronizes or uses *** services.” (Emphasis omitted.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 559 (1993). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “customer” as “[o]ne who regularly or repeatedly makes purchases of, or has business dеalings with, a tradesman or business.” Black’s Law Dictionary 348 (5th ed. 1979).
The record shows that CMRS carriers had been using the services of the ILECs and had ongoing business dealings with them prior to and at the time Alhambra filed its proposed tariff. It is clear from the record that CMRS carriers will be charged diffеrently as a result of the proposed tariffs. Prior to the tariff filings, CMRS carriers were not charged for calls terminating on Alhambra’s equipment. The Commission’s interpretation of its rule fits within the purpose of the statute, which requires 30 days’ notice to all potentially affected сustomers. On this record, we do not find that the Commission’s decision, canceling Alhambra’s tariff for the lack of proper notice to affected CMRS carriers, is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable.
The next issue is whether the Commission rule permitting an out-of-state attorney to practice pro hac vice before the Commission violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1) and encroaches on the power of the judiciary under article VI of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI).
According to the record, on January 20, 2004, Philip R. Schenkenberg, an out-of-state attorney, filed with the Commission a petition for an investigation of Alhambra’s wireless termination tariff on behalf of a number of wireless carriers. During a status hearing held on February 9, 2004, attorney Schenkenberg advised the presiding hearing examiner that he was not licensed to practice law in Illinois, and he moved to be allowed to appear in the pending proceedings pursuant to section 200.90 of Title 83 of the Administrative Code. The motion was granted. A few weeks later, the Commission cancelled Alhambra’s tariff on the grounds that Alhambra failed to provide proper notice to its affected customers. The Commission cancelled that tariff without prejudice, providing Alhambra an opportunity to refile the tariff with proper notice. Rаther than refile the tariff, Alhambra elected to appeal the order. We are now affirming the Commission’s order. Accordingly, the CMRS carriers’ petition to investigate the justness and reasonableness of the proposed tariff and the propriety of any orders entered in regard to that action are no longer in controversy. Nevertheless, we will briefly address the question of the Commission’s authority to allow an out-of-state attorney to appear before it, because it involves an issue that is likely to arise again and an authoritative determination might provide guidance to the Commission in the future. See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
The Commission is a creation of the state legislature and possesses only the authority and power necessary to supervise all public utilitiеs and to administer the regulatory laws under the Act.
In order to carry out its duties to conduct hearings and decide contested cases, the legislature has granted the Commission statutory authority to allow out-of-state attorneys to appear before it upon the same terms and conditions that Illinois attorneys are permitted to appear before the corresponding administrative body in the state where the petitioning attorney is admitted to practiсe. See
It is well established that the Illinois Supreme Court has the sоle authority to license attorneys to practice law in Illinois, to regulate the practice of law, and to sanction or discipline attorneys admitted to practice in this state. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley,
The separation of powers doctrine does not forbid every exercise of functions by one branch of government that conventionally is exercised by another branch. City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board,
The Commission and its hearing examiners are authorized by statute to exercise quasi-judicial discretion in determining whether an attorney who is not licensed in this state may appear in a particular cause before it. This discretionary authority assists the Commission in the performance of its adjudicative functions and is incidental to its duties under the Act. Moreover, this grant of authority is limited to Commission proceedings and does not impair the discretionary authority of any court in this state to decide whether to allow an out-of-state attorney to appear before it under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 707 (145 Ill. 2d R. 707). Alhambra’s prayers that
This court had previously taken with the case the CMRS carriers’ motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is moot. The motion is denied.
Accordingly, the order of the Illinois Commerce Commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GOLDENHERSH and KUEHN, JJ., concur.