Alford v. MeyerAlford v. Meyer
This is an appeal from a jury verdict for the defendants in a common law negligence action.
This cause was initially before this court by wаy of Cases Nos. H-332 and H-333 filed prior to rendition of the judgment appealed from. New and timely notices of appeal, Cases Nos. I-38 and I-39, wеre filed together with appropriate motions requesting use of the records of H-332 and H-333 in this properly filed appeal. We hereby dismiss H-332 and H-333 and proceed to review the judgments appealed from in Cases Nos. I-38 and I-39.
The separate complaints, resulting from the same incident, were consolidated for trial, and the cases are now consolidated for appeal.
An examination of the record discloses that both plaintiffs, Alford and Williams, were injured while in the course of their employment with defendants, Meyer Brothers. The injuries were sustained by а fall from a scaffold while painting gasoline storage tanks belonging to defendant, American Oil Company.
The plaintiffs contend that the employer by providing an unsafe scaffold failed in his duty to exercise the standard of care required under the circumstances involved. In attempting to prove this lack of due care, the plaintiffs offered as evidence a Florida Industrial Commission pamphlet containing the “Regulations for Construction and Use of Scaffolds,” adopted pursuant to the safety provisions of
The reasоning of the court was that the regulations were not admissible as to Meyer Brothers who, by silence, had failed to accept the law and, thеrefore, were not employers within the contemplation of
“Every employer, as defined in the workmen‘s compensation law, including employers who have elected not to accept the workmen‘s compensation law, shall furnish employment which shall be safe * * *.”
In other words, the trial court reasoned that only employers who had affirmatively elected to accept or reject the Workmеn‘s Compensation Law were subject to or needed to abide by the safety rules promulgated under the statute.
The appellees rely on a 1954 federal decision, Baker v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 212 F.2d 130 (5th Circuit), which held that an employer who had rejected the Workmen‘s Compensation Law was not subject to the sаfety rules adopted by the Industrial Commission.
At the time of the Baker case, the pertinent part of
“Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be safe * * *.”
However, at the time the instant case arose, this section had been modified by Chapter 61-428, Laws of Florida, to apply the safety standards to every employer “as defined in the * * * law, including employers who have elected not to accept the * * * law.” The title to said act states that its purpose was to “* * * extend the coverage of the safety law.” It is quite obvious that the Legislature was not content with the results produced by the Baker case.
In the cаse at bar, the trial court considered the modification of the section as to employers who elected not to accеpt the law and ruled on the necessity of an affirmative act. However, a proper construction requires the interpretation оf the effect of the modification as to “every employer, as defined in the workmen‘s compensation law,” together with
“(4) The term `employer’ means * * * every person carrying on any employment, * * *.
“(5) The term `person’ means individual, partnership, association or corрoration, * * *.”
The legislative intent as to the class of persons sought to be protected by the subject rule is perhaps manifested best by
“The industrial commission shall cooperate with the federal government so that duplicate inspections will be avoided yet assure safе places of employment for the citizens of this state.” (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no question that the term “employer” in
The ratiоnale supporting the admission of a statute, ordinance, or administrative rule or regulation as prima facie evidence of negligence is that the standard of conduct or care embraced within such legislative or quasi-legislative measures represent a standard оf at least reasonable care which should be adhered to in the performance of any given activity.
We cannot agree with thе appellees’ contention that the introduction of the regulation in evidence would have been merely cumulative. The jury might well have accorded the regulation a much higher degree of credibility than that which it gave to the oral testimony of witnesses specifically summоnsed by the plaintiffs.
Neither can we agree with the appellees’ contention that the successive proffers of the rule were insufficient for want of proper form.
The fault alleged against the defendant oil сompany was that in connection with its contract with Meyer Brothers, the oil company had retained certain supervisory authority with respect to the performance of the painting job by Meyer Brothers, and such authority had been negligently carried out.
The judgment for the appellees, Donald J. Meyer and Wilford J. Meyer, d/b/a Meyer Brothers, is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
WIGGINTON, Acting C.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.