406 S.E.2d 86 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1991
The appellant was convicted of speeding and possessing cocaine. He contends on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the possession conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence to which he had objected on relevancy grounds.
While driving southbound on Interstate 75 in a rented car, the appellant was stopped by a Georgia State trooper for speeding. At the trooper’s request, the appellant produced his driver’s license and the rental agreement for the vehicle. As he was completing the citation, the trooper questioned the appellant concerning his itinerary and the reason for his journey; and the appellant responded that he had driven to Atlanta from Miami two days earlier to visit a sick aunt and was in the process of returning to Miami. The trooper then questioned a passenger who was accompanying the appellant in the vehi-
1. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the handgun, currency and briefcase over his objection as to relevancy. This contention is without merit. “ ‘ “[T]he manner of the arrest, how [the defendant] was armed,. . . and all other circumstances connected with the arrest, [is] consider [ed] proper evidence to be submitted to the jury to be weighed by them for what they are worth.” [Cit.]”’ State v. Luke, 232 Ga. 815, 816 (209 SE2d 165) (1974).
2. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. In the absence of evidence or circumstances giving rise to a contrary inference, it may be inferred that the driver or other person in possession or control of an automobile is in knowing possession of all that is contained therein. See Reed v. State, 186 Ga. App. 539, 540 (367 SE2d 809) (1988). Besides being in possession and control of the vehicle, the appellant in this case was in possession of a handgun and a large amount of currency. We believe the jury could reasonably have inferred from this evidence, and from his false denial that he was carrying the latter items, that he was aware of the presence of the cocaine found in the vehicle. In addition, there was evidence that two drug detector dogs had “alerted” to his briefcase, indicating that it, too, had contained drugs at one time. See generally Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415 (373 SE2d 97) (1988); Jones v. State, 242 Ga. 893 (252 SE2d 394) (1979). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that it was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine. Accord Reed v. State, supra. See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Judgment affirmed.