Alexis SICILIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 07-15077
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
May 30, 2008.
936
Non-Argument Calendar.
Christopher N. Bellows, Kelly-Ann Gibbs Cartwright, Monica Vila, Holland & Knight, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Alexis Sicilia appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer United Parcel Service (“UPS“), in Sicilia‘s suit claiming violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA“),
Sicilia started working at UPS in 1997, but never informed anyone there that he had been diagnosed with epilepsy until after he suffered his first seizure at work in February 2006. Sicilia then was working a night shift as an Export PM shift clerk.2 The seizure lasted only a few minutes, and he returned to his normal work activities afterwards. At a later doctor‘s visit, Sicilia‘s doctor told him he likely was having breakthrough seizures because of noncompliance with his medication. Sicilia had a second seizure in April 2006, but again, he did not lose time from work because of it.
After the second seizure, Sicilia told his doctor that he thought the seizures were caused by working the night shift. The
Because of the doctor-imposed restrictions, UPS removed Sicilia from the Export PM shift clerk position in July 2006. Because no other positions were then available, UPS suspended his employment but continued to pay his benefits while he looked for another position. In August 2006, Sicilia requested a job-related accommodation; but Sicilia‘s doctor filled out the required medical forms and stated that Sicilia could perform all functions of his position. UPS, thus, concluded that Sicilia did not qualify for an accommodation. Still, UPS informed Sicilia of available positions. And Sicilia applied for two available day-shift positions. The positions were filled by equally-qualified employees who had worked for UPS longer than Sicilia, pursuant to UPS‘s length-of-service seniority system. Sicilia received UPS benefits for the seven months he was not working but eventually UPS terminated his employment.
In his complaint, Sicilia contended that his epilepsy diagnosis qualified him as “handicapped” under the FCRA. He alleged that UPS suspended and terminated him because of his epilepsy and failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. The district court concluded that UPS was entitled to summary judgment because Sicilia had not demonstrated that he was disabled under the FCRA and, thus, had failed to make a prima facie case of disability discrimination.3
On appeal, Sicilia argues that the district court erred when it failed to construe the FCRA with
Disability discrimination claims raised under the FCRA are analyzed under the same framework as the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA“). Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263-64 (11th Cir.2007). And a plaintiff qualifies as disabled under the ADA if, in pertinent part, he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
Sicilia‘s epilepsy does not substantially limit him in a major life activity. By his own admission, his seizures are infrequent, not severe, and controlled with medication; he can tell when he is going to have a seizure and does not lose consciousness during one. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2146-47, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (if a plaintiff‘s impairment is corrected by medication or other measures, he does not have an impairment that presently substantially limits a major life activity). In addition, he lost no work time because of the two seizures he suffered.
Even with the doctor-imposed restrictions, Sicilia still can perform certain jobs.
Sicilia also argues that UPS did not meet its burden in showing that they attempted to accommodate him reasonably. But because Sicilia did not qualify as disabled, UPS was not required to accommodate him. See Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir.2000) (employers must provide a reasonable accommodation only for employees with known disabilities). Even if Sicilia did qualify for an accommodation, UPS was not required to violate its own seniority system to accommodate him to the day-shift positions for which he applied. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 1524, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002) (explaining that it ordinarily will be unreasonable for an employer to violate its own seniority system to accommodate an otherwise qualified disabled person);
We turn to Sicilia‘s retaliation claim. He alleged that UPS suspended and terminated him in retaliation for filing his administrative and civil complaints. Sicilia filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC after his employment was suspended and filed his state court complaint in November 2006. Soon after, UPS removed the state action to federal court. In February 2007, UPS informed Sicilia that his employment would be terminated as of 3 March 2007. The district court concluded that no causal connection existed between his protected activities and his suspension and termination.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse action causally was related to the protected expression. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir.2004).6 To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct and that the protected activity and the adverse act were at least somewhat related and in close temporal proximity. Id. at 1220.
Sicilia‘s retaliation claim is defeated because he can show no causal link between his suspension and termination and the filing of his EEOC charge and civil rights complaint. He was removed from
AFFIRMED.