8 Gill 239 | Md. | 1849
delivered the opinion of this court.
The first question presented for our examination by this record, is, whether the court below erred in deciding that the proceedings in the ejectment of Merryman’s Lessee, against Smith, estop the defendants in this case, from denying the possession of Philip Walter, of the premises in controversy, at the time when such ejectment was brought?
When this case was before the Court of Appeals in 1844, 2 Gill, 204, the character of the judgment rendered by Baltimore county court, in the ejectment cause to which we have reference, was considered; and it was then held by the court, that it was not to be treated as a statutory judgment, under the act of 4 Geo. 2, ch. 28, and vested no title in Mrs. Alexander, then Miss Merryman, and constituted no bar to the appellee’s right to recover the demised premises. The language of the court is :
“To give to this judgment the efficacy ascribed to it, it must appear to this court to be a judgment rendered under the statute of 4 Geo. 2; or in other words, the record must disclose such facts and circumstances as would justify us in believing or assuming, that in rendering its judgment, the court below designed to exercise the authority conferred on it by the statute. The record before us discloses nothing which could warrant ns in any such assumption or belief. All the proceedings in ejectment; until long after the judgment, show it t,o have been an ordinary case of ejectment, (having no connection with the statute,) the judgment in which, is conclusive upon nobody.”
It is impossible to maintain that the proceedings in the ejectment are to be treated as an estoppel by the record. Irrespective of all other objections, they are deficient in the indispensable ingredient of mutuality. Philip Walter was not a party to the suit in which the judgment by default was rendered. He had no connection or privity with Smith, the tenant in possession. So far from being represented by Smith, their titles were conflicting and antagonistical; Walter professing to claim under the original lease, and Smith holding the property, so long as he retained it, as the immediate tenant of
In Viner’s Abg. tit. Estop., sec. A, 2, the law of estoppel is thus laid down. “Every estoppel ought to be reciprocal, that is to bind both parties, and this is the reason, that regularly a stranger shall neither take advantage, nor be bound by the estoppel, privies in blood as the heir, privies in estates, as the feoffee, lessee, &c., privies in law, as the lord by escheat, &c. Shall be bound and take advantage of estoppels.”
In the case of Gaunt vs. Wainman, 3 Bingh., N. C., 69, the assignees of the demandant’s husband, who was a bankrupt, conveyed the lands in controversy to the tenant as freeholder. It was a writ of dower, and the question was, whether the defendant who claimed under the deed, was estopped from showing that the premises were leasehold ?
Tindal, C. J., ruled it to be no estoppel. He said, “As between the parties to the deed, there may be an estoppel; but it is set up against a stranger to the deed. Suppose the tenant had bought the premises as leasehold, would the demandant be estopped to say that they were freehold ? This is a case in which the defendant is not precluded from showing the rea! nature of the estate. According to Coke Lit., 352, a,, every estoppel ought to be reciprocal, that is, to bind both parties, and this is the reason that regularly a stranger shall neither take advantage, nor be bound by the estoppel.”
In Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 John. Rep., 381, an action of trespass was brought by Montgomery against two defendants, Lansing and Goeway. Goeioay pleaded a former suit, and a judgment in his favor, to which file plaintiff demurred, and judgment was given for the defendant. Lansing, the other
In Hurst's Lessee, vs. McNeil, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep., 70, the defendant’s counsel offered (o read in evidence to (he jury, the record of a trial between the lessor of the plaintiff and one Pemberton. The evidence was ruled to be inadmissible. Mr. Justice Washington said, “If there be a point completely settled and at rest, it is this, that a verdict between different persons cannot be given in evidence in a suit of one of the parties against a stranger.”
Lord Coke, in his twenty-first reading on fines, says, “estoppel is reciprocal; for he that shall not be concluded by the record or other matter of estoppel, shall not conclude another by it; except in the case of the King, and that depends upon his prerogative.” This passage isquoted by Mr. Justice Bayley, in Doe vs. Martyn, 8 Barn. & Cres,, 497, where he clearly enunciates the principle, conclusive upon the point we are now considering, that estoppels must be reciprocal, that they operate only on parties and privies, and that they can be used neither by, nor against strangers.
We have already seen that the affidavit of the 3rd of February, 1823, filed by one of the appellants, as the lessor of the plaintiff, in Merryman's Lessee, against Smith, states that Smith was, at the time a copy of the declaration in the ejectment was served upon him, that is, on the 17th of March, 1823, the tenant in possession of the premises in dispute; and this affidavit, containing as it does, the declarations of a party to the record in the present suit, was unquestionably admissible in evidence as an element in the testimony introduced into the cause, to be considered and weighed by the jury, with respect to the question as to the period at which the appellants first entered into the possession of this property. The counsel for the appellees has,-however, contended that the admission embodied
The doctrine upon this point is correctly staled by the court, in the case of The Welland, Canal Company vs. Hathaway, 8 Wend., 483. The court said:—
“An estoppel is so called because a man is concluded from saying any tiling, even the truth,against his own act or admission. The acts set up in this case, it is not pretended, constitute a technical estoppel, which can only be by deed or matter of record; but it is said they should operate by way of estoppel, an estoppel in pais. Such estoppels cannot be pleaded, but are given in evicence to the court and jury, and may operate as effectually as a technical estoppel, under the direction of the court. m ® *' As a general rule, a party will be precluded from denying his own acts or admissions, which were expressly designed to influence the conduct of another, and did so iniluence it, and when such denial will operate to the injury of the latter. ® * * All the cases in which t he acts or admissions of a party are adjudged to operate against him, in the nature of estoppel, are generally cases where, in conscience and honest dealing, he ought, not to be permitted to gainsay them.”
In the case of Dezell vs. Odell, 3 Hill N. Y. Rep., 215, the. goods of David Mitchell and Alexander Dezell, were seized under an execution, and were delivered to the defendant upon his receipt, stipulating to re-deliver them to the officer by a designated day. They were not surrendered. And in an action of trover instituted by the officer against the receiptor, he offered to prove that the property was, at the time of the levy and re
“We have the clear case of an admission by the defendant, intended to influence the conduct of the man with whom he was dealing, and actually leading him into a line of conduct which must be prejudicial to his interests, unless the defendant be cut off from the power of retraction.- This is the very definition of an estoppel in pais. For the prevention of fraud, the law holds the admission to be conclusive.”
In the case of Presbyterian Congregation of Salem, vs. Williams, 9 Wend., 147, an action of ejectment was instituted by the plaintiffs, claiming to re-enter upon the premises in the possession of the defendant, as tenant, for the non-payment of rent. At the time of the service of the declaration, although there was property upon the land, tire defendant declaimed that it did not belong to him, and that it was exempted by law from being distrained for rent. At the trial, the defendant offered to show there was sufficient property on the premises, out of which the rent could be collected, and that the action could not, therefore, be maintained. The defendant was considered by the court as the real party to the suit, and he was not permitted to controvert his admissions. This was a clear case for the application of the doctrine of estoppel. The plaintiffs were influenced by the representations of the defendant, and acted upon them. In the language of the court, the plaintiffs had a right to rely upon the admission of the defendant, that there was not sufficient property on the premises, liable to distress, to countervail the arrears of rent, and he ought not to be permitted to defeat the action, by showing what he then said was false, and thereby reap an advantage from his own wrong and falsehood.
In Heane vs. Rogers, 9 Barn, & Cres,, 577, an action of trover was brought by the plaintiff (against whom a commission of bankruptcy had issued,) against his assignees, to recover goods, which they, as such assignees, had sold. To prove that the plaintiff was a bankrupt, the defendants introduced a notice addressed, by the plaintiff, to certain persons from whom he had
“ There is no doubt but that the express admissions of a party to the suit, or admissions implied from his conduct, are evidence against him; but we think that he is at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken, or were untrue, and is not, estopped or concluded by them, unless another person has been induced, by them, to alter his condition. In such case, a party is estopped from disputing their truth with respect to that person (and those claiming under him,) and that transaction; but as to third persons, he is not bound. It is a well established rule of law, that estoppels bind parties and privies, not strangers. The offer of surrender, made in this case, was to a stranger to this suit; and though the bankrupt may have been bound by his representation that he was a bankrupt, and his acting as such, as between him and that stranger to whom that, representation was made, and who acted upon it , he is not bound, as between him and the defendant,, who did not, act on the faith of that representation at all. The bankrupt would probably not have been permitted, as against his landlords, whom he had induced to accept the lease without a formal surrender in writing, and to take possession upon the supposition that he was a bankrupt, and entitled, under 6 Geo., 4, ch. 16, sec. 75, to give it up— to say, afterwards, that he was not a bankrupt, and bring an action of trover for the lease, or an ejectment for the estate. To that extent, he would have been bound, probably no further, and certainly not as to any other persons than those landlords. ’ ’
We have quoted largely from the opinion of the learned
We proceed to examine the legal propositions raised by the prayers offered, at the trial below, by the counsel for the appellants.
They asked the court to instruct the jury: First. If the jury shall find that the defendant, Sarah, entered into the pos*
By the terms of the lease from Daniel Bowley to Solomon Etting, of the 21st of December 1798, under which the appellees claim title to the premises in controversy, it is stipulated that if the rent therein reserved, shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of sixty days next after the time on which the same is to be paid, the same being first lawfully demanded, it shall be lawful for the said Daniel Bowley, his heirs or assigns, into the said demised premises, or any part thereof, in the name of the whole, to re-enter, &c. And the propositions presented in argument by the counsel for the appellants, are: First. That assuming that the facts hypothetically set forth in the prayers to be true, that the jury were bound to presume, from the possession of twenty years, as therein stated, that the defendants had made a regular and lawful re-entry at common law, on the demised premises, for the non-payment of rent, according to the condition of the lease. And secondly. That this
Upon these points, we have been referred to several cases decided by the Supreme Court of New York, which we now propose to examine.
The case of Jackson vs. Demarest, was decided in 1805, 2 Caine's Rep., 381, and it was there held, that a demand and entry at common law, would be presumed after a possession of fourteen years. Mr. Chief Justice Kent said:—
“ The lessor of the plaintiff and his family abandoned the possession in 1778. In 1785, the landlord had a right to reenter for non-payment of rent, and he then sold the land. In 1789, Kason, under his title takes possession. Here, then, is certainly a fourteen years’ possession, and after that, we wilL presume a regular re-entry at common law. Re-entry is a matter in pais, and not of record.”
In 1808, the case of Jackson vs. Walsh was decided, 3 John. Rep., 226, and it was there determined, that a possession of nine years did not afford a presumption of a re-entry for nonpayment of rent.
In Jackson vs. Stewart, 6 John. Rep., 34, a regular re-entry was presumed from a possession of twenty-two years.
In Jackson vs. Elsworth, 20 John. Rep., 180, it was held, that a possession of ten years was insufficient to warrant the presumption that the landlord had made a regular re-entry for the non-payment of rent. Woodworth, J., said:—
“It is well settled, that the right of the tenant can only he barred by ejectment under the statute. A re-entry at common law does not defeat the title in equity. It is, however, sufficient for the defendant, if a re-entry in either way can be presumed, for then he holds the possession rightfully against the plaintiff.” After stating that, under the circumstances of the case, an entry under the statute could not be presumed, and referring to the case of Jackson vs. Demarest, 2 Caine's Rep., 382, before adverted to, he remarks: “ In that case, which is the shortest period that has been deemed sufficient, the cou rt do not rest the presumption on a re-entry by ejectment under the statute, but at com
It appears, therefore, from the adjudged cases in Nev) York, that a possession of fourteen years is (here regarded as the period from which a regular re-entry at common law will be presumed. But the rule thus established by the courts of that State is entirely arbitrary, is not sustained by authority or analogy, and one to which we cannot assent. We think, however, in analogy to the statute of limitations, that if the jury had found that the facts assumed in the first of the defendants’ prayers were true, and that the defendants had been, for twenty years, in the uninterrupted, exclusive, notorious, and adversary possession of the property in dispute, they would have been bound to presume a regular re-entry at common law for the non-payment of rent, and this re-entry being presumed, the defendants would, in legal contemplation, have been regarded as rightfully holding the possession against the plaintiffs. But the vice of the prayer is, that the question of adversary possession was not presented as fact, to be found by the jury. Matthews vs. Ward's Lessee, 10 Gill & John., 458, Jackson vs. Porter, 1 Paine C. C. Rep., 466. Angel on Lim., 413.
Upon this ground, the court were right in rejecting the defendants’ first prayer.
We think, for the reasons already expressed, that the court were correct in rejecting the defendants’ second prayer. Reasoning analogically from the statute of limitations, and the doctrines of presumption as applied to land, a possession for a less period than twenty years, is not, in our opinion, sufficient
The question raised by the defendants’ third prayer, relates to the validity of the sale made by Thomas Rogers, as the collector of the city of Baltimore, on the 8th of August, 1820, of the property in controversy, to Philip Reigart, in pursuance of the act of Assembly of 1816, ch. 171, and conveyed by Rogers to Reigart, by a deed bearing date the 16th of October, 1820. This property was subsequently conveyed by Philip Reigart to the defendants, on the 1st of October, 1840.
We find from the record, that on the 2nd of November, 1820, an action of ejectment was instituted in Baltimore county court, for the recovery of this property, by Philip Reigart, against Philip Walter, and that on the 10th of June, 1824, this suit was entered upon the docket, “agreed.” This evidence was offered at the trial below, subject to exceptions, and it is now contended, by the counsel for the appellees, that the effect of this entry upon the docket, was to extinguish the legal title of Reigart in the lot for which the ejectment was brought, and operates as a conclusive bar against the defendants who claim under him.
This proposition cannot be maintained. There appears to have been no judgment rendered by the court, dismissing the .suit, upon the foundation of the agreement, as in the case of The Bank of the Commonwealth, vs. Hopkins, 2 Dana, 395; we have no information with regard to the character or terms of this indefinite agreement, and the only deduction to be drawn from it, is, that each party retired from the litigation in which they were involved, leaving their rights precisely as they stood prior to the institution of the suit. In the case reported in 2 Dana, the mere agreement was not regarded by the court as interposing a bar between the parties, but the bar was created by the judgment, dismissing the suit at the instance of the parties, and in consequence of their agreement. In the case before us, there was no such judicial action.
Having disposed of this preliminary objection, we proceed to
The 3rd section of the act of Assembly of 3 816, ch. 171, imposes upon the collector the duty of collecting the damages apportioned, as required by the preceding sections, by a sale of the property on which the damages are assessed, if the owner shall neglect or refuse to discharge the same, but is silent as to the power to convey, by deed, the property thus authorised to be sold. But the right to convey, is, we think, to be implied from the power to sell. This principle is clearly established by the reasoning of the court, and authorities cited, in the analagous case of Magruder against Peter, 11 Gill & John., 217, If the power to convey is assumed, it is very certain that the deed must be regarded as evidence of the sale; for it is made in pursuance of the sale, and stands upon if. In the case of a sheriff’s sale, the title passes by the sale, and not by the conveyance, and yet the deed of the sheriff has always been considered as evidence of the factum of the sale. In Estep and Hall’s Lessee, vs. Weems, 6 Gill & John., 306, the Court of Appeals said: “That it has been more than once solemnly decided by this court, that, it is the sale of the sheriff, which vests the title in the purchaser, which sale must be proved either by a deed, the sheriff’s return, or by some note or memorandum in writing, in order to comply with the requisitions of the statute of frauds and perjuries.”
And in Jackson vs. Roberts’ Executors, 11 Wend., 426, the chancellor said:—
“A sale under an execution is essential to the transfer of the property, and after the execution is proved to have been in the hands of the sheriff, so ns to authorise the giving of the deed, his conveyance is the legal evidence, under the statute of frauds, of a sale under that execution.”
It is, therefore, very clear, upon the authorities to which we have referred, that, the deed is to be received §s evidence of the
One of the acts in pais to be proved in this case, by the defendants, as a prerequisite upon which the power to sell depended, was, that the collector had given notice of the sale as prescribed by the 3rd section of the act of 1816, ch. 171; and a fatal objection to the validity of this sale is, that the advertisement relied upon as a matter of sale, in conformity with the requirements of the statute, does not describe, with sufficient certainty, the lot in controversy as a part of the property intended to be sold.
The act of Assembly, in requiring thirty days’ notice to be given, in the newspapers of the city of Baltimore, of the time and place of sale, intended not only to apprize the owner of the predicament of his property, that he might rescue it from the hammer of the auctioneer, by paying the damages charged upon it, but also that the lot should be so definitely and precisely described, that purchasers might, without difficulty, estimate its value, and the property in this way placed in a condition to produce an adequate price.
In this notice of sale, the property in dispute was described as a lot belonging to Philip Walter, and assessed with damages amounting to the sum of $672, situated on the east side of South street, but without designating, by reference to the plot, or otherwise, the dimensions of the lot, or the particular part of the street on which it was located. An advertisement so vague and uncertain in its terms, conveys to the public no reliable in
In the case of Ronkendorff vs. Taylor, 4 Pet., 362, the Supreme Court, when considering what was to be regarded as a sufficient description of property advertised for sale by a collector of taxes, said: —
“That the property should be so definitely described, that no purchaser could be at a loss to estimate its value. It is not sufficient that such a description should be given in the advertisement, as would enable the person desirous of purchasing, to ascertain the situation of the property by inquiry. Nor, if the purchaser at the sale had been informed of every fact necessary to enable him to fix a value upon the property, yet the sale would be void, unless the same information had been communicated to the public in the notice.”
We consider the sale as inoperative upon this ground, irrespective of the other objections which have been urged against it.
It was also insisted by the counsel for the appellees, that the return of the assessors, acting under the 2nd section of the act of 1816, ch. 171, was to be treated as informal and defective, because this lot was not, designated, with sufficient certainty, as a part of the corpus upon which the damages were laid. This objection is insuperable in the present mutilated condition of the plot. But the plot annexed to the return, is to be considered as a part of it, and we think, that if this lot had been located and described upon that plot as the other lots are designated, the return of the assessors would not have been obnoxious to this objection.
It follows, from the views thus expressed, that we think the court below erred in granting the plaintiff’s prayer, and were correct in rejecting the prayers of defendants.
JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND
PROCEDENDO AWARDED.