42 Minn. 498 | Minn. | 1890
In neither of these cases is the instrument sued on a complete contract. In some states a due-bill is held to be a promissory note; in others it is held to be so if it contains words denoting a promise to pay or an intent that it shall be negotiable. But the better authority, as well as most consistent with principle, is that a mere acknowledgment of indebtedness is not of itself a contract. It is rather an admission of fact, and, like all mere admissions, written or oral, it might be contradicted or explained by parol. It does not affect this rule that, from the facts admitted, the law would imply a promise to pay. One might in writing admit the facts that another had at his request rendered for him services of a specified value, and had not been paid. The law would imply from such facts a promise to pay such value. But undoubtedly the written admission of facts might be contradicted or explained by parol. Nor do the cases come within those where it is held that parol evidence is not admissible to vary the sense or construction to be legally implied from the written contract; for in those cases there was a completed written contract, and not a mere admission of fact, from which fact a promise would be presumed.
The principle of estoppel has no application to the case, because the writings were matters exclusively between Day and defendant, and were not intended nor expected to be relied upon or acted upon by any one else, and no one else had the right to rely or act upon them. Upon both these points the eases come within the decision in Robson v. Swart, 14 Minn. 287, (371.)
At the trial in each case the defendant made certain offers of evidence to sustain his answer. Instead of specifying in the offers what particular facts he proposed to prove, as is the proper way, he offered, in general terms, to prove the allegations of his answer. The
Orders affirmed.