Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SHA’RON ALEXANDER, MICAH BRADLEY, )
ROBERT BENTLEY, ERIC BUTLER, )
ALPACINO CARSON, FLORAJEAN CLARK, )
WESLEY COBB, CHESTER COMBS, )
CAROL DARDEN, REONTHA DAVISON, )
TERRY ELLIOT, ARAMANDO ESCORCIA, )
GINO GRAZIANO, BRENDA HAMILTON, )
TAVARES HARNEY, HOWARD HARRIS, )
KIMBERLY HUNT, TIMMY JOHNSON, )
TRINA JOHNSON, CHRISTOPHER JONES, )
DARRYL JORDAN, GEORGE LEWIS, )
ANTHONY LIGGINS, LYNELL LOVE, )
KENNETH MAYES, BRANDON MOWERY, )
MELNA ROGERS, SEAN ROLLINS, )
KIMBERLY SHOLAR, SYLVIA SMITH, )
ALBERT TATE, PAM TURNER, )
LASHAWN VAUGHN, GINGER WOODS, and )
VANESSA WRIGHT, )
)
Plaintiffs )
) v. ) Case No. 1:12-cv-01636-TWP-TAB )
SVC MANUFACTURING, INC., and )
STOKELY VAN-CAMP, INC., doing business as )
PEPSICO, )
)
Defendants. )
ENTRY ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants SVC Manufacturing, Inc. and Stokely Van-Camp, Inc. (collectively, “the Defendants”) (Dkt. 13).
Sha’ron Alexander and the above-named individuals (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) filed this
action against Defendants for a wage dispute over unpaid vacation time. For the reasons set
forth below, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED .
I. BACKGROUND
SVC Manufacturing, Inc. (“SVC”) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Stokely Van-Camp, Inc. (“Stokely”). Both are corporations with their principal offices located in Chicago, Illinois.
SVC and Stokely allegedly do business under the name of PepsiCo, [1] which has a manufacturing
facility located at 5858 Decatur Boulevard in Indianapolis, Indiana. On June 7, 2010, SVC and
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service
Workers International Union (“the Union”), on behalf of Local Union No. 1999, executed a
collective bargaining agreement (“the CBA”). The CBA took effect that day and was to remain
in effect until midnight on June 2, 2013. The CBA contained various provisions regarding
compensation, including a section devoted to how vacation pay would be earned and redeemed.
The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Defendants who worked at the PepsiCo manufacturing facility in Indianapolis. Their employment was terminated in 2012. Plaintiffs
allege that prior to their terminations, they had accrued unused vacation time, and the Defendants
did not pay the Plaintiffs for this time after terminating their employment. On August 22, 2012,
the Plaintiffs sent a letter to the Defendants demanding payment, but the Defendants refuse to
pay Plaintiffs their vacation pay. On October 1, 2012, the Indiana Attorney General authorized
the Plaintiffs to pursue their wage claims under Indiana law.
On October 11, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in state court, alleging that their unused vacation pay was wrongfully withheld from them under the Indiana Wage Claims
Statute, Ind. Code § 22-2-9-1 et seq. The Plaintiffs sought to recover their unpaid vacation time
and the penalties allegedly permitted under Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2. On November 8, 2012, the
Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court takes all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs. Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane ,
550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, the
allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests” and the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp , 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Stated differently, the complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hecker v. Deere &
Co. , 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To be facially plausible, the
complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Court is not required to accept the Plaintiffs’ legal conclusions in their
Complaint as true. Id.
III. DISCUSSION The Defendants ask this Court to dismiss this case on the grounds that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their remedies under the CBA or, in the alternative, to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims
against Stokely, because it was improperly named as a defendant since it was only the parent
company of the Plaintiffs’ employer. The Plaintiffs responded to the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss with a Motion to Remand (Dkt. 17), which was denied by the Court on September 17,
2013 (Dkt. 29). In the Court’s order on the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, the Court determined
that the Plaintiffs’ state law claims brought under the Indiana Wage Claims Statute are
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“§ 301”).
Dkt. 29 at 3-7; see also Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Assoc. , 101 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir.
1996) (“Section 301 preempts claims directly founded on or substantially dependent on analysis
of a collective-bargaining agreement.”) The Court will not repeat its preemption analysis here,
but the previous findings are relevant to this motion because it requires the Court to look to the
requirements of § 301 to determine whether Plaintiffs have properly brought their claims in this
Court. The Defendants contend that the case should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs did not
pursue their remedies under the process as set forth in the CBA that would have ultimately
required them to submit their claims to binding arbitration. Because the Court agrees with the
Defendants on this theory, it does not need to address the narrower issue of whether Stokely, as
the parent company, was a properly named defendant.
The CBA delineates a four-step grievance procedure, which the Plaintiffs did not follow.
See generally Dkt. 14-1 at 6-9. In the event of a dispute “pertaining to the application or
interpretation of the terms” of the CBA, the following procedure was required: (1) the employee
was to discuss the matter with his or her direct supervisor, with or without the presence of the
employee’s union steward; (2) the grievance could be appealed to the steward, committeeman,
the department manager and/or the personnel supervisor; (3) appeal could then be taken to the
representative of the international union, the unit chairperson of the local union, and the
grievance committee; and finally (4) the grievance would be subjected to binding arbitration.
See generally Dkt. 14-1 at 6-7. The Plaintiffs only contend that they sent a letter to the
Defendants requesting the unpaid vacation pay. Dkt. 1-1 at 10-11. Neither party has challenged
the validity of the process or the CBA itself.
Plaintiffs have not shown that they exhausted their available remedies under the CBA as required by federal law. Because the Plaintiffs’ claims arose under § 301, it is considered a suit
for breach of the CBA and the parties are required to exhaust grievance and arbitration remedies
set forth in the contract before initiating litigation. Atchley , 101 F.3d at 501 (citing DelCostello
v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters , 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983); Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. , 943 F.2d
764, 771 (7th Cir. 1991)). There is also a preference for arbitral resolution of claims under §
301. Atchley , 101 F.3d at 502 (affirming the lower court’s dismissal for failure to arbitrate the
claims despite ambiguity in the contract). The court in Atchley affirmed the lower court’s
dismissal of the case because the plaintiffs had not pled exhaustion. Id. at 502. The Court finds Atchley controlling and concludes that dismissal is warranted in this case as well because the
Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not show they had exhausted their contractual remedies under the CBA.
IV. CONCLUSION ________________________ Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge United States District Court Southern District of Indiana For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13) is GRANTED . The Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED without prejudice .
SO ORDERED.
09/25/2013
Date: _____________
DISTRIBUTION:
Heather L. Wilson
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
hwilson@fbtlaw.com
David F. Hurley
HURLEY & HURLEY PC
dhurley@hurley-legal.net
Daniel LaPointe Kent
LAPOINTE LAW FIRM P.C.
dkent@lapointelawfirm.com
Mary Jane LaPointe
LAPOINTE LAW FIRM PC
maryj@lapointelawfirm.com
Marla Elizabeth Muse
LAW OFFICE OF MARLA E. MUSE LLC
marlamuse@aol.com
Cara J. Ottenweller
VEDDER PRICE P.C.
cottenweller@vedderprice.com
Thomas M. Wilde
VEDDER PRICE, P.C.
twilde@vedderprice.com
[1] The Defendants claim that Stokely does not do business as PepsiCo, but the Court accepts, without deciding, that is does for the purposes of this Entry.